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Restorative Justice: A Marxist Analysis 
RAKoen 
Abstract 
Restorative justice is the enfant terrible of the criminological world. In no 
time, it has rocked the edifice of the criminal justice system, challenging the 
latter's very existence. It has inculpated the retributive focus of criminal justice 
in the creation and reproduction of the contemporary crisis of criminality. It has 
proclaimed itself to be in possession of the solution to that crisis. And it has 
offered itself as the path to a higher plane of human existence characterized by 
respect, trust, mutuality, and the like. 
The restorationist answer to the crisis of criminality is a radical one. Taking 
their theoretical lead from Nils Christie, the adherents of restorative justice 
propose the privatization of the criminal episode. That is, they contend that crime 
should be removed from the public arena and reconstituted as a private conflict in 
which victim, offender and community all have an interest as 'stakeholders'. The 
crime should be comprehended as the property of these 'stakeholders' who may 
dispose of it according to terms and conditions which they negotiate inter se, 
without reference to a public authority. The proponents of restorative justice 
believe that this was humankind's aboriginal response to criminal conflict and 
that it succeeded in a way that statist criminal justice never has. They therefore 
advocate that we should take our adjudicative cue from our ancestors, and revert 
to our restorative instincts. 
Two versions of restorative justice may be identified. Firstly, there is a 
comprehensive version which proposes the abolition of the criminal justice 
system as a public institution. In other words, it anticipates the complete 
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separation of criminal justice and the state. All criminal conduct is to be resolved 
privately, according to the designs of the triad of 'stakeholders'. Secondly, there 
is a partial version which proposes a sphere of privatized justice within the public 
system. In other words, the state surrenders designated criminal conflicts for 
private resolution, but remains in overall command of the criminal justice system. 
Although it devotes some attention to partial restorative justice, this dissertation is 
concerned primarily with the analysis of comprehensive restorative justice. 
The approach adopted is a critical one, informed by the tenets of Marxism. 
That is, the dissertation is a Marxist critique of comprehensive restorative justice. 
It deploys the analytical resources of Marxism in an attempt to excavate the 
ontological presuppositions of restorative justice and to confront its core 
principles. The hope is that the Marxist method will lay bare the hidden 
constitution of restorative justice, which constitution is routinely obscured by its 
form. 
The analysis is located at two levels of abstraction. At the lower level, it 
follows the traditional Marxist endeavour to uncover the class content of 
restorative justice. Here the operational principles of restorative justice are 
subjected to Marxist class analysis. At the higher level, the analysis seeks to 
comprehend restorative justice as a legal form. Here the argument relies upon the 
non-traditional general theory of law elaborated by Evgeny Pashukanis. The 
general theory posits that the analysis of the legal form should proceed in terms of 
its relation to the commodity form. The critique of restorative justice presented 
here seeks to interrogate it as a legal form of late capitalism. This is the 
postmodern epoch of capitalism, marked by 'the commodification of everything'. 
In other words, it is an epoch in which the commodity form enjoys absolute 
supremacy. Pashukanis's general theory of law is used to analyse restorative 
justice as a legal form which commodifies criminality. 
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Restorative justice is easily and indisputably the most exciting and fascinating 
recent development in the criminological field. As a self-consciously new way of 
doing justice, it is no more than twenty-five years old. Yet, it has captured the 
imagination and won the approval of large numbers of criminal justice analysts and 
practitioners who see in restorative justice a practicable and promising solution to the 
international crisis of criminality. One discerns a collective sense of relief - and 
belief - that finally, after so many false starts and blind alleys, there is a real 
possibility that the answer to one of the most intractable problems of contemporary 
society has been discovered. Indeed, if the proponents of the restorative justice are to 
be believed, their project may hold the key to solving all the serious socio-economic 
problems of our time. Certainly, restorative justice has rapidly acquired an imposing 
presence in and dramatic influence upon the world of criminal justice, and demands 
to be taken seriously. 
The popularity of restorative justice is evident from the large number of 
officially-sanctioned restorative justice programmes operating in a large number of 
countries. l All over the world, restorative justice has become the rallying cry of 
organizations and institutions which see in its principles and practices a way of 
transcending the limitations of criminal justice. The banner of restorative justice flies 
high in the troubled atmospheres of very many criminal jurisdictions. It is no longer 
possible to participate in, or even to comment upon, matters criminological without 
some sort of engagement with restorative justice and its implications. The 
criminological community is abuzz with the clamour and challenge of this new way 
of doing justice. Whether we like it or not, this is the era of restorative justice. Its 
See Batley & Dodd (2005) for a recent survey of the international development of restorative 
justice. See also Ashworth (2003: 165-168). 
advocates never tire of reminding us of the impotence of the criminal justice system 
in the face of the crisis of criminality. And they are strident in their conviction that 
the answer to the crisis lies in the restorationist way. 
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The growth of restorative justice has been no more apparent than in the 
multitude of books, articles, reviews and reports which have been written to explain 
or analyse or justify virtually every aspect of the restorationist project. There has, in 
the last decade, been a dramatic explosion of advocacy literature. Publications have 
mushroomed to the point where it is no longer possible for one person to keep abreast 
of the literature. This literary boom has been productive, in the sense that the 
fundamental principles of restorative justice have been progressively clarified over 
time. Whereas a decade ago there was still some uncertainty about the parameters 
and principles of restorative justice, today there is fairly widespread agreement about 
what restorative justice is and how it is supposed to be achieved. Whatever 
disagreements persist within the restorationist camp nowadays tend to concern issues 
of ambit and implementation rather than of principle. The field is thus a fairly 
unified one, certainly amongst those who would consider themselves to be 
restorationists? 
One of the consequences of this restorationist accord has been a conspicuous 
dearth of critique. Despite the near surfeit of literature on restorative justice, very 
little of it is properly critical. 3 Advocates outnumber critics manifold. Most of the 
literature tends to be either expository or exhortatory. It focuses either upon 
2 See Batley (2005), Marshall (2003) and Zehr & Mika (1998) for useful statements of the major 
principles of restorative justice. 
3 Thus, for example, the seventeen-article collection edited by McLaughlin et at (2003) while 
purporting to focus upon critical issues in restorative justice, contains only one article (by 
Ashworth) which may be classified readily as properly critical. Similarly, the collection of 
thirty-one 'critical' articles edited by Zehr & Toews (2004: vii) is authored, according to the 
editors, entirely by 'long-term advocates and practitioners of restorative justice' . 
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explicating the principles of restorative justice or upon assessing the success or 
otherwise of restorative justice projects. The bulk of whatever criticism of restorative 
justice is contained in the literature tends to be of the 'friendly' or reflexive sort, in 
the sense that the critics are themselves committed to the success of the restorationist 
project and are concerned about the negative impact which restorationist excesses 
may have upon that success.4 Restorative justice gets very little bad press. 
Commentators generally do not engage the precepts and presuppositions of 
restorative justice in any deep and sustained critical sense. And a strong voice of 
disapproval is immediately noticeable for its infrequency. The critical endeavours of 
analysts such as Acorn, Ashworth, Delgado, Levrant et aI, Takagi & Shank, Varona 
and Von Hirsch stand out precisely because they tend to be rarities. s This 
dissertation stands with the critics, albeit from a position which is very different from 
existing restorative justice criticism. 
At this point, it is as well to delineate the object of the analysis undertaken 
here. There are two versions of restorative justice, which I shall designate 
comprehensive and partial.6 Comprehensive restorative justice is systemic, in the 
sense that it considers itself to be a comprehensive alternative to the criminal justice 
system. The restorative process would be applicable to all crimes and offenders, and 
the restorative sanction would replace all state punishments; Whereas criminal 
justice is statist, comprehensive restorative justice envisages a dispensation which is 
wholly privatized. It is, in this regard, anti-statist. Partial restorative justice, by 
contrast, is not systemic. It does not present itself as a substitute for the extant 
4 See, for example, Daly (2003) and Van Ness (1993). 
5 See Acorn (2004), Ashworth (2003a & 2003b), Delgado (2000), Levrant et af (1999), Takgaki 
& Shank (2004), Varona (1996) and Von Hirsch & Ashworth (1992 & 1993). 
6 See Tshehla (2004: 7) who states that 'there are two main approaches to restorative justice', the 
first seeing it 'as an alternative system to the conventional one', the second as 'a complement to 
the criminal justice system'. 
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system. It is content to be an adjunct to the system. This rendition of restorative 
justice typically is restricted in application to certain crimes or certain offenders, and 
proffers the restorative sanction in place of state punishment for these cases only. 
Partial restorative justice is not anti-statist. It accepts the role of the state in the 
existing system. However, it does want a designated non-statist sphere, parallel to 
the existing system, in which sphere justice is privatized. Comprehensive and partial 
restorative justice coincide in the sense that both require their respective areas of 
operation to be free of state control. However, the former is radical in its anti-
statism, while the latter is conservatively reliant upon the consent of the state. The 
former is abolitionist, the latter accommodationist. 
The object of analysis of this dissertation is comprehensive restorative justice. 
Any analytical attention which is devoted to partial restorative justice is incidental to 
this focus. One suspects that a large number ofrestorationists are adherents of the 
partial version.7 However, this version of restorative justice holds little philosophical 
attraction and is of minimal theoretical consequence. It is little more than a 
pragmatic adaptation to the contradiction between criminal justice and 
comprehensive restorative justice. Like every via media, it attempts to have the best 
of both worlds. However, in this case the conflict between those two worlds is 
fundamental. Comprehensive restorative justice is the negation of criminal justice, 
and vice versa. Comprehensive restorative justice is engaging analytically precisely 
because it entails a radical rejection of what is. Partial restorative justice is not, 
precisely because it seeks a modus vivendi with what is. It therefore does not demand 
7 Thus, for example, Batley & Maepa (2005: 19) declare that to support restorative justice 'is not 
to suggest an overhaul of the entire system'. For them, restorative justice 'should complement 
rather than replace the current retributive justice system'. See also Tshehla op cit 15 and Van 
Ness op cit 261-264. 
sustained analytical attention.8 In any event, it makes sense only in its relation of 
incompleteness to comprehensive restorative justice.9 In the remainder of this 
dissertation, then, any unqualified reference to restorative justice means 
comprehensive restorative justice. References to partial restorative justice will be 
identified explicitly as such. 
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Comprehensive restorative justice summates in the abolitionist proposition to 
dismantle the criminal justice system and, thereby, to evict the state from its current 
position as organizational axis of society's response to crime. Restorative justice is 
thus about the privatization of criminal justice. In this new world of privatized 
justice, crimes cease to be incursions against the public authority of the state and are, 
instead, re-conceptualized as private disputes between the affected parties, to wit, the 
offender, the victim and the community. Indeed, according to the leading theorist of 
restorative justice, a crime is the property ofthose most directly affected by it and, 
qua property, may be disposed of according to what its owners consider to be 
appropriate to the circumstances. 10 Restorative justice is thus infused with the 
proprietary ethos. It theorizes proprietorship as the key to the resolution of the crisis 
of criminality. It bears repeating that this stance, in its total departure from the 
protocols of criminal justice, is a radical one. 
Unlike all its predecessors, restorative justice approaches the crisis of 
criminality, which has virtually every Western capitalist country in its grip, in terms 
of contrivances which fall completely outside the parameters of criminal justice as 
8 For the most part, the analysis of partial restorative justice is entailed in the analysis of 
comprehensive restorative justice. 
9 Of course, partial restorative justice cannot be dismissed summarily, since it is the version of 
restorative justice which has been implemented in programmes all over the world. The theory 
of partial restorative justice is engaged in some detail in Chapter Four below. 
10 See Christie (1977). 
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we know it. Indeed, it rejects all the suppositions of modern criminal justice and 
proposes a strategy which deviates fundamentally from the conventional criminal 
justice design. Restorative justice signals a paradigm shift, from the modern to the 
postmodern. Criminal justice operates within the parameters of the modern response 
to criminality. It proceeds from the metanarrative of the state as the guarantor of 
public order. It establishes standardized criteria for dealing with all forms of criminal 
conduct as offences against the state. And it imposes like punishments for like 
offences. Restorative justice, by contrast, is the prototypical postmodern answer to 
the international crisis of criminality. The modern metanarrative is rejected as 
unreliable and passe, and replaced with an outsider jurisprudence organized around 
the postmodern narratives of the multitude. Public criminal justice yields to 
privatized restorative justice, and justice itself becomes a matter of negotiation, 
according to the exigencies of each individual restorative encounter. 1 1 
What is more, the aspirations of restorative justice go well beyond the problem 
of criminality. Most restorationists, both comprehensive and partial, do not consider 
their project to be an exclusively crime-fighting endeavour. They anticipate that it 
has the capacity and resilience to tackle and perhaps even eradicate the causes of the 
crisis of criminality. In other words, restorative justice aims to be more than a 
successful response to crime. Transformation is integral to its agenda. The 
restorative process is intended to be a source of existential change for those involved. 
The successful restorative encounter is supposed to be the gateway to a higher level 
of human interaction. The following statement by Braithwaite is representative: 
'Restorative justice, conceived as an intellectual tradition or as an 
approach to political practice, involves radical transformation. On this 
radical view restorative justice is not simply a way of reforming the 
criminal justice system, it is a way of transforming the entire legal 
11 The postmodern aspect of restorative justice is analysed fully in Chapter Six below. 
system, our family lives, our conduct in the workplace, our practice of 
politics. Its vision is of an holistic change in the way we do justice in 
the world.' 12 
7 
Toews & Zehr, too, have a quite euphoric vision of the promise of restorative justice: 
'The restorative process itself embodies other benefits that carry a 
powerful message and challenge our understanding of the social world. 
The process empowers those who are typically silenced in the justice 
process. It indicates that people can solve their own problems if given 
the means to do so. It promotes the importance of dialogue. It builds 
community and relationships among people who are typically seen as 
enemIes. 
Perhaps most importantly ... restorative justice processes contribute to 
the breakdown of othering and social distance. Victims, offenders, and 
those involved in facilitating these processes begin to see beyond 
stereotypes and generalizations that they have about the people involved 
in the crime event. They see victims as people deeply wounded by an 
event and hear the personal impact of the crime upon their lives. They 
hear the individually unique perspective of offenders and their ideas for 
justice. Through the dialogue they are no longer in categories of "us" 
and ''them'' but rather in the category of "we", shaped by their mutually 
created meaning of the crime event.' 13 
The radicality of restorative justice is extensive enough to include a self-image as 
general social panacea. A new way of doing justice portends a new way of living in 
the world. 
Restorative justice thus postulates a solution to the crisis of criminality which 
breaks decisively with all that has gone before. The claims of restorative justice are 
capacious, and its operational techniques are very different from what we know and 
have long accepted as more or less indispensable. Indeed, the restorationist project 
trashes criminal justice as we know it, and seeks to remove it to the archive of 
12 Braithwaite (2003c: 1). 
13 Toews & Zehr (2003: 265-266). See also Braithwaite (2003a and 2003b). See further Acorn 
(2004: 2) who states that restorative justice envisions 'justice as the repair of the world'. 
Christie (op cit) too thinks of restorative justice in such large and catholiconic terms. 
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criminological disasters. The confrontation between restorative justice and criminal 
justice is, in this sense, rudimentary. There is, therefore, every reason why 
restorative justice should be the subject of systematic and sustained critical 
engagement. A project which aims to create a new world by destroying the old ought 
to be taken seriously. It is difficult to comprehend why there has been so little effort 
to analyse restorative justice critically. 
The practice of critique is, by definition, an exercise in fault-finding. But it is 
also a method of analysis. It is a mode of scrutinizing the epistemological postulates 
and of excavating the ontological presuppositions of the object of analysis. The 
critique of restorative justice must go to its compositional elements and must 
comprehend its quotidian concerns in relation to these elements. Critique needs to 
uncover the set of presumptions about social existence which underlies the 
restorationist project. It needs to avoid the lure of the restorationist self-image and 
lay bare its hidden constitution. The form of restorative justice is not an accurate or 
complete expression of its content. A primary purpose of critique is to interrogate 
this dichotomy between form and content. Such interrogation must aspire to the dual 
goal of both illuminating the content concealed by the form and of explaining why 
the content has 'chosen' the given form. 
This dissertation is a critique of restorative justice. The critical enterprise 
undertaken here traverses four facets of the restorationist project. Firstly, it examines 
the crucial historical claim that restorative justice is the primeval form of human 
justice; secondly, it evaluates the key principles which comprise the operational 
directives of restorative justice; thirdly, it scrutinizes the theory of restorative justice; 
and finally it investigates restorative justice as a species of postmodernism. As a 
whole, the dissertation is conceived as a contribution to the development of a 
sustained critical engagement with the factors constituting restorative justice, which 
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engagement is signally underdeveloped in the current literature on the subject. It is 
an extended and polemical exercise in confronting restorative justice at its basis, that 
is, at the level of its foundational propositions. It is an exercise which is both 
necessary and overdue. The advocacy literature is dominated by highfalutin 
hagiography. It is high time that sober critique, from without the ranks of its 
advocates, becomes more regular and prominent. 
The analysis presented in the chapters which follow proceeds from an openly 
and consciously partisan perspective, namely, the Marxist perspective. Hitherto, 
Marxists have not given serious attention to restorative justice. Indeed, I have not 
happened upon even one explicitly Marxist analysis of restorative justice. This 
apparent lack of interest is or ought to be surprising. For, restorative justice presents 
the kind of challenge to the criminal justice system that resonates with the radicality 
of the Marxist project. The idea of a response to crime which goes beyond the 
conventional notion of punishment should be, in the least, intriguing to the advocates 
of Marxism. The notion that the solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality lies in 
the relocation of crime to the realm of the private should be, if nothing else, 
fascinating from the Marxist perspective. Certainly, Marxism has much to say about 
restorative justice. The analytical resources of Marxism provide keenly incisive tools 
for the critique of restorative justice. The Marxist method provides insights into the 
constitution of restorative justice which are otherwise inaccessible. It is a perspective 
which facilitates the critique of restorative justice in a properly interrogative manner, 
as regards both ontology and epistemology. Indeed, it is arguable that the critique of 
restorative justice has remained relatively primitive and has not advanced beyond the 
rudimentary precisely because it has not yet enlisted the critical apparatus of 
Marxism. 
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This dissertation is thus an exercise in Marxist critique, that is, in taking 
restorative justice seriously as an object of systematic materialist analysis. It seeks to 
uncover and confront the elemental structure of restorative justice by subjecting it to 
the critical gaze of the Marxist analytic. The analysis presented is intended to operate 
at two levels of abstraction. The first and lower level is the traditional Marxist 
emphasis upon class analysis, in which an effort is made to make manifest the class 
content of juridical relations and legal arguments, and to introduce the idea of class 
struggle into their comprehension. This is the level at which the claims of restorative 
justice are subjected to the searching type of analysis which is informed by the 
Marxist concept of social class, and more specifically, the class relations which found 
the social relations of production of the capitalist mode of production. 
The second and higher level of abstraction entails a focus upon the legal form 
as such, and upon its relation to the value or commodity form which constitutes the 
aboriginal unit of capitalist political economy. This is a more rarefied level of 
analysis, which is concerned to examine the extension of the operation of the laws 
which govern capitalist production and exchange to the superstructural incidents of 
the capitalist world. It is the level of analysis which is concerned to comprehend the 
legal form in its own right, not as a passive reflection of a given class content, but as 
a superstructural effectivity which needs and deserves analysis qua legal form. The 
idea of such analysis is not to detach the legal form from its material roots. Rather, 
the idea is to show how those material roots find juridical expression in the form they 
do. This level of analysis is concerned to demonstrate that restorative justice, as legal 
form, has deep roots in the material constitution of the capitalist mode of 
production. 14 
14 The Marxist concept of abstraction is fleshed out further in Chapter One and in Chapter Five 
below. 
Although located at different levels of abstraction, the two modes of analysis 
relied upon thus share this fundamental link, that they are both concerned to make 
explicit the material basis of the juridical moment of the social relations of 
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production of capitalism. Also, both modes of analysis are informed by the canons of 
the Marxist method. Chapter One contains a concentrated exegesis of the 
fundamentals of this method. It is, of course, not possible to do justice to the 
complexities of the method of Marxism in a single chapter. Certainly, no claim can 
be made for the exposition in Chapter One being either definitive or comprehensive. 
The most that can be asserted is that the chapter sets out, in telescoped form, the 
essential signposts ofthe Marxist methodology. If the chapter imparts a working 
sense of the materialism, in its dialectical and historical aspects, which informs the 
epistemology of Marxism, then it has succeeded. It is hoped that the remainder of the 
dissertation will then succeed in its attempt to apply the Marxist method to the 
critique of restorative justice. 
Chapter Two evaluates what is surely the most popular and generally accepted 
restorationist claim, namely, that the sources of restorative justice go back to the 
premodern juridical past of humankind. This is a claim which is readily asserted but 
which is far too seldom subjected to serious investigation. Yet it needs to be 
interrogated, for it is the basis of the considerable historical legitimacy which 
restorative justice enjoys. There is perhaps no more credible an argument for a 
project than that it is historically justifiable. The argument from history is powerful 
and decisive.]5 Who can take issue with a way of doing justice which has, by all 
accounts, worked very well in the past and which promises to do in the present what 
no other programme has been able to achieve? Who dares raise objections against a 
form of justice which is presented as primordial and even natural? The historical 
15 See Fiiredi (1992: 17-18). 
13 
directly to the development of production for exchange. In other words, Chapter 
Two offers historical insight into the constitution of restorative justice as an advanced 
juridical expression of generalized commodity production. 
The fundamental operational claims or requirements of restorative justice are 
canvassed in Chapter Three. Five such claims 16 are identified and subjected to 
critical scrutiny in the chapter. The analysis undertaken is conventionally Marxist, in 
the sense that it assesses the claims of restorative justice in terms of the notions of 
class and class struggle. This is necessary, not least because the advocates of 
restorative justice appear to have little regard for the effect that these notions may 
have upon their project, its implementation and the kind of justice it ultimately 
delivers. The impact of social class is both extensive and deep, and very few 
criminal justice practitioners would nowadays attempt to deny or ignore the 
relationship between class and criminality. Yet restorationists routinely argue their 
case and promote their project as if the society in which we live or the community in 
which they operate is classless, at least in the sense that it is not rent by class conflict. 
This obviously is unacceptable, even from a non-Marxist sociological 
perspective. The weight of social class is simply too great to bypass altogether and 
must be factored into any serious analysis of restorative justice. Chapter Three thus 
confronts the claims of restorative justice with the notions of class and class conflict. 
Its primary purpose is to challenge the apparent class-blindness of restorative justice. 
If restorative conferences are not to become yet another source and site of class 
domination, the importance of class needs to be accepted and the dangers of class-
based restorative sanctions must be faced head-on. In this regard Chapter Three falls 
16 They are the restorative sanction, the restorative process, the empowerment of the victim, the 
reconstruction of the offender, and community participation. 
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squarely within the orthodox Marxist technique of foregrounding issues of class and 
class conflict in situations where these have apparently been overlooked. 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five engage the theory of restorative justice directly. 
Like every other project, the restorationist one is grounded in theory, that is, a 
coherent set of propositions which gives shape to its practice. The principles 
according to which the restorative justice programme operates are derived from the 
corpus of theory underlying it. The task of these two chapters is to explicate and 
dissect the theoretical physiognomy of restorative justice. The critique of the theory 
of restorative justice is the core component of the critique of restorative justice. For, 
it is in the theory that is to be found the true justification of the principles and 
practice. It is the theoretical statutes which contain the key to the restorationist 
epistemology. Chapters Four and Five are, in this connection, the core chapters of 
the dissertation. They interrogate the theory of restorative justice theoretically, in an 
effort to unveil the essential constitution of restorative justice as legal form. They 
make accessible, via the Marxist critical method, the ontological hypotheses of the 
restorationist project. 
At this juncture it must be noted that the proponents of restorative justice are 
not the most eager of theoreticians. In fact, there is a discernible tendency in 
restorationist ranks to eschew theory and focus upon the operational requirements of 
the restorative justice project. And there are, in the pantheon of restorationist works, 
but few of any genuine theoretical consequence. Three works stand out in this regard 
as properly theoretical. They are Christie's Conflicts as Property, Braithwaite & 
Pettit's Not Just Deserts, and Cragg's The Practice of Punishment. This trilogy is 
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deeply and scrupulously theoretical. Christie's IS-page piece is the undisputed 
theoretical progenitor of restorative justice. And Braithwaite is the most prominent 
and prolific of the advocates of restorative justice. 17 In a field marked by 
atheoreticism, their contributions thus demand serious consideration. 18 Christie and 
Braithwaite & Pettit theorize comprehensive restorative justice, while Cragg 
theorizes partial restorative justice. Chapter Four is devoted to the exposition and 
critique, from the Marxist perspective, of the theories of restorative justice 
constructed by Christie, Braithwaite & Pettit, and Cragg. 
Chapter Five is the theoretical heart ofthe dissertation. It is concerned to apply 
to the analysis of restorative justice the general theory of law elaborated by the 
Bolshevik jurist, Evgeny Pashukanis. It is a theory which is steeped in the tradition 
of classical Marxism and which established the critique of the legal form on a firm 
materialist footing. Pashukanis took the Marxist analysis of legal relations beyond 
the conventional attempts to uncover their class nature. Instead, he identified the 
legal form itself as a valid object of Marxist analysis, and sought to explain it 
materialistically in relation to the cell-form of capitalist production, the commodity. 
That is, Pashukanis comprehended the legal form as the homologue of the 
commodity form. It is the commodity form juridified. There is, in other words, a 
constitutional correspondence between legal and commodity relations. The central 
argument of Chapter Five is that Pashukanis' s general theory oflaw is pivotal to the 
Marxist critique of the theory of restorative justice. 
17 See Acorn (2004: 30). 
18 Interestingly, although neither Conflicts as Property nor Not Just Deserts is expressly 
concerned with the principles of restorative justice, both theorize restorative justice with 
cOnsiderable sophistication. It would appear that the authors of both works accepted that the 
theory of restorative justice could not be derived from the practice of restorative justice. Hence 
their disregard for the operational tenets of restorative justice. 
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In theoretical terms, restorative justice is fundamentally about the extension to 
the legal form of the principle of equivalence which governs the commodity form. 
The ideas of class and class conflict do not feature here. In the world of the 
commodity, every person is a proprietor, regardless of the actual class position which 
the person occupies and of the kind of property owned. 19 The world of the 
commodity is a world structured by the principle of equivalence, a principle which 
denies qualitative difference and which treats every commodity owner as the equal of 
every other commodity owner. According to PashUkanis, the self-same principle of 
equivalence which defines the commodity fom also governs the legal form. Chapter 
Five seeks to comprehend restorative justice as a Pashukanian legal form. That is, it 
seeks to make sense of the theory of restorative justice in terms of the principle of 
equivalence expressed in the fundamental juridical categories. To this end, the 
chapter commences with a fairly extended exposition and defence ofPahukanis's 
general theory of law and ends with an interrogation of the basic theoretical claims of 
restorative justice in relation to the elements ofthe general theory. 
Chapter Six, the final chapter, submits that restorative justice is the criminal 
justice ofpostmodernism. The postmodern project is the product of the 
contradictions of late capitalism. It attributes the contemporary social crisis to the 
failure of the metanarrative of modernism, and aspires to replace it with the 
relativism and instability of a congeries of narratives. Essentially, restorative justice 
is the juridical conjugate of postmodernism. Its genesis lies in the same matrix of 
material conditions which gave life to postmodernism, and its principles echo the 
basic arguments of the postmodern project. Postmodernism is radical in its assault 
upon modernism, and restorative justice is radical in its rejection of the criminal 
19 The nature of the property owned or controlled is directly dependent upon the proprietor's class 
position. The capitalist is constituted by ownership of the means of production, the worker by 
ownership of his own labour-power. 
justice system produced by modernism. Chapter Six, then, is concerned to 
comprehend the relationship between the postmodern and restorationist projects in 
Marxist terms. To this end, Pashukanis's general theory is again deployed in the 
critique of restorative justice as a postmodernjurisprudence. It is argued that both 
postmodernism and restorative justice remain devotees of that most basic law of 
capitalist political economy, the principle of equivalence. 
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Earlier it was noted that the analysis contained in the dissertation is intended to 
operate at two levels of abstraction. It remains now to record how these two modes 
of analysis or levels of abstraction relate to the composition of the individual 
chapters, specifically Chapters Two to Six.2o Chapters Three and Four are located 
almost entirely at the first level of abstraction. In other words, they employ a mode 
of analysis which endeavours to expose the ideological impulses and class 
imperatives of restorative justice. In this connection, they fall squarely within the 
traditional Marxist approach to the analysis of legal relations. Chapter Five, by 
contrast, is located almost entirely at the second, higher level of abstraction. It relies 
upon a mode of analysis which seeks to uncover the deep structure of restorative 
justice as legal form, regulated by the principle of equivalence. The aim is to 
demonstrate the connections between the fundamental categories of political 
economy and the fundamental categories of juridical life. It is this relationship which 
informs the analysis of restorative justice undertaken in the chapter. 
Chapters Two and Six are different in that they invoke both modes of analysis 
and move from one level of abstraction to the other. They commence at the lower 
level of abstraction with a focus upon class and class conflict and then progress to the 
higher level and a consideration of the fundamental concepts of the juridical moment. 
20 Chapter One is methodological and falls naturally without these modes of analysis. 
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Thus, Chapter Two examines both the class content of the notion of composition 
upon which the historical claims of restorative justice rest, and it seeks to uncover the 
historical link between the concept and the value relation in the process of 
commodification. Chapter Six, similarly, seeks to expose the class nature of the 
postmodern project while simultaneously demonstrating that, like its restorationist 
counterpart, the postmodern moment obeys the basic laws of the commodity 
economy, including the law of value as expressed in the principle of equivalence. 
All in all, the dissertation strives to elucidate the strengths and the weaknesses 
of restorative justice as a self-proclaimed solution to the international crisis of 
criminality. It is Marxist and, hence, systematically critical. It is concerned to 
engage restorative justice in a manner that facilitates comprehension of its class 
content and of its character as legal form. This concern is fully justified by the patent 
insufficiency of analyses of the restorationist project which are properly critical and 
the even starker dearth of analyses which are Marxist. This dissertation has thus been 
written from the dual conviction that critique is the cornerstone of comprehension, 
and that the Marxist method is the most potent instrument of critique. It would be 
heartening if the chapters which follow demonstrate that this method has unearthed 
the core elements of the material constitution of restorative justice. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Chapter One: Methodological Matters 
'My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor 
political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or 
on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, 
but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of 
life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English 
and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the 
term "civil society"; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, 
has to be sought in political economy. The study ofthis, which I 
began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, where I moved owing to an 
expUlsion order issued by M. Guizot. The general conclusion at 
which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding 
principle of my studies can be summarised as follows. In the social 
production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real · 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness 
of men that determines their existence, but their social existence 
that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of 
development, the material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely 
expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations 
within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From 
forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn 
into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The 
changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying 
such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between 
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, 
which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and 
the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, 
ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict 
and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what 
he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of 
transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this 
consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of 
material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of 
production and the relations of production. ' 
[Karl Marx: from the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy 1859] 
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1.1 Classical and Post-classical Marxism 
As its title indicates, this dissertation offers a Marxist analysis of restorative 
justice. Marxism has always had a troubled and often openly adversarial 
relationship with the academy. Much of the corpus of modem bourgeois social 
science has been fashioned in 'debate with Marx's ghost'. 1 And despite becoming 
entrenched as 'part of the mental scaffolding,2 of modem times, Marxism has 
been as much misunderstood as it has been maligned, also amongst those 
concerned with the law.3 Indeed, in recent years, following the restoration of 
capitalism in the Soviet Union and the collapse of a host of Stalinist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, the voices of those declaring the death of Marxism have taken on 
a triumphalist stridency.4 Their equation of Stalinism with Marxism typifies the 
misunderstanding (or mischief) that Marxism has had to contend with in its 
confrontation with bourgeois social science. It is therefore both necessary and 
desirable to preface my study of restorative justice by clarifying what I mean by an 
analysis which is Marxist (and one which is not). 
Contemporary Marxism is a contested terrain. There exists a wide variety 
of schools of Marxism, each laying claim to be the true heir to the legacy of Marx 
and Engels.5 They are unified in their overall commitment to a Marxist 
1 Grabb (1990: 14). 
2 McLellan (1983: 10). See also Girling (1987: Introduction) who, despite assessing Marx's 
worldviewas 'too inflexible', opines that: 'Without Marx's insights it would not be possible 
to understand the nature of the problems confronting the modem world - nor find ways to 
an acceptable solution.' 
3 The generally symbiotic relationship between the law and the state tends to instil an 
uncritical attitude towards and an accommodation with the status quo into those involved in 
the practice and administration of law. 
4 See, for example, Vorhies (1991: 108ff). Magnus & Cullenberg (I994: vii) refer to this 
anti-Marxist trend as 'the orgy of self-congratulation which followed the 1989 crumbling of 
the Berlin Wall'. 
5 It should be noted that there have been more than one attempt to discern fundamental 
differences between Marx and Engels on matters such as determinism, dialectical 
materialism and economism. These efforts are analyzed critically and repudiated by 
Novack (1978: 85-115) and Timpanaro (1980: 73-133). 
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worldview. However, the contours and composition of this worldview are the 
source of perennial debate and cross-criticism. These contending approaches 
divide conveniently into two broad camps, which may be designated classical and 
post-classical Marxism. 
The classical tradition begins with the writings and political practice of 
Marx and Engels and continues with such Marxist leaders as Plekhanov, Lenin, 
Trotsky and Luxemburg. It is a tradition which is demarcated by an organic unity 
of theory and practice, aimed at comprehending the laws of motion of capitalism 
and organizing a proletarian assault upon the rule of capita1.6 The post-classical 
tradition is the temporal successor of classical Marxism and is more or less 
coterminous with so-called Western Marxism. This is a body of Marxist thought 
which includes the work of such diverse analysts as Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, 
Sartre, Althusser, Poulantzas, the Frankfurt School, the Analytical Marxists and 
the Kapitallogik school.7 Each of the major post-classical schools has produced 
its own systematic and distinctive rendition of Marxism. Post-classical Marxism 
is thus not unified in the sense that its classical predecessor was. However, it 
does possess certain generalized features, the most conspicuous of which have 
been a 'structUral divorce of this Marxism from political practice,8 and a strong 
analytical focus upon the 'study of superstructures,.9 There is thus a fairly deep 
divide, theoretical and political, between classical and Western Marxism. 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the constitution of the classical tradition see Anderson 
(1979: 1-23). 
7 A perspicacious survey of the major theorists and most variants of Western Marxism 
(except Analytical Marxism and the Kapita/logik school) is contained in Anderson's (1979 
& 1983) two very useful volumes. For a comprehensive study of Analytical Marxism see 
Mayer (1994). The Kapitallogik approach is competently canvassed in Jessop (1982: 78-
141). It may be noted here that the argument of the Kapita/logik school owes much to 
Pashukanis's derivation of the legal form from the commodity form. 
8 Anderson (1979: 29). Gramsci is generally acknowledged as the notable exception here. 
9 Ibid 75. 
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This dissertation is informed by the precepts of classical Marxism. It relies 
primarily upon the works of Marx and Engels and their classical successors. Post-
classical sources are enlisted only when and to the extent that they are compatible 
with the classical tradition. In this regard, regular recourse is had to Trotskyist 
analysts such as Mandel, Novack, Reed, Callinicos, Slaughter and Pilling. 10 
Occasional reference is made also to certain works of Western Marxism where 
such reference assists to promote the argument from the classical tradition. II 
This chapter will thus function as a kind of methodological prologue, 
located within the compass of classical Marxism. It is, of course, not possible to 
convey the complexity and profundity of any form of Marxism in the space of one 
chapter. What follows will thus necessarily be truncated and incomplete. 
Nevertheless, it will attempt, from fust principles, to explicate the fundamental 
elements, and their interrelations, of the classical Marxist worldview. 12 
Marxism is self-consciously revolutionary. It was created and elaborated as 
a weapon at the disposal of the proletariat in its struggle to overcome the grip of 
bourgeois ideology and the dominance of the political culture of capital. The 
Marxist world outlook thus links social analysis directly to social transformation. 
It is concerned to comprehend capitalism with a view to dismantling, transcending 
and replacing it with socialism and, ultimately, communism. It is committed to 
the destruction of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the installation of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat as precursor to the dissolution of all social classes 
and the construction of a community of free human beings. 
10 The works of these writers are itemized in the References below. According to Anderson 
(ibid 96-101), it is the Trotskyist strain of post-classical Marxism whlch has remained most 
faithful to the classical tradition. Trotskyism is, in tills sense, the antithesis of Western 
Marxism whlch has abandoned the core concerns of the classical tradition. 
11 Thus, for example, later in this chapter Lefebvre is cited in support of my exposition of the 
dialectic and Cohen in support of my argument for the primacy of the forces of production. 
In Chapter Two Althusser is cited to advance my position on empiricism. 
12 Henceforward any unqualified reference to Marxism or the Marxist worldview should be 
read as a reference to the classical tradition, unless the context demands otherwise. 
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1.2 Form and Content 
By its nature, any academic work based upon the Marxist analytic abstracts 
from the revolutionary practical motif of Marxism. Such an academic endeavour 
can, at best, operate at the level of theoretical critique of bourgeois ideological 
hegemony in the specific socio-economic, political, legal or cultural terrain being 
analysed. 13 Its task is to reveal the imperatives which govern the life of the 
process or relation in question. These are seldom evident. They tend to lie buried 
under all kinds of bourgeois ideological obfuscations. The form of a relation -
which we encounter in our daily lives - invariably does not correspond with its 
content. 14 It is not 'the form o/the content' .15 In fact, the form in which we live 
the relation conceals its content. 16 The layperson, as a rule, understandably 
'mistakes the form for the content' .17 The serious analyst must avoid this 
'commonsense trap' 18 and seek to comprehend the real, material content from 
which the form in question emerged. 19 Analysis must, in other words, go below 
the level of appearances, in search of the essential relationships which constitute 
the dialectic of form and content. 
13 See Marx & Engels (1978: 64, original emphasis): 'The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at 
the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental 
production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are subject to it.' 
14 Thus Marx (1974: 817) tells us that 'all science would be superfluous if the outward 
appearance and the essence of things directly coincided'. 
15 Slaughter (1980: 109, original emphasis). 
16 See Larrain (1979: 55). 
17 Slaughter (1985: 62). 
18 Humphrey (1993: 7). 
19 The following statement by Marx (1977b: 38), while specifically applicable to the contest 
between two political parties (Orleanists and Legitimists), is of obvious general value to the 
discussion of the form-content relation: 'And as in private life one differentiates between 
what a man thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical 
struggles one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their real 
organism and their real interests, their conceptions of themselves from their reality.' 
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The contemporary concept of restorative justice is a product of the 
criminological sector of the legal academy.2o It was developed as a possible 
solution to the problem of crime which plagues virtually every capitalist social 
formation in the world, and which has reached desperate proportions in many. In 
other words, the concept of restorative justice was elaborated as a response to the 
worldwide capitalist crisis of criminality.2! The epistemological starting point of 
a Marxist analysis of restorative justice must be that the concept has no biography 
or history separate from this crisis of criminality, which is itself one of the 
expressions of the general structural crisis besetting the capitalist mode of 
production. 
20 Its immediate origins lie in the tenets ofvictimology (which it has incorporated and 
transcended). See Chapter Two below. 
21 Following Vermes (1978: 42-67), the notion ofa crisis of criminality used in this 
dissertation refers, essentially, to crime as a mass phenomenon. In other words, a crisis of 
criminality exists when crime has risen to the level where it becomes a generalized feature 
of social existence, and hence a serious social problem. Historically, the emergence of 
crime as a mass phenomenon coincides, more or less, with the rise of the capitalist mode of 
production. Pre-capitalist societies did not experience the kind of universal criminality 
which characterizes capitalism. It took a world-historic transformation of the scale 
required for the installation of bourgeois society to engender a catholic criminality. And 
contemporary capitalism is burdened by an unrelenting crisis of criminality. See Young 
(1998.260): 'Crime has moved from the rare, the abnormal, the offence of the marginal 
and the stranger to a commonplace part of the texture of everyday life.' 
The crisis is epitomized by the steady rise in the crime rate in most capitalist social 
formations since the Second World War, at least. In this regard, see Rhodes (1977: 14-15), 
Braithwaite (1989: 44-50), Coleman & Moynihan (1996: 111-122) and Young (ibid: 259-
260 & 268-269). To be sure, there have been variations in the form of episodic 
stabilizations or even falls in the crime rate in certain countries or in respect of certain 
crimes. And often the public perception of crime levels exceeds the reality. See Reid 
(1991: 42-46), Conklin (1995: 100-103), Donziger (1996: 1-3), Merlo & Benekos (2000: 
172-174) and Beckett (2001: 914-921). But such particularities do not gainsay the overall 
upward trend in the crime rate, which makes criminality such a conspicuous feature of 
contemporary capitalism. See Coleman & Moynihan ibid. 121: 'The rate of recorded crime 
over the last 60 years has shown remarkable resistance to wildly differing economic and 
social conditions. Through a world war, full employment, the swinging sixties, 
hyperinflation and economic decline, the crime rate has doggedly continued its skyward 
. projection, apparently unstoppable.' 
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The point is that, from the Marxist perspective, restorative justice cannot be 
analysed as a concept on its own terms. It does not have a life of its own, and 
exists only as one of the 'celestialised forms' of the 'actual relations oflife'?2 Its 
existence and career are essentially derivative. The concept of restorative justice 
must, therefore, be comprehended materialistically, in relation to and as an aspect 
of the social relations of production of the capitalist mode of production. The 
organizational axis of the capitalist mode of production is the capital-labour 
relation, which summates in that most basic of capitalist forms, the commodity. 
The political economy of capitalism begins and ends with the commodity. It is 
the distillation of all capitalist relations of production and exchange. The 
academic dissertation which aims to apply the Marxist method to the analysis of 
restorative justice and its accoutrements must seek, therefore, to discern its 
juridical connection to the commodity relation.23 The commodity relation holds 
the key to unlocking the theoretical constitution of the concept of restorative 
justice. The remainder of this chapter will thus provide a brief exposition of the 
analytical tools required for comprehending the commodity relation, namely, the 
basic philosophical tenets and theoretical concepts of Marxism and its method. 
1.3 Idealism and Materialism 
As intimated in the previous paragraph, the philosophical premise of the 
Marxist worldview is materialism. All philosophical systems fall into one of two 
great schools, namely, materialism or idealism. Every philosopher is, at bottom, 
either a materialist or an idealist. Materialism and idealism are philosophical 
contraries. They exist in opposition to each other, and the one makes sense only 
in its relation of contradiction to the other.24 Idealism gives ontological primacy 
22 Marx (1954: 352 footnote 2). 
23 This is also the starting point ofPashukanis's general theory oflaw, which forms the 
theoretical cornerstone of my critique of restorative justice. See Chapter Five below. 
24 See Engels (1976: 16ft). 
to the mind or the spirit. It encompasses 'any theoretical or practical view 
emphasizing mind or what is characteristically of pre-eminent value or 
significance to it' .25 
There are two basic variants of idealism, namely, the subjective and the 
objective. The chief exponent of sUbjective idealism is Berkeley, who pithily 
expressed the doctrine in the dictum esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). 
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His 'most famous conclusion' is that: 'No object can exist unless it is perceived 
by someone. ,26 Subjective idealism posits, essentially, that reality is a mental 
construct. It holds that 'the world exists only for the mind'?7 Matter is conceived 
in the mind, and the material exists by virtue of its being thought. The consistent 
subjective idealist must, in the end, stake everything on the human mind and deny 
matter any independent existence separate from the constructs of the mind. 
Objective idealism, by contrast, comprehends reality in terms of a universal 
which has an existence independent and outside of the human mind. Hegel, for 
example, conceived of material reality as the exemplification of the Absolute Idea 
and of the movement of history as the manifestation of the World Spirit.28 The 
objective idealist thus does not ascribe matter to mind, but to Mind, that is, an 
objective universal which is not a product of or dependent upon the human mind. 
Thus, while objective idealism does not deny the existence of matter, it does 
subjugate matter and its movement to the thrall of the universal Mind. 
25 Runes (1966: 136). 
26 Bennett (l971: 138). 
27 See Runes op cit 303. 
28 See Novack op cit 316. 
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Despite their differences, subjective and objective idealism are united in 
their rejection of materialism. All committed idealists insist, and must insist, that 
the material is an expression of the non-material. The latter is the independent 
variable, the former the dependent. Whether it relies upon the human mind as the 
source of material reality or upon a universal with its being outside the human 
mind, idealism is committed epistemologically to the non-material as the ultimate 
source of material reality. The corporeal is subsumed in the incorporeal. The 
human idea or the universal Idea is the motor of history. The mindlMind is 
elevated to the level of explanans. In fine, idealism in both its major versions 
posits the relationship between the material and the ideal as being one of 
mindlMind over matter. 
By contrast, materialism prioritizes matter. For the materialist, reality is 
material, first and foremost. The fundamental materialist postulate is that 'matter 
is the primordial substance, the essence, ofreality,.29 Materialism does not deny 
the existence of mind or its role in the comprehension and transformation of 
matter. But it does insist that the material precedes the ideal, that nature predates 
consciousness. Matter has an objective existence, prior to and independent of 
mind.3o Indeed, for the materialist, mind constitutes the highest form of the 
organization of matter. Mind is, in a word, what the brain does? Materialism 
thus understands mind as a dependent variable in its relation to matter. The 
relationship between mind and matter is summed up by Novack in the following 
terms: 
'According to materialism, matter produces mind, and mind never 
exists apart from matter. ,32 
29 Novack (1965: 4). 
30 See Humphrey (1993: 15ft) who refers to the epoch before life emerged on earth as a 
'mindless stage of history'. Minds need brains to exist. 
31 See Searle (1984: 13ft) and Evans & Deehan (1991: 85ft). 
32 Novack op cit 4. 
The materialist ontology thus gives precedence to matter as it occurs in 
nature. The ideal derives its being from the material, with every 
non-material phenomenon or relation being an expression of a determinate 
array of matter. 
1.4 Monism and Dualism 
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Materialism thus inverts the idealist postulate. The relationship between 
mind and matter is reversed, to foreground the determining role of the material in 
the constitution of reality. Whereas idealism has mind as its organizing and 
explanatory motif, materialism relies upon matter for this purpose. Interestingly, 
both idealism and materialism, in so far as they are consistent, are monist in their 
world outlook. Both rely, as Plekhanov expresses it, upon 'explaining phenomena 
with the help of some one main principle' . 33 Both eschew the dualism which 
routinely characterizes the many attempts to reconcile idealism with materialism 
or to find a via media between the twO.34 
Monism is an important attribute of materialism. It is a conduit to the 
comprehension of reality as a complex but single organic unity. Whereas the 
dualist posits the real world as a unity of discrete levels or compartments, the 
monist proceeds on the basis that reality is an indivisible whole, which has to be 
comprehended as such. The monist concept can assist, for example, to make 
sense of an issue which is germane to the Marxist analysis of restorative justice, 
namely, the so-called base-superstructure metaphor. This relation has been a 
major item of debate and disagreement in the history of Marxism. It is submitted, 
however, that this seemingly intractable question stems, in large part, directly 
from a curious neglect of the monist fundamentals of Marxism. The matter will 
be canvassed in more detail in the latter part of this chapter. 
33 Plekhanov (1956: 14). 
34 Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena is a good example of the kind of 
dualism which attempts to avoid the choice between idealism and materialism. 
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1.5 Dialectical and Formal Logic 
The Marxist worldview is then, to begin with, uncompromisingly materialist 
(and hence monist). It is a view consummately expressed by Marx himself when, 
differentiating his materialism from Hegel's idealism, he explains: 
'To Hegel, the life process of the hwnan brain, ie the process of 
thinking, which, under the name of ''the Idea", he even transforms 
into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and 
the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea". 
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material 
world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought. ,35 
But Marxism's is not a generic materialism which merely posits matter as prior to 
mind, or consciousness as secondary to being. The materialism of Marxism is 
also, and vitally, distinguished from other forms of materialism by its method: the 
dialectic. Engels taught us that 'motion is the mode of existence of matter'. 36 The 
dialectical method of Marxism seeks, simply, to comprehend matter in its natural 
condition, that is, of constant and internally contradictory motion. The insight 
that matter exists in motion renders invalid the thing as object of cognition. 
Dialectical materialism thus posits a world of matter as relation. 'Every 
determinate existence is a relation. ,37 Instead of a collection of discrete objects, 
the world is made up of a matrix of relations, in constant and contradictory 
interaction. What is more, each relation, insofar as it has an individual existence, 
is internally a cluster of contradictions, which is the source of its self-development 
and change. The dialectical method seeks to capture the movement which is 
reality. It seeks to comprehend every relation for what it really is, namely, a 
contradictory unity of opposites. It thus also seeks to comprehend the struggle 
35 Marx (1954: 29). 
36 Engels (1934: 70). 
37 Lefebvre (1970: 33). 
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between opposites which is at the heart of every relation. The dialectical method 
is, in a word, 'the logic of matter in motion and thereby the logic of 
contradictions' .38 
Dialectics thus seeks to comprehend the 'secret life' of matter, which is one 
of motion, continual and contradictory, through various levels of development and 
decay. It entails, according to Engels, a methodological disposition which is 
informed by the: 
'great basic thought that the world is to be comprehended not as a 
complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in 
which apparently stable things no less than the concepts, their 
mental reflection in our heads, go through an uninterrupted change 
of coming into being and passing away' .39 
Marx makes a similar point, endorsing Engels's statement: 
'In its rational form, [the dialectic] is a scandal and abomination to 
bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in 
its comprehension and affinnative recognition of the existing state 
of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of 
that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every 
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and 
therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its 
momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and 
is in its essence critical and revolutionary. ,40 
The dialectical dimension of Marxist materialism was elaborated in opposition to 
the epistemological tradition which Marxists (following Hegel) generally label as 
metaphysics.41 This rubric refers to any 'philosophical system that arbitrarily 
divides up reality into a series of externally imposed and unchanging categories' .42 
38 Novack (1971: 94). 
39 Engels (1976: 41). 
40 Marx op cit 29. 
41 Engels op cit 42. 
42 Novack (1978: 313). Matter is conceived to be either at rest or in linear motion from one 
inert nodule to another. In other words, the only motion which the metaphysician 
comprehends is mechanical, the mere displacement of a thing from one point of immobility 
to another. Metaphysical cognition is premised upon the thing, as opposed to the relation, 
as the elemental unit of reality. Each thing is a determinate organization of matter, 
complete in itself. Each phenomenon is an isolated entity with fixed properties. 
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Metaphysical cognition is grounded in inertia and linearity. Pre-Marxist 
materialism was dominated, for the most part, by metaphysics. Engels refers to 
metaphysics as the 'old method of investigation and thought' which 'preferred to 
investigate things as given, as fixed and stable' .43 
Metaphysical principles of cognition did not comprehend the dialectic. 
Instead, they relied upon the laws of formal logic, that is, a logical system which 
eschews change and contradiction. The centrepiece of formal logic is the notion 
of identity in terms of which every thing, every phenomenon is always identical 
only to itself.44 It is a logic which embraces stasis and which banishes motion. It 
is a method which is founded upon the axiom that rest is the natural condition of 
all matter and which understands change and development as exceptions to this 
true condition. Via the axioms of formal logic, metaphysics ousted contradiction 
- the prime defining condition of motion and hence of matter - from the process of 
cognition. 
Marx and Engels rescued materialism from metaphysics by detaching it 
from the strictures of formal logic and basing it instead on the laws of dialectical 
logic (taken from Hegel). This enabled them to transcend 'the old method of 
investigation and thought'. The dialectic injected motion into the analysis of 
matter, thereby illuminating cognition with the truly radical principle that the 
extant arrangement of the material world was neither changeless nor permanent. 
43 Engels op cit 42, original emphasis. 
44 This notion of identity is usually stated in the three basic principles of fonnallogic: the 
principle of identity eX is equal to X); the principle of contradiction ex is not equal to non-
X); and the principle of the excluded middle (a thing is either X or not X). These 
principles mean that: everything is always absolutely identical to itself; nothing can ever 
simultaneously be itself and not itself; everything always exists in complete isolation of its 
opposite. Collectively, these three principles form the core of the metaphysician's 
commitment to a logic of identity. See Pilling (1980: 39-40), Mandel (1979: 160-161) and 
Novack (1971 : 15-53). 
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Whereas metaphysics posited fixity or, at best, mechanical motion, dialectics 
embraced change. Whereas metaphysics relied upon identity, dialectics 
proceeded from contradiction. Dialectical materialism not only posits motion as 
the mode of existence of matter; it also holds that all motion is 'utterly, explicitly, 
even rudely contradictory,45 and that contradiction is the true source of change 
and development. Mandel sums up the substance of the dialectical method in the 
following terms: 
'The study of every object, phenomenon or set of phenomena 
ought to have as its aim the discovery of its constituent 
contradictory elements, and of the motion and dynamic unleashed 
by these contradictions. ,46 
The dialectic applies as much to the products of human thought as it does to social 
products. Mental constructs, including the concept of restorative justice, should 
thus be analysed in terms of a dialectic of knowledge, aimed at comprehending 
the ensemble of contradictions comprising its inner life. This is exactly what 
Marx achieved so superbly in his critical analysis of the laws of motion of the 
capitalist mode of production. It is also what a Marxist analysis of the concept of 
restorative justice should aim to achieve. 
1.6 Against Triadicity 
It must at this stage be made absolutely clear that the Marxist dialectic 
cannot be reduced to the cliched triad ofthesis-antithesis-synthesis.47 Certainly, 
Hegel, the acknowledged father of modem dialectical thought, was by no means a 
proponent of such a formulaic approach to the dialectic. In fact, he appears to 
have avoided consciously the three-term construction which is so regularly 
45 Novack ibid 43. 
46 Mandel op cit 162. See also Pilling op cit 32: 'For Marx, an opponent of metaphysical and 
purely fonnal thought, contradiction was the form taken by all development. Thought, if it 
was to be truly scientific, must consciously aim to express the contradictions in the 
phenomenon it was investigating. ' 
47 Wood (1984: 197). 
attributed to him. Thus Wood points out that 'Hegel almost never uses' the 
'tedious and uninformative jargon of ''thesis-antithesis-synthesis'" .48 And 
McBride confIrms that Hegel: 
'very seldom invokes the rigid terminology of "thesis-antithesis-
synthesis", and yet manages to remain a dialectician. ,49 
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Marx, too, roundly rejected the lure oftriadicity in his conjoining of the Hegelian 
dialectic to materialism. Thus, Swingewood notes that 'in Marx's many analyses 
of society and history he never made use of these terms' . 50 Wood points out that 
Marx uses the language of the triad 'only once, and solely for the purpose of 
parody' .51 And Lenin tells us of Marx scoffing at the 'wooden trichotomies' to 
which a detractor had reduced materialist dialectics. 52 
The real objection to the triadic summation of the dialectic is the fact that it 
tends to distort and to simplify complex and often problematic processes and 
relations in an effort to fIt them into the formula. It encourages linearity in 
thought and restricts us to the 'superfIcial and external aspect of our mode of 
cognition' .53 It condones a mechanistic approach to the dialectic: a relation which 
does not fIt neatly into the schema, which lacks one of the terms, is excluded from 
dialectical cognition. 
48 Ibid. 
49 McBride (1977: 53). 
50 Swingewood (1975 : 15). 
51 Wood op cit 197. 
52 Lenin (1976: IS). 
53 Lefebvre op cit 44-45. 
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The conventional three-term formula is simply inadequate to grasp the 
undetermined contours of dialectical motion. 54 The triadic conception of the real 
movement of matter permits the intrusion of the spirit of formal logic into the 
dialectic and sets formal parameters for dialectical logic. It formalizes the 
dialectic and, ultimately, delivers it to metaphysics. The Marxist method is aimed 
at grasping the contradictory fundament of all relations. Dialectical materialism is 
about attempting to comprehend reality for what it is, that is, a complex of 
contradictory relations, both internally and externally. It involves, essentially, an 
analytical endeavour to comprehend the content of form. This requires an 
elimination of the formal method. 55 The triad, in fact, undermines the dialectic by 
providing a refuge in it for the formal method. Dialectical materialism must 
therefore avoid the attractive simplisms oftriadicity, for they lead inexorably to 
the analytical pitfalls of formal logic. 56 
1.7 For Historicity 
The fact that matter, the foundation of objective reality, exists only, and can 
exist only in dialectical motion leads to the other fundamental dimension of 
Marxist materialism, namely, its historical-mindedness or historicity. All motion 
entails time (and space). Movement necessarily takes place over time. Matter can 
thus exist only in time (and space) and, hence, in history. Dialectical materialism 
is therefore perforce also a historical materialism. The old metaphysical 
54 There is here an unbridgeable chasm between dialectical and formal logic. The former 
prizes contradiction, the latter abhors it. Contradiction is the heart of the dialectic. Every 
process is internally contradictory, every relation comprises a struggle of opposites. Every 
'thing' contains its own negation and is always in the process of becoming its own 
opposite. Every 'thing' is, in truth, a relation containing the 'thing' and its negation. The 
dialectical method seeks to uncover the existential turbulence which structures the 
evolution of all social relations. 
55 Lefebvre op cit 81. 
56 Thus Slaughter (1975: 16-17) considers it 'absolutely against the spirit of dialectics to 
artificially impose the ''triad'' of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis on whatever process one 
chooses to abstract' . 
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materialism was ahistorical. It abstracted from history. It conceived of the world 
as given. Whatever movement it recognized was mechanical and repetitive, linear 
and circular. Metaphysical materialism thus banishes history or, at best, 
condemns it to repeat itself endlessly. For Marxism, however, materialism 
remains incomplete unless and until it is infused with the historical aspect. 57 In 
particular, it must comprehend the material relations of humankind historically. 
Historical materialism teaches that human society must be treated as the 
historical product of purposive human activity upon nature.58 To the extent that it 
is a determinate form of matter, human society may be said to be a natural 
construct. But its naturalness is always historically defined and hence subject to 
change over time. In other words, whereas the naturalness of human society is 
transhistorical, the form of this naturalness is fundamentally historical. This form 
varies according to the character of human material relations in a given historical 
epoch. That is, our relationship to nature is materialized in historically specific 
social relations of production and their institutional concomitants. Human society 
is thus a complex of historico-natural relations, which relations differ according to 
the extant mode of production. Each social formation should be viewed as the 
specific product of' a process of natural history' .59 
Marxism does not separate history from philosophy or sociology from 
epistemology. Dialectical materialism and historical materialism are not discrete 
. methodologies; they are the defining components of the Marxist Weltanschauung 
which is fundamentally monist and materialist. In this connection, the basic 
Marxist submission is that materialism can be properly dialectical only if it is 
simultaneously historical, and that, in order to avoid the morass of idealism, the 
57 See Slaughter ibid 30. 
58 Sociality has its origins in the human quest to survive the treacheries of nature. 
59 Marx op cit 21. See also Marx & Engels op cit 62-63. 
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dialectic must be conjoined with history. Matter, in all its forms of organization, 
is constituted dialectically, in history. The dialectical transformations of matter 
involve developments which take place in and over time. They are, thus, also 
historical transformations. 
It is this grounding of philosophical materialism in the process of (natural) 
history which separates Marxism from all previous materialisms. Marxism 
propounds a materialism which is historical because it is dialectical. To separate 
the dialectic from history, to conceive of dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism separately, as belonging to different spheres of enquiry, is to 
misunderstand and to undermine the achievement of Marx and Engels in 
transcending the limitations of the metaphysical worldview. Their materialism is 
a unity of the dialectical and the historical. Marxism does not admit of 
epistemological apartheid: the dialectical must be comprehended historically, and 
the historical dialectically. 
1.8 Sociality and Historicity 
The articulation of the dialectical and historical dimensions of Marxist 
materialism governs the Marxist method of social analysis. A Marxist 
investigation into any society or its institutions, including the law, can proceed 
from one premise only: the production of material life. This is the fundamental 
materialist precept. Thus Marx and Engels refer us to: 
'the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all 
history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live 
in order to be able to "make history". But life involves before 
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and 
many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of 
the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life 
itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition 
of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily 
and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. ,60 
60 Marx & Engels ibid 48. 
37 
In order to exist, then, humankind must produce the material means of its 
existence. And in order to do so, human beings must co-operate, they must work 
together upon and against nature. For Marxism, 'the irreducibly social nature of 
production,6! is a first principle, as appears from the following statement by 
Marx: 
'In the process of production, human beings work not only upon 
nature, but also upon one another. They produce only by working 
together in a specified manner and reciprocally exchanging their 
activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections 
and relations to one another, and only within these social 
connections and relations does their influence l.lpon nature operate, 
i.e., does production take place. ,62 
The imperatives of survival thus require humans to enter into social relations of 
production, that is, to join together in order to organize a division of labour 
according to which the production of life's necessaries is undertaken. 
Thus, human production (and hence reproduction) is necessarily co-
operative, a characteristic which entails the social. Material production thus 
engenders society. In this regard, the essence of humanity is sociality, and the 
necessity of this sociality is a transhistorical one. At any point in history, human 
life can exist and continue to exist only if humans enter into social relations of 
production. In its analysis of social life, the focus of Marxism is thus upon the 
social relations of production in terms of which all human societies are 
constituted. However, the form of these social relations of production is neither 
given nor fixed. Generic social relations of production which are historically 
uniform do not exist. Social relations are produced by human activity, at a 
particular time, in the material production and reproduction of humankind. In 
other words, they are always definite or historically specific. And they are general 
only in the sense that they are the primary determinant of the nature of human 
61 Sayer (1987: 24). 
62 Marx (1932: 28). 
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relations at a particular conjuncture. They constitute the economic structure, that 
is, the organization of material production that prevails or is dominant in a given 
social formation during a particular historical period. 
1.9 The 1859 Preface 
The social relations of production (economic structure or base) comprise the 
area of intersection between two sets of determinations. The first relates to the 
character of the relations of production. This depends crucially upon the forces of 
production (material substructure) in that the relations of production which 
characterize a particular historical epoch are generally determined by the level of 
development of the forces ofproduction.63 The second set of determinations 
relates to the ideational dimensions of social reality (the non-economic 
superstructure). These are determined generally by the extant social relations of 
production. 
So it is possible to conceive of social reality in terms of two interrelated 
levels of determination: on the one hand, the material substructure determines the 
economic structure; on the other hand, the economic structure determines the non-
economic superstructure. Marx's own summary of these relations of 
determination, contained in the 1859 Preface, is justly famous: 
'In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely 
relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the 
development of their material forces of production. The totality of 
63 It is generally accepted that the forces of production include, at least, the means of 
production (raw materials, machinery, buildings, etc) and labour power. This may be 
termed the material aspect. Most analysts also inject a social dimension into the concept. 
Thus, Slaughter (op cit: 38) tells us that: 'By "forces of production" Marx does not only 
mean techniques, or implements, or natural forces harnessed by technique. He places the 
actual forms of co-operation between men in labour among the forces of production ... 
When Marx writes of "forces of production" he therefore means the totality of the 
developed ability of man to confront and transform nature.' See also Novack (1978: 306), 
Larrain op cit 77 and Sayer op cit 26-27. 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions 
the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their 
social existence that determines their consciousness.' 
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Many commentators have, correctly, viewed this passage as the fundament 
of the Marxist approach to social analysis. The hostile ones have used it to 
condemn Marxism, incorrectly, as an economic determinism, in the sense that it 
supposedly sees 'all human behaviour as a mechanical effect of economic 
pressures,64 or that it allegedly posits that 'all human actions are causally 
determined by factors wholly outside the agent's control- in Marx's case, by 
"economic" factors' .65 This view has, bizarrely, been encouraged by the 
theoretical offerings of the Stalinist epigones of Marx, which offerings have 
routinely reduced Marxism to precisely the economic determinism which is the 
rallying cry of its detractors. 
However, whereas a charge of economic determinism against Stalinism is 
thus a legitimate one, against Marxism it is, as will be argued later, spurious. Yet, 
there has appeared a number of reconstructionist publications which, although 
either avowedly 'Marxist' or at least sympathetic to Marxism, accepts that the 
Preface does allow, perhaps even encourages, economic determinism, and hence 
seeks to develop a Marxism which is not contaminated by the perceived 
inadequacies of the Preface. The work of Cain, Hunt, Collins, Larrain, Fine, 
Sayer and Davis are good examples ofthis reconstructionist tendency.66 
64 Slaughter (1985: 33). 
65 Wood op cit 63. 
66 See Cain & Hunt (1979), Hunt (1993), Collins (1984), Larrain op cit, Fine (1984), Sayer op 
cit and Davis (l988a). 
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It is submitted, however, that the Preface has nothing whatsoever to do with 
the crassness of economic determinism and is instead a reliable expression of the 
core tenets of dialectical and historical materialism. It sets out unambiguously 
how Marx himself understood the crux of the Marxist analytic. Of course, the 
value of the Preface should not be overestimated. It is not the last word on the 
method of Marxism. In fact, it is no more than a summary, and one in a 
condensed form, of that method. As such, it cannot convey the fulness and 
subtlety of the method itself. It is obviously inadequate to equate the summary of 
the method with the method itself, as so many commentators are wont to do. Still, 
Marx himself did describe the summary as 'the guiding principle of my studies' . 
In other words, he did present it as a valid general statement of his method. 
The 1859 Preface can be relied upon therefore, legitimately, as the 
methodological point of departure of Marxism. Of course, it cannot be read as an 
exposition of a law of social development, 'analogous, for instance, to Boyle's law 
or Ohm's law in the physical sciences' .67 Marx certainly never claimed for it the 
status of a law. He did not even assert that the Preface contained a complete 
statement of his social theory, nor did he consider the conceptual framework 
proposed in the Preface to constitute a model into which social reality must fit. It 
bears repeating that for Marx the Preface was a summary of his materialist 
'guiding principle', reached in the course of settling accounts with Hegelian 
idealism. It must therefore be taken for what it was intended to be, namely, a 
guide to social analysis, founded upon philosophical materialism, and providing a 
method to investigate the complex unity of contradictory relations which 
constitutes objective reality. 
67 Carver (1982: 22). 
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1.10 The Preface and the Reconstructionists 
As indicated earlier, and despite the clarity of the 'guiding principle' as 
stated in the Preface, many commentators who would associate themselves with 
Marxism, have questioned its coherence and offered their own reconstructions of 
Marx's theoretical schema. Faced with the distortions of Stalinist orthodoxy and 
sensitive to the accusations of economic determinism, these analysts have sought 
to rescue Marxism by proposing purportedly non-deterministic readings of the 
Preface. These may be divided into two broad categories, related to the above-
mentioned two sets of determinations.68 
Firstly, there are those efforts which suggest that the relationship between 
the forces of production and the relations of production as established in the 
Preface be inverted. Whereas the Preface ascribes primacy to the forces of 
production over the relations of production, these reconstructionists assign 
priority to the latter. For them, it is the relations of production which determine 
the forces of production. They believe that the development of the forces of 
production is dependent upon movement in the relations of production which 
permit such development. Anderson typifies this school, as is evident from the 
following proposition: 
'[O]ne of the most important conclusions yielded by an examination 
of the great crash of European feudalism is that - contrary to widely 
received beliefs among Marxists - the characteristic "figure" of a 
crisis in a mode of production is not one in which vigorous 
(economic) forces of production burst triumphantly through 
retrograde (social) relations of production, and promptly establish a 
higher productivity and society on their ruins. On the contrary, the 
forces of production typically tend to stall and recede within the 
existent relations of production; these then must themselves be 
radically changed and reordered before new forces of production can 
68 The first set comprises the forces of production and relations of production and the second 
set the relations of production and superstructure. 
be created and combined for a globally new mode of production. In 
other words, the relations of production generally change prior to the 
forces of production in an epoch of transition, and not vice versa. ,69 
Those who share with Anderson the belief in the primacy of the relations of 
production include Hook/o Magaline71 and Balibar.72 
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Attractive as this position may appear to analysts wishing to avoid the 
distortions of Stalinist orthodoxy, it is a fundamentally unMarxist position. Marx 
and Engels were unequivocal about the primacy of the forces of production in 
their relationship to the social relations of production. Cohen shows indisputably 
that throughout their writings, from the 1840s to the 1890s, Marx and Engels were 
and remained totally committed to the 'primacy thesis' which holds, in Cohen's 
terms, that 'the nature of a set of production relations is explained by the level of 
the productive forces embraced by it'. 73 This unwavering commitment has 
prompted Larrain to inquire why Marx was 'so emphatic in asserting the primacy 
of productive forces in his general theoretical statements about history,?74 The 
answer to this apparently problematic question is simple and singular: both Marx 
and Engels were materialists through and through. By the time they had 
completed their critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach, they had also constructed the 
dialectical and historical materialism which was to inform all their subsequent 
theoretical and analytical work. 
69 Anderson (1981: 203-204, original emphasis). 
70 Hook, S. (1933) Towards an Understanding o/Karl Marx, cited in McMurtry (1978: 15 
footnote 24). 
71 Magaline, A. (1975) Lutte de Classes et Devalorisation du Capital, cited in Larrain op cit 
114. 
72 Balibar (1970: 233ft). 
73 See Cohen (1984: 134-150). 
74 Larrain op cit 88. 
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This adherence to materialism in philosophy led (and should lead any self-
respecting materialist) necessarily to the 'primacy thesis ' as defined by Cohen. 
Lenin, too, was uncompromisingly materialist in his view of the world. This 
emerges clearly in his description of historical materialism as 'the consistent 
continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social 
phenomena' .75 The primacy of the productive forces is entailed in the materialist 
conception of history. The level of development ofthe material forces of 
production determines the character of the social relations of production (the 
economy). Cohen's defence of Marx on this point is indefeasible. Those 
reconstructionists who posit the primacy of the relations of production must, 
ultimately, abandon materialism - and Marxism. 
The second, and very popular, type of reconstructionism is concerned with 
the so-called base-superstructure problem, that is, the relationship between the 
social relations of production (the base) and the superstructure. Marx, again, is 
unambiguous about this relationship in the 1859 Preface: the economic structure 
determines the legal and political superstructure; the base is the 'real foundation' 
of the superstructure. Slaughter makes the point thus: 
'It is the relations between men in production which form the 
economic base or economic structure, determining the characteristic 
legal, political and ideological forms of each society. , 76 
Again, this primacy of the base over the superstructure follows necessarily from 
the materialist premises of Marxism. The priority of matter over mind, and hence 
of being over consciousness, implies that the origin of superstructural 
transformations must be sought in the movements of the economic structure, that 
is, the social relations of production. This basic materialist conclusion has been 
--- - -------------------------------------------------------
75 Lenin op cit 17. 
76 Slaughter (1975: 37). 
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strangely, some would say wilfully,77 misinterpreted by numerous analysts, who 
have espied in the determinism of Marx the spectre of the crude economic 
determinism of vulgar materialism or the technological determinism of Stalinism 
adverted to earlier in this chapter. 
Despite the fact that Engels, in a cycle of letters written in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century,18 both warned against a simplistic notion of determination 
and clarified the relationship between the base and the superstructure, the self-
styled opponents of Marxist 'orthodoxy' have persisted with their reconstructions. 
They ignore Marx's own writings which supplement and flesh out the 'guiding 
principle' of the Preface,19 and they belittle Engels's efforts to combat the 
vulgarization of the Preface80 so that they may tell us, contrary to the explicitness 
of the Preface, what Marx really meant. They are not at all averse to the notion 
that Marx and Engels may not really have meant what they actually said. Thus, at 
least one reconstructionist has gone so far as to claim that 'occasionally Marx's 
own version of his theoretical activity may be incongruous with ·the real 
significance of it'. 81 It is now apparently necessary to save Marx from his own 
intellectual incompetence! 
1.11 Rendering Marxism More Profound 
None of the reconstructionists argues for the primacy of the superstructure 
over the base. That would be too blatant a capitulation to idealism. Instead, they 
question whether the base-superstructure divide established in the Preface is 
capable of comprehending the real relationship between the economy and such 
77 See Guest (1939: 60). 
78 See letters to Schmidt 5 August 1990; to Bloch 21-22 September 1890; to Schmidt 27 
October 1890; to Mehring 14 July 1893; and to Borgius 25 January 1894, all in Marx & 
Engels (1975). 
79 See, for example, Marx (1977) and Marx (1954). 
80 See his letters on historical materialism cited above. See also Engels (1934). 
81 Larrain op cit 9. 
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typically superstructural aspects as law, politics, and ideology. Notwithstanding 
the many occasions on which Marx and Engels made clear that their' guiding 
principle' must be understood dialectically, the reconstructionists find that the 
base-superstructure metaphor is too static82 and simplistic83 to grasp the 
complexities of social reality. They aim to render Marxism more profound, to 
inject into Marxism the subtlety which Marx and Engels were apparently unable 
to provide. 
However, the reconstructionist quest for subtlety leads quickly to an assault 
upon the integrity ofthe 'guiding principle' itself and to the conclusion that its 
central division between base and superstructure is untenable and indefensible. 
They collapse the distinctions identified by Marx, arguing that each is contained . 
within the other and hence constitute a single, indivisible reality. The case of law 
is paradigmatic in this regard. For Marx and Engels law is an aspect of the 
superstructure. As such, that is, as a superstructural effectivity, law can and does 
condition the form of the relations of production. 84 But Marx and Engels were 
uncompromisingly committed to the primacy of the relations of production in this 
relation: whereas they allowed that legal relations can sometimes determine the 
form of the relations of production, they were adamant that it is the content of the 
relations of production which always determines the legal form. That is classic 
and consistent dialectical materialism from the founders of Marxism. 
Evidently, however, for our reconstructionists, a 'mere' dialectical 
apprehension is not good enough to clarify the true relationship between law and 
economy. A graphic sample of the reconstructionists' avowed non-determinist 
approach to this relationship is Thompson's passionate and picturesque outburst: 
82 Ibid 110. 
83 See Cain & Hunt op cit 50 and Hunt op cit 203. 
84 See Marx & Engels (1978: 58) and Engels's letter to Bloch 21-22 September 1890 in Marx 
& Engels (1975). 
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'For I found that law did not keep politely to a "level" but was at every 
bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and the 
production relations themselves (as property rights, definitions of agrarian 
practice) and it was simultaneously present in the philosophy of Locke; it 
intruded brusquely within alien categories, re-appearing bewigged and 
gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced a cotillion with religion, 
moral ising over the theatre at Tyburn; it was an arm of politics and politics 
was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigours 
of its own autonomous logic; it contributed to the definition of self-identity 
both of rulers and ruled; above all, it afforded an arena for class struggle, 
within which alternative notions of law were fought out. ,85 
Thompson's frontal assault upon the supposed analytical deficiencies of the 1859 
Preface has been joined, in somewhat more subdued terms, by a host of other 
anti-reductionists and non-instrumentalists. They all adhere or tend towards 
adherence to one proposition: that law is not a dependency but a specificity. That 
is, they tell us that the legal form is not in fact a superstructural configuration; it 
is, in truth, a relation of production! Thus, Fine asserts that law is 'an essential 
relation of production' ;86 Hunt advises that 'the legal relation is itself constitutive 
of the relations ofproduction,;87 and Collins holds that 'legal rules actually 
constitute, define and express the relations of production' .88 
In their concern to avoid the perceived 'limitations and simplifications of 
the base/superstructure metaphor',89 said reconstructionists have also succeeded in 
avoiding Marxism. For, none but the most myopic can fail to notice that the 
dialectical materialist conception of law and all other superstructural forms 
developed by Marx and Engels has no relation whatsoever to notions of legal 
relations as relations of production or as constitutive of relations of production. 
Marxism has discerned and been alive always to the possible impact of law upon 
85 Thompson (1978: 288). 
86 Fine op cit 146. 
87 Hunt op cit 207. This book is sub-titled., significantly, 'Toward a Constitutive Theory of 
Law'. 
88 Collins op cit 89. 
89 Cain & Hunt op cit 50. 
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the form of the relations of production; but it has also been always categorical that 
legal relations must be grasped with reference to their material roots in the 
relations of production. In other words, Marxism posits that the relationship 
between legal forms and production relations is fundamentally asymmetrical in 
that the latter is the source of and determines the former. Reconstructionists, by 
contrast, favour a symmetry between law and economy. They claim to have 
discovered an identity between legal relations and relations of production, or that 
the former is constitutive ofthe latter. In their endeavours to render Marxism 
more profound they jettison its core materialist premises. 
All the reconstructionists - both those who assert the primacy of the 
relations over the forces of production and those who claim a decisive role for 
superstructural configurations in the constitution of the relations of production -
proceed from the conviction that the concepts (and their interrelations) contained 
in the 1859 Preface are not rich enough to comprehend the complexity of our 
social reality. They rely in their reconstructions on other works of Marx, such as 
Capital, the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value, which are supposed to 
provide a richer theoretical terrain than the Preface. They forget two things. 
Firstly, they forget that in all of his subsequent writings, Marx never ever 
even hinted at any deficiencies in his 'guiding principle' of 1859; and that 
Engels's subsequent writings on historical and dialectical materialism were not 
about correcting the 'guiding principle' but about defending it and correcting 
errors which others had committed in its name. 
Secondly, they forget that in Volume 1 of Capital, the only volume which 
he himself saw through to publication and which nobody doubts is his analytical 
meisterwerk, Marx was explicit and unapologetic in his defence of his 'guiding 
principle' as fonnulated eight years earlier. It merits full quotation: 
'I seize this opportunity of shortly answering an objection taken by 
a Gennan paper in America, to my work, "Zur Kritik der Pol. 
Oekonomie, 1859". In the estimation of that paper, my view that 
each special mode of production and the social relations 
corresponding to it, in short, that the economic structure of society, 
is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure 
is raised, and to which deflnite social fonns of thought correspond; 
that the mode of production detennines the character of the social, 
political and intellectual life generally, all this is very true for our 
own times, in which material interests preponderate, but not for the 
middle ages, in which Catholicism, nor for Athens and Rome, 
where politics, reigned supreme. In the first place it strikes one as 
an odd thing for anyone to suppose that these well-worn phrases 
about the middle ages and the ancient world are unknown to 
anyone else. This much, however, is clear, that the middle ages 
could not live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics. 
On the contrary, it is the mode in which they gained a livelihood 
that explains why here politics, and there Catholicism, played the 
chief part. For the rest, it requires but a slight acquaintance with 
the history of the Roman republic, for example, to be aware that its 
secret history is the history of its landed property. On the other 
hand, Don Quixote long ago paid the penalty for wrongly 
imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic 
fonns of society.'9o 
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It would be hard to fmd a more direct denial of the validity of the reconstructionist 
project. The original Marxists were and remained unrepentant materialists and 
unreconstructed determinists. 
90 Marx (1954: 86 footnote 2). 
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1.12 The Unity of Social Reality 
Much of the reconstructionists' striving after a deeper and more 
sophisticated understanding than can allegedly be attained via the conceptual 
apparatus of the Preface is founded upon the argument from the wholeness of 
social reality. They link their rejection of the perceived simplisms of the Preface 
to the 'discovery' that the real world is a single, indivisible whole which does not 
consist of separate levels. The fundamental unity of social reality renders useless 
the attempt to separate it out into discrete planes, however interconnected these 
might be conceived. In consequence, it is urged, the differentiation between the 
forces and relations of production is uninformed and that between base and 
superstructure untenable. Thus, for example, Sayer tells us that the 
'forces/relations distinction as conventionally drawn must accordingly collapse,;91 
and Collins posits that' it makes little sense to ask if some of the laws we have 
looked at are in the base or the superstructure' .92 
Now, the insight that social life comprises a seamless totality is 
incontrovertible. It would be either sheer folly or supreme arrogance for any 
serious analyst even to consider contesting the essential oneness of existence. 
Objective reality is indeed an incorruptible unity which cannot be disassembled 
into independent elements. The problem is that most reconstructionists (Sayer is a 
notable exception here) wield this truism like an indictment against Marx and 
Engels, as if they were inexplicably ignorant of it. 93 They presume that the 
progenitors of Marxism were somehow unable to comprehend this most basic 
feature of socio-economic life and incorporate it into their worldview. They 
forget that because Marx and Engels were materialists through and through, they 
were also, as intimated earlier, monists through and through. In other words, they 
91 Sayer op cit 37. 
92 Collins op cit 90. 
93 Recall Thompson's tirade cited earlier. 
would have no truck with the dualist shenanigans which are the philosophical 
source of the stratose conception of social life. They thus took the essential 
oneness of the world for granted. 'The concept of totality is central to Marxist 
theory' .94 Hence Marxism's analytical focus, not on individual objects or 
independent phenomena, but on networks of relations and circuits of processes, 
united in contradiction. 
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The notion that social reality actually consists of discrete levels is thus 
anathema to Marxism. The rejection of this notion is entailed in its commitment 
to materialism, which denies (and must deny) the ideal an autonomous existence. 
For Marx, as we know, 'the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected 
by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought' .95 In other words, the 
superstructure is an effect of the base and is not separable from it. The base and 
superstructure comprise a totality which cannot be decomposed into independent 
strata. They constitute an irreducible and indivisible singularity. Despite his 
sympathies for the reconstructionist project, Sayer explains the relationship 
between base and superstructure well: 
'The "superstructure", in brief, is simply the "ideal" form in which the 
totality of "material" relations which make up the "base" itself are 
manifested to consciousness, not a substantially separable order of reality at 
all.'96 
Such monism is the necessary concomitant of dialectical and historical 
materialism. 
94 FUredi (1990: xi, original emphasis). 
95 See footnote 26 above. 
96 Sayer op cit 84. 
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However, it does not follow from the constitutional unity of social life that 
the distinction between base and superstructure is unsustainable, as Sayer 
suggests.
97 
As we have seen, Marx did make the distinction in the Preface and he 
defended it in Capital. Indeed, he relied upon the concepts which he described in 
the Preface as his 'guiding principle' in all his subsequent work. In other words, 
despite his total commitment to the monist view of social reality, he did elaborate 
a conceptual framework which divided up that reality. This is not as contradictory 
as many reconstructionists who are averse to the 'guiding principle' suppose.98 
1.13 The Process of Abstraction 
The problem evaporates if one remembers that there is a difference between 
the object of analysis and the analysis of that object. The object of analysis 
confronts us as a chaotic empirical totality. It is an epistemological axiom that we 
can order and analyse such object only via a set of concepts designed to render it 
comprehensible.99 OHman makes the point forcefully: 
'[A]ll thinking about reality begins by breaking it down into 
manageable parts. Reality may be in one piece when lived, but to be 
thought about and communicated it must be parceled out. Our 
minds can no more swallow the world whole at one sitting than can 
our stomachs. Everyone then, and not just Marx and Marxists, 
begins the task of trying to make sense of his or her surroundings by 
distinguishing certain features and focusing on and organizing them 
in ways deemed appropriate.' 100 
Each concept which we construct is necessarily an abstraction, not an 
obvious and direct attribute of the object, but presumably chosen on the 
97 Ibid 37. 
98 These distinctions do not imply a return to Kantian dualism. Marxism recognizes that 
Hegel had settled with Kant. The distinctions drawn by Marx are analytical ones, to help 
illuminate the complex reality in its totality. In order to be able to analyse the whole it is 
methodologically necessary to identify its constituent elements and their interrelations. 
Herein lies the motivation for the different levels of determination identified in the Preface. 
They correspond to the actual workings of the organic social whole; they express the 'laws' 
which govern objective reality in all its contradictory complexity. 
99 See Slaughter (1975: 25). 
100 Oilman (1993: 24). 
basis ofa knowledge of the history and empirical contours of the object. 
Each such concept is also invariably partial, in that it is able to 
comprehend only a portion of the whole. In other words, 
conceptualization necessarily involves a process of 'pigeon-holing', in 
terms of which the analyst bifurcates social reality in an effort to 
comprehend it.101 The conceptual framework contained in the Preface is 
nothing more nor less than such a 'pigeon-holing' exercise. Marx was 
obviously fully alive to the elemental singularity of social life. But he was 
just as obviously alive to the fact that social life could not be analysed 
scientifically in its fundamental oneness. And his identification of 
different levels of social life in the Preface is, in consequence, a rational 
methodological imperative and not, as the reconstructionists would have 
it, an index of some species of ontological errantry. 102 
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The construction of any conceptual framework - not just a Marxist 
conceptual framework - always and necessarily involves the analyst in a process 
of abstraction. 103 It is not possible to theorize a concept or form without having 
recourse to abstraction, which OIlman defmes as 'the intellectual activity of 
breaking [the] whole down into the mental units with which we think about it' .104 
101 See Mouton & Marais (1994: 58 and 126). 
102 See Jakubowski (1990: 37). 
103 See Marx op cit 19: 'In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor 
chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.' 
104 OIlman op cit 24. It is via the process of abstraction, involving the decomposition of the 
whole into its constituent elements in order to focus upon a particular element, that 'truth' 
in social analysis is pursued. However, every given social fact is, to begin with, already an 
abstraction. We encounter it for the first time in isolation, as an independent phenomenon, 
detached from its organic unity with the whole. The first step in the process of abstraction, 
therefore, is to relocate the given social fact into the social whole of which it forms a part. 
This means situating it in relation to the fundamental social process, namely, production. 
Simultaneously this means locating it in relation to the two sets of determinations identified 
above and deciding to which of the two it belongs. The next step is to abstract the given 
social fact again, to re-abstract it, from the social whole. It can then be the subject of close 
dialectical materialist analysis to show exactly how it relates to the whole. See Marx 
(1977a: 205ft). 
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The process of abstraction isolates and purifies the relations chosen for analysis, 
and reduces them 'to certain standard types, from which all characteristics 
irrelevant to the relation under examination are removed' .105 In the Preface, Marx 
is concerned to communicate the core relations of social reality and social 
change. 106 Reconstructionists tend, mcorrectly, to conflate Marx's focus on 
essentialia with an inattentiveness towards the complexities of the world. They 
misunderstand his deployment of the force of abstraction. 107 They forget that it is 
precisely in order to give coherence to 'our intuitive sense of the complexity of 
the social world' 108 that the essentialia ofthe relations comprising that world have 
to be identified, highlighted and analysed. 'Our intuitive sense of the complexity 
of the social world' has its material foundation in the dialectical character of that 
world. 
1.14 Abstraction versus Model-Building 
The reconstructionists do not appreciate that the conceptual framework in 
the Preface operates at a high level of abstraction, to enable us to comprehend the 
fundamental dialectical relationships which comprise social reality without being 
sidetracked by non-essential considerations. That is why Marx called it and 
defended it as his 'guiding principle'. It holds the key - the dialectic of forces and 
relations of production - to discerning the inner logic of the process of 
development of the real world. Thus, Marx explains in the Preface: 
'At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of 
society come into conflict with the existing relations of production 
or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the 
property relations within the framework of which they have operated 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these 
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social 
105 Sweezy (1942: 17). 
106 See Sweezy ibid 14. 
107 See Chapter Five below for more on Marx's use of abstraction. 
108 Hunt op cit 209. 
revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or 
later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. ' 
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For Marx, in other words, social change - conceived on the world-historical level -
originates in the maturation of the contradictions which govern the relationship 
between the forces and the relations of production. Every mode of production 
develops to the point where the tendency of the forces of production to 
development is confronted by the tendency of the relations of production to 
inertia. The latter impedes the former. This historical impasse can be resolved 
only by 'an era of social revolution' which, in class society, is a historical period -
sometimes condensed, sometimes protracted - of struggle between rulers and 
ruled about the continuation of the extant relations of production. The 
revolutionary era results in the transformation of the relations of production and, 
by operation of the materialist premise, of 'the whole immense superstructure'. 
Ifwe are to take seriously Marx's own characterization of the 1859 Preface 
as containing his 'guiding principle', we must also accept the conceptual 
framework which it outlines as central to the Marxist approach to historical and 
social analysis. The concepts of forces of production, relations of production and 
superstructure, and their interrelations, give methodological coherence to Marx's 
extension of philosophical materialism, in both its dialectical and historical 
aspects, to the analysis of the social world. The conceptual distinctions which 
Marx drew and the levels of determination which he identified in the Preface, 
therefore, must be considered as integral to his method. 
It must be emphasized, however, that in the Preface Marx was providing us 
not with a model of social reality but with a methodological map to the analysis of 
social reality. The difference is crucial. Indeed, it is arguable that mere 
cognizance of this difference defeats, in large part, the reconstructionist assault 
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upon the supposed inadequacies of the Preface. For, it is precisely the 'model-
building interpretation of Marxism' , 109 in terms of which the social world is 
supposed to fit into Marx's 1859 'model' of it, which is the prime target of the 
reconstructionists. It is the obvious non-correspondence between the complexities 
of the social world and Marx's supposedly simplistic 'model' of it which prompts 
them to question the validity of the 'model' and, ultimately, of dialectical 
materialism, the Marxist epistemology. 
However, it is submitted that it is not the conceptual framework of Preface 
which is defective, but the reconstructionists' perception of it as constituting a 
model. They transform Marxism into a model-building project and then evaluate 
it as being unable to comprehend the intricacies and subtleties of our social 
existence. They need reminding that whereas model-building may well be 
germane to the method of bourgeois social philosophy, it is foreign to Marxism. 
They inflate the conceptual framework of the Preface beyond Marx's own 
description of it, and thereby invent problems which their reconstructions are 
intended to resolve. However, these problems cease to be if the Preface is taken 
for what Marx actually said he intended it to be, that is, his 'guiding principle', 
not a comprehensive model of the social world, but a methodological compass, 
and its concepts analytical signposts, for uncovering the laws of motion of that 
world. 
1.15 Marxism and Determinism 
It is time to resume the discussion of Marxism and economic determinism 
adverted to earlier in the chapter. The Marxist method, as outlined in the Preface, 
does entail a determinism. The determinations identified in the 'guiding 
principle' follow quite naturally and necessarily from the Marxist commitment to 
109 FUredi op cit xii. 
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dialectical and historical materialism. Marxism is, in this connection, 
unequivocally deterministic. But it is a determinism which is informed by and 
derived from the recognition of the impact of being upon consciousness. It is an 
axiom of Marxism that being is constituted materialistically, in the social relations 
of production. Marxist determinism is thus simply an acknowledgement of the 
priority, in nature and social life, of matter over mind. 
Many reconstructionists have problematized the deterministic dimension of 
Marxism. Some even consider it to be a major weakness, petrified under the 
weight of Stalinist orthodoxy, and have sought to develop a non-deterministic 
version of Marxism. It must, therefore, be stressed that, despite the sensibilities 
of the reconstructionists, Marxism does consciously embrace the 'spectre of 
determinism' .110 It does teach us that reality has an objective existence 
independent of what we may think of it. And it does hold that historical 
110 Despite differing significantly on a number of issues, prominent' Western Marxists' such as 
Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas all rely upon a notion of relative autonomy to distance 
themselves from the perceived economistic crudities of the 'spectre ofdetenninism'. See, 
for example, Gramsci(l971: 161-164,366 & 407 ), Althusser (1969: 89-128) and 
Poulantzas (1978: 255-262). See also Cain (1983), Boggs (1976) and Merrington (1977) 
for commentary on Gramsci; Callinicos (1976), James (1985) and Mclennan et al (1978) 
on Althusser; and Grabb (1990), Jessop (1982) and Wood (1986) on Poulantzas. Relative 
autonomy allocates to the superstructure a conditional independence from the base, 
allowing for determination by the base only in the last instance. It would appear that the 
relative autonomists want to have their cake and eat it. Their formal adherence to Marxist 
determinism is accompanied by theoretically sophisticated efforts to avoid its substance. 
Althusser's concept of overdetermination is exemplary here. It allows for a complex of 
reciprocal determinations between superstructure and base, and for superstructural 
elements, although never determinant, to be dominant, in the sense that the economic 
instance 'determines' that a non-economic instance 'dominates' the social formation in a 
given conjuncture. As will be seen below, classical Marxism readily accepts that there are 
superstructural aspects which cannot be attributed directly to the workings of the base, and 
that non-economic relations may have an impact upon the form of economic relations. But 
this is not the same as theorizing the superstructure as relatively autonomous from the base, 
especially if, as Althusser (ibid: 113) tells us, 'the lonely hour of the last instance never 
comes'. From this admission it is but a short step to absolute superstructural autonomy. 
Relative autonomy thus entails a sleight-of-hand in terms of which determination in the last 
instance or in the final analysis becomes a covert route to the abandonment of materialism 
in the comprehension of the superstructure and its relation to the base. Chapter Five below 
contains additional commentary upon the notion of relative autonomy. 
development and social existence, like death, are rational processes which are 
governed by material necessity, regardless of our distaste for them. 
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However, Marxist determinism is not, by any means, an economic 
determinism, of the kind so often charged by anti-Marxists. In other words, the 
determinism of Marxism does not reduce social actors to hapless victims of 
structural economic processes over which they have no control. It is, instead, a 
determinism which endows social actors with a vital say in the constitution of 
society. In this regard, it is a determinism which is, firstly, materialist in that it 
bases itself, as Engels tells us, upon Marx's discovery of 'the law of development 
of human history', namely: 
'the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, 
that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, 
before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc' .111 
Secondly, it is a determinism which is dialectical, giving full recognition to the 
effectivity of the non-material. It does not debase 'politics, science, art, religion, 
etc' to absolute dependence upon or total subservience to the so-called economic 
factor. Despite the allegations of its detractors, the determinism espoused by 
Marxism is a determinism which celebrates agency. 
Fortunately, many perceptive analysts, including non-Marxists, do not take 
seriously the charge of economic determinism. They appreciate that historical 
materialism is 'not the crudely deterministic model which it has so often been 
taken to be' .112 Such commentators understand that neither Marx nor Engels ever 
relied upon the kind of mechanical reductionism which has been attributed to 
them, falsely, and that both recognized fully the creative impact of human 
111 Engels (1978: 681). 
112 Tosh (1991: 165). 
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productive activity upon the construction of social life. I 13 The Marxist antipathy 
to economic determinism is made crystal clear in the opening paragraph of 
Engels's letter to Bloch: 
'According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately 
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of 
material life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. 
Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element 
is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. ,114 
Again, as with Marx's defence of his 'guiding principle', it would be hard to find 
a more direct denial of the charge of economic determinism. 
Plekhanov's distinction between dialectical materialists and economic 
materialists is enlightening here. Marxists are dialectical materialists, concerned 
with comprehending the materiality of the laws of motion of the social 
complexus. Economic materialists subscribe to the kind of economic determinism 
which ascribes all social and political developments directly to the operation of 
'the economic factor'. But, as Plekhanov demonstrates, economic determinism 
patently has no material foundation and in the end turns out to be 'nothing but a 
variety of idealism' .115 Dobb, also, makes clear that, despite initial similarities, 
there exists an analytical chasm between Marxism and economic determinism 
which is unbridgeable: 
'The Historical Materialism of Marx shares with the economic 
determinist an insistence that history is to be interpreted in terms of 
material events. In other words, it shares with the mechanists their 
materialism. But this statement Historical Materialism intends in a 
purely practical sense: namely, that knowledge of history is given 
solely in scientific study of historical experience, and not in intuition 
or in a priori knowledge. By this insistence that history is to be 
explained in material categories, the Marxist does not intend to erect 
an abstract separation of events into "material" and "ideal", the 
113 See Slaughter (1985: 33) and Wood (1984: 63-4. 
114 Letter to Bloch 21-22 September 1890 in Marx & Engels (1975: 394). 
115 Plekhanov (1976: 8). 
former playing an active, and the latter only a passive, role in 
historical causation: the formulation of the issue in such terms, into 
which the economic determinist so frequently falls, is for the 
Marxist entirely barren and unreal.' 116 
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The vulgar economic determinist reading of the Preface is thus easily defeasible. 
The simple fact, to imitate Engels, is that there is nothing whatsoever in the 
Marxist worldview, properly comprehended, against which an allegation of 
economic determinism could be sustained. 
1.16 Socio-economic Determinism 
If the determinism of Marxism has to be labelled at all, it may perhaps be 
described usefully as a socio-economic determinism, as opposed to an economic, 
determinism. Mandel puts it thus: 
'Historical materialism in no way affirms that material production 
(''the economic factor") directly and immediately determines the 
content and form of all so-called superstructural activities. 
Moreover, the social base is not simply productive activity as such, 
and even less is it "material production" taken in isolation. It is the 
social relations that people form in the production of their material 
life. In fact, historical materialism is not, therefore, economic 
determinism, but socio-economic determinism. ,117 
The point is that, contrary to the reconstructionist reading of the 1859 Preface, 
Marxism and economic determinism are incompatibles. The latter asserts a direct 
determination of the superstructure by the base and lapses easily into the 
compartmentalization of dualism. The former is committed to the monist 
conception of the world and postulates a dialectical relationship between base and 
superstructure. It ought to be evident that Marxist determinism and economic 
determinism occupy distinct and contrary epistemological terrains. Certainly, 
Marxism neither shares nor condones any of the rudenesses of economic 
116 Dobb (1932: 14). 
117 Mandel op cit 175, original emphasis. 
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determinism. Instead, it is committed to the nuanced analytic of socio-economic 
determinism. 
For Marxism, determinism means the unconditional acceptance of 'the 
decisive primacy of the socio-economic level over juridical, political and cultural 
phenomena' . 118 It is indisputable that we are born into a definite economic 
structure. In other words, we inherit a determinate set of social relations of 
production. Certainly, we have no choice in the matter. And as we develop, we 
undergo a process of socialization in terms of which we acquire the social, 
political and moral values which correspond to the given relations of production 
and which facilitate the reproduction of those relations. Few thoughtful analysts 
can offer or would care to construct any sustained argument against this aspect of 
Marxism. Indeed, many are willing to accept and even defend the veracity of this 
Marxist postulate, and do not hesitate to incorporate it into their own work. Thus, 
for example, Sargent readily concedes, in relation to the determinism of Marxism, 
that: 
'The most basic point, which is a truism today, is that the way 
people think is greatly affected by the way they live. It would be 
very difficult to argue against this point.' 119 
In other words, the material aspect of our lives governs the subjective aspect, and 
the social relations of production establish the parameters within which our 
mental production occurs. In this Marxism is unequivocal: 'it is social existence 
which determines social consciousness' .120 
118 Timpanaro op cit 40. 
119 Sargent (1981: 85). 
120 Mandel op cit 183. 
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1.17 Making History 
But Marxism is equally unequivocal in the view that humans make their 
own history. We do not and cannot choose the matrix of material conditions in 
which we find ourselves and in which we have to act. But our practical activity 
constantly re-configures that matrix. It is the course of human living that 
'determines' the course of human history. We are not mere objects of the 
economic structure. That structure comprises, importantly, a determinate set of 
social relations of production which humans inhabit and construct in the course of 
their productive interactions. The point is that although we have no say in the 
kind of economic structure into which we are born, we have a huge say in the 
development, changes and eventual destruction of that structure. 
What is more, the superstructure does not simply emerge spontaneously out 
of the economic structure. It is created by humans, in their living in, with and 
against the economic structure. The latter prescribes only the limits human action. 
Mandel clarifies: 
'While it is of course true that humanity's choices are predetermined 
by material and social constraints from which it cannot escape, it can 
forge its own destiny within the framework of these constraints. 
Humanity makes its own history. If humanity is the product of given 
material conditions, these material conditions are in turn the 
products of human social practice.' 121 
This is why the superstructural dimension of social reality can never be conceived 
as a direct or proximate reflection of the material base. Our consciousness can 
never be read off linearly from our social existence. Engels makes this point 
forcefully, if somewhat sardonically, in his letter to Bloch: 
'It is hardly possible, without making oneself ridiculous, to explain 
in terms of economics the existence of every small state in Germany, 
past and present, or the origin of the High German consonant shift, 
which widened the geographic partition formed by the mountain 
121 Ibid, original emphasis. 
ranges, from the Sudetes to the Taunus, into a regular fissure 
running across Germany.' 122 
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The relationship between the base and the superstructure is a dialectical one, 
expressed in the social practice of humankind. And the determination of the 
superstructure by the base is usually, if not invariably, a mediated determination, 
the crucial intervening factor being humans 'making their own history'. Indeed, 
even the constitution of the economic structure is demarcated in terms of human 
activity. This is made clear by Engels in the following comment: 
'What we understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the 
determining basis of the history of society, is the manner and method by 
which men in a given society produce their means of subsistence and 
exchange the products among themselves. ,123 
If Marxism comprehends determinism as an epistemological necessity, then it 
comprehends praxis as the necessary conjugate of that determinism. 
In this regard, it should be emphasized that Marxism does not entail either 
voluntarism, which would privilege human activity absolutely, or fatalism, which 
would denigrate such activity absolutely. It neither apotheosizes human activity, 
as the praxis theorists are wont to do, nor does it hypostatize the social system and 
its institutions, as is the tendency amongst structuralists. In other words, Marxism 
neither elevates humans to free subjects upon whom material conditions have no 
impact whatsoever, nor does it reduce humans to passive objects of external 
forces in the face of which they are powerless. Instead, it insists that, within the 
confines of a deftnite, historically specific set of material conditions, human social 
practice is fundamentally creative. That is, it propounds the view that humans do 
'make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please' .124 Thus 
Engels writes to Borgius that: 
122 Letter to Bloch 21-22 September 1890 in Marx & Engels (1975: 395). 
123 Letter to Borgius 25 January 1894 in Marx & Engels (1968: 693). 
124 Marx (1 977b: 10). 
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'Political, legal, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development 
is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another 
and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic situation is 
cause, solely active, whereas everything else is only passive effect. There 
is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately 
always asserts itself.' 125 
Marxism considers human social practice to be dialectically related to the 
materiality of human social existence. The relationship between the two is 
necessarily an asymmetrical one. 126 For, whereas practice can and does influence 
the composition and development of social existence, it is always constrained by 
the material framework of that existence, and can never have effects which are not 
founded in that material framework. In other words, the unity of social practice 
and social existence is achieved in a relationship of contradiction, marked by the 
dominance of the latter over the former. We generally act the way we think, and 
in so acting we affect the way we live - but only because the way we think has 
been determined by the way we live. Our subjectivity is constituted objectively. 
The determinism of Marxism is not, it must be reiterated, an economic 
determinism. It does not, as is so often alleged, rob us of our subjectivity and 
transform us into helpless victims of some kind of overwhelming vis absoluta. 
On the contrary, Marxist determinism allows us to explain the material basis of 
our subjectivity, and also that our feelings of helplessness have identifiable causes 
in objective reality. It arms us with the means to investigate social practices and 
historical developments systematically, without having to rely upon the vagaries 
of chance or the fancies of free will. 127 Provided we conceive of it as did Marx 
and Engels, and all the other great Marxists, that is, dialectically, the idea of 
determinism is neither disarming nor dehumanizing. Rather, it affords us 
125 Letter to Borgius op cit 694, original emphasis. 
126 Symmetry entails fixity, which does not accord with the developmental tenor of dialectics. 
127 See Lenin (1975: 198). 
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philosophical access to the defining feature of social reality, namely, that all social 
practice begins with human beings in definite and historically specific social 
relations of production. 128 
1.18 The Problem of Legality 
At this point it is necessary to canvas an issue which has apparently caused a 
major problem for the materialist conception of history, especially as regards the 
classification of the legal form as a superstructural element. The problem, raised 
by critics such as Acton and Plamenatz, derives from Marx's lexical choices 
(emphasized below) in the following sentence from the 1859 Preface: 
'At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces 
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms 
- with the property relations within the framework of which they 
have operated hitherto.' 
In this sentence Marx tells us, inter alia, that property relations express relations 
of production 'in legal terms'. The argument of the critics is that here Marx, in 
effect, is making an admission which undermines any clear distinction between 
base and superstructure. For, if relations of production and property relations are, 
according to Marx, equivalents, then law is in fact an aspect ofthe economic 
structure of society. It is not a mere superstructural aspect. It is an attribute of the 
base. This conclusion follows from the fact that property is quintessentially a 
legal construct. 
The critics press on, arguing that, in fact, social relations of production can 
be defmed properly only in legal terms. Thus, for example, Plamenatz contends 
that: 
128 Marxist determinism may perhaps be likened to a form of vis compu/siva which allows a 
margin of choice within a situation of necessity. 
'Unfortunately, it is quite impossible to define these relations [of 
production] except in terms of the claims which men make upon one 
another and recognize - except in terms of admitted rights and 
obligations.' 129 
Hence, if the relations of production are in fact legally constructed, Marx's 
distinction between the base and superstructure collapses, and so does the 
materialist conception of history. Cohen refers to this issue as the 'problem of 
legality',130 and Hunt dubs it 'the legal problem in Marx' .l31 Cohen poses 'the 
problem' as follows: 
'The problem: if the economic structure is constituted of property 
(or ownership) relations, how can it be distinct from the legal 
superstructure which it is supposed to explain?' 132 
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According to the commentators, the 'problem of legality' implies that historical 
materialism is 'viciously circular': 133 it is unable consistently to separate the base 
from the superstructure and must, ultimately, 'lapse into incoherence' .134 
Cohen's solution to the problem is well known. He argues, contrary to 
Plamenatz, that it is indeed possible to defme the relations of production in terms 
other than the legal ones of 'admitted rights and obligations'. He constructs what 
he terms 'rechtsfrei production relations', 135 by 'dropping the word "right" and 
replacing it by the word "power'" .136 Despite appearances to the contrary, the 
change effected by Cohen is not simply a formal terminological one. The change 
is also an analytical-methodological one. For, he says: 
129 Plamenatz (1963: 281). 
130 Cohen op cit 217. 
131 Hunt op cit 183 . 
132 Cohen op cit 217-8, original emphasis. 
133 Sayer op cit 50. 
134 Collins op cit 77. 
135 Cohen op cit 222. 
136 Ibid 219. 
'Possession of powers does not entail possession of the rights they match, 
nor does possession of rights entail possession of the powers matching 
them. ,137 
In other words the lexical shift implies a substantive transformation from a 
rechtsvoll to a rechtsfrei conception of relations of production. 
1.19 What Problem? 
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Whether or not Cohen has succeeded in solving the 'problem of legality' is 
moot. The matter need not be pursued further here, because there is, it is 
submitted, a prior issue which requires discussion, namely, whether or not the 
'problem of legality' is a real problem for Marxism. Specifically, does Marx, in 
the Preface, defme the relations of production in legal terms, as Cohen's 
formulation of the problem implies? A number of reconstructionists, even though 
they do not share Cohen's faith in 'traditional historical materialism', agree that 
'the legal problem in Marx' does indeed exist. They accept that in the Preface 
Marx does in fact tell us that supposedly superstructural legal relations are at once 
also part and parcel of the economic structure of society, thereby calling into 
question the validity of the base-superstructure distinction which is so basic to 
'traditional historical materialism,.138 And they have offered solutions to the 
problem of legality which, for the most part, amount to an abandonment of 
'traditional historical materialism' . 
Unlike Cohen, who defends the base-superstructure distinction, the 
reconstructionists, as already noted, have moved, to a greater or lesser degree, 
towards conceiving the juridical itself as a relation of production or as constitutive 
of the relations of production. This approach to the 'problem of legality' derives 
137 Ibid 217. 
138 See, for example, Hunt op cit 182ff, Collins op cit 77ffand Sayer op cit 50ff. 
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from the' obviousness' of the impact of legal relations upon the economic 
structure of capitalist society. But, in taking it, the reconstructionists have 
virtually abolished the distinction between base and superstructure. In their 
efforts to meet the Acton-Plamenatz charge and to distance themselves from the 
official Stalinist conception of history, they have essentially repudiated a 
distinction which is crucial to the integrity of historical and dialectical materialism 
- and hence to Marxism. 
It is submitted, however, that the 'problem of legality' is a spurious 
problem. Its existence has much more to do with justifying the reconstructionist 
project than with resolving supposed inconsistencies in the 'guiding principle' of 
the Preface. The answer to the question posed above must, then, be an emphatic 
no: Marx does not define production relations in terms of or with reference to 
legal relations. Even Plamenatz accepts this, when he writes that: 
'He [Marx] also says that property relations are the legal expression 
of relations of production ... Why say of them [relations of 
production] that property relations are their legal expression, 
implying that they can be distinguished from them? Why not just 
call them property relations, and have done with it? .. . Presumably 
because they [Marx and Engels] want to exclude law from what they 
call the economic structure of society, and therefore feel the need to 
suggest that relations of production can be defined without bringing 
the notion of law into the definition.' 139 
Here we have one of the supposed prime movers of 'the legal problem in Marx' 
telling us, expressly, that Marx does not equate relations of production with 
property relations and consciously avoids 'defining the relations of production by 
reference to legal rights and obligations' .140 
139 Plamenatz op cit 280-281. 
140 Collins op cit 81. 
The truth is that Plamenatz never actually alleges that Marxism is faced 
with a 'problem of legality'. What he, in fact, does is simply to declare, as we 
have seen, that 'it is quite impossible' to defme the relations of production 
without reference to the law. Acton asserts similarly, if more broadly, that: 
'The "material or economic basis" of society is not, therefore, 
something that can be clearly conceived, still less observed, apart 
from the legal, moral and political relationships of men.' 141 
The point is that both Acton and Plamenatz are opponents of Marx's materialist 
conception of history on which the base-superstructure distinction is founded. 
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They deny the primacy of the base over the superstructure and allege 
instead that the relations of production can only be identified and defined in tenns 
of one or more elements of the superstructure. That, however, is very different 
from alleging that, in the Preface, Marx defmes the relations of production in 
legal or proprietary tenns. Inexplicably, none of the reconstructionists appears to 
have noticed this crucial difference. They all accept that the 'problem of legality' 
as fonnulated by Cohen does indeed exist and requires resolution. They, more 
than the Acton-Plamenatz school, have created the 'problem oflegality' or, at 
least, have wrongly extrapolated it from the Acton-Plamenatz objections to 
dialectical and historical materialism. 
141 Cited in Cohen op cit 235. 
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1.20 Social Relations and Property Relations 
Marx's own formulation of the matter in the Preface is unambiguous. In the 
seventh sentence of the excerpt he tells us that property relations express the 
relations of production in legal terms. This postulate can be transformed into the 
'problem of legality' only by a truly sophist reading which employs the rules of 
formal logic, the method of reasoning which Marx expressly rejected. 142 The 
problem which the reconstructionists claim to have espied in the Preface emerges, 
literally, from one sentence. That sentence comes after five others in which Marx 
establishes explicitly that the superstructure derives from the social relations of 
production, and hence that legal relations need to be understood in relation to their 
material origins in the social relations of production. Thus, at the very beginning 
of the excerpt Marx comments that: 
'My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations 
nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves 
or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human 
mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material 
conditions of life. ' 
Between this comment and the offending sentence Marx makes crystal clear the 
relationship of determinism which materialism posits between being and 
consciousness, between the economic structure and the superstructure. It is 
therefore difficult to countenance, as the reconstructionists appear to do, that he 
should, whimsically and mysteriously, and in contradistinction to all that he has 
said before, suddenly decide that legal relations and production relations are 
ontological equivalents, that the relations of production are in fact property 
relations. 
142 According to the principles of formal logic, it is indeed impossible for legal/property 
relations to be both superstructural and structural. The problem, however, evaporates if one 
reads the Preface as Marx wrote it, that is, dialectically. 
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It is noteworthy that the sentence in which Marx refers to property relations 
as the legal expression of the social relations of production is also the sentence in 
which he begins his explanation of the process of social revolution, that is, the 
transformation from one mode of production to another. Such transformation is a 
dialectical movement, proceeding from the unity and conflict of forces and 
relations of production. And it is entirely consistent with a dialectical 
comprehension of social transformation for Marx to advert not only to the 
economic structure but also to its legal expression, the property relations. For, 
these property relations invariably are or, if they are not, ought to be the prime 
target of the human agents of social revolution. 
In class society people encounter the social relations of production most 
immediately in their juridical guise, as property relations, as differential 
proprietary relationships to the means of production. When Marx points to the 
superstructural copula of the relations of production as an alternative mode of 
comprehending the dialectic of social transformation, he is pointing to the form of 
the relations of production against which human social practice aimed at social 
revolution is necessarily directed. When he reminds us that property relations are 
the legal expression of the social relations of production, he is re-uniting form and 
content, pertinently foregrounding the fact that formal property relations have 
their material foundation in the social relations of production. In the Preface, 
Marx does not intrude the juridical into the relations of production and hence does 
not lead us into the conceptual quicksand of legal relations being simultaneously a 
component of the superstructure and the base. The 'problem of legality' is not a 
problem 'in Marx' but a problem in an epigonism which, ultimately, must 
repudiate the materialism of Marxism and itself 'lapse into incoherence'. 
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1.21 Marxism and Jurisprudence 
Despite the many assaults, reconstructionist and reactionary, upon it, to this 
day the 1859 Preface stands as the best short exposition of the main tenets of the 
Marxist method of social investigation. 143 It contains all the conceptual 
guidelines required for a critical analysis of restorative justice as a theory of 
criminal justice. Restorative justice is an aspect of capitalist legality.l44 It is <a 
jurisprudential intervention in the search for a solution to the capitalist crisis of 
criminality. As already noted, the fundamental premise of the Marxist approach 
to bourgeois jurisprudence is that capitalist legality is, essentially, the juridical 
expression of capitalist social relations of production. 
The capitalist legal form is an element of the superstructure of the capitalist 
mode of production. It has its origins in and is determined by the social relations 
of production, in other words, its content is to be found in the economic structure 
of capitalism. Restorative justice is a legal superstructural form and must 
therefore be analysed as a conjugate of the legal relations of the capitalist mode of 
production. Marxism holds that capitalist relations of production summate in the 
struggle between the two major classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In 
other words, the content of the theory of restorative justice, as an aspect of 
bourgeois legality, is to be found in the ties of exploitation comprising the capital-
labour relation. 
In class, and hence also in capitalist society, law makes a crucial 
contribution to the systematic reproduction of the mode of production, by 
operating to protect and regulate the social relations of production. 145 In a word, 
143 See Timpanaro op cit 77-78. 
144 It is posited in Chapter Six below that restorative justice is a postmodern theory of justice 
and, as such, a feature of specifically late capitalist legality. See Mandel (1975). 
145 Certain proponents of restorative justice recognize this. Thus, Toews & Zehr (2003: 261) 
refer to 'laws being created to preserve' the extant social arrangements. 
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the general purpose of bourgeois legality is to protect the dictatorship ofthe 
bourgeoisie against attack, conscious or spontaneous, organized or random, from 
its class enemies, to guarantee the conditions of existence of capitalist private 
property.146 Restorative justice is an aspect of this structure of class domination 
which the law reinforces, via the competencies of the state. Conventional 
punishment highlights the coercive competency of the state in respect of the 
individual criminal; ideological domination has a role only in the general deterrent 
value of such punishment. By contrast, restorative justice appears to focus much 
more on the consensual dimension ofthe law, aiming at an ideological hegemony 
backed up, in the fmal analysis, by the coercive power of the state. 
However, generalities about the class content of legal relations and the role 
of the state in defending the class rule of the bourgeoisie, although true, do not 
suffice as a materialist explanation of restorative justice. Such generalities are 
applicable to the whole gamut of legal superstructural elements which we 
encounter in capitalist social formations. The Marxist analysis of restorative 
justice thus cannot be content with mapping the class basis of the legal 
superstructure. It also has to engage law as form. In particular, it has to explore 
the peculiarities of restorative justice as legal form. 
146 The work produced by Quinney and Chambliss in the 1970s and 1980s exemplifies the 
Marxist commitment to uncovering the class content of and the power configurations 
expressed in legal relations. Quinney's (2002) Critique o/Legal Order, first published in 
1974, and Chambliss's (1973) study of vagrancy law remain classics ofthls school of 
Marxist criminology. It is true that they are sometimes criticized for espousing 
instrumentalism. See, for example, Shelden (2002: xii) and Winfree & Abadinsky (2003: 
254-256). However, insofar as they seek to comprehend legal relations materialistically 
and to discern the class interests and conflicts embedded in the legal system, they may be 
taken to be part of the classical tradition of Marxism. And while the charge of 
instrumentalism may be sustainable in respect of their early writings, it is not readily 
applicable to their writings of the 1980s. In this regard, see Quinney (1980: 46-47) and 
Chambliss & Seidman (1982: 144). The real weakness in their work is not their alleged 
instrumentalism (which, for classical Marxism, is not the repugnancy it is for Western 
Marxism) but their failure to engage the legal form as object of analysis. 
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A properly Marxist analysis needs to comprehend the class content of a 
legal form such as restorative justice. But its also needs to comprehend it qua 
form, that is, it needs engage the concept of restorative justice as a superstructural 
specificity. Restorative justice is a legal form of the social relations of production 
of capitalism. These relations, we know, are lived, for the most part, as the 
property regime of capitalism, that is, as commodified relations. From the 
Marxist perspective, the legal form is the homologue of the commodity form. 147 
The Marxist interrogation of restorative justice as legal form must therefore 
commence with the commodity, as the pristine form of capitalist property. 
Significantly, the core theoretical claim of restorative justice is a proprietary 
one. It seeks to re-defme the criminal episode as the property of the offender and 
victim. 148 That is, it seeks to remove crimes from the public arena and to treat 
them instead as private disputes, owned and thereby falling to be resolved by the 
affected parties, as equals, according to a contract negotiated in a restorative 
conference. 149 Restorative justice thus commodifies the criminal incident and 
transforms offender and victim into commodity owners who relate to each other 
as equals. In other words, it campaigns for crime to be comprehended as a 
materialization of the commodity form. In this sense, restorative justice theorizes 
itself in explicit and unmediated relation to the social relations of production of 
the capitalist mode of production, as the material milieu of the commodity form. 
The analysis Wldertaken in the chapters below will thus, for the most part, simply 
be following the cue given by restorative justice itself. 
147 This relationship was originally postulated by Marx and Engels in various writings and later 
elaborated into the Marxist general theory oflaw by Pashukanis. See Chapter Five below 
for a full discussion. 
148 See Christie (1977). The theory of restorative justice is analysed in detail in Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five below. 
149 See Weitekamp (1999: 97) whose equation of the restorative sanction with a negotiated 
contract entails a proprietary precept. 
CHAPTER TWO 
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Chapter Two: Historical Perspectives 
There is a strong strand of historicism running through the body of 
restorative justice. Its proponents invariably include in their validatory manifesto 
an appeal to history. They argue that the concept has deep roots in the juridical 
past of humankind. They tell us that our pre-modem forebears created and 
embraced the principles of restorative justice, and that for them it was the normal 
way of doing justice. Punishment as we know it is considered a historically 
exceptional response to criminal conflict. 1 There are few restorationists who do 
not fInd comfort in the belief that our restorative intuitions are antediluvian, and 
may coincide with the formation of human society.2 It is a belief which enjoys the 
status of a restorationist article of faith, more or less.3 
The restorationist argument from history is well-illustrated in the reference 
by Van Ness & Strong to an 'ancient pattern' in Western law according to which: 
'diverse cultures responded to what we now call crime by requiring 
offenders and their families to make amends to victims and their 
families - not simply to ensure that injured persons received 
compensation but also to restore community peace. ,4 
Mazrui makes a similar point in respect of the aboriginal African approach to the 
justice: 
'In indigenous terms, the protection of the innocent was precisely the 
main focus of law enforcement, rather than the punishplent of the 
guilty per se. Arising out ofthl.s came the victim-focus in law 
enforcement rather than the villain focus. When a crime was 
committed it was more fundamental to have the victim's family 
compensated than to have the villain or culprit punished. ,5 
1 See Weitekamp (1999: 82). 
2 Ibid 8l. 
3 For a dissenting view from within the restorationist ranks, see Daly (2002: 61-64). 
4 Van Ness & Strong (1997: 8). 
5 Mazrui (1986: 205). See also Van Ness & Strong ibid 9. 
He goes on to suggest that the reason for the intractability of the crime 
problems plaguing contemporary Africa lies in that continent's failure to 
adopt the ideas and to make use of the methods of restorative justice in its 
attempts to resolve the problems: 
'What almost no African government is doing is returning to 
. indigenous principles of norm fulfilment and methods of 
compensation and collective responsibility.,6 
Weitekamp makes a direct connection between restorative justice and the 
practices of the premoderns: 
'In looking at the latest developments in restorative justice, one finds 
some of the newly implemented programmes are in fact very old, 
and that ancient forms of restorative justice have been used in 
acephalous societies and by early forms of human kind.,7 
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Restorative justice was born of dissatisfaction with the patent inability of the 
criminal justice system to resolve the contemporary crisis of criminality and 
represents a major challenge to the legitimacy of that system. It is at the same 
time, of course, concerned to establish its own legitimacy as a viable alternative. 
The restorationist project is, in fme, a campaign to replace criminal justice with 
restorative justice. It is a campaign which needs to be justified. Hence the appeal 
to history. Hence the claim to a historical pedigree which goes back well beyond 
the modem era. 8 
6 Mazrui ibid 209. 
7 Weitekamp op cit 93 . 
8 It is argued in Chapter Six below that restorative justice is a postmodern jurisprudence. 
Appeals to premodern ways are standard in the postmodern campaign against the supposed 
tyranny of modernism. 
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2.1 Restoration and Retribution 
The historical argument for restorative justice is constructed, for the most 
part (and in true dialectical fashion), in opposition to the perceived domination of 
the retributionist paradigm in the modern approach to crime and punishment.9 As 
intimated above, restorationists argue that our response to crime has not always 
been punitive, as it is today. They point out that punishment is but one of a 
number of possible ways which we have inherited of responding to offenders. 
History has also bequeathed us a range of non-punitive responses to criminal 
conduct. Hence, there is nothing either inevitable or necessary about the 
punishment paradigm. Certainly, it cannot claim historical priority over the 
restorative paradigm. 10 Zehr makes the argument thus: 
'The retributive model of justice is not the only way we have 
envisioned justice in the West. In fact, other models of justice have 
predominated throughout most of our history. Only within the past 
several centuries has the retributive paradigm come to monopolize 
our vision. ,11 
Wright takes the argument in favour of the restorative paradigm forward in much 
the same vein: 
'Crime and punishment are traditionally associated. Even 
definitions of crime generally include punishment: it is an act 
prohibited by law for which a duly convicted offender can be 
punished. But that has not always been the case. In other periods 
and cultures the response has been a restorative one: offenders make 
up for what they have done.' 12 
In other words, there has always been a miscellany of ways of doing justice, and 
the restorative paradigm has at least as much historical purchase as the 
punishment paradigm. 
9 Weitekamp (op cit 73 & 97) extends this opposition to rehabilitation. 
10 The opposition between the punishment paradigm and the restorative paradigm is derived 
from Ashworth (1993: 280). 
11 Zebr(1995: 87). 
12 Wright (1991: 1). 
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From the restorationist viewpoint, then, retributionism does not enjoy a 
historical monopoly and is in fact a relative latecomer in the evolution of criminal 
justice. And it is a way of doing justice which is neither as natural nor as obvious 
as is often supposed. It is also not qualitatively superior to its competitors or 
predecessors. Its advocates argue that the restorative approach, in terms of which 
the response to criminal wrongdoing is geared towards mending the damage 
caused by the offender to the victim and the community, was once as 
jurisprudential and practical a commonplace as retributionism appears to be today. 
According to Wright: 
'Historical and anthropological reviews show that many simple 
societies function with little or no distinction between civil and 
criminal wrongs; indeed some do not have a system of law as 
understood in the complex societies of today, but rather a procedure 
for restoring the balance through reparation in individual cases 
where one citizen has harmed another. ' 13 
Zehr describes the premodern version of the restorative approach as 
community justice, that is, a type of justice which: 
' recognized that harm had been done to people, that the people 
involved had to be central to a resolution, and that reparation of 
harm was critical' .14 
In sum, then, its proponents submit that restorative justice is an integral, albeit 
neglected, aspect of our penal heritage, and can be traced back at least to a period 
of human history which predates the definition of crime as an offence against the 
state and which needs to be punished. They contend that the answer to the 
contemporary crisis of criminality begins with the recovery of our restorative 
proclivities. 
13 Ibid 8-9. 
14 Zehr op cit 107. See also Van Ness & Strong (op cit 9) who submit that 'the purpose of the 
[traditional] justice process was, through vindication and reparation, to restore a community 
that had been sundered by crime' . 
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The appeal to the restorative impulses of our ancestors is usually made, as 
intimated above, to counter the belief that humankind's aboriginal and natural 
response to injury or wrongdoing was vengeance. The restorationists hold that 
reparation as a response to wrongdoing has a history at least as long as vengeance. 
For them vengeance was not historically primary, but 'only one of a much richer 
set of options' 15 which included restoration. In other words, the notion that 
retribution forms the historical core of our penal jurisprudence is false. Our 
natural respbnse to wrongdoing was not merely to take revenge but also to ensure 
the restoration of the status quo ante, that is, to require the offender and/or his kin 
to make good the harm caused by his conduct to the victim and the community. 16 
Thus, restorative justice was, at minimum, an aspect of the original human penal 
impulse. It is neither new nor a radical postmodem creation. It has, at least, the 
same historical legitimacy as retribution, and if today we tend to think of 
retribution as the obvious response to crime, there is no reason why we should 
not, in the future, think of restorative justice in the same terms. 
Such, briefly, is the argument for restorative justice from history. This 
chapter will attempt to evaluate this argument in terms of the precepts of historical 
materialism. It will analyse the history of the concept of restorative justice 
materialistically, relying upon the relevant concepts and methodological resources 
delineated in Chapter One. It is a Marxist axiom that material production 
determines mental production. There is always an objective basis, sometimes 
patent, often latent, to our thought products. The concepts which the human mind 
invents are invariably responses to historically specific material conditions. The 
analysis of concepts must therefore proceed from the material conditions in which 
they were created and elaborated. The aim of this chapter is thus to map the 
history of the concept of restorative justice in relation to this basic premise of 
historical materialism. 
15 Zebr ibid 98. 
16 See Zebr ibid 106-107. 
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2.2 Marxism and Social Evolution 
Marxist historiography is overtly evolutionist. It embraces a notion of 
social evolution, that is, the 'theory that society has passed through successive 
stages of development from lower to higher' .17 Such evolution is, of course, 
materialistically comprehended, according to the historical development of the 
forces of production and the impact of such development upon the development 
of human culture and social life. In other words, Marxism accepts that the history 
of humankind displays a general progression from lower to higher stages of social 
organization, with each such stage corresponding to a deftnite mode of 
production. 
As an analytical perspective, evolutionism does not enjoy much support 
outside of Marxist circles. It was very popular in the late 19th century. At that 
time, it was not a speciftcally Marxist approach. It was an integral aspect of the 
general intellectual milieu, 'a current of opinion that was almost universally 
accepted' .18 Today, however, it is the object of near universal rejection. While 
pockets of evolutionary thought persist, it is anti-evolutionism which currently 
reigns supreme. 19 Certainly, evolutionism has little credence amongst legal 
anthropologists?O Their disaffection is founded upon the convictions, ftrstly, that 
history is not 'lawful' in the evolutionary sense and, secondly, that evolutionism is 
unable to comprehend the wide diversity of social organization which human 
17 Reed (1975: 466). 
18 Bloch (1983: 63). See also Dugger & Shennan (2000: 3) and Sanderson (1992: 2). Sack & 
Aleck (1992: xvii) refer to evolutionism as 'this ideological linchpin of modern western 
civilization' . 
19 See Sanderson ibid 209, Bloch ibid, Sack & Aleck ibid xix, Stein (1980: 124-127) and 
Barrett (1985: 16). 
20 Thus, for example, Sack & Aleck (ibid xvii-xx) dismiss evolutionism as a species of 
positivism. It is accorded little, if any, space in anthologies on the anthropology of law. 
For example, the collections edited by Starr & Collier (1989), Sack & Aleck (1992) and 
Nader (1997) do not contain any pieces which are written from the evolutionary perspective 
or which are dedicated to analyzing or criticizing evolutionism. And the recent reader 
edited by Moore (2005) devotes perhaps 30 pages (of some 360) to brief extracts from 
works (of writers such as Maine, Morgan, Durkheim and Weber) which embrace an overtly 
evolutionary perspective. 
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beings have created. These arguments coalesce in the assertion that there is too 
much that is unique about individual societies to fit them all neatly into a general 
evolutionary scheme.21 The cognate discipline of the sociology oflaw treats 
evolutionism with more or less the same short shrift?2 
A brief response to these critics of evolutionism is necessary. The argument 
that there are no general laws of social development is undennined by the weight 
21 See Bloch ibid 63-64, Stein ibid 124, Leacock (1988: 12), Novack (1980: 35) and 
Friedman (1977: 42-45), Moore (2000: 82-133) concludes her extensive critique of 
Pound' s legal evolutionary schema with the observation that his supposedly successive 
stages in fact 'can be found glued together' in pre-industrial societies. She also criticizes 
the schemes of Maine, Durkheim and Malinowski as being 'overfocused on particular 
elements', thereby using 'one aspect ofa system to characterize the whole, which is a 
procedure of dubious worth'. Moore's arguments are refinements upon the basic anti-
evolutionist position outlined above. 
22 For example, Cotterrell (1984: 27) discusses evolutionism (after a fashion) but dismisses it 
in the following terms: 'Yet these evolutionary theories of breathtaking range and 
generalisation provide only the vaguest hints of the complex nature of social change. " 
Now, it is apparent that the variety of societies is such that evolutionary studies assuming 
broad uniform patterns of social development in all societies are at best simplistic (if 
suggestive), at worst grossly misleading.' 
The attention which Hunt (1978) devotes to evolutionism in his study of the sociological 
movement in law is largely expository of the work of Pound, Durkheim and Weber. In his 
conclusion, Hunt (ibid: 141-142) does castigate bourgeois legal ideology for enlisting 
evolutionism in its argument for the necessity and naturalness oflaw in 'civilized' societies. 
However, even though he declares 'a strong commitment to Marxism' (ibid 9), he makes no 
commitment to the evolutionary perspective of classical Marxism. 
The developmental model oflegal ordering posited by Nonet & Selznick (2001) does not 
follow the generalized anti-evolutionist tenor of the sociology of law. They conceive of 
their triadic typology of repressive, autonomous and responsive (or purposive) law in 
evolutionary terms. Thus, they tell us (ibid 18): 'We want to argue that repressive, 
autonomous and responsive law are not only distinct types of law but, in some sense, stages 
of evolution in the relation of law to the political and social order.' They continue (ibid 
116): 'In conclusion, it may be helpful to restate the main point of the developmental model 
we have proposed, that is, the sense in which responsive law represents a "higher" stage of 
legal evolution than autonomous and repressive law.' However, as is evident from this last 
quotation, Nonet & Selznick subscribe to a model-building version of evolutionism. From 
a Marxist point of view, model-builders (even those who accept evolutionism) commit the 
cardinal methodological error of hypostatizing their model of reality. Marxism is not 
concerned with straitjacketing reality into an evolutionary model but with comprehending 
its evolution in its material and historical specificity. For the model-builder, fitting a 
phenomenon into an evolutionary stage forecloses investigation; for the Marxist it is the 
methodological beginning of investigation. In this regard, see Leacock ibid 14. 
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of empirical evidence to the contrary.23 And the argument from historical 
particularism misses the point about evolutionism entirely. That point is to 
discern the directionality of social development on a world-historical scale. The 
fact that many societies do not fit easily into the general pattern of historical 
change proves only that evolutionism cannot be equated with or reduced to a 
'simplistic unilinearlism' ,24 as the particularists are wont to do. It does not 
disprove evolutionism, nor does it present a serious challenge to the evolutionary 
record. There is, in this regard, some considerable substance in Sanderson's 
conclusion (derived from Lenski) that anti-evolutionists 'find no patterns in 
history because they don't want to find them,?5 Certainly, classical Marxism is 
unequivocally evolutionist. Indeed, as Sanderson observes, 'Marx's theory of 
history makes no real sense except as a type of evolutionism' .26 
It is well-known that Marx and Engels identified a sequence of five modes 
of production in the evolution of human society hitherto. These are the primitive 
communist, the Asiatic, the slave, the feudal and the capitalist modes of 
production. It must be stressed, however, that these modes of production are 
successive only in the world-historical sense, that is, they indicate the general 
development and overall direction of human society as a whole. The Marxist 
concept of social evolution has no relation whatsoever to the idea that each 
society has passed or must pass through each of the identified modes of 
23 Leacock (ibid 16-17) makes the point thus: 'Criticisms of evolutionary theory have 
characteristically emphasized the infinite variability of specific lifeways found around the 
world, each the historical end product of unique events and influences. Yet the 
accumulation of data has not merely documented diversity. Archaeological researches have 
yielded an undeniable picture of mankind's development from "savage" hunters to 
"barbarian" agriculturalists and finally to the "civilizations" of the Ancient East.' See also 
Novack (op cit 31-48) for a useful survey of the 'lawfulness' inherent in the record of social 
evolution. See further Sanderson (op cit 216-218) for more evidence of and arguments for 
evolutionary directionality. 
24 Sanderson op cit 216. 
25 Sanderson op cit 218. 
26 Ibid 1. 
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production in strict order. Marxism eschews such crass linearity and crude 
teleology. The modes of production are sequential only in the sense that each, 
wherever and whenever it may have developed first, represented an advance upon 
its predecessor in the global development of human society. 27 
Historians conventionally divide the human record into two great sections, 
namely, prehistory and history, separated by the art ofwriting?S In the Marxist 
canon, primitive communism is a prehistoric mode of production, while the others 
are historical modes. In their analysis of primitive communism, Marx and Engels 
relied heavily upon the social evolutionary thesis formulated by the American 
anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan in his Ancient SOciety, first published in 
1877. This work formed the basis of Engels's own The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State.29 
Morgan postulated that human society has developed through three world-
historical epochs or 'ethnical periods', each identified by a specific 'art of 
subsistence'. He designated these epochs savagery, barbarism and civilization.3o 
The savage 'art of subsistence' was food gathering.3! For barbarism it was food 
27 See Childe (1947: 10-11). 
28 See Daniel (1964: 10). 
29 Marx took extensive notes from Ancient Society, and Engels used these to write a Marxist 
treatment of Morgan's findings in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. 
See Engels (1940: 3) who, while accepting the fundamentals of Morgan's scheme, notes that 
the 'treatment of the economic aspects, which in Morgan's book was sufficient for his 
purpose but quite inadequate for mine, has been done afresh by myself. 
30 See Morgan (1912: 3-28). 
31 Engels (op cit 25) describes savagery as 'the period in which man's appropriation of 
products in their natural state predominates'. See also Childe (1944: 12) and Mandel 
(1979: 18). 
production.32 Civilization is marked by the steady development of the forces of 
production, from agriculture through manufacture to industry.33 It summates in 
capitalism, which has generalized commodity production as its 'art of 
subsistence'. Savagery and barbarism constitute the prehistory of humankind, 
civilization its history. 
Marxism adopted Morganism substantially.34 There are, of course, 
important differences. Marx and Engels subsumed Morgan's fust two 'ethnical 
periods', savagery and barbarism, under the prehistoric primitive communist 
mode of production. They divided his third 'ethnical period', civilization, into 
four historical modes of production. They also went beyond Morgan by 
supplementing the formal-technical distinction between prehistory and history 
with a substantive socio-economic criterion of class and its concomitant, class 
struggle. The historical materialist postulate in this regard is that human 
prehistory is marked by the absence of social classes and hence is free of class 
struggle, whereas the historical period is dominated by the constant struggle 
between antagonistic social classes. Prehistoric societies are classless and 
communist; historical societies are rent by class divisions and endemic social 
inequality. The difference is fundamental and derives, in materialist terms, from 
the different' art of subsistence' or level of development of the forces of 
production which characterized each 'ethnical period' or mode of production. 
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32 Barbarism was a transitional epoch between savagery and civilization. It was marked by 
the Neolithic revolution, that is, the historic passage from food gathering to food 
production. Engels (ibid) refers to barbarism as 'the period during which man learns to 
breed domestic animals and to practice agriculture, and acquires methods of increasing the 
supply of natural products by human agency'. Our barbarian forebears thus took a giant 
leap which advanced human social evolution prodigiously. They were the heralds of 
civilization. 
33 Engels (ibid) describes civilization as the epoch 'in which man learns a more advanced 
application of work to the products of nature, the period of industry proper and of art'. 
34 Terray (1972: 66) considers that 'Morgan's arts of subsistence are, in fact, no different from 
Marx's productive forces; the ethnic period is the mode of production together with the 
juridical and political superstructures it has called forth' . 
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2.3 Savagery and Primitive Communism 
The aboriginal savage unit of human social organization was the primal 
horde.35 During this stage of our evolution (by far the longest) we had no or very 
little control over the natural environment and life was a constant battle to wrest 
from nature the requirements of our survival. Individual survival depended 
entirely upon social or group survival.36 In other words, the imperatives of 
survival imposed upon early humankind a social organization which was 
communal and collective, marked by the most complete equality possible.37 
Sociality and equality were thus the presuppositions of savagery. Our savage 
predecessors were perforce also communards. 
In the epoch of savagery the primal horde was elemental and total. There 
were no families. There were no classes. This is the era of unadulterated 
primitive communism. Social relations were founded upon the principle of literal 
equality. Social life was devoted to one goal only, the collective survival of the 
horde, against nature and rival hordes. The only division of labour was that 
between the sexes. In the material conditions of savagery, this meant that 
everyone (bar the very young and the very old and infirm) had to participate in the 
collection of the means of subsistence, which then had to be shared amongst all 
members.38 There was enough to feed everyone, but no surplus which could 
privilege some members of the horde materially at the expense of others. 
35 Reed op cit 197. Manfred (1972: 12) refers to it as the primitive herd. It spanned most of 
the 450 or so millennia which constituted the archaeological Palaeolithic or Old Stone Age. 
36 See Manfred ibid: 'During that distant epoch man found his sustenance mainly by gathering 
whatever food nature happened to provide, such as fruits and berries, and by hunting small 
animals. Since people at that time were to a large extent helpless before the forces of 
nature, they were obliged to live, work and defend themselves in groups.' 
37 See Manfred ibid: 'These primitive herds were completely lacking in any concept of 
hierarchy or inequality.' 
38 See Newman (1983: 142). 
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The primal horde was a complete social entity in and unto itself, 
autonomous and self-sufficient, which related to other hordes only in competition 
in the primal quest of food and shelter.39 But in its internal relations it was 
necessarily fully egalitarian. Communism was a condition imposed upon our 
savage ancestors by the material conditions of their existence. It could not occur 
to any member to lord it over his fellows. The relentlessness of the communal 
battle against the forces of nature precluded the very idea of any individualist 
battle against the equality postulate. Savages had no choice but to be 
communards also. 
Savage society was not only classless. It was also propertyless. According 
to Seagle, 'it is fair to assume an aboriginal state of non-property' .40 In other 
words, as the aboriginal epoch of human society, savagery had no or little notion 
of property as we know it. There was, no doubt, recognition of personal property 
such as clothing, body ornaments, weapons and the like.41 But such personal 
property, given its peculiar relationship to its 'owner' ,42 could not undermine the 
communist nature of social relations. Seagle puts the matter cogently: 
'Communism does not imply that no exclusive possession of objects 
of personal use can be recognized, nor that there are no individual 
rights and obligations in a communist society. In the nature of 
things, there can be little or no communal interest in a loin-cloth. A 
man's spear is no more than an extension of his hand and he would 
no more think of parting with one than with the other.'43 
39 See Reed op cit 197. 
40 Seagle (1946: 51). 
41 See Lafargue (1975: 10-11) and Seagle ibid 50-51. Both these writers note that the 
personal 'property' of primitive people is so intensely personal, that it becomes 
'incorporated with the person' or is 'hardly more than an extension of the person'. Such 
objects of personal use are inalienable. They live and die with the person, being destroyed 
or buried with the 'owner' on death. 
42 See previous footnote. 
43 Seagle op cit 53 . 
The point is that humans in the epoch of savagery, given their 'art of 
subsistence', could not conceive of property in their most important means 
of production, the land. As hunters and gatherers their interest was in 'the 
yield of the land - its game, trees, fruit, grains - rather than in the land 
itself.44 Their relation to the land was entirely natural and hence non-
proprietary . 
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Savagery was also stateless.45 The state is a specifically historical 
phenomenon which emerged as a product of the division of society into classes. 
In prehistoric times, whatever public authority existed was communal, and 
generally exercised by all adult men and women of the horde. In other words, the 
public authority was properly public, coincidental with the social unit as a whole. 
The state is the negation of such collective jurisdiction. Its emergence removes 
public authority from the collectivity to: 
'a special category of people set apart to rule others and who, for the 
sake and purpose of rule, systematically and permanently have at 
their disposal a certain apparatus of coercion, an apparatus of 
violence' .46 
Such 'privatization' of the public authority was foreign to savage society. It knew 
only the complete democracy of the community, in which there was literally no 
place for state structures. There was only the horde, and it was the only public 
authority. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Hindess & Hirst (1975: 22). 
46 Lenin (1984: 9). 
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Statelessness entailed lawlessness.47 There was no law, there were no 
courts, there was no notion of justice dispensed by a specialized juridical 
apparatus. Savage society was governed by custom and convention, not law. The 
'legal relations' of savagery are customary relations. Thus Seagle notes that: 
'The great reality of primitive society is not "civil" law, or 
"criminal" law, but custom. ,48 
The absence of law from the prehistoric world is not the fabricated result of a 
definitional choice.49 The designation of the savage epoch as lawless is not a 
sophistry. Law and custom are contraries, historically and logically. Law is 
symptomatic of state power, whereas custom signifies the absence of such power. 
Custom is, essentially, non-legal, 50 and law non-customary. In the epoch of 
savagery, then, 'custom is king' .51 
Prehistoric lawlessness meant that savage peoples had no conception of 
lawbreaking conflicts. In the absence of legal institutions, injuries inflicted by 
one member of the prehistoric commune upon another could not be construed as 
crimes. There was no such thing as criminal harm by one communard against 
another. Vermes concludes: 
'Therefore under the conditions of the primitive community there was no 
question of either crime or criminal offences, for both notions presuppose 
legal regulation, which in the absence of a state was non-existent. ,52 
47 Lawlessness here means the non-existence of the legal form. It does not refer to a 
generalized collapse of 'law and order'. Even less does it signify an intellectual incapacity 
for legal rationality amongst savages. Savagery was lawless simply because the material 
conditions for the emergence of law did not exist. It is, of course, arguable that human 
relations in savage society were qualitatively richer than in our civilized society precisely 
because they were free of the legal form. 
48 Seagle op cit 33 . 
49 The idea of savage lawlessness is also not an instance of contemporary legal ethnocentrism, 
as suggested by Spradley & McCurdy (1975: 386-387). 
50 See Diamond (1987: 257). The idea of 'customary law' is thus a contradiction in terms, 
and demonstrates a signal ignorance of the evolution of both custom and law. 
5! Seagle op cit 27. 
52 Vermes (1978: 46). 
Savage society was thus crime-free, at least in the sense that we understand the 
concept of crime. Certainly, there were interpersonal conflicts in the commune. 
Certainly, there was conduct which we would today classify as criminal. But 
savage society had no crime because it had no law. We shall return to this 
question later. 
2.4 Barbarism and the Rise of Gentile Society 
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The gens or clan was the basic unit of social life under barbarism. 53 The 
gens was constituted by a combination of a number of hordes. Unlike its 
predecessor, which existed always in a state of isolation, the clan had links with 
other clans via membership of a common tribe. 54 Clan society retained the 
fundamental communist character of the horde. As with the primal horde, the 
members of the gens were communards, one and all. They, too, lived and died by 
the principle of perfect equality in all things. Thus Moret & Davy observe that: 
'When the horde becomes a social segment instead of being an 
entire society, it changes its name and is called the clan, but it 
preserves all its constituent features. ,55 
Clan or gentile society was thus the fundament of the primal horde evolved to a 
higher level of social organization. 
Barbarism was exemplified by the Neolithic or food-producing revolution, 
which Mandel describes as 'the greatest economic revolution in humanity's 
existence' because it involved a qualitative leap in the development the forces of 
production, which enabled humanity 'to control more or less its own subsistence' 
53 The primal horde began to disintegrate dwing the Upper Palaeolithic age and was replaced, 
during the Mesolithic and Lower Neolithic periods, by the gens. 
54 See Reed op cit 197-198. 
55 Cited in Reed op cit 197. 
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and which 'permitted the building up of food reserves' .56 The emergence of class 
divisions was entrained in the production of a permanent surplus. However, this 
remained a potentiality for most of the epoch, as the battle for survival remained 
predominant, and surpluses were generally stored to ensure the availability of 
sufficient food between harvests. 
Barbarism thus retained the essentialia of the social organization of savagery 
for most of its existence. In other words, our barbarian ancestors, like their 
savage predecessors, were communards also. Only in the last phase of barbarism, 
in the period from about 4000 BC to 3000 BC, do we see the beginnings of the 
break-up of the gentile constitution and the germs of the institutions and relations 
which would become characteristic of the epoch of civilization, namely, class 
inequality, rooted in appropriation ofthe social surplus by an unproductive class, 
and institutionalized in state and law. 
Conceptions of property developed very slowly in the human mind57 and it 
took an event of the magnitude of the Neolithic revolution to initiate the demise of 
the aboriginal 'non-property' regime of the epoch of savagery. Only in the period 
of barbarism, with its pastoral and agricultural 'arts of subsistence' , clid the idea of 
property in land become a possibility. For, unlike its food-collecting antecedent 
which is essentially nomadic, a food-producing society requires, at least, an 
established terrain and a settled population. The birth of property (in its original 
landed version) was contingent upon this transformation in the material conditions 
of human existence. As Seagle tells us, there was: 
'no particular reason for the appropriation of the land until dwellings 
and crops had become permanent' .58 
56 Mandel op cit 18-19. 
57 See Lafargue op cit 18 and Seagle op cit 55. 
58 Seagle ibid 53. 
In other words, humans could only begin to conceive of a proprietary 
regime in land once the productive forces had been revolutionized. This 
occurred during the Neolithic revolution. 
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Gentile society was organized around the village commune, based upon 
landed clan property. However, clan property was collective property. There was 
no settled notion of private property. The territory occupied by the clan was 
owned and worked in common. The village commune was' based on the absence 
of private property in land' .59 Both gentile production and consumption continued 
along the path established during savagery, to remain essentially communal: 
'[A]part from personal articles which were regarded more as parts of 
one's body than as individual wealth, all land and property were held 
in common and utilized for the benefit of all the members of the 
clan. ,60 
Only when gentile society was in the process of disintegration did the notion of 
private property begin to insinuate itself into the heart of human social relations. 
Like its savage predecessor, barbarian society too was stateless. Engels tells 
us that the state is the antithesis of the 'gentile constitution'. The latter: 
'had grown out of a society which knew no internal contradictions, 
and it was only adapted to such a society. It possessed no means of 
. coercion except public opinion. ,61 
In other words, in barbarian society the clan was the public authority. There was 
no power above or authority separate from the clan. There was no specialized 
apparatus of political control. There was thus no state and, consequently, there 
was no law. The values and traditions of savagery survived intact into the epoch 
59 Mandel op cit 15. 
60 Reed op cit 159. 
61 Engels op cit 192. 
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of barbarism, and continued to inform the fundamental structures upon which 
barbarian society was based. Custom continued as king also in barbarian society. 
2.5 Civilization and the Rise of Class Society 
In its main lines, then, the prehistory of humanity - savagery and barbarism -
comprised close to 500 000 years of primitive communism, free of classes, the 
state and law, and during which social existence was governed by the principle of 
equality in all things. Our 5000 or so years of history, which coincide with 
Morgan's third 'ethnical period' of civilization, is, so to speak, another story 
altogether. If, as Mandel has stated, the era of barbarism witnessed 'the greatest 
economic revolution in humanity's existence', then civilization may be said to 
have initiated 'the greatest social revolution in humanity's existence' thus far. For 
the transition to civilization was founded upon the defeat of the primitive 
communism of the prehistoric era, and the birth of social classes and class 
struggle. 
This is the context of the famous aphorism with which The Communist 
Manifesto opens.62 It refers to a social revolution which had its material roots in 
the vast increase in human productive capacity initiated by the Neolithic 
revolution and brought to fruition, in the civilized era, by the creation of large and 
pennanent surpluses.63 Reed explains the significance of these surpluses: 
, At fust these surpluses were used to sustain the village elders who 
coordinated work on community projects such as irrigation systems. 
But gradually some men elevated themselves into priest-kings, 
nobles, and overlords, standing above the common people, exacting 
foodstuffs, livestock and handicrafts as tribute and later as taxes. 
62 Marx & Engels (1967: 79): 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles.' 
63 See Mandel op cit 19 and Novack (1980: 44-45). 
Private wealth was now accumulating in the hands of an elite, a 
ruling class. ,64 
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In other words, the surplus food and goods which had freed humankind from its 
subservience to the forces of nature led, over time, to the subservience of one 
section of humankind to another. That is the social mark of civilization, the 
division of human beings into two great classes - one which produces, and one 
which does not produce but owns the means of production and appropriates the 
social surplus product - tied to each other in a relation of structural contradiction, 
and living out this relation in class struggle. 
Civilization thus introduces social inequality into human society, based on a 
qualitative change in the nature of production. Before the advent of civilization, 
production was geared 'in its totality to fulfil the needs of the producers' .65 
Production in the civilized epoch is bifurcated into the socially necessary product 
and social surplus product. The former refers to the means of subsistence 
required to ensure the reproduction of the class of direct producers. The latter is 
surplus production which is appropriated by the class of non-producers and 
applied to its own subsistence and to wealth creation. This latter pursuit leads, 
over time, to the transition from production for use to production for exchange. In 
other words, civilization is coincident with the development of commodity 
production, including that 'commodity of commodities', money.66 Engels 
summed up the economic foundation of civilization as: 
'the stage of development in society at which the division of labour, 
the exchange between individuals arising from it, and the 
commodity production which combines them both, come to their full 
growth and revolutionise the whole of previous society. ,67 
64 Reedopcit412. 
65 Mandel op cit 20. 
66 Engels op cit 189. 
67 Ibid 198-199. 
Civilization brought with it, literally, a brand new and truly revolutionary 
world, which laid waste all the presuppositions of the past. 
2.6 Property, State and Law 
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One of the most revolutionary innovations of civilization was the institution 
of private property. The epoch of civilization is, above all, the epoch of private 
property. The growth of private property was a direct result of the break-up of 
kin-based gentile society and the concomitant emergence of class society. 
Primitive communism had to be destroyed in order for private property to 
develop. The communard had to perish in order for the proprietor to be born. 
Private property, especially in the means of production, is the necessary 
copula of the division of society into antagonistic classes of producers and non-
producers. In a word, class society and private property are logically coincident. 
The fust forms of private property were movables, including the instruments of 
production, and slaves. It is one of the grandest ironies of history that civilization, 
as Novack reminds us, 'was ushered in and raised on direct slavery. ,68 The reach 
of private property was in due course extended to land, to complete its conquest of 
the means of production and its installation as the proprietary institution 
characteristic of class society. 
The other institution which is peculiar to class society, and hence 
civilization, is the state. As pointed out earlier, prehistoric society was not only 
classless, it was also stateless. The state is a specifically historical phenomenon 
which emerges as a product of the division of society into classes. It is a 
characteristic trait of the civilized epoch and an index of the ruination of primitive 
classlessness. It will be recalled that Engels referred to the state as the antithesis 
68 Novack op cit 45 . 
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of the gentile constitution of the barbarian epoch. He added that with the coming 
of civilization: 
'The gentile constitution was finished. It had been shattered by the 
division of labour and its result, the cleavage of society into classes. 
It was replaced by the state. ,69 
Class society has need of a mechanism which operates to maintain and perpetuate 
the social inequality which defines the relations between exploiters and exploited. 
The state fulfils this role. Engels again: 
'The state ... has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies 
which have managed without it, which had no notion of the state or state 
power. At a definite stage of economic development, which necessarily 
involved the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity 
because of this cleavage.' 70 
The state was thus called into being to guarantee the reproduction of the social 
relations of production which structure the domination by the minority ruling 
class of the masses constituting the productive class. It exists to defend the 
existence of class privilege. It is, as Lenin so trenchantly expressed it, 'a machine 
for maintaining the rule of one class over another,.71 
Whereas savagery and barbarism were lawless, civilization was the first 
lawful epoch of human history. The emergence of the state entailed the 'demise' 
of the lawlessness of the prehistoric epochs. Law is an attribute of the state, and 
hence of class rule. Civilization abhors custom. It requires law. It requires an 
institution, of its own creation, which is able to weld together the various organs 
of the state, to legitimize state violence, to guarantee the sanctity of private 
property and to demarcate the province of each ideological state apparatus. Law 
69 Engels op cit 193. 
70 Ibid 198. 
71 Lenin op cit l3 . 
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is that institution. If the armed forces are the right hand of the state, then law is its 
left.72 
Civilization thus gave us social classes, private property and the state. It 
also gave us law. Civilization is an era of social evolution which emerged in 
opposition to the institutions and ethos of prehistory. Its birth required the death 
of almost half a million years of social collectivism. The achievements of the 
epoch of civilization were possible only on the basis of the destruction of the 
primitive communes and the subjugation of the communards. History is, in this 
regard, the negation of the communism of our prehistoric ancestors. It is the 
record of class dictatorship and class struggle about the parameters of such 
dictatorship. It is in this context that I propose to analyse the historical claims of 
the proponents of restorative justice. 
2.7 The Maine Thesis 
These claims rely squarely upon an assertion by Sir Henry Maine in his 
Ancient Law, to the effect that conduct which today we would classify as criminal 
was dealt with as delictual conflict by our prehistoric forebears: 
'If therefore the criterion of a delict, wrong, or tort be that the person 
who suffers it, and not the State, is conceived to be wronged, then it 
may be asserted that in the infancy of jurisprudence the citizen 
depends for protection against violence or fraud not on the Law of 
Crime but on the Law of Tort. ,73 
72 Of course, the legal fonn as we know it did not emerge fully-grown. Like every other 
social phenomenon, it had to go through a process of evolution from infancy to adulthood. 
The earlier periods of civilization, spanning the pre-capitalist modes of production, had 
legal relations in their embryonic and developing stages. The legal fonn reaches maturity 
in the capitalist era, which is the highest stage of class society and hence of civilization. 
This is the era of complete fit between social and legal evolution in that the bourgeoisie, the 
ruling class in capitalist society, adheres to a worldview which is definitively juridical. See 
Chapter Five below for further discussion of this issue. 
73 Maine (1906: 380-381). 
In other words, Maine proposes that prehistoric 'crime' was dealt with as a 
private or civil matter, in which the state had no role and which was 
resolved by an award of 'delictual' damages to the victim. 
His thesis has attracted consistent support over the years, especially from 
legal anthropologists. Thus Mair holds that, in primitive society: 
'the principle which covers the majority of breaches of rule is that it 
is the injured individual who matters, and that what is important is 
for him to be compensated. ,74 
And Beattie concludes that: 
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'Where there is no centralized authority, and specialized political and 
judicial offices are lacking, most wrongs have to be treated as private delicts 
and dealt with by the injured party without reference to a higher authority.,75 
The consensus, it would seem, is that prehistoric injuries were private delicts 
governed by the institution of composition. The harm suffered had to be repaired, 
by way of a solatium of sorts. 
This anthropological conception of 'crime-as-delict' is, obviously, grist to 
the mill of the proponents of restorative justice. Although they do not 
acknowledge it, their historical arguments against retributionism are based upon 
the Maine thesis, as embraced and elaborated by those who followed him. They 
are convinced that restorative justice has deep roots in the history of humankind, 
74 Mair (1972: 148). 
75 Beattie (1966: 174). See also Peristiany (1963: 43): 'What characterizes most of the 
actions which come up for settlement, even those arising from homicide, is that they are 
introduced by a private person in defence of sectional interests and that they claim 
restitution or private damages and not social retribution. In our idiom, most actions in 
societies of this type would come under civil rather than criminal wrongs.' See further 
Lewis (1994: 341-342): 'On the whole ... attacks on property and persons in uncentralized 
societies tend to be treated as wrongs, demanding reparation (if necessary in kind), rather 
than as crimes demanding punishment.' See also Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 212-219) who 
posits that in pre literate societies, crimes were treated according to the 'law of private 
delicts' which corresponds to the 'civil law of modem times'. 
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and that our response to crime was not always or only a punitive one. The Maine 
thesis goes far to confirm this conviction and, for that reason, needs to be 
examined critically. 
2.8 The Public and the Private 
A crucial dimension of the Maine thesis is the assertion of a prehistoric 
juridical distinction between the public and the private. It is this distinction which 
enables Maine to posit that conduct which today would be classified as a public 
crime would in prehistoric times have been understood and dealt with as a private 
delict. In a word, our ancestors conceptualized 'crime' in private terms, as a 
conflict between the offender and victim, to be resolved by them, without recourse 
to any public authority. As we shall see, the 're-privatization' of the criminal 
episode is an epistemological premise of the contemporary theory of restorati ve 
justice, as formulated by Nils Christie.76 There is, thus, a discernible theoretical 
affinity between Maine and Christie in this regard. 
However, a prehistoric legal dichotomy between the public and the private 
did not exist. As we have seen, the 'great reality' of prehistoric society is custom, 
in relation to which the public-private divide is a non-issue. Custom is totalizing 
and indivisible. It is the 'sway of custom',77 not the distinction between the 
public andthe private which is characteristic of prehistoric society. In prehistoric 
conflicts, then, the issue is not whether they are public or private, crimes or 
delicts. The only issue is whether or not there has occurred an infraction of a 
customary norm. 
76 See Chapter Four below. 
77 Seagle op cit 33. 
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The public-private distinction is a patently modem invention. Although 
notions of the distinction go back to the early days of the existence of law and 
state, its coherent formulation can be traced directly to the birth and development 
of the capitalist mode of production. The elemental economic unit of capitalism 
is the commodity; its elemental juridical unit is the legal subject, the autonomous 
individual who, theoretically, is free to transact with any other autonomous 
individual by way of that most ubiquitous of legal bonds, the contract.78 
'The attempt to segregate private law is thus an attempt to establish 
the autonomy of the individual will, to create a private preserve for 
the individual, to guarantee the unfettered activity of juristic persons 
in the market. Private law is thus only another form of the triumph 
of freedom of contract. ' 79 
The legal subject is the juristic alter ego of the commodity, and freedom 
of contract the legal foundation of the capitalist market. It is generally 
accepted that Maine was a prime proponent of the idea of the freedom and 
sanctity of contract, a conviction which he expressed so pithily in his 
famous epigram that 'the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract' .80 As Seagle puts it, 
with the birth of capitalism and the triumph of the commodity form, 'there 
was no god but Contract, and Sir Henry Maine was its prophet' .81 
Maine's thesis on the prehistoric conception of 'crime' must therefore be 
read in the context of his role as the 'prophet of Contract' and hence of his 
commitment to the autonomy ofthe individual. His messianic attachment to the 
mission of Contract resulted in his ignoring the essentially communal nature of 
78 This proposition is derived from Pashukanis (1978) and is discussed fully in Chapter Five 
below. 
79 Seagle op cit 267. 
80 Maine op cit 174, original emphasis. 
81 Seagle op cit 266. 
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prehistoric social organization and discerning in its stead a primitive 
individualism, at least as regards the conception of wrongs. In other words, what 
the Maine thesis does is to elevate a historically specific condition of social life 
into a permanent feature of human nature. Prehistoric society is thus seen to be 
governed, juridically at least, by an individualism not dissimilar to that which 
dominates the structure of contemporary life. The bourgeois class sensibilities of 
the writer-prophet are insinuated into the life circumstances of his prehistoric 
communist ancestors. 
Of course, the anthropologists who have adopted the Maine thesis are fully 
aware of the communalism which structured prehistoric social relations. Yet, they 
have endorsed Maine's 'private law' conception of prehistoric crime. And it is not 
a case of merely making use, for the sake of clarity and convenience, of current 
tenninology to explain what our ancestors did in dealing with the problems and 
conflicts they encountered.82 Rather, those anthropologists who adhere to the 
Maine thesis adhere also to the notion that the prehistoric individual is, in essence, 
identical to the contemporary one, and hence that there existed in prehistoric 
society a sphere of the juridical private which was founded upon the individual as 
the 'private prosecutor'. 83 The Maine thesis is thus a striking example of legal 
ethnocentrism. It is an aspect of a general ideological disposition which assumes 
both the naturalness and universality of the bourgeois code of individualism and 
transplants it, transmuted, even into relations which are communal, and hence 
anti-individualist, to their core. The old is remade in the image of the new. 
For the prehistoric person the kinship-based commune (initially the horde, 
later the clan) to which he or she belonged was everything. It was such person's 
entire universe. The idea of an individuality separate from the commune was 
82 See Mair op cit 146. 
83 Hoebe1 & Frost (1976: 288). 
inconceivable. The prehistoric worldview was, fundamentally, a communal 
worldview, derived from the harshness of the material conditions of existence. 
The savage, says Lafargue: 
'has no conception of his individuality as distinct from the 
consanguine group in which he lives'. 84 
Reed observes that: 
'individualism was so poorly developed in primitive society that 
there was no term to express the individual as an entity apart from 
the group' .85 
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There was a complete identity between the individual and the primitive commune. 
The individual was the commune and the commune the individual. 'The clan was 
all in all.' 86 
The Maine thesis stands in stark contradiction to the fundamentally anti-
individualist outlook of the primitives. It imports the autonomous individual into 
a universe in which the founding value is not individualism but group solidarity, 
thereby rendering a historically specific human quality natural and suprahistorical. 
But, as Briffault reminds us: 
'Primitive human nature differed considerably from what we often 
assume to be human nature in general. Primitives do not think in 
terms of their ego and its interests, but in terms of the group-
individual ... The individualism which is the alpha and omega of the 
motives of modem man is not a primitive character but a product of 
social evolution, which has developed mainly, ifnot solely, in 
relation to social circumstances, and more especially to the growth 
of personal property. ,87 
84 Lafargue op cit 11. 
85 Reed op cit 161 . 
86 Lafargue op cit 12. Of course, the absence of individualism in primitive society did not 
imply a corresponding absence of individuation. See Diamond op cit 160 and Cameron 
(1973: 26-27) in this regard. It is arguable, with Lafargue (op cit II), that prehistoric 
people were 'individually completer beings' than us postmoderns. See further Briffault 
(1959: 266-8) and Reed ibid 159-162. 
87 Briffault ibid 268. 
The schism between the public and the private proposed by the Maine 
thesis for prehistoric society is thus indefensible, except in the very limited 
sense that in the absence of a state which is authorized to resolve them, 
disputes and conflicts have to be dealt with 'privately'. But there is no 
sense in which the prehistoric individual actually acted or could have acted 
as a 'private prosecutor' to secure satisfaction for an injury suffered at the 
hands of another autonomous individual. As there could not be crimes in 
a stateless society, so there could be no independent sphere of the juridical 
private in a communist one. 
2.9 Prehistoric Conflicts and Blood Revenge 
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Prehistoric communism meant, necessarily, that both personal injuries and 
the response thereto were communal issues. A harm inflicted upon a member of 
the commune was, literally, a harm suffered by the entire commune. 
'Where the interests of one member are the interests of all, an injury 
to one is an injury to all. ,88 
The notion of a private injury or dispute was not feasible in the prehistoric epoch. 
There was thus no conception of a 'crime' or wrong against a person. All 
'crimes' struck a blow against the survival of the commune, and were thus 
perceived as offences against the commune as such. 
This may be difficult for the modem or the postmodem mind to 
comprehend, but it is the only logical materialist explanation of the prehistoric 
approach to 'crime'. Communism in production gave rise to a communal 
understanding of 'crime and punishment'. The unity of member and commune 
meant that: 
88 Ibid 267. 
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'All quarrels and disputes were settled by the whole body of those 
concerned .. . In conformity with rules that had become established through 
centuries-old custom, the whole community sat in judgement on the 
conflicts that emerged, and defined the consequences. ,89 
Prehistoric justice was non-legaL In the stateless societies of the epochs of 
savagery and barbarism there could be no notion of any specialized coercive 
institutions. There was only the commune, and it was everything and it took 
responsibility for everything. In such circumstances of communal predominance, 
'the kin unit was the juridical unit, just as it was the economic and social unit' .90 
The original form of justice was quite simply, and necessarily, vengeance. 
As intimated earlier, in conditions of savagery and barbarism, an injury to or the 
death of one member of a commune put the future of the entire commune at risk. 
The natural response was therefore to seek revenge against the offender and/or his 
kin. This response was rooted in the human instinct for self-preservation.91 The 
'first law oflife' was self-preservation; the 'first law of man' was revenge.92 In 
prehistoric society, it is in her membership of the commune that a person's identity 
is rooted. It is by her contribution to the construction of the solidarity of the 
commune that the individuality of each member is secured. An attack upon any 
member is thus an attack upon the life of the commune. It has to be avenged, not 
by the individual victim but by the commune. There is no other way to obtain 
justice. There is no property which can be offered or taken in compensation. 
There is no central judicial authority which is able to impose punishment upon 
and enforce it against the offender. There is only communal justice which, in the 
material conditions of prehistory, can initially only take the form of communal 
blood revenge. Thus, Lafargue says of the primitive communards: 
89 Lafargue op cit 167. 
90 Diamond op cit 268. 
91 Lafargue op cit 16l. 
92 Seagle op cit 36. 
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'They put offences in the common fund, like everything else; an injury done 
to one savage is resented by the whole clan as if it were personal to every 
member; to shed the blood of one savage is to shed the blood of the clan. 
All its members consider it their duty to wreak vengeance. ,93 
Blood revenge begins as an instinct, progresses to a duty and is then transformed 
into a social custom. The commune becomes entitled, by custom, to take revenge 
for the harm suffered by its member. Such harm is felt collectively, and is 
avenged communally. The aboriginal justice was thus the justice of communal 
revenge.94 
The offender, like the victim, was a member of a commune. And hence the 
offence was collectivized. The entire commune of the offender becomes a 
legitimate target of the vengeance of the victim's commune. There was no 
individual victim and there was no individual offender. There was only the 
collective injury to and collective vengeance of the victim-commune against the 
offender-commune. 
'The savage, who understands his existence only as an integral part 
of his clan, transforms the individual offence into a collective 
offence; and vengeance, which is an act of personal defence and self-
preservation, becomes an act of collective defence and self-
preservation. ,95 
93 Lafargue op cit 165. 
94 The discussion which follows deals only with inter-communal conflicts. If the injury was 
intra-communal, that is, ifthe offender and victim were kin, the typical sanction was 
expUlsion from the commune. This usually amounted to the offender being condemned to a 
solitary existence; which, to one who knows only the solidary relations of life in the 
commune, must have been a truly terrifying prospect. According to Vennes (op cit 44-45) 
expUlsion was, in the material conditions of prehistory, 'a measure essentially equal to 
physical annihilation, for the man banned from his community was in his solitary and 
unequal struggle against the forces of nature, condemned to death.' See also Roberts 
(1979: 85-86) and Reed op cit 40. Even if the material conditions were favourable to 
solitary survival, it was highly likely that a person severed from a commune would die, 
anyway, from loneliness, or go insane from social deprivation. 
95 Lafargue op cit 166. 
The primitive system of communal 'crime and punishment' meant that any 
member or members of the offended commune could exact blood from 
any member or members of the offending commune. 
2.10 From Blood Revenge to the Lex Talionis 
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The aboriginal blood revenge was unbridled and indiscriminate, and would 
easily lead to the protracted belligerence of a blood feud between the two 
communes. As Vermes observes: 
'In the beginning the means of retaliation of injuries inflicted on the 
community by external agents was the unrestricted vendetta or blood feud, 
which extended to the whole community of the man outraging the 
community in question, and purposed the extirpation of all members of the 
insulting community, i.e. it meant warfare in its essence. ,96 
However, the dangers of the unmitigated blood feud, including the possible 
extermination of both communes, impressed themselves very early upon the 
minds of the prehistoric communards. They were here faced with a choice which 
was, literally, of vital significance: collective revenge versus collective self-
preservation. 
The impulse towards collective self-preservation triumphed. The passion 
for unlimited revenge was reigned in and replaced by a system of controlled and 
calculated revenge. The imperatives of collective self-preservation led prehistoric 
humanity away from the law of the open vendetta to the law of retaliation. 
Revenge could still be had, but it could no longer be total. It was to be exacted in 
like measure to the injury suffered by the offended commune. Whereas initially 
all members of the offending commune were fair game, now only so many as had 
caused the harm could be the target of vengeance. This was the principle of 
retribution or the talio principle, based on a code of exact equivalence between 
96 Vermes op cit 44. See also Seagle op cit 36. 
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harm suffered and revenge taken. 
It is a code which has its most popular expression in the biblical injunction: 
'life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for 
burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe' .97 This was the law of retaliation or 
retribution, an extension to punishment of the fundamental communist spirit of 
equality which governed all other aspects of prehistoric existence. As Lafargue 
observes: 
'Retaliation is merely the application of equality in the matter of satisfaction 
to be awarded for an injury. It is the equalized expiation ofthe offence. 
Only a damage exactly equal to the offence committed - a life for a life, a 
burn for a burn - can satisfy the equalitarian soul of primitive men. The 
equalitarian instinct, which in the distribution of food and of goods imposed 
the equal share, created the law of retaliation. ,98 
The communards found it necessary to set limits to the blood feud. In doing so, 
they reproduced their primary existential principle as the law of retribution. 
The talio principle thus emerges out of the collective instinct of self-
preservation, and is governed by the communist devotion to perfect equality 
which governed the social existence of prehistoric humankind. The prehistoric 
talio began, literally, as a death-exchange system: a death for a death, according to 
the principle of exact equivalence.99 Thereafter it was extended to incorporate 
non-fatal injuries, also according to the principle of equivalence. The prehistoric 
law of retaliation entailed the extension of the communism of life also to death 
and injury. It was a progressive and historic development which took humankind 
a step higher on the ladder of social evolution. 
97 Book of Exodus: Chapter XXI, Verses 23 and 25. 
98 Lafargue op cit 168. 
99 See Reed op cit 223-225 and Lafargue ibid 166-168. 
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'The principle of equivalence was a major achievement for ancient 
humanity when the hazardous conditions of life and the ignorance of natural 
death are considered. It held down reprisals to a rigid minimum: one for 
one and no more. ,100 
The victim-commune was still entitled to vengeance, but it had to be exacted only 
as 'just deserts' , according to the principle of equivalence. This both satisfies the 
natural passion for revenge and prevents such passion from becoming a danger to 
the existence and reproduction of the commune. 
The egalitarianism of the primitive talio extended also to the target of 
vengeance. Since all members of a commune were perfectly equal to one another, 
if one of them had to be the target, anyone of them was a legitimate target. The 
specific communard who caused the harm was not the prescribed target. His 
entire commune was. 101 In this regard, then, primitive retaliation remained 
essentially indiscriminate. All the members of the offended commune were 
entitled to mark for vengeance any member of the offending commune. But blood 
revenge was at the same time highly regulated. It was aimed at preserving life in 
already precarious material conditions, and not causing death. The principle of 
equivalence meant, literally, that account had to be made for each and every death. 
The death-exchange system was aimed at preserving or restoring the fraternal 
relations with other communes upon which the life of the commune depended. 
An episode of death-exchange was thus normally closed by a session of gift-
100 Reed ibid 227. 
101 See Reed ibid 218: 'Since primitive blood kinship was established on a communal basis, 
blood revenge was likewise communal. The whole community was held responsible for the 
actions of each individual member. It was not necessary that any specific CUlprit be found 
and killed in reprisal for the death of a kinsman - any member of his community would 
suffice to satisfY the claims of blood. ' See also Lafargue op cit 165: 'The offence is 
collective like the injury. The offended clan takes vengeance by killing any individual 
whatever of the offending clan.' 
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interchange between the two communes. 102 
In prehistoric times justice was necessarily vengeance. There was no other 
form of justice which could be conceived by savage and barbarian peoples. Their 
response to 'crime' was completely natural, and in accordance with the 
communist principles which governed their existence. Historically, then, 
retributive justice was the natural and necessary product of the epoch of primitive 
communism. The principles and practices of the tolio developed logically from 
the material conditions in which humankind originally found itself. It is worth 
noting, in this connection, that since prehistory comprises by far the largest part of 
humankind's existence, retributive justice, as equivalent physical retaliation, is 
historically the pre-eminent human response to the question of 'crime', that is, the 
pre-eminent form of punishment. 
2.11 The Rise of Civilization: From the Lex Talionis to Composition 
It will be recalled that the proponents of restorative justice generally posit 
the restorative sanction as aboriginal, if not exclusively, then as one of a number 
of options relied upon by our ancestors to deal with disputes. This view appears 
to derive from like pronouncements by certain anthropologists and legal 
historians. Stein's comment in this connection is typical: 
'The principle of compensation is as prominent as that of retaliation 
even in the simplest societies. They are seen as complementary 
10' rather than opposed to each other. ' .) 
However, this statement cannot be correct, certainly not as a generalized 
proposition about the penal culture of prehistoric societies. Had savage and 
102 See Reed ibid: 'Blood revenge therefore represents a system ofpunisbment and counter-
punishment between two communities but one that is regulated to prevent a total rupture 
between them. Hence, after the punishment, peace and fraternity are restored through the 
exchange offeasts and gifts.' 
103 Stein (1984: 19), See also the anthropological sources relied upon by Weitekamp op cit. 
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barbarian justice included a restorative mechanism, it would typically have been a 
form of composition. 104 However, composition (other than in the form of blood 
compensation) requires the general availability of surplus goods which can be 
tendered as solatium by the offending commune and accepted by the offended 
one. Prehistoric society was fust and foremost a subsistence society. Production 
was geared towards procurement of the necessaries of existence. Surplus 
production was minimal, and whatever surplus was available would have been 
applied to the upkeep of the very young, the infirm and the aged. Whatever 
composition did exist in the prehistoric world had to be the exception rather than 
the rule. 
Just as people who existed in 'an aboriginal state of non-property' could not 
have had serious or sustained disputes about land and other forms of property, 105 
so they could not have relied upon a system of dispute settlement, such as 
composition, which was proprietary in its essentials. Composition as a 
generalized mechanism of social control was neither conceptually nor actually 
possible for the bulk of the many millennia which constituted the prehistory of the 
world. 106 Certainly, it could never have been on par with the talio system, as the 
restorationists suggest. Communes had nothing which could be proffered and 
taken in compensation for offences, except their members' bodies and body parts. 
The material realities of humankind's prehistory guaranteed the primacy of the lex 
talionis. 
Composition did, however, find an early niche in the interstices of the talio 
system. It had a significant presence especially in the epoch of the break-up of 
104 Composition is used here as the generic term for all the concepts and procedures which 
seek, by way of a make-up, to repair the harm caused by the offender's conduct (as opposed 
to those which entail taking revenge). 
105 See Fried (1967: 71-72). 
106 See Seagle op cit 42 and Diamond (1951: 22). 
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barbarism and the transition to civilization, that is, in the twilight of prehistory, 
after the Neolithic revolution had made the production of regular surpluses 
possible and private property was making its debut on the historical stage. During 
this period, exchange and the circulation of commodities became a feature of 
economic life, albeit still secondary to and dependent upon the production of use 
values in the primitive commune. However, despite its subordination to the 
natural economy, the growth of the market proceeded apace. These conditions 
facilitated the emergence of composition as a means of resolving inter-communal 
conflicts. 
Indeed, it appears that composition became a fairly common method of 
dealing with disputes amongst peoples in the late stage of barbarism, around 3000 
BC. Childe classifies this period as the era of the urban revolution, marked by the 
growth of town settlements and the emergence of a stratum of specialist craftsmen 
such as potters and smiths. These latter lived by exchanging their products for the 
surplus products of their food-producing customers. 107 This is the beginning of 
the commodification of the social surplus. The development of this material 
process had a juridical parallel in the arena of dispute settlement. Hitherto the 
standard response to injury had been blood revenge, governed by the talionic 
equation in terms of which retaliation had to correspond exactly to the harm 
suffered by the victim-commune. Now a pecuniary equivalent to the harm 
suffered began to occupy one side of the equation. The talionic equation was 
being transformed into an economic equation, and the customary system of blood 
revenge was giving way to the legal institution of composition. 108 
107 See Childe (1964: 77-87). 
108 See Newman op cit 163. 
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As a means of dealing with social conflict, composition was obviously 
much more attractive and much less dangerous than blood revenge for the social 
well-being and general survival of the barbarian commune. Hence its fairly rapid 
development during the late barbarian era, when the material conditions for its 
existence had come into being. Indeed, many barbarian tribes embraced the 
institution of composition and created detailed tariffs according to which the 
victim-commune was to be compensated. The commodification of the social 
surplus thus entailed a qualitative shift in the law of retaliation. On the basis of 
material developments in the production process, humans were able to raise the 
talia principle from the brutally corporeal to a calculated abstraction. In place of 
the physical identities of blood revenge there now arose the regime of economic 
equivalents. 
The physicalities of the talia were each ascribed an economic value, bodies 
and their organs were now valued in relation to a universal equivalent of some 
sort. The latter was a commodity which served as a standard of value against 
which all other commodities could be exchanged. The universal equivalent 
shifted commodity exchange from physicality to generality. Its invention 
represented another qualitative leap in the intellectual development of our 
forebears, enabling them to advance beyond the exactitudes of identity in 
exchange to the abstractions of equivalence. 109 The institution of composition 
was, in this respect, the law of retaliation commodified. Lafargue expresses the 
transformation thus: 
'Then instead of life for life, tooth for tooth, beasts, iron or gold are 
demanded for life, tooth and other wounds. ,110 
109 In the beginning, the most important products in a region (cattle, wheat, rice, salt, tools, etc) 
would be used as the universal equivalent. Later precious metals took over, as valuable 
objects replaced anatomical parts in the talionic relation. See Reed op cit 222. 
110 Lafargue op cit 174. 
Humankind thereby made a further substantial juridical advance: harms 
need no longer be avenged physically, they could be composed 
pecuniarily. However, this advance was in itself an index of the 
emergence of social inequality which, in the historical period, would 
develop into a class structure and deny the majority of humankind the 
benefits of this transformation of the law of retaliation. 
III 
It can be owned readily that composition did exist and occupy a significant 
place in the penal culture of higher barbarism. However, it was not and could not 
have been the dominant, or even the co-dominant, prehistoric response to inter-
communal injuries and disputes. Given that the fundamental structural features of 
the prehistoric world were communist, its justice was eminently and necessarily 
retaliatory. Composition developed but late, in the epoch of the break-up of 
primitive communism, when the material prerequisites of civilization had already 
sprouted in the soil of barbarism. Whereas the tatio was an expression of the 
egalitarian structure of primitive society, composition was a signpost en route to 
the class structure of civilization. Whereas the talionic remedies were always 
available as of right to the populace as a whole, composition was, virtually ab 
initio, a restricted option, structured by class criteria. 
The material basis of composition was the commodification of the social 
surplus. It arose at a time when the contradiction between the forces and relations 
of production of barbarism was at its sharpest, and its development presaged the 
class justice of civilization. It is in this context that the restorationists' historical 
claims must be comprehended. The restorative aspect of primitive justice was not 
aboriginal. It surfaced only in the twilight of prehistory, in material conditions 
pregnant with all the antitheses of the community justice posited by the 
restorationists. Retaliation was community justice. Composition prefigured class 
justice. The two were not synchronous, either in time or in substance. The former 
was an expression of millennia of social egalitarianism, the latter of the recent 
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emergence of social inequality. With the transition from prehistory to history, 
from barbarism to civilization, both would be injected with an unmistakable class 
character. 
Civilization was born of the disintegration of primitive communism. The 
historical successor of the gentile constitution was the class system. The non-
antagonistic relations of the primitive commune were replaced by the 
fundamentally antagonistic relations of class. Civilization and class formation 
were historically coterminous. The achievements of the epoch of civilization 
were won on the basis of the social inequality which was entailed in the division 
of society into two great and opposing classes: one productive, the other not; one 
ruling, the other ruled. 
2.12 The Asiatic Mode of Production 
The first form of class society emerged some 5000 years ago, with the great 
river-valley civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China. The large-
scale irrigation works which characterized these societies revolutionized 
agriculture and made possible the production of permanent surpluses for the first 
time in human history. Marx classified the mode of production of these alluvial 
or hydraulic societies as Asiatic. The ruling class comprised an aristocracy which 
was fused, more or less, with a managerial-bureaucratic elite of state officials, 
administrators, scientists-engineers, priests and military leaders. There was an 
almost total congruence between the state and the ruling class. 
The dominated class was made up of peasant farmers whose labour formed 
the productive foundation upon which the famous cities of this era arose. 
Between the two major classes were minor classes of merchants and urban 
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craftsmen. They were essentially parasitic upon the surplus extracted by the state 
from the peasant producers. There was also a sizeable slave population, but it was 
not pivotal to the structure of production in Asiatic society. I I I The outstanding 
proprietary feature of the Asiatic mode of production is the absence of private 
property in land. 1l2 The peasant producers continued to live in self-sufficient 
village communes very like those on which the gentile constitution had been 
based. And production in the Oriental commune was still primarily devoted to the 
creation ofuse-values. ll3 
The survival of such features of primitive communism and natural economy 
notwithstanding, it must be stressed that the Asiatic formations were class 
societies in all their essentials. This was most apparent from the fact that the 
social surplus product of the peasant producers was appropriated by the ruling 
class, in the form of ground rent or taxes. The commodification of the surplus 
which had begun in the era of late barbarism now became more and more 
widespread, primarily because the surplus was so much bigger and was 
relentlessly extracted from the direct producers by the ruling class. The latter 
lived lives of conspicuous opulence, and the market for trade in manufactured 
goods grew significantly, as towns became virtual manufactories for the 
production of luxuries and other goods to satisfy the tastes of the emperor and 
nobles. Needless to say, the direct producers had to make do with bare 
necessities, sometimes with less. The benefits of the urban revolution, which was 
based upon their labour, did not reach them. They became the victims of the 
civilization which they built. 
III See Melotti (1981: 59-62). 
112 See Mandel (1971: 15) and Melotti ibid 54. The state, in the person of the ruling despot, 
was the only landowner. There was private property in movables. 
113 See Mandel (1977: 58): 'The whole of the economy appeared indeed like a great estate 
producing use-values to satisfy its needs.' See also Melotti ibid 56-57. 
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Also, although production in the Asiatic mode was essentially for use, 
exchange of and trade in the social surplus grew significantly. The steady 
commodification of the surplus is evident from the fact that, by about 2000 BC, 
the precious metals, especially silver, had ousted all other competitors as universal 
equivalent. From here it was but a short step to the role of universal equivalent 
being occupied exclusively by the 'commodity of commodities', money. 1 14 The 
natural economy was being invaded by the commodity and its apotheosis, money. 
Whatever had survived of the gentile constitution was under implacable assault 
from and inexorably succumbing to the contrivances of civilization. 
The 'civilizing mission' of the class system in Asiatic society extended, of 
course, also to the juridical. This is the era of the birth of law proper. Custom 
was superseded by law, and the curial apparatuses of the state replaced the 
commune as the locus of adjudicative authority. It was the era in which the 
communard was 'liberated' and reconstructed as the legal subject. The famous 
Code of Hammurabi (circa 1750 BC) represents the high-water mark of the legal 
development of Asiatic society. Its 282 sections comprise a reliable source of 
information about both the nature of Asiatic law and the economic structure and 
social organization of the typical alluvial society. And even though the Code may 
be read in large part simply as a written collection of existing customary practices, 
it was in fact qualitatively different from these. For it was the legislative creation 
of the ruler of a class state, the antithesis of the gentile constitution, and it 
confIrmed the formal transformation of custom into law. 
114 The installation of money as universal equivalent was undoubtedly an index of the steady 
growth of commodity production and hence of the demise of the natural economy. In this 
regard, the Asiatic mode of production was certainly the gravedigger of the primitive 
commune. However, commodity production in this epoch, as in all precapitalist epochs, 
remained petty, as represented by the circuit C-M-C. Production of exchange-value was at 
this stage not the rationale of the production process but merely an adjunct to that rationale, 
namely, production for use or direct consumption. 
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Despite the persistence of communal social relations structuring an 
economic system dedicated to the production of use-values, the Code was a class 
construct. It gave express recognition to the social classes which made up Asiatic 
society, prescribed different legal treatment for these various classes and made no 
concessions whatsoever to the egalitarian morality of the primitive commune. 
Law was, in this regard, infused with the ethos of class and, hence, of inequality 
from the beginning. 
Criminal law in Asiatic society was rudimentary. There is in the Code of 
Hammurabi no clear distinction between criminal and civil law as we have come 
to know it. It is true that the Code does recognize and prescribe sanctions for a 
range of conduct which we would today classify as criminal. But, despite its 
despotic and hypertrophied nature, the Asiatic state had not yet invented the 
notion of a crime as an attack upon its sovereignty or as an offence against its 
integrity. Subsequent historical states would take this step, to claim crime and 
punishment as their own, and to deny the parties the right to resolve inter se the 
conflict engendered by criminal conduct. The Asiatic state, however, did not yet 
construe individual injuries as public ones.1I5 The primitive talio, as blood 
revenge, survived into this ftrst period of the epoch of 9ivilization. But it was the 
talio transftgured and blood revenge transformed, as both were contaminated with 
the imprints of those two standard bearers of civilization, namely, class and the 
commodity. Primitive justice could not withstand the frontal assault upon 
egalitarianism and communalism entrained in the forward march of civilization. 
115 The Asiatic state was certainly powerful enough to define crimes as offences against it. It 
did not do so, probably because of the coincidence between itself and the ruling class. 
Offences by members of the oppressed classes against members of the ruling class were, in 
fact, simultaneously offences against the state, and were severely punished. 
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Asiatic criminal law was overtly class-based and unambiguously biased in 
favour of the ruling class. The Code of Hammurabi identifies three social classes 
namely, freemen, plebeians and slaves. 116 It retains the lalio, as a system of 
punishment based upon exact equivalent retribution, but removes its original 
communal aspect and invests it with a class character. Retaliation became 
essentially a credo of the ruling class, the freemen, and the blood revenge of 
prehistory was transformed into the blood feud, according to which freemen and 
their families settled intra-class criminal disputes, including murder. The Code 
required freemen to take revenge against freemen according to the talionic 
equation. But freemen were entitled to revenge many-fold against plebeian and 
slave offenders, to whom the benefits of the tal ionic equation did not apply. The 
Code also did not make talionic vengeance available to plebeian and slave victims 
of the transgressions of freemen. These were composed: the patrician offender 
faced nothing more than a pecuniary sanction. 117 This was the lalio commodified. 
The commodity of commodities was enlisted as a class weapon, at the disposal of 
noble offenders. The physical injuries they inflicted upon their lower-class 
victims were transformed into values, measured against the universal equivalent. 
Composition in the first historical societies was thus unequivocally a ruling-
class contrivance, already thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the commodity. 
The plebeian and slave victims of ruling-class offenders were inserted, effectively, 
into the commodity circuit: the social surplus which the offenders appropriated 
could be employed to purchase and consume the victims' injuries, like so many 
luxuries. These were thereby eradicated, if not in fact, then certainly in law. The 
116 See Edwards (1937: 63) and Diamond (1950: 31). 




anti-egalitarian tendencies apparent in the prehistoric beginnings of composition 
matured early in the historical epoch. 
When restorationists refer to the 'ancient' roots of restorative justice they 
refer, essentially, to composition as a restorative sanction, that is, to those legal 
arrangements in terms of which offenders were entitled to or required to make 
good their trespasses by way of a compensatory offering to their victims. The 
restorationists tend to present such ancient restorative justice in general terms, 
without reference to social class or inequality. The impression is created that the 
restorative sanction was applicable and freely available to everybody. It is 
implied that ancient restorative justice was essentially egalitarian, involving all 
members of society and operating to mend harm and maintain social equilibrium. 
Hence its description as community justice. 
However, this construction is, at best, utopian. It fails to comprehend the 
very strong and evident links between ancient restorative justice and class 
inequality. It takes no account of the material foundations of the restorative 
sanction. And it ignores the patent historical fact that there was nothing 
communal whatsoever about the class-selective manner in which the rights to 
composition and to retaliation were legally invested in the Asiatic formations. 
The restorationist belief in the existence of an ancient restorative justice thus has 
little historical basis. Primitive justice was community justice, but based on the 
principle of blood revenge, not restoration. The first form of civilized justice, as 
is evident from the Code of Hammurabi, was class, not community,justice and its 
restorative aspect had no community impetus at all. 
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2.13 The Slave Mode of Production 
The Asiatic mode of production was followed, in world-historical 
evolutionary terms, by the ancient or slave mode of production. Civilization thus 
'advanced' from Oriental despotism to European slavery. The Graeco-Roman 
societies of antiquity are archetypal in this regard. 118 And Roman law is 
paradigmatic of the penal jurisprudence which characterized the slave-holding 
epoch. Like their Asiatic predecessor, the Graeco-Roman formations too were 
fully fledged class societies, with all the necessary appurtenances of such 
societies. 119 And their approach to criminal justice, as evidenced in the criminal 
law of Rome, was structured by the same class concerns and class prejudices as 
were to be found in the alluvial societies. Civilized justice is class justice because 
civilized society is class society. 
Roman criminal law was an advance upon Asiatic criminal law in that it 
accepted very early on the notion that certain human conduct, albeit directed 
against the interests of an individual victim, should be construed as an attack upon 
the integrity of the state. Thus, for example, Wylie tells us that 'so far back as we 
can go' Roman law treated murder as a crime. 120 Other early examples of crimina 
included high treason, perjury and arson. The list of crimes increased steadily and 
by the time of the emergence of the empire, 'Rome had to a large extent evolved a 
118 This was not a linear development, except in the sense that the Graeco-Roman formations 
followed the Asiatic ones in time. But they were not the natural extensions of Asiatic 
society. The latter initiated civilization on a world-historical scale, but did not advance it 
beyond the basics, and more or less stagnated developmentally. The Graeco-Roman 
formations which did advance civilization did not arise via the Asiatic mode at all. 
119 The emergence of these slave-holding societies coincided with the dissolution of the gentile 
constitution. The gravedigger of the primitive commune was private property in the means 
of production, including slaves and especially land. Aspects of the gentile constitution 
survived in the early years of the Roman republic. But these were battered and bastardized 
as the bulk of communards was transformed into pauperized plebeians (often condemned to 
debt slavery) and the bulk of the land became the private property of the patrician 
aristocracy. 
120 Wylie (1948: 86). 
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criminal law proper'. 121 Punishment for the crimina was imposed and inflicted by 
the state and ranged from the death penalty through banishment, penal servitude 
and corporal chastisement to fines. 122 Composition was not a possibility for the 
offender, and the state punishments did not have any obvious restorative 
dimension. 
However, the ambit of the Roman criminal law was initially fairly limited as 
compared to the modern law. Many conflicts continued, as in Asiatic law, to be 
treated as the concern of the wrongdoer and the victim, that is, as privata delicta. 
These included theft, robbery, injuries to person and malicious damage to 
property. The privata delicta were governed by the talio principle from the 
beginning. The victim and/or his agnates were entitled to blood revenge against 
the offender, but subject to the equivalence prescription of the lex talionis. 
However, by the time of the XII Tables, the talio principle had already been 
commodified, in the sense that physical retaliation for harm suffered could be had, 
according to Kunkel, 'only if the parties had failed to agree upon a money 
composition and thus to settle their dispute by means of a peaceful settlement' .123 
The XII Tables also prescribed the compensation to be paid in certain 
cases. 124 Composition was clearly a major element of the law of privata delicta 
early on already. Indeed, according to 1010wicz & Nicholas: 
'Roman law was at the time of the XII Tables in a state of transition 
from voluntary to compulsory composition for private wrongs'. 125 
121 Burchell & Hunt (1983 : 14). 
122 See Mackenzie (1991: 422-429). 
123 Kunkel (1966: 28). See also Thomas (1981: 349-350). 
124 See Thomas ibid 350. 
125 Jolowicz & Nicholas (1972: 172). 
In the later empire many of the privata delicta were transformed into 
crimina extraordinaria, that is, into crimes proper. But the possibility of 
composing them remained, as the victim had the right to: 
'elect between criminal and civil punishment. Presumably his 
election was dictated by whether the offender was worth powder and 
ShOt.,126 
All in all, then, composition appears to have been either a requirement or a 
possibility throughout all the periods of Roman law, at least as regards the 
'crimes' which were dealt with as privata delicta. 
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However, any attempt to enlist the Roman institution of composition to the 
cause of the contemporary restorative justice movement must needs be assessed in 
relation to the social structure of Roman society. As already intimated, the 
ancient mode of production was a slave mode of production. In the Graeco-
Roman formations the 'basic labour everywhere was slave labour' .127 The owner-
slave relationship embodied the core social relations of production. The slave was 
owned by the slave-holder: 
'The slave was always at Rome, so far as the law was concerned, a 
piece ofproperty.'128. 
Slaves were essential means of production. Their ability to labour, to put the 
instruments of production into motion, formed the basis of the process of 
production in the Graeco-Roman world. 
126 Burchell & Hunt op cit 15 . 
127 Cameron op cit 187. A substantial amount of slavery did exist in the hydraulic societies, 
and some also in the barbarian era of the prehistoric commune. But slavery was never the 
socio-economic basis of these modes of production. Also, the earlier forms of slavery were 
not private. Slaves were 'owned' either by the commune or by the state. Only the ancient 
mode of production was a properly slave-holding mode. 
128 Jolowicz & Nicholas op cit 133. 
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The basic class contradiction in ancient Roman society was that between 
liberi and servi. 129 The fundamental legal divide was that between persons and 
things. Liberi were persons. Slaves were not. At best, in law 'the Roman slave 
was a hybrid, both person and thing', 130 that is, 'a man-thing,.131 But it must be 
stressed that the elements comprising the 'man-thing' relation were not 
equiponderate. It was the slave's res-status or thingness which dominated in law. 
The slave was, in this regard, considered a species of res, the unique 
instrumentum vocale, and hence a legal non-subject. He was a thing whose value 
depended on his human qualities, but whose legal status was constructed on the 
basis of the denial of those qualities. Thus, 'as a person, the slave had no rights' 
in law. 132 
Such literal reification of the human subject was the necessary and essential 
legal presupposition of the ancient mode of production. It was the key to the 
destruction of the primitive commune and to the transformation in the social 
relations of production which made possible a qualitative leap in the productive 
capacity of human society. This stage of civilization was premised upon the 
commodification of the human body. itself. The person became the commodity. 
The entire human body was transformed into a form of private property which 
could be inserted into and move through the commodity circuit, like any other 
item of private property. 
129 See Van Zyl (1983: 81). For most of its existence Rome had many more slaves than fiberi. 
For example, Cameron (op cit 191) records that during the time of Cicero, Rome had a 
population consisting of some 900 000 citizens and 4 500 000 slaves. More than 80% of 
the population was thus servile and legal non-persons. 
130 Thomas op cit 393. See also Spiller (1986: 48). 
131 Hindess & Hirst op cit 112. 
132 Thomas op cit 394. 
122 
The man-thing of Roman slavery was a combination of two components, 
namely, the slave-as-thing and the slave-as-person. The notion of the slave-as-
thing meant, in practice, that the slave-holder had absolute power over his 
existence. As with any item of private property, the slave could be used, abused 
and even destroyed by the owner with impunity. 133 Thus, Cameron tells us that 'a 
master could legally kill a slave as he could an animal' .134 And Thomas states 
that the slave was 'at the mercy of his master who had the power of life and death 
over him' .135 
The idea of the slave-as-person was especially pertinent to the criminal law. 
Here the slave was deemed by law to be more than a mere res, to possess legal 
subjectivity. But it was essentially a negative subjectivity, granted in order to visit 
criminal liability upon the slave. 136 The slave-holders were, it appears, prepared 
to grant the offender slave a temporary legal persona, for the sole purpose of 
·133 See Vennes op cit 48. 
134 Cameron op cit 194. 
135 Thomas op cit 394. This position continued into the so-called golden age of the imperial 
era, during which era, according to Manfred (op cit 116-117), 'the slave-owners strove to 
squeeze all the profit they could out of their slaves and did not refrain from using the most 
bestial forms of exploitation. The lot of the slaves was exceedingly cruel. For the tiniest 
misdemeanour they were incarcerated in special prisons which existed on every estate, were 
made to work in fetters, beaten and put to death. The slaves were held in subjection by 
means of overt terror. On one occasion a noble Roman was killed by his slave: in 
accordance with the law ... aJl his town slaves - in this case there were 400 of them - were 
liable for the death penalty ... all 400 of the slaves were put to death.' 
Often, as the passage above shows, all the slaves owned by a slave-holder had to pay for the 
offence of one of their number. The Roman ruling class was prepared to protect the slave 
system by reverting to the excesses of communal revenge against a segment of the 
dominated class. Civilization based on slavery reinvented a system of punishment, but only 
for the class of slaves, which the prehistoric barbarians had long abandoned in favour of the 
law of retaliation. The principle of equivalence on which the law of retaliation was based 
would raise the instrumentum vocale to the level of personhood, and would undermine the 
fundamental premise of slavery. Hence, the brutality of slave punishments. Hence the law 
which visited death upon an entire household of slaves as punishment for crime of one of its 
number. Subsequent laws which regulated the owner's power over slaves had little to do 
with improving the lot of slaves and everything to do with protecting and maintaining the 
system of slavery intact. See also Cameron op cit 194 and De Ste. Croix (1981: 459-460). 
136 According to D.48.2.12.3, as cited in Spiller (op cit 51), when the law deals with a crime by 
a slave, 'the same rule should be observed as if he were free'. 
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using the law to punish his errantry and to put him back in his place, to reduce 
him to the 'piece of property' he really was. Slave punishments were invariably 
corporal or capital. Composition was never an option for the slave offender. 137 
Roman crirninallaw operated a dual system of punishment, demarcated strictly in 
class terms: penalties for slave-owners were lighter than penalties for slaves. 138 
Thus, although composition became a part of Roman law early on, it was, as 
the talio commodified, available only to offenders from the ranks of the liberi, 
who were legally entitled to proffer the victim compensation as a way of avoiding 
the talionic retaliation. The human commodity was always excluded from the 
benefits of the commodification of punishment which composition entailed. This 
was, of course, a structural attribute of the slave system, for the slave owned no 
property, not even his own body - he was property - with which to compose an 
offence. The real effect was that the bulk of the Roman population was legally 
excluded from Roman 'restorative justice'. 
The secondary class contradiction in Roman society was located within the 
ranks of the liberi, between the honestiores and the humiliores.139 Composition, 
although available to them, could likely not be afforded by the bulk of offenders 
from the class of humiliores. They would have had to suffer the punishment, 
talionic or state, prescribed for their crimes. In practice, then, it was the members 
of the Roman ruling class, the honestiores, who were the real beneficiaries of the 
institution of composition. The wealthy liberi were the only members of the 
137 Conversely, the slave victim could not accept compensation for his injuries. Such 
compensation would have been arranged by and would have accrued to the slaveholder. 
See Institutes of Gaius 3.222, as cited in Spiller (op cit 49): 'A slave is not considered 
personally to suffer outrage, but an outrage is held to be committed through him on his 
owner.' 
138 See De Ste Croix op cit 458 and Cameron op cit 194. 
139 The former comprised the upper classes of the free population, the latter the lower orders. 
See De Ste Croix op cit 458 and Kunkel op cit 65. 
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Roman population who possessed both the legal right and the proprietary means 
to pay for their crimes, literally. 
Roman law thus does not provide any substantive support for the historical 
arguments of the advocates of restorative justice. Much the same conclusion as 
was reached in relation to Asiatic law is valid also for Roman law: the institution 
of composition was thoroughly imbued with the precepts of class inequality; it 
had very little to do with restorative justice and everything to do with class 
justice.140 It was only the Roman ruling class that was not, in one way or another, 
prejudiced by the restorative veneer of composition. Both the servi and the 
humiliores had to negotiate its oppressive class contours. 
2.14 The Feudal Mode of Production 
Of all the historical epochs, it was the Middle Ages, the epoch situated 
between the fall of the Roman Empire and the modem era, which was most 
accommodating of the institution of composition. This was an era during which, 
as Vermes notes: 
'the institutions of the blood feud and the talio were resorted to 
exceptionally only, and composition in terms of money had become 
the dominant punishment' .141 
Haynes confirms the point about medieval criminal justice: 
'Crimes were met by restitution, not punishment. Every sort of 
injury was atonable by a money compensation paid to the injured 
man or his relations.' 142 
For a killing, the offender had to pay his victim's wergild or worth money to his 
kin; for injuries, the offender had to compensate the victim with payment of bot, 
140 See Vermes op cit 48. 
141 Ibid 51. 
142 Haynes (1935: 209). 
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according to a detailed injuries tariff, and he had to compensate the state with 
payment of wife. 143 Such pecuniary punishments were more popular in this period 
than in any other. And there can be little doubt that the Middle Ages did indeed 
constitute one of the most favourable historical terrains for the institution of 
composition. 
A number of commentators present this epoch as particularly victim-
friendly, as one in which the focus of the criminal law was upon the welfare of the 
victims of crime. Offenders had to make good the damage they had caused and 
restore the social equilibrium they had broken, by composing their offences. The 
primary concern of the criminal law was thus to ensure that offenders repaired the 
harm they had inflicted upon their victims and, by extension, upon the 
community. Often the medieval epoch is referred to as a 'golden age' of the 
victim. l44 Such a classification of the Middle Ages constitutes a major 
endorsement for the historical claims of the restorationists. Medieval criminal 
law and, especially, medieval sanctions can be presented as some kind of Shangri-
fa of restorative justice, thereby endowing the contemporary restorationist 
movement with historical legitimacy. This 'golden age' of the victim needs to be 
examined through the lens of historical materialism. 
The medieval epoch was the epoch of the feudal mode of production, the 
world-historical successor of the ancient mode of production. The feudal 
143 See Fry (1951: 32); 'In England in Saxon times, the wer, or payment for homicide, the bot, 
or compensation for injury, existed alongside the wife, or fine paid to the King or overlord.' 
See also Schafer (1977: 14), Mawby & Gill (1987: 36), Karmen (1990: 280) and Jacobs 
(1977: 46). 
144 See Schafer ibid 5: 'The term 'golden age' of the victim refers to the time during which 
there was recognition of the victim's important role and an emphasis on compensation. The 
historical origin of the victim's dominant role in criminal procedure lies in the Middle Ages 
and is plainly evident in the system of "composition" (compensation) in the Germanic 
common laws.' 
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economy was essentially a natural economy, that is, an economy dedicated in its 
fundamentals to the production of use-values. It did, however, produce a 
substantial surplus, which was commodified and exchanged against the universal 
equivalent, money. It is the enhanced presence of the commodity circuit in the 
feudal economy which accounts for the triumph of composition as the premier 
feudal sanction. 
Feudalism raised the commodification of the talio to its apogee. Unlike the 
ancient mode of production, feudalism was not based upon the commodification 
of the person of the direct producer. The serf was not formally a slave, and did 
possess a legal persona. But, for the purposes of the criminal law, at least, every 
man had a monetary worth prescribed legally: 
'From the king himself down to the poorest peasant scratching out a 
living on an under-tilled farm, every freeman had his value in money 
laid down by the law.'145 
Every man also had a bot for virtually every part of his body which may be 
harmed or injured in a criminal assault. The feudal commitment to the interests of 
the victim, and hence to composition as the preferred criminal sanction was, if not 
absolute, certainly stronger, in formal terms, than in any other historical epoch. 
However, and as suggested by the quotation in the previous paragraph, 
feudal society was, like its Asiatic and ancient predecessors, a class society. 
Feudal relations of production were structured by the contradiction and conflict 
between the two major social classes, the serfs and the feudal lords. 146 The serfs 
lived and worked on strips of land granted to them by their lords. As a class, the 
145 Bresler (1965: 17). Fry (op cit 32) records that the Frisians, a medieval Germanic tribe, 
valued a noble's life at 80s, a freeman's at 53s, and a serfs at 27s. 
146 There were numerous levels of overlordship between the serf at the bottom and the 
monarch on top. There were thus also numerous levels of class contradictions. But they 
were all secondary to the primary contradiction between serf and his direct feudal overlord. 
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feudal lords were unproductive, and lived off the surplus which they extracted 
from their serfs. Serfdom was a legal status which subjected the serf to the 
juridical thrall of his lord. It entailed a legal obligation upon the serf to surrender 
to his lord a predetermined portion of his produce (quit-rent) or labour-power 
(corvee).147 The serf had no choice in the matter. In other words, the serfwas 
required by law to warrant the reproduction of the livelihood of the lord. Of 
course, the serf's own livelihood would become decidedly precarious ifhe did not 
comply with this legal duty. 
Unlike its Asiatic and ancient predecessors, the feudal state was 
centrifugal. 148 There was no functional centralized repository of political power. 
Instead, it was parcellized and deconcentrated. The feudal manorial estate or 
seigniory was the real locus of political power and hence of juridical authority. In 
relation to the serf, the king was sovereign in name only. It was his feudal lord 
who was the practical embodiment of sovereignty. 
'In feudalism the lord stands in relation to serf as state to subject, 
seignoral power is state power writ small, and serfdom is the 
subjection of the serf to the state in the person of the lord.' 149 
'Government thus became a private affair; the prerogatives of office 
were owned as private property and inherited as private property was 
inherited .,. Feudalism as a system of government may accordingly 
be defmed as private assumption of public authority.' 150 
For the serf, then, the feudal lord was the feudal state personified. The feudal 
manor was the feudal state materialized. The person who exploited the serf 
economically also dominated him politically. 
147 See Thompson & Johnson (1965: 329-337) and Cameron op cit 248-249. 
148 Anderson (l981: 152). 
149 Hindess & Hirst op cit 224, original emphasis. 
150 Thompson & Johnson op cit 29 1. 
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Indeed, as is well known, feudal exploitation was 'non-economic', in the 
sense that the appropriation of surplus by the feudal lord was premised upon his 
political power over his serfs. In the feudal epoch, political power entailed legal 
power. The seigniory was the basic juridical unit of feudalism and the seignior 
the administrator and dispenser of feudal justice. 151 In fact, there was, for the 
most part, a coincidence between power and justice. The seignoral power was 
also the judicial power. Certainly, these two powers could be neither conceptually 
nor practically distinguished from each other. The feudal lord: 
'within the confmes of his lands was not only a landowner but also a 
ruler, that is the individual invested with administrative and legal 
powers, as far as the commoners working in his particular seigniory 
were concemed.' 152 
There was in feudal times, then, a type of justice which was derived directly from 
the social relations of production, a type of justice which, indeed, was the social 
relations of production expressed juridically. 'Justice was the central modality of 
political power ... It was the ordinary name of power.' 153 
Feudal justice was thus incontrovertibly class justice. The 'golden age' of 
the victim was structured by an unmediated vinculum between class power and 
juridical relations. This meant, quite simply, that composition as a criminal 
sanction was not as accessible practically as it may have been available legally. In 
feudal times also, as in the Asiatic and ancient epochs, composition was thus 
essentially a ruling-class expedient. The rich could commit crimes, including 
murder, with no fear of being punished for their actions in any way, other than 
having to part with a modicum of their wealth. Composition was, however, not a 
genuine right of the poor, not even of the poor victim. 
151 See Tigar & Levy (1977: 25). 
152 Manfred op cit 148. 
153 Anderson op cit 152-153, original emphasis. 
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A criminal sanction which is delineated in terms of access to economic 
resources almost always favours the rich and disadvantages the poor. Medieval 
composition is such a sanction. This problem is acknowledged even by Schafer, 
the originator of the idea of the golden age of the victim: 
'The amount of compensation varied according to the nature of the 
crime and the age, rank, sex, and prestige of the injured party ... 
Thus, the ''value'' of human beings and their social positions were 
involved in determining compensation, and a socially stratified 
composition developed. ,154 
Wright, a contemporary restorationist, also admits the class character of feudal 
justice. His comments on composition in the feudal epoch deserve quotation at 
some length: 
'In so far as there was a golden age of the victim, this was it ... But 
class justice seems to have been practised: compensation for injury 
was confined largely to the nobility and the warrior class ... As for 
the poor man, with no kin, who became a victim, the historians do 
not say how he could enforce his claim. It appears that composition 
worked among equals, for example among the warrior class (and 
perhaps among serfs, although no evidence appears to have 
survived), but the majority of poor thieves, murderers and rapists 
were hanged, burned, drowned or mutilated, while from those who 
had the wherewithal as much money as possible was extracted by the 
victim or the lord, whoever had the most power. There was no 
question of equality before the law. Such a system, even if 
reparation was a key element, hardly deserves a halo.' 155 
154 Schafer op cit 12. 
155 Wright op cit 2-3 . See also Bresler op cit 19: 'Modem historians are divided as to what 
happened if a man could not pay his bot. Either way it was unpleasant. Professor Maitland 
says that he went into slavery or was outlawed; a more recent expert, Professor Plucknett, 
claims that his life was forfeit and in the gift of the injured party.' See further Karmen op 
cit 280: 'But fragmentary historical records confirm the suspicion that in a society with 
sharply defined classes, restitution worked to the advantage of the upper crust. If they were 
powerful enough, guilty parties could scoff at the claims of their social "inferiors". If 
compelled to settle accounts, the affluent could easily make fiscal atonement for even the 
most outrageous breaches of the law through relatively inconsequential composition 
payments of gold, cattle, land or other valuables. On the other hand, offenses by the 
marginal against the mighty were not so readily resolved. The amounts specified were 
often beyond the resources of the common folk. Those who could not meet their 
obligations were branded as outlaws or were forced to sell themselves into virtual slavery. 
Restitution functioned as one of many mechanisms that made the rich richer and the poor 
poorer.' 
It was implicit in the structure of feudal society that composition could not 
be other than class bound. One's position in the class system was an 
attribute of one's legal persona, and had important legal consequences. 
Lords enjoyed legal superiority over serfs and the other dominated classes. 
The feudal lord was the judicial authority in his domain. 'The man who 
had the land judged the man who had not.' 156 There was but little chance 
of a serf prevailing at law against a lord. I57 Feudal justice was thus class 
justice in terms of the law. And feudal composition was a system which 
operated to protect lordly criminals while throwing the poor ones to the 
wolves. It was a system suffused with the iniquities of class. It was a 
system which, as Wright so aptly observes, 'hardly deserves a halo'. 
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It must at this point be noted that the ambit of feudal composition was not 
comprehensive. Certain crimes remained botleas, that is, not commutable to 
pecuniary terms. Thus, for example, housebreaking, arson and treason were 
botleas crimes and hence outside of the feudal institution of composition. 158 These 
were met with corporal, . often capital, punishment. Over time, the list of botleas 
crimes was slowly increased, as more and more crimes were deemed 
unemendable. This development became, by the late feudal period, a decisive 
shift away from composition as the typical criminal sanction. Late feudalism was 
a period which witnessed the emergence of physical punishments, many of which 
were surprisingly harsh. 159 The heyday of composition was over. 
! 56 See Wright op cit 4. 
157 See Huberman (1968: 10): 'A quarrel between serf and lord was very apt to be decided in 
favor of the lord, since he would be the judge in the dispute.' 
158 See Wright op cit 3 and Bresler op cit 20. 
159 See Bloch (1965: 365). 
131 
2.15 The Age of Absolutism 
The demise of composition coincided more or less with the rise of the 
centralized state. During the late feudal period, in place of the parcels of state 
power constituted by the myriads of feudallatiJundia, there now emerged the true 
feudal monarch, who was able to impose his political will upon all his liegemen 
and to unite their disparate statelets into a single national state. The centralization 
of feudal sovereignty was based upon the support of the new urban middle classes 
which had emerged, with the growth of cities, in the tenth and eleventh centuries. 
Urbanization and the growth of a market economy based upon money 
signalled the beginning of the downfall of the manorial economy. Huberman 
describes this transformation in the following terms: 
, After the twelfth century the economy of no markets was changed 
to an economy of many markets; and with the growth of commerce, 
the natural economy of the self-sufficing manor of the early Middle 
Ages, was changed to the money economy of a world of expanding 
trade.' 160 
The merchant masters of the money economies of the feudal cities found in the 
monarch their best weapon against the power of the feudal lords. The political 
defeat of seignoral power was accomplished on the basis of an alliance between 
the urban middle classes and the feudal monarch. 161 By the fifteenth century the 
national state had emerged, ruled by a king who had succeeded, with the backing 
of the cities, in centralizing political power within a determinate geographical 
area. The age of absolutism had arrived. 162 It was to be the gravedigger of 
composition. 
160 Huberman op cit 26. 
161 See Tigar & Levy op cit 47. 
162 See Tigar & Levy ibid 42-46. See also generally Mehring (1975) and Mooers (1991). 
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The absolutist state was the political form required for the development of 
merchant capital. In the same way as the manorial economy needed the 
parcellization of state power, so merchant capitalism needed its centralization. 
For the merchant: 
'the unification of all administrative and military power in one hand, 
princely absolutism, was an economic necessity.' 163 
Merchant capital was the dis solvent of feudal relations of production. It 
infiltrated money into the marrow of the manor, and led a frontal assault upon the 
integrity of the natural economy. Under its sway the insularity of the manor began 
to disintegrate, both feudal lords and serfs wanted after the perceived liberating 
power of money, and the regime of use-value began to succumb irreversibly to the 
regime of exchange-value. 
Absolutism was the necessary political conjugate of this historic economic 
transformation. The latter required the former. Indeed, it elevated the political to 
primacy in the matrix of social relations of production. The birth of generalized 
commodity production could occur only in an absolutist political context. The 
central state arrogated to itself an absolute monopoly of force in order to 
guarantee the political milieu required for the impending transformation of the 
mode of production. The age of absolutism was thus the age which nurtured all 
the presuppositions of the capitalist mode of production. 
In class terms, the absolutist state held the balance of power between two 
classes, representing two different and competing modes of production: on the 
one hand, there was the declining feudal nobility and, on the other hand, the rising 
bourgeoisie. The impasse in the struggle between these two classes for socio-
economic supremacy facilitated the emergence of a centralized monarchy which: 
163 Mehring ibid 2, original emphasis. See also Kautsky (1979: 14-17). 
'represented a form of relative state autonomy, balanced on the 
countervailing pressures of the contending classes' .164 
Neither class had the strength to defeat the other, and the state was able to 
establish itself as autonomous arbiter, supporting now one, favouring now the 
other, in order to keep both in line. The overall effect of absolutism was a 
combined one of extending the embattled life of the feudal mode of production 
while simultaneously providing the material conditions for the birth of the 
capitalist mode of production. Absolutism was thus essentially a politics of 
transition, corresponding to the historic transition from petty to generalized 
commodity production. 
The impact of absolutism on crime and punishment was radical. 
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Notoriously, the absolutist state defined crime as an attack upon its sovereignty, 
and declared punishment to be its exclusive competence. Absolutism thus 'de-
privatized' the criminal law. Criminal justice became an affair of state. And the 
medieval regime of composition had to give way to state punishment, 
administered by the king's men. The two passages below give a sense of the 
disintegrating impact which the statism of the absolutist epoch had upon the 
notion of composition: 
'The idea of damage done to the individual was merged and lost in 
the greater trespass alleged to have been committed by the offender 
against the peace and the code of the king.' 165 
'With the growth of this conception of crime as an offense against 
the public welfare, as exemplified in the majesty of the king, there 
was a corresponding decline in the principle of compensation, which 
ultimately became obsolete.' 166 
164 Draper (1977: 477). See also Engels op cit 196. 
165 Caldwell (1965: 491-2). See also Haynes op cit 210. 
166 Barnes & Teeters (1959: 288). 
The absolutist state thus moved criminal justice definitively into the public 
arena. Crimes were reinvented as affronts to the 'king's peace' and 
punishments were imposed and executed by functionaries of the 
centralized state. 
134 
Initially, it appears, the monarch simply stepped into the shoes of the 
victim. That is, compensation which would have been due to the victim was 
replaced by [mes due to the Crown. Indeed, the system of [mes became an 
important source of revenue for cash-strapped monarchs. 167 In thirteenth-century 
England 'money collected from fines was equal to one-sixth of the king's 
revenue' .168 However, as the power and liquidity of the Crown grew, so did its 
reliance upon the fine system for revenue recede. Although the [me continued as 
a criminal sanction, it was rapidly supplanted by a host of physical punishments, 
infamous for their arbitrary nature and their brutality. 
By the fifteenth century, when absolutism reigned supreme, criminal 
sanctions had become primarily physical, and composition had been relegated to 
penological insignificance. Thus, Wright comments that: 
'If, earlier, compensation to the victim had been superseded by [mes 
to the Crown, the latter now gave way to deterrence and retribution 
in the form of physical punishments, commonly hanging or 
beheading.' 169 
The absolutist state, despite its historical transitoriness, thus presided over a 
sweeping re-definition of crime and a fundamental transformation of punishment. 
The absolutist state took the historic step of establishing itself as the functional· 
167 See Haynes op cit 209-210. 
168 Wright op cit 4. 
169 Ibid 5. See Foucault (1977: 3-72) for an engaging study of the power relations underlying 
the brutalities of punishment in pre-revolutionary France. 
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axis of criminal justice. It was during this period that the state became a surrogate 
for the crime victim who, in turn, 'became the Cinderella of the criminal law' .170 
The absolutist break with the feudal tradition of composition was 
encouraged, if not prompted, by the emergence of 'vagrancy and beggary as a 
mass phenomenon,.l7l The growth of the money economy ofthe cities and the 
concomitant break-up of the natural economy of the latifundia led to the 
pauperization of large numbers of serfs and peasants. Many were forcibly ejected 
from the land by feudal lords; others sought refuge from feudal exploitation and 
access to the perceived benefits of the money economy in the cities. But these 
recently 'liberated' people exceeded by far the number that could be absorbed into 
the productive life of the cities. The bulk of them became 'surplus people' who 
formed a stratum of unemployed and unemployable urban poor, languishing in 
medieval slums.172 Dislocated and disaffected, they were ready material for the 
lures of criminality. 
'They were turned en masse into beggars, robbers, vagrants, partly from 
inclination, but in most cases from force of circumstance. ' 173 
Thus was born the so-called criminal class, a class of people for whom there was 
no place on the land or in the cities and for whom crime was often, literally, the 
only way to keep alive. 
This period witnessed an unprecedented leap in the crime rate. Criminality 
mushroomed, to levels unheard of in any previous epoch of human history. As a 
systemic feudal response to crime, composition required two conditions: firstly, a 
low level of crime; and secondly, criminals who had the wherewithal, personally 
170 Schafer (1960: 8). 
171 Vermes op cit 55. 
172 See Mehring op cit 3-4. 
173 Vermes op cit 55. 
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or by lineage, to compose their offences. 174 The material conditions which 
fostered the emergence of absolutism also facilitated the demise of the system of 
composition by destroying its necessary preconditions. As a system, composition 
was ill-prepared to manage the flood of offences committed by a pauperized 
criminal stratum. The quantitative leap in criminality was so great as to 
necessitate a qualitative change in the nature of criminal justice. Composition had 
to give way to state punishment. 
Historically, the extent of a society's reliance upon composition as a 
sanction is an index of the penetration of commodity relations into the socio-
cultural life of that society. In other words, the growth of composition can be 
superimposed onto the development of commodity relations in the system of 
production. Through the ages, movement from the (alio to composition was the 
juridical expression of the progressive commodification of social relations. That 
movement reached its apogee in the classical feudal era, when composition held 
sway as the generalized mode of disposition of crimes. During the period of 
absolutism, however, that movement was definitively halted, arguably even 
reversed. The period which nurtured the preconditions of the capitalist mode of 
production and which prefigured the transition from petty to generalized 
commodity production was also the period which jettisoned composition. 
Absolutism was, essentially, the political response to the extended crisis of 
the feudal mode of production. It was feudalism on the threshold of its death 
agony. It was the epoch of the break-up of the natural economy. It was a period 
of turmoil and dislocation, of political violence and social distress. There was no 
place for composition here. The penal flagship of classical feudalism ran aground 
174 These requirements follow directly from the class nature of medieval composition. 
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in the treacherous waters of late feudalism. Nefariously savage punishments 
replaced composition. Brutality in punishment was the necessary juridical 
corollary of absolutism in politics. There was a complete correspondence 
between absolutist penology and the violence of the socio-economic 
transformation then in progress. 175 Absolutism in fact resurrected a version of 
pre-talionic blood revenge, that is, an indiscriminate vengeance that was not 
governed by the talionic principle of equivalence. The absolutist state took the 
place of the victim-commune and imposed upon the offender a punishment which 
was typically hugely disproportionate to the crime. 
2.16 The Rise of the Capitalist Mode of Production 
Composition, which had for so long been the measure of the 
commodification of social relations of production, had to be sacrificed in order to 
ensure the [mal victory the commodity. The world-historical transition from 
natural to market economy, from feudalism to capitalism, signalled the final 
demise of composition as a system. Unlike all its predecessors, which, at best, 
sustained various levels of petty commodity production, the capitalist mode of 
production is a mode structured by generalized commodity production. The entire 
production process is geared, from start to finish, to the production of 
commodities. The commodity is the elemental cell of capitalist production. 
Exchange-value is the raison d'efre of the production process. 
Capitalism is a mode of production which entails, in Wallerstein's pithy 
formulation, 'the commodification of everything', 176 including labour-power, the 
unique value-producing commodity. Everything has an exchange-value which is 
175 The process of proletarianization was the most violent aspect of this transfonnation. 
176 This is the title of the first chapter in Wallerstein (1993). 
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determined in relation to the universal equivalent, money. Yet the capitalist state 
has, from its inception, eschewed composition as a generalized penological 
option, despite its historical consonance with the process of commodification. It 
has, instead, elected to keep alive the public conception of crime and punishment 
developed by the absolutist state, modified by the enlightenment principle of 
legality and a clearly discernible talionic posture. England is paradigmatic here. 
2.17 Corporal and Capital Punishment 
The early capitalist state appropriated the pre-tal ionic penal practices of the 
absolutist state lock, stock and barrel. The era of primitive capitalist 
accumulation was also the era of savage punishments for criminal offences. 
Imprisonment had not yet been invented as a general criminal sanction. 
Punishments were thus invariably corporal or, distressingly often, capital. They 
were: 
'cruel and of exaggerated severity, ranging from burning alive or 
breaking on the wheel to the galleys and many forms of mutilation, 
whipping, branding and the pillory'. 177 
The death sentence was imposed routinely for even the most petty of 
crimes. The early English capitalist state had an almost affectionate 
affinity, which lasted well into the nineteenth century, for the death 
sentence as its punishment of choice. According to Vermes, by 1820 
England had at least 200 capital statutes which prescribed the death 
penalty as the punishment for 6789 offences. 178 
177 Radzinowicz (1966: 3). 
178 Vermes op cit 56. See also Hay (1975: 18) and Diamond (1951: 322-323). Bresler (op cit 
32) gives a graphic sense of the early capitalist penchant for capital punishment: 'If a man 
injured Westminster Bridge, he was hanged. Ifhe appeared disguised on a public road, be 
was banged. Ifbe cut down young trees; ifbe sbot rabbits; ifbe stole property valued at 
five shillings; ifbe stole anything at all from a bleacb field; ifbe wrote threatening letters to 
extort money; if he returned prematurely from transportation; for any of these offences be -
was inunediately hanged.' 
The early and singularly violent texture of the criminal law in the 
home of the capitalist mode of production was determined by the 
exigencies of the appropriation of ownership of the means of production 
by the rising capitalist class. The new proprietary regime had to be 
guaranteed, and any opposition from or rebellion by the recently 
expropriated, however episodic, had to be crushed. The new proletariat 
had to be taught that resistance to the capitalist project was futile and that, 
in the world of the commodity, capitalist ownership of the means of 
production was inviolable. In this era there was no doubt that the law was 
the handmaiden of capitalist class terror against the proletarian masses. 
This was the era of bourgeois revolutionariness, of the forceful separation 
of the direct producers from the means of production, an era which was 
inequitable to its core, and which left no margin for the equivalent niceties 
of composition. The latter did not accord with the tumult which marked 
the social relations of production of early capitalism. 
2.18 The Political Economy of the Prison 
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Theoretically, mature capitalism could have resurrected composition as a 
generalized system of punishment. Indeed, it should have commodified 
punishment more thoroughly than even feudalism had. Such a development 
would have been fully consistent with the idea of capitalism as a generalized 
system of commodity production. It did not occur. And the reason therefor, it 
appears, is that mature capitalism invented a system of punishment which had an 
even better fit with its relations of production, namely, imprisonment. From the 
mid-nineteenth century imprisonment became the standard capitalist means of 
dispensing criminal justice. The material roots of this development are to be 
found in the nature of commodity relations, and more particularly in the nature of 
that most unique of commodities, labour-power. The capitalist mode of 
production is predicated upon the constant sale of labour-power by the proletariat 
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to the bourgeoisie. This sale is the ultimate source of all surplus value, and hence 
of the extended reproduction of the mode of production. In other words, the 
economic foundation of the capitalist system is to be found in the sale and 
purchase of labour-power, the only commodity capable of creating value. 
The legal form of this elemental capitalist transaction is the contract of 
employment, in terms of which the worker sells his labour-power to the capitalist 
for a given period of time, in exchange for a wage. The capitalist economy is thus 
an economy of labour time. By selling their labour-power, the workers put it at 
the disposal of the capitalists for a predetermined time, during which time the 
workers are put to task producing commodities. Hence the value of each and 
every commodity emerging from the capitalist production process is determined 
by the amount of socially necessary labour-time that was required to produce it. 
This is the law of value, the so-called labour theory of value. 179 
The law of value thus defines value in terms of abstract labour time. The 
value of every commodity, as Marx tells us, 'represents human labour in the 
abstract, the expenditure ofhurnan labour in general' .180 Value is a relation which 
embodies the essentialia of capitalist social relations of production. It is the 
signature relation of the political economy of capitalism. It percolates throughout 
the social fabric and leaves its impress on all superstructural relations. There is 
little in the capitalist universe that is not structured, in one way or another, by the 
value relation. Certainly, in the current postmodem incarnation of capitalism, the 
domination of daily life by the law of value is relentless and complete. 
179 Mandel (1979: 17-18) explains that 'the exchange value ofa commodity is determined by 
the quantity of labour necessary to produce it. The quantity of labor is measured by the 
length of time it takes to produce the commodity.' 
180 Marx (1977: 51). 
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Imprisonment is the penological analogue of the value relation. It is the law 
of value juridified. Industrial capitalism found in the prison the best juridical 
correlate of the commodity. Imprisonment, not composition, was the institution 
which accomplished the commodification of punishment most thoroughly. It was 
the form of punishment which accorded most fully with juridical worldview of the 
new ruling class, the bourgeoisie. lSI Pashukanis elaborates upon the relationship 
between the rise of the prison and the law of value in capitalist society: 
'Deprivation of freedom, for a period stipulated in the court 
sentence, is the specific form in which modern, that is to say 
bourgeois-capitalist, criminal law embodies the principle of 
equivalent recompense. This form is unconsciously yet deeply 
linked with the conception of man in the abstract, and abstract 
human labour measurable in time. It is no coincidence that this form 
of punishment became established precisely in the nineteenth 
century, and was considered natural.,IS2 
Commodity relations express the exchange of equivalent amounts of abstract 
human labour; imprisonment of a criminal offender expresses the exchange of an 
amount of abstract freedom equivalent to the severity of the crime. The affinity 
between the two, as Pashukanis notes, was natural. IS3 
In the pre-capitalist world, composition had been the natural penal 
accessory of the growth of commodity relations. But pre-capitalist commodity 
production was petty, and labour-power itself had not yet been transformed into a 
commodity. All the pre-capitalist class societies were formally unequal societies, 
181 Engels (1990: 598) describes the juridical worldview as 'the classical one of the 
bourgeoisie' . 
182 Pashukanis op cit 180-181. 
183 It is not being suggested here that the bourgeoisie had a grand plan to develop the prison as 
its penal instrument of choice. Ignatieff's (1985: 92-95) criticism of this vulgar Mandst 
position is correct. In many senses, the prison 'chose' itself. There was certainly a degree 
of accident involved in its development. There may also have been significant non-
bourgeois, including proletarian, support for the prison, as Ignatieff suggests. However, 
this does not detract from the fact that there exists an objective correspondence, based on 
the principle of equivalence, between imprisonment and the commodity form. 
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legally privileging the non-producers over the producers. 184 We have seen that 
pre-capitalist composition, although based on the principle of equivalence, was 
nevertheless overtly biased, in terms ofthe law, in favour of the ruling classes. 
Capitalism generalized commodity production and commodified labour-power. It 
also established formal equality as its primary legal principle: all were possessed 
of the same basic rights; all were equal before the law. This break with the pre-
capitalist pattern of class-determined legal regimes was necessary, demanded by 
the configuration of the capitalist mode of production. Marx explains: 
'The exchange of commodities of itself implies no other relations of 
dependence than those which result from its own nature. On this 
assumption, labour-power can appear upon the market as a 
commodity, only if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose 
labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity. In 
order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his disposal, 
must be the untrammelled owner of his capacity to labour, i.e., of his 
person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal 
with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference 
alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the 
eyes of the law.'185 
It was thus the nature of capitalist relations of production which determined the 
contours of the capitalist legal form. The generalization of commodity relations 
required a legal milieu of eqUality. The commodification of labour-power brought 
with it, in Marx's cutting phrase, 'a very Eden of the innate rights of man' .186 
Composition was far too infused with the pre-capitalist credo of inequality 
to fmd a home in the new Eden of equality inscribed in the bourgeois worldview. 
Instead, the capitalist state turned to the prison to punish those who violated its 
legal prescriptions. Imprisonment was the one form of punishment which fully 
184 These were the hydraulic, slave and feudal societies. 
185 Marx (1954: 165). 
186 Ibid 172. 
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recognized the criminal as the 'untrammelled owner' of his freedom. 187 It was the 
penal institution which expressed most completely the total triumph of 
commodity relations and the final destruction of the natural economy. Criminals 
would pay for their crimes with the one currency which all could afford and had 
access to, namely, freedom, measured in time. 
The measure of abstract human labour at the heart of the capitalist economy 
became the great leveller in the criminal justice system. The prison banished the 
class inequalities which had marked pre-capitalist composition. Capitalist legality 
was necessarily egalitarian. All were and were required to be equal before the 
law. And all who broke the law would be subject to a form of punishment which 
was egalitarian. In other words, capitalism transformed crime, too, into an equal 
exchange relation. The convicted criminal would, perforce, have to exchange his 
offence and the damage he had caused for a specified period of his existence in a 
prison. Like everything else, capitalism thoroughly commodified crime and 
punishment also. 
2.19 The Abandonment of the Victim 
Today, more than a century after its invention, imprisonment remains the 
primary and preferred criminal sanction in the capitalist world, a fact which 
confirms its consonance with the penal requirements of the capitalist mode of 
production. The prison, of course, has nothing to offer the victim (except, 
perhaps, the satisfaction of knowing that the offender is being made to pay for the 
crime). Indeed, it is an oft-made argument amongst victimologists and 
restorationists that the centralization of the state and the consequent rise of the 
prison had the effect of relegating the victim to the status of a 'poor relation' in 
187 This ownership is a structural requirement of the commodity economy. 
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the criminal law. 188 They bemoan the fact that the redefinition of crime as an 
attack upon the integrity of the state signalled the death knell of the rights of 
victims and the pre-modem restorative elements of the criminal sanction. They 
tell us that the shift to imprisonment as the typical sanction was simultaneously a 
shift away from the historical restitutionary rights of victims. 189 
In restorationist lore, then, the victim, as an element of the criminal justice 
process, died with the Middle Ages. The modem state was concerned with the 
offender; the victim was an unwelcome trespasser, to be ignored, even hidden 
from the public view. 190 A central aim of the restorationist project is to 'restore' 
the victim, to rehabilitate him as one of the key components of the criminal justice 
matrix. The advocates of restorative justice believe that, absent the victim's 
reinstatement and recognition as a criminal justice agent, the search for a properly 
restorative sanction, and hence a legitimate criminal justice dispensation, is 
doomed to failure. 
However, the abandonment of the victim was in fact a necessary 
concomitant of the great socio-economic transformation occurring at the time, 
namely, the demise of feudalism and the triumph of capitalism. Unlike all its 
predecessors, the capitalist mode of production has an inherently anti-community 
188 See, for example, Schafer (1977: 16), Walklate op cit 109, Mawby & Gill op cit 36, 
Kannen op cit 16, Jacobs op cit 47, Van Ness & Strong op cit 10 and Zehr op cit 109-110. 
189 See Jacobs ibid: 'The connection between restitution and punishment was severed. 
Restitution to the victim came to play an insignificant role in the administration of the 
criminal law.' 
190 In this regard, Falandysz (1982: 110) makes the important observation that there may have 
been a class aspect to the desertion of the victim: 'An interesting result emerges when we 
realize that these "forgotten people" are mostly from the working class - poor, uneducated 
and generally underprivileged by the existing social system. Isn't it very logical that the 
same system which "remembers" to punish "the criminals" forgets the victims? Is it by 
accident only that both criminals and victims belong basically to the same category of 
people? If the victims were mostly from the ruling and privileged classes of society, could 
they ever have been forgotten by the criminal justice system of a society which these classes 
rule and in which they are privileged?' 
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dimension. Its social relations are premised upon the autonomous individual, for 
whom community is an encumbrance. In other words, capitalism posits, as its 
elemental human component, a free and undetermined individual. For such an 
individual, becoming the victim of a crime is a hazard of autonomy. Victirnhood 
is immanent in the condition of self-determination. It is thus an attribute of the 
individual, not of the community. The individual owns his status as a victim, and 
must deal with it as a private matter, like every other feature of his autonomy. 
That is, in a sense, the price of autonomy, and incursions upon it cannot be 
constructed in social terms. The atomistic individual must perforce be an 
atomistic victim. The early capitalist mode of production did not countenance 
sociality in respect of victimhood. This is also why the victim disappeared from 
view more or less with the rise of capitalism: it was part of the logic of the 
system. 
Capitalism postulates an exultant individualism as part its ideological 
arsenal. One of the consequences is an intolerance of victimhood as a legitimate 
or even valid social category. The victim mentality had no place in the 
triumphalist chronicle constructed upon the enterprising spirit of the capitalist 
pioneer. The capitalist notion of personhood had to be unencumbered, also by the 
notion of victimhood. Hence victims of crime did not merit the kind of attention 
which they had apparently received in the pre-capitalist world. The new world 
was organized around the norm of the individual commodity owner, autonomous 
and equal to every other commodity owner. It comprehended progress in terms of 
the destruction of all previous conceptions and beliefs. It could thus give no 
credence to victimhood, a status which was bereft of deVelopmental potential and 
which, if validated as a social concern, could only be an impediment to progress. 
Hence, the abandonment of the victim. Hence the focus, instead, upon the 
offender. 
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Unlike the victim, the offender had to be given proper attention, for his 
conduct did more than merely harm the individual victim. It also taxed the 
integrity of the social relations of production of capitalism. As we have seen, 
these relations entailed the notion of the rights-bearing autonomous individual so 
pivotal to liberal bourgeois philosophy. The criminal was, in this connection, the 
autonomous individual in extremis. He had gone beyond the pale and broken the 
fundamental rule ofthe commodity economy, namely, equality in exchange. He 
had, by means foul, engineered an unequal exchange with his victim. He had 
abused his autonomy and had to pay for his errantry. However, his offence was 
not a private matter. It was not one for settlement with his victim. For the entire 
system was his victim. He had breached the social contract. He had partaken of 
the poisonous fruit of inequality in the 'very Eden of the innate rights of man'. He 
knows the cost of his transgression. His crime was a public one, and he had to 
atone for it by yielding to the state a measured portion of his life, equivalent to the 
damage he had caused. 19\ 
Capitalism's penal focus upon the offender was thus a necessary 
concomitant of the architecture of its social relations of production. These 
relations require formal equality in all things. Hence capitalist personhood 
implies perfect equality of rights for all. The criminal violates this law of equality 
and must be made to pay for his crime. In this sense, crime in capitalist society is 
not so much an attack upon the rights of the victim as it is upon this law of 
equality whence those rights derive. The net effect of capitalism's approach to 
crime was the virtual excision of the victim as an attribute of the criminal justice 
!91 See Foucault op cit 89-90: 'The citizen is presumed to have accepted once and for all, with 
the laws of society the very law by which he may be punished. Thus the criminal appears 
as a juridically paradoxical being. He has broken the pact, he is therefore the enemy of 
society as a whole, but he participates in the punishment that is practised upon him. The 
least crime attacks the whole of society; and the whole of society - including the criminal-
is present in the least punishment ... In effect the offence opposes an individual to the entire 
social body; in order to punish him, society has the right to oppose him in its entirety.' 
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system. Whereas the pre-capitalist modes of production had all, to a greater or 
lesser extent, formally acknowledged the actual victim as the legal correlative of 
the offender, capitalism acknowledged only its own state as surrogate victim. The 
actual victim became a casualty of a criminal justice system which reserved the 
benefits of agency for the offender. The victim was relegated to the status of 
onlooker, constrained to observing a process which concerned his interests 
directly and which affected him profoundly, but over which he had little influence 
and no control. Such was the fate of the crime victim for at least the first century 
of the life of the capitalist mode of production. 
2.20 The Rediscovery of the Victim 
It is generally accepted that the victim was 'rediscovered' in the decade 
immediately following the Second World War.l92 Essentially this meant that a 
number of criminologists and other criminal justice professionals launched a 
campaign to reinstate the victim as a legitimate component of the criminal justice 
system. They argued that the rights and interests of the victim of a crime mattered 
at least as much as those ofthe offender, and hence that the system ought to take 
them seriously. They contended that for too long the victim had been sidelined, 
despite being an obvious and indispensable aspect of the crime question. 193 
Victims and their families suffered, often severely, as a result of the conduct of 
the offender. They did not break the law, and did not deserve to be treated as an 
unwelcome intruder in the dispute between the offender and the state. 
192 See Walklate op cit xi. 
193 The acknowledged leader in this regard was Margery Fry, whose life's work was devoted to 
the cause of the crime victim and to winning recognition for victimhood as a compensable 
social category. Her Arms afthe Law (1951) remains a victimological classic. See 
Walklate ibid 109. 
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This pro-victim campaign had at least three consequences of significance. 
Firstly, it spawned the branch of criminology which we know as victimology; 
secondly, it led to a number of countries introducing some form of victim 
compensation arrangements in terms of which victims who met the prescribed 
criteria were legally entitled to be compensated for the injuries they had suffered 
at the hands of the offender;194 thirdly, it has in the last two decades or so, 
provided fertile ground for the growth of the restorative justice movement. These 
are important developments, which have had a major positive impact upon the 
way in which the criminal justice system comprehends and treats victims of 
crime. The victim has been rescued from legal obscurity and, to some extent at 
least, has been rehabilitated as agent in the criminal justice process. Capitalism, 
which abhors victimhood, has at last allowed the victim a voice. 
2.21 Capitalism in Crisis 
The historical and material backdrop to this rebirth of the victim is familiar. 
By the end of the Second World War the capitalist mode of production had been 
in crisis for at least half a century, as a result of the deepening contradiction 
between its relations and forces of production. This contradiction triggered 
regular socio-economic and political explosions, including the imperialist 
'scramble for Africa', the First World War, the great depression, the rise of 
fascism, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. All of these put 
tremendous strain upon the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and undermined 
its ability to rule as it had before, arrogantly and self-indulgently. 
194 See, for example, Walklate ibid 113-126, Maguire & Shapland (1990: 212-219) and 
Williams (1999: 10-13). 
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There was also the 'spectre of communism'. Since the Bolshevik 
Revo I ution in 1917, there had come into existence a practical modern alternative 
to the capitalist system. By the end of the Second World War a number of 
Eastern European countries had followed the USSR, albeit now in the thrall of the 
Stalinist thermidor. There were strong communist parties in most capitalist 
countries. The anti-colonial revolution in the Third World had begun, and often 
took on a strong anti-capitalist posture. And by the start of the fifties, the Chinese 
revolution had expanded the post-capitalist world considerably. There was the 
real danger that the international proletariat, inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution, 
was becoming a c1ass-for-itselfand, hence, a threat to the very existence of the 
capitalist mode of production. 
Capitalism was in crisis. In order to survive it had to be restructured. The 
bourgeoisie's primary response began at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire, USA 
in 1944, when some 40 capitalist countries met to restructure the international 
capitalist economy. Bretton Woods was a concerted capitalist effort to solve the 
structural crisis besetting the capitalist mode of production. Its most important 
immediate results were the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank,195 the acceptance of the US dollar as a currency which was 'as 
good as gold' and, hence, the emergence of the USA as the undisputed leader of 
the capitalist world. These arrangements were all geared to stimulating the 
international capitalist economy. They succeeded in generating a relatively long, 
if artificial, post-war boom. For at least two decades after the Second World War, 
capitalism was able to avoid a major slump. 
195 Galbraith (1995 : 174) describes the functions of the World Bank and IMF as follows: 'The 
first was to provide the money for investment in the hard plant of economic development; 
the second, more diverse and less specific in its tasks, would help countries, new and old, to 
overcome the deficit in their balance of payments ... and specify the internal economies and 
discipline that, with prayer and hope, would correct imbalance. ' 
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2.22 Welfare Capitalism 
The bourgeoisie was also able to disarm the militant proletariat by accepting 
the need to introduce a welfare dimension into its class hegemony. In the post-
war era, many capitalist countries introduced social legislation aimed directly at 
removing that atmosphere of hostility to capitalism which prevailed amongst most 
people outside the ranks of the bourgeoisie. 196 Welfarism was the bourgeoisie's 
response to the popular conviction that it was dispensable as a class. 
The British welfare state exemplified this approach to public and especially 
proletarian disenchantment with capitalism. Laski explains: 
'Social legislation is not the outcome of a rational and objective willing of 
the common good by all members of the community alike; it is the price 
paid for those legal principles which secure the predominance of the owners 
of property. It waxes and wanes in terms of their prosperity. It is a body of 
concession offered to avert a decisive challenge to the principles by which 
their authority is maintained.' 197 
Welfare capitalism was thus a direct response to the strength of proletarian 
opposition to capitalist rule. It was the price paid by the bourgeoisie to defeat the 
proletarian threat to its dictatorship. 198 It was, according to Miliband: 
'part of the "ransom" the working classes had been able to exact 
from their rulers in the course of a hundred years. But it did not, for 
all its importance, constitute any threat to the existing system of 
power and privilege. What it did constitute was a certain 
humanisation of the existing social order.' 199 
196 See Schumpeter (1979: 63) whose book was first published in 1943: 'The public mind has 
by now so thoroughly grown out of humor with it as to make condemnation of capitalism 
and all its works a foregone conclusion - almost a requirement of the etiquette of 
discussion. Whatever his political preference, every writer or speaker hastens to conform to 
this code and to emphasize his critical attitude, his freedom from "complacency", his belief 
in the inadequacies of the capitalist achievement, his aversion to capitalist and his sympathy 
with anti-capitalist interests .' 
197 Cited in George & Wilding (1976: 99). 
198 See George & Wilding ibid 100 and Miliband (1980: 99). 
199 Miliband ibid, original emphasis. 
Welfare capitalism thus entailed bourgeois cognition of the growth of 
proletarian organization and solidarity, and an admission that the working 
class was a crucial agent in the life - and death - of the capitalist mode of 
production. It was an attempt by the bourgeoisie to soften the violence of 
capitalist exploitation, to give the system a human face, and hence to find 
a modus vivendi with its class enemy. 
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One aspect of the welfare 'ransom' paid by the bourgeoisie after the Second 
World War was, as already intimated, the 'rebirth' of the crime victim. Welfare 
capitalism provided the material milieu for the development ofvictimology. Its 
humanizing project included space for a positive construction ofvictimhood.2oO 
Most of the victims of crime were also, by virtue of their class position, victims of 
capitalist exploitation. The new welfare capitalism would acknowledge their 
status as victims of crime as part of the cost of perpetuating their status as victims 
of exploitation. It was in this context that victimhood in the criminal law could be 
affirmed as a status deserving of concern and compassion. The crime victim was 
once again put on the agenda, and acknowledged as an essential element of the 
criminal justice system. The earlier negative conception of victimhood was, 
under the influence of the proselytizing victimologists, replaced by a more 
positive notion of the victim as a rights-bearer and thus worthy of protection. 
The restorative justice movement is a natural extension ofvictimology. But 
it is also an attempt to move beyond victimology, to a penology which is centred 
upon healing all the effects of crime. Restorative justice is, in this regard, the 
most inclusive of all contemporary approaches to crime and punishment. It 
endows both offender and victim with agency, but an agency which is 
fundamentally social. 
200 See Mawby & Walklate (1994: 72). 
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In this regard, it harks back to pre-capitalist penal practices. However, it is a 
response to late capitalist conditions. Restorative justice emerged some 25 years 
ago, after the bubble of the post-war boom had burst. By the early 1970s the 
international capitalist system was once again in serious and open crisis. The 
contradiction between capitalist relations and forces of production, long concealed 
by the post-war prosperity based on the Bretton Woods system, asserted itself 
more acutely and starkly than ever before. The capitalist mode of production was 
in dire straits, and the atmosphere of hostility which it experienced in the 1930s 
and 1940s returned with a vengeance. 
2.23 Privatization and Popular Capitalism 
A new approach was needed if capitalism was to survive. Hence the late 
1970s and the 1980s witnessed the birth of another project in capitalist 
reconstruction. The watchword of this process was privatization. In an attempt to 
counter increasing downward pressures on the rate of profit, the bourgeoisie 
turned its back on welfare capitalism and embraced popular capitalism in its stead. 
The precepts of popular capitalism were formulated with a view to giving all 
citizens a material stake in the mode of production. It entailed the dismantling of 
most of the components of the welfare state and the steady repeal of social 
legislation. State assets were sold off to private capitalist consortia. Ordinary 
working people were assured by capitalist ideologues that they too could enjoy a 
slice of the profit pie and were lured by opportunities to invest in the economies 
of their countries via the equity market. The idea was to free the economy from 
state interference and control, and thereby to prove that capitalism was a d~ic 
system which could bring good fortune to all who embraced its values.201 
201 For a detailed exposition oftbe tenets of popular capitalism see Redwood (1989: 24-45). 
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Capitalism was no longer only for the capitalists. It was for everybody. It 
was a people's mode of production, and all people could profit by investing in it. 
Welfare capitalism had enabled the state, which had now become a hindrance to 
capitalist progress. Popular capitalism wished to liberate the market from the 
strictures of state control. The free market was the key to prosperity. The wider 
the process of commodification, the more opportunity there would be for avoiding 
crises and promoting growth. Hence privatization. Hence the celebration of the 
market as the great leveller. Hence the enthusiasm for entrepreneurship and free 
enterprise. 
Of course, popular capitalism meant serious cutbacks in the hard-won social 
rights of the workers. But, they were told, every worker now had the right to 
break free of a life of dependence upon and charity from the state, and to discover 
his true worth in the heady atmosphere of the free market. Popular capitalism was 
proffered by its ideologues as the solution to the structural crisis of and proletarian 
disaffection with the mode of production. "It promised to sideline the class 
struggle and to transform every citizen into a property owner, motivated by the 
ideals of individual incentive and self-promotion, and dedicated to making 
capitalism work. Popular capitalism was, in this regard, an attempt to replace 
classes with consumers. 202 
The primary target of the popular capitalist ideologue was the state. It was 
argued that capitalism was in trouble because of too much state interference in its 
operations. State control was hampering the working and development of the 
market and had to be resisted. Such resistance had to be popular: all of us could 
fight the disabling state; all of us stood to gain from privatization and 
liberalization. The problem with capitalism was, according to the popular 
202 See Mawby & Walklate op cit 80-86. 
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capitalists, not structural but conjunctural, deriving from the overbearing presence 
of the state in affairs which ought to be private. The state was an undesirable 
interloper and had to be expelled from the relations between private commodity 
owners. The assault upon the state was, in reality, an assault upon the range of 
social rights which the proletariat had won in the fonn of welfare capitalism. But 
that was a point effectively sidelined by the euphoria of the promises of the spirit 
of free enterprise. The key to prosperity was not in class solidarity but in 
individual achievement. The possibility of a better life lay in a private, not a 
social, future. People could make their own futures, without the help from or 
interference of the state. Such were the pledges of popular capitalism: it was not 
an elitist system; it could uplift the masses. 
The intellectual origins of restorative justice are to be found in the 
postulates of popular capitalism. Restorative justice is in many respects the 
penological equivalent of popular capitalism. The correspondence between the 
two is remarkable. Restorative justice emerged at virtually the same time as the 
popular capitalist progranune was being implemented. Like the popular 
capitalists, the restorationists too decried the state as an interloper. They proposed 
a criminal justice system which was founded upon the relationship between 
offender and victim, as private citizens. In the same way as popular capitalism 
advocated the privatization of state assets, so restorative justice agitated for the 
privatization of crime. The state-managed criminal justice system had failed 
demonstrably to solve the problem of crime. The post-war rehabilitation of the 
victim had been a major step forward but had made no perceptible contribution to 
the solution. The weight of the state had hampered the free development of the 
capitalist market; the presence of the state in the criminal justice system was 
obstructing the development of a solution to the crisis of criminality. Like the 
popular capitalists, the restorationists began their campaign with an attack upon 
the role of the state. 
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This was the motif of Christie's now famous 1976 Foundation Lecture of the 
Centre of Criminological Studies at the University of Sheffield, in which he 
argued that crimes are private conflicts which the state has appropriated from the 
individuals involved.203 Christie's thesis is at the heart of the theory of restorative 
justice. The restorationist movement is committed to ousting the state from its 
position as arbiter and interloper, and to reclaiming crimes as the property of the 
offender and victim, to be resolved according to restorative principles. 
Restorative justice is thus crucially about extending and applying the premises of 
popular capitalism to criminal justice. The coincidence between the two about the 
state and its role is virtually complete: both view the state as an obstruction to 
progress which has to be removed; both seek to base their respective projects 
upon the individual as property owner. 
There are, of course, important differences between popular capitalism and 
restorative justice which need to be noted. Popular capitalism was concerned to 
guarantee the existence of capitalism as a mode of production. Its rejection of 
large-scale state involvement in the economy was ultimately aimed at revitalizing 
the capitalist economy and, thereby, protecting the integrity of the capitalist state. 
However, it did not question the non-economic role of the state and certainly did 
not contemplate a privatized criminal justice system. If anything, popular 
capitalism envisaged a criminal justice system in which the state was much more 
active than before, as it strove to improve the levels of delivery to consumers of 
its services.204 The proponents of restorative justice, by contrast, were concerned 
to construct a criminal justice system which did not bear the imprint of state 
influence. They took seriously the notion that crime was a private matter, to be 
203 The lecture was published in 1977 as an article titled 'Conflicts as Property' and, although 
it contained no express reference to restorative justice, has since acquired the status of a 
theoretical classic of the restorative justice movement. 
204 See Mawby & Walklate op cit 84. 
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dealt with by the parties involved, without state interference. And whereas 
popular capitalist penology remained heavily statist in all its essentials, restorative 
justice aspired to a way of doing justice which was fundamentally non-statist. 
Their differences notwithstanding, restorative justice is a juridical aspect of 
the ideology of popular capitalism. Both were born of the structural crisis of the 
capitalist mode of production which exploded in the 1970s. The one was a 
campaign to solve the economic crisis of capitalism. The other was a project to 
fmd a way out of its crisis of criminality. Both elected privatization as the mast 
upon which to nail their colours. In the case of restorative justice, privatization 
entailed the resurrection of the notion of composition, which had flowered briefly 
in medieval times, only to be demolished in the age of absolutism. The 
restorative sanction is the latter-day rendering of the composition of criminal 
offences. It is about repairing the harm occasioned by the crime, albeit not 
according to so patently proprietary a morality as historical composition. The 
evolution of pre-capitalist systems of composition had all been linked to the level 
of the development of petty commodity production within the natural economy. 
Restorative justice is the culmination of this movement, in the conditions of 
generalized commodity production of late capitalism. It represents, as I shall 
argue later, the historical apogee of the commodification of legal relations.205 
And since the commodity is the exemplification of the capitalist property regime, 
restorative justice is as deeply proprietary as historical composition. Restorative 
justice is, in this connection, composition modernized or, more accurately, 
d . d 206 postmo erruze . 
205 See Chapter Five below. 
206 See Chapter Six below. 
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2.24 Conclusion 
This survey of the history of the institution of composition has shown that, 
despite the assertions of its advocates, the historical roots of restorative justice do 
not go very deep. Composition is essentially an institution of historical society, 
that is, class society, which is some 5000 years old at most. All of human 
existence before that was classless. Our prehistoric ancestors could not have 
enlisted composition as their principal response to wrongdoing simply because 
they did not possess the material means of doing so. Instead, their justice was 
initially the justice of blood revenge, later that of the lex talionis. Composition 
emerged only after the Neolithic Revolution, and grew as commodity production 
grew. It was the lex talionis commodified. There is thus not so great an 
opposition between retribution and restoration as restorationists would suppose or 
have us believe. Retribution is governed by the law equivalent retaliation or 
requital. Restorative justice is but the primitive law of retaliation infused with the 
spirit of that most pivotal element of property, the commodity. It is the civilized 
version of the talio. 
What is more, composition was from the beginning of its existence overlaid 
with the inequalities of social class. Although it may have been formally 
available to all, in practice it always favoured the rulers against the ruled. It was, 
in other words, from its inception an institution which expressed class rule and 
which operated to protect upper-class offenders from the unpleasant punishments 
which lower-class offenders had to endure because they could not afford to 'pay' 
for their crimes. There is thus little in the history of composition upon which 
restorationists can legitimately rely. Rather, that history reveals a clear and 
unflattering connection between composition, on the one hand, and class rule and 
commodification, on the other. 
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This chapter has attempted to provide a Marxist treatment of the historical 




Chapter Three: The Claims of Restorative Justice 
The contemporary claims of restorative justice are large. They summate in 
the proposition that restorative justice is the antithesis of criminal justice. Given 
the hegemonic status of criminal justice in the modem era, this proposition is one 
of considerable moment. It delineates restorative justice as a way of doing justice 
which circumvents the 'penal harm' embedded in criminal justice. l Like its 
historical claims,2 the contemporary claims of restorative justice too are 
constructed in opposition to retribution, as the exemplification of criminal 
justice.3 
The purpose of this confrontation is to establish that, as a deliberative 
response to criminal conduct, restoration is superior to retribution. Its advocates 
are unanimous that restorative justice constitutes a more enlightened approach to 
the problem of criminality than retributive justice, and hence enjoys better 
prospects of resolving it. There is a discernible confidence within restorationist 
ranks that restorative justice will succeed in fmding a solution to the ills which 
have rendered our criminal justice system more or less impotent in the face of the 
one of the biggest international crime waves in human history. 
However, as suggested in the sentence above, the claims of restorative 
justice are not confmed to devising non-punitive dispositions. Restoration aspires 
to such higher ideals as healing, peacemaking, social reconstruction and the like. 
The restorative experience is supposed to be a life-changing one for participants. 
It is supposed to be transcendent, and to make possible the emergence of a 
1 See Levrant et al (1999: 3-4). 
2 See Chapter Two above. 
3 See Levrant et a/op cit 4. This opposition is reflected in the structure ofConsedine's 
(1999) book which consists of only two sections headed 'Retributive Justice' and 




community of equals governed by mutuality and respect. Restorative justice is 
thus not merely concerned to be a better way of doing justice. It also imagines a 
better way of living for all within its purview.4 Levrant et at refer to this as the 
benevolence of restorative justice: 
'It broadens the focus of justice from offender-oriented penal harm 
to community-oriented peacemaking and only considers justice to be 
achieved when the suffering of offenders, victims, and communities 
has ended and crime has been reduced.'5 
This is 'the seductive vision of restorative justice' .6 It comes with its own 
'benevolent rhetoric,.7 And it amplifies the claims of restorative justice 
considerably. 
3.1 Privatizing Criminal Justice 
The restorationist movement contends (as it has to) that it can solve the 
crisis of criminality, the magnitude and complexity of which have been the 
undoing of all its predecessors. This self-belief is not feigned, nor is it the 
bravado of the tyro. It is founded in the core theoretical postulate of restorative 
justice, namely, the privatization of the criminal episode. Here restorative justice 
is radical, in the true sense of the word, that is, it goes to the root of the crime 
problem. It is radical because it 'moves away from a state-centred definition of 
crime',s contemplates a 'transfer of power from the state,9 and re-conceptualizes 
the criminal episode as a private matter. It is not concerned with the conviction 
and punishment of offenders. It is concerned to analyse and respond to the 
criminal episode for what it really is: a private conflict between individuals which 
4 See, for example, Consedine & Bowen (1999: 12), who hold that restorative justice 'creates 
opportunities for better human interaction, for the healing of wounds'. 
5 Levrant et at op cit 6. 
6 Acorn (2004: 1). 
7 Levrant et at op cit 22. 
8 Ibid 5. 
9 Takagi & Shank (2004: 151). 
has disturbed the relations of community within the affected segment of the 
population. The essential task of restorative justice is to mend those relations, 
without the intrusion of the ultimately violent resources of the state. 10 
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Restorative justice is the flrst general theory of criminal justice expressly to 
posit a privatized notion of crime and sanctioning. All its predecessors took for 
granted the central role of the state in the criminal justice system. There were, to 
be sure, persistent, often perspicacious, critiques of the nature of the state's 
invol vement and its impact especially upon the interests of the victims of crime. II 
However, the right of the state to occupy its central position in the system was 
seldom, if ever, an issue for debate. Before the advent of the restorative justice 
movement, it was generally accepted amongst criminologists that criminal justice 
was essentially state justice, that is, justice administered and dispensed by 
specialized agencies of the state. 12 
The restorationists are engaged in a re-deflnition of the criminal justice 
landscape. The crux of this project is their position on the role of the state. All 
the other propositions of restorative justice follow from or are directly dependent 
upon this central axiom. For the restorationists, the state is the problem of the 
criminal justice system. They posit that the crisis in which the system is 
foundering is in no small part directly attributable to the dominant role of the state 
and its apparatuses. It is, in other words, precisely the statist texture of the 
modem criminal justice system which is the fundamental source of the crisis. The 
10 Privatization is the direct implication of Christie's (1977) theorization of criminal conflicts 
as forms of property. See Tshehla (2004: 4): 'One attribute of restorative justice especially 
its radical version is that it would take the case out of the public (sic) and make it a private 
matter between the individuals involved.' 
II For example, the victims' movement and the informal justice movement both developed, in 
part, in response to the perceived failures or inadequacies of state justice. 
12 See Braithwaite (2003a: 62) who lists 'central state control' as one of key elements of 
criminal justice that has 'globalized almost totally during the past two centuries' . 
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raison d'efre of the restorationist project is thus to reconstruct the criminal justice 
system by dethroning the state as principal protagonist and fore grounding the 
actual parties to a crime, that is, the victim, the offender and the affected 
community. 13 
The restorative justice movement thus rests upon a postulate which is but 
seldom expressly acknowledged, namely, that the state does not have a legitimate 
interest in crime and punishment as a party and hence has no right to sovereignty 
over the criminal justice system. It is this postulate that underlies the 
restorationist project to privatize the criminal episode. The proponents of 
restorative justice believe that the state, as a public institution, has no place in, 
indeed, no right to intervene in a relationship which, although conflictual, is 
fundamentally private. In other words, restorative justice is constructed upon an 
essentially anti-statist theoretical premise. 14 
The proposal to excise the state from the criminal justice process is a truly 
radical one. Indeed, it is arguably a revolutionary aspiration. From being the 
primary agent in the adjudicative process, the restorationists seek to relegate the 
state to the position of no more than facilitator and resource provider. The state is 
the quintessential coercive institution of our times. By their anti-statist posture, 
the restorationists are declaring that a successful criminal justice system must be a 
13 See Zehr & Mika (1998: 51). Note that the adherents of partial restorative justice share this 
reconstructionist ambition, at least in respect of those segments of the criminal justice 
system ceded to the restorationist project by the state. 
14 Braithwaite (op cit 62) notes that 'restorative justice theorists see most ... elements of the 
central state takeover of criminal justice as retrograde'. See also Bowen (1999: 18): 
'Restorative justice seeks to redefine crime, interpreting it not so much as breaking the law, 
or offending against the state, but as an injury or wrongdoing to another person or persons. 
The offender and victim are encouraged to be directly involved in airing the issues 
surrounding the conflict through dialogue and negotiation, in the presence of the offender's 
family and the victim's support people. Those involved in the conflict are empowered to 
become central to its understanding and eventual resolution.' 
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non-coerCIve one. State punishment is backed, ultimately, by state violence. IS 
The restorationists are positing that the restorative sanction is fundamentally non-
violent. All in all, the restorative justice movement is arguing that true justice has 
to be private justice and that the state is an obstacle to the attainment of true 
justice. 16 
Restorative justice in its comprehensive version is thus a radical alternative 
to the formal criminal justice system as we know it. It is this paradigmatic claim 
which makes comprehensive restorative justice philosophically interesting and 
theoretically valuable. It is not just another scheme to re-arrange the established 
institutions of criminal justice or to re-configure the existing distribution of 
financial and human resources. Nor is it an attempt to construct yet another 
justification for state punishment. The restorationist project aspires to transcend 
the state and, hence, also punishment. It is about re-defining crime and criminal 
justice without any reference to the state and its adjudicative institutions. 
For restorationists, the intrusion of the state has compromised the integrity 
of the criminal justice process. They argue that the historical locus of criminal 
justice is the realm of the private. It is the modem state which has chosen to 
present itself as attribute of the criminal justice system. 17 By its trespass it has 
violated the historical naturalness of a private system of criminal justice. The 
15 See Cragg (1992: 91). 
16 The idea is that 'ownership' of the criminal episode and its resolution no longer vest in the 
state. Such 'ownership' is transferred to the parties directly affected by the episode. See 
McCold (2001: 41): 'Restorative justice processes, in their purest form, involve victims and 
their offenders in face-to-face meetings and it is these participants (along with their 
respective communities of care) who determine how best to deal with the offence.' See also 
Carey (2001: 152) who argues that 'the criminalfjuvenile justice system must recognize 
crime as an interpersonal conflict (Le., a conflict between individuals as opposed to 
involving a more abstract party such as the state).' 
17 The development of restorative justice has coincided more or less with the emergence of the 
postmodem state, that is, a state which is typically minimalist and which promotes the 
privatization of traditionally public functions. See Chapter Six below. 
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contemporary crisis of criminality is a direct result of this state intrusion. The 
obvious and necessary response is thus to eject the state and to re-privatize the 
entire system. In other words, restorative justice proposes the de-statization of 
criminal justice, a development which is supposed to take us 'beyond the punitive 
society' into the brave new world of the restorative sanction. 
Comprehensive restorative justice thus proceeds from a privatized definition 
of crime and an anti-statist notion of criminal justice. This is its founding precept, 
and all its tenets derive in one way or another from this precept. Five main tenets 
of restorative justice emerge from the literature. These are the restorative 
sanction, the restorative process, the empowerment of the victim, the 
reconstruction of the offender, and community participation. This list is, of 
course, not exhaustive. Also, there is a fair degree of overlap amongst its various 
items. But collectively they do constitute the essential pillars of the restorative 
justice movement. Also, together they amount to an umbrella rejection ofthe 
precepts of the extant criminal justice system. Each is explicated below. They are 
then criticized from the Marxist perspective. 
3.2 The Restorative Sanction 
The restorative sanction is perhaps the single most important tenet of 
restorative justice. It implies all the others. And it is expressly non-punitive. It 
thus encapsulates all that is radical about restorative justice. However, the 
restorative sanction is difficult to define and not easy to analyse. It is an analeptic 
concept, rather than a specific method of disposition. It has been developed in 
opposition to state punishment, and is probably best elucidated in relation to its 
contrary. The features of state punishment are well-known and need not be 
traversed here in any detail. Suffice it to say that, in its retributive aspect 
especially, it reduces to a painful relationship between the state and the offender. 
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State punishment is an essentially compelling response to the destructive 
behaviour of offender. It is the imposition by the state of its will and, hence, its 
violence upon the offender. 18 
The restorative sanction is meant to be the antithesis of state punishment. 
Thus, it a rejects the notion of the state as all-purpose victim, and negates the 
exclusive vinculum which the criminal justice system establishes between the 
state and the offender. It is concerned to rescue the victim from the powerless 
obscurity imposed by state justice, and to prevent the offender from becoming a 
victim of state repression. 19 The restorative sanction is intended to be the 
outcome of a collaborative effort between the actual victim and the offender. 
Victim and offender are meant, via the experience of creating the restorative 
sanction, to become the saving of each other. The sanction is concerned to repair 
and heal, not to punish.2o Justice is to be found in the restorative quality of the 
sanction, and not in any state penal programme. 
The primary objective of the restorative sanction is to restore the status quo 
ante for the victim, that is, to return the victim to his or her pre-crime status. The 
idea is that the sanction should be the means of repairing the harm suffered by the 
victim and of restoring him to the position he enjoyed before the offence. All in 
all, the restorative sanction is supposed to express the expunction of the crime and 
all its consequences. 
Of course, there are situations which do not allow for an actual restoration 
of the status quo ante. This is the case where the victim dies or suffers permanent 
18 See Walgrave (2001: 19-20) and Wright (1991: 15-16). 
19 See Zehr (2003: 69) who argues that victims have been reduced to 'mere footnotes in the 
process we caUjustice' and that offenders experience punishment as 'deeply damaging'. 
20 See Van Ness et al (2001: 6), Van Ness & Strong (1997: 41-43) and Zehr (1995: 186-187). 
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physical or mental injury, or where the offender refuses to participate in the 
restorative encounter or is unable to make good the harm he has caused. But even 
if it were physically possible always, mere restoration of the status quo ante for 
the victim entails the logical possibility of a repetition of the same criminal 
episode ad infinitum. The restorative sanction must necessarily do more. It must 
also prevent or, at minimum, contribute to preventing the iteration of the crime. 
In other words, it should also operate to steer the offender away from crime, back 
to the law-abiding existence which he presumably led before his transgression. 
The restorative sanction must therefore have at least two components: firstly, a 
restorative component in tenns of which the victim is restored as far as is possible 
to his position before the commission of the offence; secondly, a preventive 
component, aimed at obviating recidivism.21 
By definition, the restorative sanction is supposed to achieve its aims 
without reference to or reliance upon the coercive resources of the state. This 
ideal perforce entails a third component, namely, a community or civil society 
component. For, absent state involvement, community participation is the only 
tenable way of developing and implementing the restorative sanction. The 
healing of the relationship between victim and offender requires the mediation of 
the community. The restorative sanction achieves legitimacy from the imprimatur 
of the community. It is the community milieu, as against the apparatuses of the 
state, which clinches the deal, so to speak, and validates the restorative sanction.22 
The community is the guarantor of victim-offender collaboration. Restorative 
justice thus depends as much upon community oversight as it does upon the co-
operation of the offender and victim. Both victim and offender necessarily exist 
21 See Van Ness & Strong ibid 41 & 43, Morris (2003: 467) and Johnstone (2003: 3). See 
also Levrant et al op cit 17-22 and Ashworth (2003: 174-175) who are sceptical about the 
capacity of the restorative sanction to reduce re-offending. 
22 See Zehr op cit 208. 
in community. Both are members of a determinate social complex which 
constitutes the context of the crime and its implications.23 
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The restorative sanction purports to mend what the crime has fractured by 
mobilizing the triad of offender, victim and community: the offender is required 
to take responsibility for his offence and to account therefor to the victim and the 
community; the victim is positioned as an indispensable agent of the restorative 
process with a decisive voice in the construction of the sanction and the ultimate 
resolution of the conflict; and the community becomes the locus of the 
implementation of the sanction and the overall monitor of the restorative 
process.24 I shall deal with the position of each component of this triad 
individually and in more detail later. At this juncture, suffice it to say that the 
success of the restorative project rests crucially upon the level of co-operation 
which the elements of the restorative triad are able to achieve. 
3.3 The Restorative Process 
The tenets of the restorative process have been elaborated in direct 
opposition to those of conventional criminal procedure?5 Criminal justice relies 
upon a highly formalized and formalistic procedural canon which is antagonistic 
in all its core attributes. Formal criminal procedure is organized around a 
presumption of basic conflict between the state and the offender. The entire 
corpus of rules is infused with the spirit of this antagonism. The procedures of 
restorative justice, by contrast, are self-consciously non-antagonistic, and 
13 See Zehr & Mika op cit 52, Van Ness & Strong op cit 40-41, Marshall (2003: 34-35) and 
Bowen op cit 19-20. 
24 See Marshall ibid 36, Zehr & Mika ibid 77 and McLauglin et al (2003: 7). 
25 Criminal procedure refers to the adjectival component of the criminaijustice system. This 
component may be structured according to either adversarial or inquisitorial principles. See 
Wright op cit 12. 
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dependent for their efficacy upon the collusion of the participants in the process. 
The restorative process is non-antagonistic because it is not directly connected to 
any punitive agenda.26 Instead, it is directed at facilitating the repair of the 
relations which the criminal conflict has rent, and with the co-operation of all the 
affected parties. Restorative justice thus requires procedural precepts which 
express the conviction, fIrstly, that offender and victim are not or do not have to 
remain antipathetic and, secondly, that there can be a rapprochement between the 
offender and the affected community. 27 
Conventional critics of conventional criminal procedure tend to focus upon 
the resources available to accused persons. They argue that criminal procedure 
cannot be fair unless the accused has qualifIed and - importantly - committed legal 
representation, which is often not the case. Essentially, these critics take a 
remedial or corrective approach. They wish to see due process upheld, that is, 
they wish the criminal trial to be a fair fIght between equals.28 The criminal 
justice system ought to be resourced and re-aligned in such a way as to vindicate 
due process. Restorationists have a different and more fundamental critique of 
criminal procedure. They believe that the real problem lies in its disputatious 
nature. They take a transformative approach, and hold that justice is to be assured 
26 It is arguable that, in practice, there can be a coercive element embedded in the restorative 
process, and hence that it can be indirectly punitive, especially as regards the recalcitrant 
offender. See below. 
27 See Van Ness & Strong op cit 34-35 and Johnstone op cit 2. 
28 Contemporary capitalist democracies have assigned due process an elevated status in their 
legal orders. Every decision of substance which has not been reached by a proper and fair 
procedure is likely to be impeachable. Before any other consideration, a decision stands or 
falls according to the propriety of the process by which it has been reached. Criminal 
procedure is, then, not merely a conduit to a substantive outcome. It is also a protective for 
the integrity of that outcome. The procedure is exalted as guarantor of the result. Due 
process is construed as the foil to substantive injustice. See McElrea (1999: 59). 
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not by re-organizing criminal procedure but by supplanting it with the restorative 
process.29 
Due process seeks to regulate the conflict between the adversaries and to 
ensure that each enjoys, fonnally at least, an even chance of emerging victorious 
from the process. There is, of course, always only one real winner. And there has 
to be a loser. Restorative justice rejects the winner-loser dichotomy. It is 
concerned to produce multiple winners. It is not interested in losers. Its 
procedure is thus fundamentally collaborative in nature and method. The 
restorative process seeks to implicate all parties in fraternal relations, out of which 
is supposed to emerge the restorative sanction and, ultimately, the solution to the 
crisis of criminality. 30 
Advocates of restorative justice set much store by the restorative process. 
Indeed, they insist that restorative justice implies 'a distinctly restorative 
process' .31 So crucial is the restorative process that it infonns one of the best 
known definitions of restorative justice: 
'Restorative justice is a process whereby parties with a stake in a 
specific crime resolve collectively how to deal with the aftennath of 
the offence and its implications for the future. ,32 
29 See Zehr op cit 203, original emphasis: 'Not simply justice, but the experience of jus rice 
must occur.' 
30 See Wright op cit 112. 
31 Bazemore & Walgrave (1999: 51). See also Johnstone op cit 2. 
32 Marshall op cit 28. Bazemore & Walgrave (ibid 48-49) say that 'this definition 
underscores the importance of a unique process that engages and involves stakeholders in 
an effort to deal with the problems crime causes'. Van Ness et at (op cit 5) describe it as a 
'procedural definition' . Zehr, cited in McCold (2004: 161), gives a definition which also 
highlights process: 'Restorative justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those 
who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs, 
and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.' 
This process-based notion of restorative justice is eloquently expressed by 
Bowen: 
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'There is no predetermined outcome. It is through the process that 
transformation of the victim-offender relationship can occur. " The process 
allows the victim to view the offender as the person seated opposite now, 
rather than as the unknown person who previously offended. The offence 
takes on a more personal dimension for both parties. Fears are set aside. ,33 
For many restorationists, it would appear, the proof of the restorative justice 
pudding is in the process. 
The restorative process is essentially the face-to-face collaboration of the 
restorative triad in a restorative conference to develop a restorative sanction.34 
Criminal procedure is transacted or, at least, intended to be transacted by lawyers 
in ritualized encounters in stylized courtrooms. Restorationists point out that both 
the offender and the victim are incidental to this process. They have (or are 
supposed to have) surrogates who engage each other on their behalf. But, say the 
restorationists, the procedure disempowers them. They are alienated from each 
other and from the very process upon which the future direction of their lives may 
depend.35 Even if they wished to, they cannot collaborate. They would not be 
allowed to do so because the procedure itself requires that they relate to each other 
only, or primarily, as adversaries. The possibility of direct collaboration between 
the victim and the offender is excluded by the surrogacy inscribed in the 
procedure.36 
33 Bowen op cit 19, original emphasis. See also Wright op cit 112, original emphasis: 'The 
process itself should help promote understanding; the aim is to agree upon an outcome 
acceptable to both parties ... Attention would be given not only to the outcome, but also to 
evolving a process that respected the feelings and humanity of both the victim and the 
offender.' 
34 See Bazemore & Walgrave op cit 50, Van Ness & Strong op cit 35, Van Ness et at op cit 5, 
Johnstone op cit 3, Zebr & Mika op cit 51, Bowen op cit 19, Zehr (1995: 203-204) and 
Pranis (2001: 288 & 290-291). 
35 See Zehr ibid 203-204. 
36 Settlement negotiations between the surrogates (for example, a plea bargain) cannot be 
equated with collaboration because they fall within the rules of the procedural contest. 
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Restorative justice eschews surrogacy in process. It is committed to a deux 
engagements between victim and offender under the auspices of the community. 
Needless to say, these may entail some form of antagonism. 37 But the rationale of 
the restorative process is to resolve such antagonism collaboratively. The idea is 
that the process should position the offender and victim into colluding to repair 
the damage caused by the crime. Hence their personal participation in the 
process, and their endeavours, with the assistance of community representatives, 
to construct a mutually acceptable restorative sanction.38 
Whereas criminal justice understands process as a means to an end, 
restorative justice comprehends process as an end in itself. For the one, the 
process leads to justice. For the other, the justice is in the process. The 
restorative sanction is, in this sense, not the substantive outcome of a procedural 
exercise. Instead, it is the actualization of the process of doing justice. 
Restorative justice thus does not make a clear distinction between procedural and 
substantive levels of justice. There is only justice, undivided. If criminal justice 
has raised due process to eminence, restorative justice has invested the restorative 
process with near talismanic status. 
37 The antagonism may come from either the victim or offender. The victim's antagonism 
may derive from a desire for revenge against the offender, the offender's from a feeling of 
being humiliated by the process. See Acorn op cit 51-53 & 151-154. 
38 The anti-statist impulses of restorative justice are perhaps most evident from its procedural 
focus upon the restorative triad. The state has no place here, as agent. Neither has the 
conventional lawyer. They may have an episodic contribution to make. But they and their 
predisposition to antagonism are not germane to the process. The state and its institutions 
are not welcome as components of the restorative project. The restorative process is to 
criminal procedure as the restorative sanction is to state punishment. 
3.4 The Empowerment of the Victim 
There is widespread agreement that restorative justice is in large measure 
about victim empowerment. It is generally acknowledged that 'a primary 
purpose' of the restorative conference is the 're-empowerment of the victim' .39 
Thus Zehr says: 
'For victims, disempowerment is a core element of the violation. 
Empowerment is crucial to recovery and justice. ,40 
Braithwaite makes a similar argument: 
'Disempowerment is part of the indignity of being a victim of crime 
... It follows that it is important to restore any lost sense of 
empowerment as a result of crime.'41 
Restorative justice is centrally concerned to undo the victim incapacitation 
inscribed in the criminal justice system and to rehabilitate the victim as a key 
factor in society's response to the criminal episode.42 
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Restorationists insist, correctly, that the criminal justice system victimizes 
the crime victim. In this regard they share the general aims of victimology to 
secure for the victim a better deal. However, when restorationists refer to victim 
empowerment, they encompass far more than conventional victimology does. For 
them victim empowerment is merely one of a range of intersecting goals focused 
39 Hayden & Henderson (1999: 80). See also Achilles & Zehr (2001: 90): '[V]ictims need to 
feel empowered. They need to recover the sense of autonomy and control that was taken 
away from them in the offense. Consequently, the justice process needs to be designed to 
re-empower victims.' 
40 Zehr op cit 204. 
41 Braithwaite op cit 56. 
42 See Bowen op cit 22: 'The offending leaves the victim with a feeling of profound 
disrespect. So the victim needs in some way to recover from this and obtain the respect 
back again. They need to recover a sense of meaning.' See also Achilles (2004: 73), Batley 
(2005: 30), Zehr & Mika op cit 52 and Morris op cit 465. 
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upon reconstructing the criminal justice system in totO. 43 Their notion of the 
empowerment of the victim entails a radical corollary, namely, the 
disempowerment of the state. The restorationist aim is not to negotiate a secure 
place for the victim in the criminal justice system. The aim, instead, is to replace 
the criminal justice system with a restorative justice system which turns upon 
victim participation. In the restorative justice paradigm, then, it is not enough to 
make the extant criminal justice system victim-friendly. Victim empowerment 
means transforming the victim into an agent of the restorative process. The idea 
is to endow the victim with a 'party interest' in the offence and with 'standing' to 
participate in its resolution.44 
As we have seen, it was the capitalist state which abandoned the victim and 
which renounced the concept ofvictimhood.45 It is a fIrst principle of restorative 
justice to rehabilitate the victim. Restorationists insist that the victim should have 
a premier role in the elaboration of the restorative sanction. Indeed, they 
understand that the success of the entire restorative justice project rests crucially 
upon the extent to which the victim is afforded the opportunity to become a 
genuine party to the process.46 They also accept, however, that victim 
empowerment proper will have to occur despite the state. In other words, there is 
a relationship of inverse proportion between victim empowerment and the role of 
the state in the criminal justice system. Progress for the one entails regress for the 
other. 
43 Restorative justice implies that real victim empowerment is not possible within the confines 
of the criminal justice system. It is a system that is premised upon the marginalization of 
the victim. To the extent that it works, it does so because the victim has been marginalized. 
It therefore cannot be expected to tolerate proper victim empowerment. 
44 Van Ness & Strong op cit 133-134. See also Acorn op cit 144: 'The victim is empowered 
by being restored to the status of active participant. ' 
45 See Chapter Two above. 
46 See Achilles op cit 65: 'As I see it, the promise of restorative justice is the elevation of 
victims to the position of stakeholders in a justice process that starts immediately from the 
point of harm. They are no longer relegated to the sidelines, dependent on someone else to 
let them in.' 
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This is a crucial insight. It is an insight which founds the theorization of the 
criminal episode as a private conflict.47 This privatized notion of crime may be 
understood as a victim empowerment strategy. Restorationists have identified the 
state as the source of the powerlessness of crime victims. They consider that re-
humanizing the criminal justice system means privatizing our concept of crime. It 
is because the state has converted crime into a public matter that the private 
concerns of the victim have been severely neglected. Yet every victim of crime is 
aware of the fact that, when all is said and done, it is his person or property that 
has been violated, and that the meaning of such violation for him is never 
confronted and resolved by the criminal justice system.48 Restorative justice 
seeks to acknowledge and accredit the real, individual victim of each crime, and 
to repair the damage which the crime has done to that particular person.49 A 
public concept of crime, which casts the state as generic victim, is unable to 
accommodate such an agenda. Criminal justice needs a passive victim. 
Restorative justice demands an active one. Hence the campaign for a private 
concept of crime. 
Restorationists see victimhood as a status which is acquired unwillingly, but 
which need not be calamitous. They consider that within the restorative context it 
can be transformed into a trigger for regeneration. Via the restorative conference, 
the victim is given the opportunity of analysing the meaning of his imposed status, 
and of transcending it, as one of the agents comprising the restorative triad. 
Victimhood under the criminal justice system is an alienated state. Restorative 
47 See Chapter Four below. 
48 See Strang (2001: 71): 'For centuries victims had been the forgotten third parties in a 
justice system which conceives criminal behaviour as a matter between the offender and the 
state, with no formal role for the individuals who suffer the crime.' 
49 See Consedine (1999: 81) who cites the following description of Marae justice in a 
television documentary: 'It is about recognising who got hurt - to hell with people saying 
society is the victim: it was me, not society, that got hurt.' 
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justice aims to overcome this alienation, by involving the victim in a process 
which is properly responsive to the condition ofvictimhood. In a word, 
restorative justice seeks to make a virtue of victimhood. The restorative project is 
to a large extent dedicated to the conquest of victimhood. It views the victim as a 
valuable resource who, if integrated into the justice system as an agent, can make 
a significant contribution to solving the crisis of criminality. Whereas criminal 
justice problematizes victimhood, restorative justice espouses it and allocates the 
crime victim a material role in the response to crime. 
Of course, as noted earlier, the rise of the victim is proportional to the fall of 
the state. They are dialectical associates. Criminal justice sacrificed the victim to 
the domination of the state, to the extent that the state became the literal alter ego 
of the victim. Restorative justice posits a triumphant victim, who has been 
reinstated as agent in the criminal episode, at the expense of state sovereignty. 
The restorationist proposal to empower the crime victim must thus be understood 
in these terms of relational opposition. In the restorative paradigm, victim 
empowerment is more than just giving the crime victim a role in the criminal 
justice system. It is really about reconstructing that system in such a way that it 
cannot function without the co-operation of the crime victim. 
3.5 The Reconstruction of the Offender 
Restorative justice is magnanimous. It is concerned not only to repair the 
damage which the offender has caused to the victim (and the community). It is 
concerned also with the welfare of the offender himself and to deliver him from 
the clutches of a criminal existence. It is, of course, arguable that criminal justice 
shares this aspiration to redeem the offender. State punishment may, in this 
regard, be viewed as attempt to discourage recidivism by convincing the offender 
that crime does not pay, and that it is more prudent to obey the law than to break 
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it. However, restorationists would distance themselves from such a programme. 
For them the offender is important, not as passive recipient of an imposed 
punishment, but as co-agent ofthe restorative process and co-author of the 
restorative sanction. 50 
It is a truism that criminal justice adheres to a negative construction of the 
offender. It is his imprudence which triggers the penal apparatus of the criminal 
justice system. The punishment itself always entails a negation of certain of the 
offender's rightS.51 Whatever benefits the offender may derive from his 
punishment are fortuitous by-products of an essentially negative mobilization of 
the coercive powers of the state. This negative conception extends to the offender 
being considered unencumbered in relation to his victim. The offender is 
encumbered by a duty to account to the state for his criminal deviation. However, 
he has no especial duty of care to his victim. The initiation of the criminal justice 
process severs his relationship with his victim. He has to answer for his crime, 
but not to his victim. 
Restorative justice, by contrast, demands that the offender be accountable to 
his victim for the damage he has caused. It requires that the offender continue his 
relationship with his victim, at least until such time as the effects of his crime 
have been repaired. And whereas this relationship was initially an entirely 
negative one, restorative justice aspires to transform it into a positive experience, 
which can become the source of closure for the victim and of enlighterunent for 
50 See Toews & Katounis (2004: 116) who urge that we recognize offenders as 'key 
stakeholders in the restorative process'. Restorationists consider that the criminal justice 
process reduces the offender to an object in that he is gridlocked into a process which 
dominates him. It is a process which has been constructed by his adversary, the state, and 
which has been imposed upon him. Criminal justice, then, is really about the state using its 
powers of coercion against a captive offender. The offender himself is in an important 
sense a 'victim' of the criminal justice system. Restorationists seek to end this 
'victimization' of the offender by bestowing full agency upon him. 
51 See Van Ness & Strong op cit and Zebr (2003: 69) 
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the offender. All of this is possible if the offender accepts responsibility for his 
offence, thereby inaugurating the restorative process. Offender accountability is 
an indispensable aspect of restorative justice. He needs to admit his culpability, 
and to commit to participation in the restorative process. 52 He has done the crime. 
Restorationists require him to playa key role in undoing it. Restorative justice 
wants to implicate the offender in the repair of the harm his crime has caused. 
However, the object of drafting the offender into the restorative process is 
not reparative merely in respect of the harm suffered by the victim. Such pro 
forma restoration implies that the offender, once he has repaired the damage 
caused by one crime, theoretically would be free to commit any number of others. 
That is patently not what restoration is supposed to mean. It has to include 
offender restoration, in the sense that the offender comes to choose, via his 
participation in the restorative process, not to continue with further criminal 
activity.53 Restorative justice understands that a crime is often an offender's 
mode of resistance against a sense of powerlessness derived from his conditions 
of existence. Thus Zehr notes: 
'For many offenders, crime is a way of asserting power, of asserting 
self-identity, in a world which defmes worth in terms of access to 
C '.f: • f' "I b d " ,54 power. rune, lor many, IS a way 0 saymg am some 0 y . 
52 See Bowen op cit 19, Van Ness & Strong ibid 114 and Zehr (1995: 42-43 & 200-201). 
53 See Bazemore & Dooley (2001: 103) who submit that 'support for offender redemption and 
reintegration remains a primary theme in most restorative justice writing'. 
54 Zehr (2003: 70). See also Braithwaite op cit 57: 'The sense of insecurity and 
disempowerment of offenders is often an issue in their offending, and in discussion of what 
is to be done to prevent further offending. ' 
For restorative justice, then, the offender is in as much need of 
regeneration as his victim. 'Offenders too need healing.'55 In this regard, 
offender restoration means empowering offenders to develop a new sense 
of self-worth. 
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Restorative justice purports to reconstruct the offender and the restorative 
process is the designated instrument of offender reconstruction. It is his 
collaboration, as agent, with the victim and the community in the elaboration and 
implementation of the restorative sanction which is supposed to be the saving of 
the offender. It is his participation in the restorative process that affords the 
offender an opportunity to reconstruct himself. By accounting for his conduct and 
by performing what has been settled upon to repair the damage he has caused, the 
offender simultaneously begins 're-storying' himself. That is, he begins to 
redefine his identity away from a despoiled persona towards an unsullied one.56 
Restorative justice thus proposes the 'death of the offender'. That is the ultimate 
aim of the restorative sanction, to 'punish' the offender with death. But it is a 
liberating and creative death, a 're-biographing' of the offender as one who is free 
of the criminal impulse and whose self-worth is derived from his cognizance of 
the value of his fellow human beings. In restorationist lore, the 're-storied' 
offender is the restored offender. 
55 Zehr (1995: 188). See Morris op cit 465: 'However, I also take restoring to mean 
redressing the harms caused both by and to the offender. This means that action needs to 
be taken to address both the factors underlying their offending in the first place and the 
consequences of that offending.' See also Van Ness et af op cit 6: 'Offenders, too, may 
need healing; they may need release from guilt or fear; they may need resolution of 
underlying conflicts or problems that led to the crime; and they may need an opportunity to 
make things right. ' 
56 See Braithwaite (2002: 157-158). 
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3.6 Community Participation 
It is a restorationist absolute that the community feature as an integral part 
of the restorative process. While there may be some contention about the 
constitution of the restorative community,57 there is unanimity that it is a 
'stakeholder', along with the victim and the offender, in the restorative process. 
Indeed, many of its proponents are wont to equate restorative justice with 
community justice. 58 Although such an equation is not completely accurate, it 
does give a sense of the significance which restorationists attach to community 
participation in the restorative process. The community is the element which 
completes the restorative triad. It is thus also indispensable to the legitimacy of 
the restorative process. A restorative sanction which does not enjoy the 
imprimatur of the community is, in principle, doomed to failure. The 
restorationist project stands or falls according to its readiness to embrace 
community participation as a compositional requisite. 
It would appear that community participation has two intersecting goals. 
Firstly, the community operates 'as a resource for the resolution of disputes and 
victim/offender reintegration' .59 Its participation injects a social dimension into 
the restorative process and makes the restorative sanction a social construct.60 
57 For discussions of the meaning of the term 'community' see Van Ness & Strong op cit 32-
33), McCold op cit 155-157 and McCold & Wachtel (2003: 294-296). These discussions 
are concerned with specifying the ambit of the 'community' and do not go to the role of the 
'community' as 'stakeholder' in the restorative process. Their details therefore need not 
detain us here. 
58 See Zehr & Mika op cit 80 and Crawford & Clear (2001: 127). 
59 Crawford & Clear ibid 132. 
60 Restorative justice rejects the atomistic theory of personhood which founds the 
epistemology of criminal justice. Instead it proposes a social ontology of the person. It 
posits a personhood which is socially constructed, in relations of conflict and co-operation 
with other persons. It comprehends offender and victim as members of a determinate social 
unit, each encumbered with the responsibilities accessory to such membership. The status 
of offender or victim is not merely legal; it is also derived from the social. A person is a 
victim or offender not only in law but also in community. Criminality and victimhood are 
thus not individualist attributes. They encompass the community directly. The community 
is thus as much a protagonist in the criminal episode as are the offender and the victim. 
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This means that the nexus between the victim and offender is extended beyond the 
criminal episode into the community. They relate to each other not as individual 
but as social beings. The community becomes the custodian of the restorative 
sanction, and constitutes the milieu for its implementation. It becomes the locus 
of the healing of the victim and offender, which is achieved by their reintegration 
into the conununity.61 This aspect of community participation in restorative 
justice is essentially about the community providing resources of renascence to 
both victim and offender. 
Secondly, community participation in the restorative process is intended to 
be a mechanism of community restoration. Restorative justice postulates that 
crime rends community.62 Crime is a social problem which endangers the welfare 
of the community and threatens its cohesion. The community is, in this regard, 
the generic victim of all crimes.63 Every crime unsettles community balance and 
is therefore a community issue. Every crime victimizes the community. The state 
invented itself as generic crime victim. Yet, very little crime specifically 
threatens the integrity of the state. By contrast, every crime is a real threat to the 
equilibrium of the victimized community. Hence the restorationist insistence 
upon community restoration.64 Zehr's comment is representative: 
'The community also needs healing. Crime undermines a 
community's sense of wholeness, and that injury needs to be 
redressed. ,65 
Restorative justice is thus as much about healing the community as it is about 
healing victim and offender. Indeed, the success of victim and offender 
reintegration into the community is directly related to the restoration of the 
community. 
61 See Marshall op cit 34-35, Van Ness & Strong op cit 161-162, Zehr & Mika op cit 52 and 
McCold op cit 168. 
62 See Van Ness & Strong ibid 32, McCold & Wachtel op cit 297 and Bowen op cit 20. 
63 See Crawford (2002: 118). 
64 See Braithwaite op cit 58, McCold op cit 157, Zehr & Mika op cit 53 and Van Ness et alop 
cit 6. 
65 Zehr (1995 : 188). 
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For the restorationists, then, community participation is a sine qua non of 
the success of any restorative project. The resurgence of the victim and the 
redemption of the offender occur in the bosom of the community. There is a 
genetic connection between the victim and offender, on the one hand, and the 
community, on the other. All three have been sullied by the crime. All three have 
to be restored. According to the restorationists, community participation is the 
key to restoring the triad. It is community involvement that gives the victim and 
offender a real chance of reaching the rapprochement needed to develop and 
implement the restorative sanction. It is community oversight that ensures that 
the injury to the victim is repaired and that the offender accounts for his crime. 
The reintegration of victim and offender is based upon the deployment of the 
analeptic resources of the community. And it is only the community which, by its 
participation in the restorative justice process, can ensure that its own integrity is 
constantly re-inured against the mischiefs of crime. In this regard, the notion that 
restorative justice is community justice is not too far off the mark. 
3.7 Critique of the Claims of Restorative Justice 
The five elements explicated above collectively comprise the constitutional 
tenets of restorative justice. Restorationists invariably rely upon most or all of 
them in their endeavours to propagate and popularize their project. These are the 
elements which provide the source material for the paradigm shift which 
restorationists urge. They are the claims of restorative justice. The remainder of 
this chapter offers a Marxist treatment of these claims. It seeks to develop a 
materialist assessment of the tenets of restorative justice and to uncover their class 
content. 
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. The critique proceeds on a level which might be classified as internal. That 
is, it is in the nature of a 'micro-critique', concerned to evaluate the compositional 
specificities of restorative justice against the yardstick of Marxist class analysis.66 
We shall begin at the end, with the last tenet of restorative justice discussed 
above, namely, that of community participation. This choice is motivated by the 
fact that community participation is derived from the concept of 'community', 
which item is, from the Marxist perspective, easily the most problematic one in 
the conceptual canon of restorative justice.67 A critical analysis of community 
participation will provide insights which have direct relevance for the analysis of 
the other four elements of restorative justice. 
3.7.1 Of Community, Affectivity and Functionalism 
Despite the imprecision which characterizes the restorationist position, there 
are two aspects of community which bulk large. Firstly, the statutes of restorative 
justice contain a preswnption of affective community, that is, a community 
constituted around a shared complex of social and cultural values. 'Affective 
community is the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture. ,68 Whether the 
restorative community is conceived as a geographic community or as a 
66 Internal critique may be contrasted to external or 'macro-critique' which is concerned to 
evaluate the relation of restorative justice to capitalism. The argument of the external 
critique is simply that comprehensive restorative justice is incompatible with capitalism. It 
ultimately entails the destruction of the capitalist state and is therefore unachievable within 
the confrnes of the capitalist system. Internal critique must presume the opposite, namely, 
that comprehensive restorative justice is indeed practicable under capitalism. Internal 
critique is not possible without an acceptance of the hypothetical validity of the restorative 
justice project. See Delgado (2000: 758 & 763). 
67 The problematic nature of the concept of 'community' is widely recognized within 
restorationist ranks. See, for example, McCold op cit ISS: 'One of the greatest challenges 
facing restorative justice, as it aspires to maturity, is to defme the role of "community" in 
theory and practice.' See also Pavlich (2004: 171), McCold & Wachtel (2003: 294), Schiff 
(2003: 329) and Walgrave (2003: 68). There seems to be two major variants of 
'community', namely, the community-as-place and the community-as-network. The former 
is delineated geographically or spatially (the local community), the latter emotionally (the 
community of care). 
68 Wolff (1968: 187). 
183 
community of care, there is substantial accord that either variant ought to be 
affective. It should be integrated in terms of a common morality and culture. In 
practice, this would mean that the restorative community is united in its rejection 
of crime and in its commitment to restorative justice as the solution to the crisis of 
criminality. Community participation in this context is a structured process, from 
the application of affective solidarity to the inauguration of the restorative 
process, through the development of the restorative sanction to the facilitation and 
monitoring of its implementation. 
Secondly, restorative justice comprehends affective community from a 
functionalist perspective. Functionalism is a sociological approach which is 
concerned to engage the function of social activity. According to Giddens: 
'To study the function of a social practice or institution is to analyse 
the contribution which that practice or institution makes to the 
continuation of society as a whole. ,69 
Robertson takes the point further: 
'Functionalist theory implies that society tends to be an organized, 
stable, well-integrated system, in which most members agree on 
basic values. Under normal conditions all the elements in the social 
system ... tend to "fit together", with each element making a 
contribution to overall societal stability.'7o 
Functionalist thought, then, is interested in understanding how social practices 
and institutions operate to ensure the smooth functioning of society. Its 
watchword is social equilibrium. And any activity which disrupts social 
69 Giddens (1993: 711). See also Haralambos & Holbom (1991: 8), Swingewood (1975: 188-
191) and Lawson & Garrod (1996: 105). 
70 Robertson (1977: 17). 
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equilibrium is considered dysfunctional.7! 
Restorative justice brings a functionalist reading to affective community. 
Criminal conduct is comprehended as an attack upon the peaceful functioning of 
the community. It disturbs the composure of the community and threatens its 
unity. Peace and equilibrium are recovered by way of community participation in 
the restorative process. For restorative justice, then, social equilibrium and the 
affectivity upon which it is founded are the norm. Crime is a symptom of a social 
pathology which violates the norm and creates disequilibrium. The function of 
the restorative process is to neutralize the effects of crime and return the 
community to its normal state ofharrnony. According to the restorationists, 
community solidarity is best reclaimed by involving the disrupted community 
directly in the restorative endeavour. Community participation in the process of 
its own recovery is, in this connection, deemed to be both necessary and desirable. 
From a Marxist perspective, the first and obvious question about any 
community is its class character. Class is the elemental unit of social organization 
in the capitalist system. Indeed, all historical societies have been class societies. 
Hence class enjoys the status of a fundamental analytical concept in the theory of 
historical materialism. Marxism teaches that we exist first and foremost as 
members of a determinate social class, and that our entire existence is marked by 
the reverberations of the class struggle which is the hallmark of human 
civilization.72 
71 See Robertson ibid 17-18: 'In the functionalist view, a society has an underlying tendency 
to be in equilibrium, or balance ... Because their main emphasis is on social order and 
stability, functionalists risk the temptation of dismissing disruptive changes as 
dysfunctional, even iftbose changes are necessary, inevitable, and beneficial in the long 
run.' See also Swingewood op cit 188: 'Explicit in these formulations is a model of society 
as a functional unity, its constituent parts meshing together with a degree ofhannony and 
consistency to prevent serious conflict from developing; and that such conflict must be seen 
as dysfunctional to the maintenance of the whole.' 
72 See Chapter Two above. 
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Restorative justice betrays a consistent ignorance of or disregard for the 
importance of social class and its impact on most aspects of human existence, 
including crime and its punishment. 73 It postulates a community free of structural 
class conflict. If restorative justice accords any analytical credence to a 
determinate social combination, it is to the affective community. For 
restorationists, it is a theoretical imperative that all of us belong to a community 
with which we identify naturally and to which we feel an elemental allegiance. 
However, their notion of an affective community is based upon the incorrect 
supposition that crime and class are discrete phenomena, without any moments of 
intersection. Hence the tendency amongst the proponents of restorative justice to 
treat our class affiliations as theoretically insignificant. 
In the restorative credo, community consciousness is prior to class 
consciousness, and community cohesion takes precedence over class struggle. 
Certainly, virtually all communities, whether spatially or emotionally constituted, 
are affective in their rejection of crime. All of us, except perhaps criminals 
themselves, share an abhorrence for crime. In this regard we are united across 
class borders. Rival classes coalesce in their response to crime.74 Our common 
humanity asserts itself in the face of the crisis of criminality. That is as it should 
be. However, restorationists fail to comprehend that our common humanity is 
permanently fractured by the facticity of class and the inevitability of class 
73 This tendency of restorative justice has elicited the following rebuke from Takagi & Shank 
(op cit 158) in respect of Braithwaite's concept ofre-integrative shaming: 'Braithwaite does 
not discuss the issue of power, who holds it, how it 'is exercised, or how it is channeled into 
certain dominant structures, especially in class/race/gender relations of domination and 
subordination. Society is viewed in terms of "individuals", rather than as social formations, 
social forces, and social structures. As such, the shaming/integration theory is ahistorical 
and fails to capture the deterioration of the condition of the working class, and their 
progressive marginalization in production, consumption, and community life.' See also 
Cwmeen 2003: 192: 'There are often assumptions made that all individuals will experience 
the restorative justice process in a certain way irrespective of their gender, class, "race", 
ethnicity or age. ' 
74 See Ignatieff(l985: 90). 
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conflict. They assume' a classless society at the local level'. 75 They forget that in 
our capitalist world, every affective community is always also a community of 
class, and the temper of its affectivity derives from its class character. 76 
3.7.2 Communities of Class 
In relation to the restorative justice project, the community of class may be 
composed of either a single class or two classes. Its class composition is derived 
from the class positions occupied by the two primary 'stakeholders' in the 
restorative process, the victim and the offender. The class-singular or 
homogeneous restorative community is constituted when both offender and victim 
belong to the same social class. They are class equals. Of course, crime jumps 
class barriers easily. If this happens, the offender and victim are members of 
different social classes, and hence have different 'natural' community 
affiliations.77 In the class-dyadic or bifurcated restorative community, the offender 
will typically be proletarian or lumpenproletarian, and the victim either bourgeois 
or petite bourgeois.78 
A community which consists of a single class is an affective community, in 
the sense that its members will, as a rule, all share the same class psychology and 
values. The class-singular community is in this regard a 'natural' community, 
75 Repo (1977a: 48). 
76 The following comment by Repo (1977b: 67) on class denialism is instructive here: 'Since 
the concept of class has been derived from reality, as an attempt to explain history and the 
present capitalist order, and since the concept is fIrmly based on economic and social 
realities ~ the ownership of the means of production combined with the power and 
privileges in one's social position - the denial of social classes constitutes a denial of 
objective reality.' 
77 Different classes generally occupy different living spaces and have different class 
psychologies. In the class-singular restorative community, therefore, the community 
attachments of the victim and offender will likely coincide both spatially and emotionally, 
while in the class-dyadic restorative community, these attachments will likely differ on both 
counts. 
78 See Acorn (op cit 145) who posits that 'the perpetrators of crime are likely to occupy a 
lower socio-economic strata (sic) than their victims'. See also Ignatieff op cit 96. 
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bound together by common material interests and a unified worldview. The 
participation of such a community in the restorative process ought to be both 
uncontroversial and unremarkable. Whatever questions, tensions or difficulties 
arise ought to relate to technical or implementation matters only. They should not 
go to the legitimacy of the restorative process or the integrity of the restorative 
project. However, as we shall see, it all depends upon which class comprises the 
community in question. 
If the restorative community is class-dyadic, the question of its participation 
in the restorative process is immediately problematized. The constitution of the 
restorative community then becomes a vital issue. For when crime crosses class 
boundaries, community homogeneity is no longer either given or guaranteed. 
Indeed, it is non-existent, and restorationists are saddled with the thorny problem 
of having to construct community solidarity in the face of class antagonisms 
rooted deep in the structure of the mode of production. 
In the class-singular community the net effect of a successful restorative 
conference is always to reinforce the material culture of the constituent class. If 
the community is bourgeois its bourgeois sensibilities prevail, if petite bourgeois 
its petite-bourgeois insecurities are assuaged, and if proletarian its proletarian 
deprivations are confirmed. Community participation in this context is ultimately 
about convincing the offender to accept and abide by the mores of his class. For 
the bourgeois and petite bourgeois offender this is unproblematic. His crime is 
simply an index that he has taken the edacity and cupidity of his class to its logical 
conclusion. Restorative justice requires him to keep a reign upon the rapacity of 
his class impulses, and to respect the agreed legal boundaries of his class 
privileges. Here community participation amounts to his being admonished by his 
class companions not to disrupt the social compact with internecine conflict. It is 
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also his route to reintegration into the ranks of his class companions. For his 
victim, community participation is the avenue back to the personal comfort which 
comes with class peace.79 
lfthe single~class community is proletarian and/or lumpenproletarian, the 
restorative justice project takes on an altogether different complexion. The whole 
of such a community is structurally the victim of exploitation by the bourgeoisie. 
It is a site of the agglomeration of labour~power as value~producing commodity 
and, hence, of surplus~value extraction. Its offenders are the anti-social and 
alienated products of capitalist exploitation and its repressive accoutrements. Its 
victims are the weak ones, defeated and disarmed by the brutalities of unrelenting 
poverty and hopelessness. Criminals and casualties are together trapped in a 
barbaric existence, imposed by the reproductive imperatives of the capitalist mode 
of production. 
In this milieu the community's participation in the restorative process is 
potentially injurious to its interests as a class. For restorative justice, in the final 
analysis, requires the community to condone the structure of capitalist 
exploitation and oppression. The proletarian community is expected to make 
peace with its conditions of life. In other words, restorative justice implicates the 
proletarian community in its own disadvantage. 
79 Levrant et af (op cit: 16) note that, in comparison to poor communities, 'it is likely that 
affluent communities will have the resources to develop programs that are more integrative 
because they offer a greater number of quality services to offenders'. Of course, the same 
quality of services would be available to those of their victims who may require 'healing' 
before they are able to resume the 'normal' privileges of their bourgeois or petite bourgeois 
existences. 
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3.7.3 Functionalism and Class Conflict 
As intimated earlier, restorative justice is informed by the precepts of 
normative functionalism. It therefore comprehends social conflict in pathological 
terms, that is, it 'treats conflict as aberrational, and the absence of it as the desired 
state' .80 This, of course, presupposes that extant social arrangements are at least 
defensible, probably legitimate. Certainly, it does not countenance the possibility 
that conflict is endemic in our society.8! And it does not consider that the solution 
to the crisis of criminality may lie, not in the restoration of harmony to social 
relations, but in the dismantling of those relations. Restorationists are perforce 
functionalists. They seek to remove the alleged dysfunction which crime imports 
into community life. They are, in this connection, defenders of the structure of 
community relations. These have to be restored to their pre-crime vivacity. The 
crime has breached the affective concord. The repose of the community has to be 
reconstituted via the restorative process. 
Marxism repudiates the restorationist ambition to return the community to 
the state of functioning harmony which it supposedly enjoyed prior to the criminal 
episode. That ambition perceives as normal and fmal the class composition of the 
affective community and, hence, accepts as natural the social and economic 
inequalities which percolate throughout its various levels. Marxism considers that 
both class and its attendant inequality are neither natural nor necessary. They are 
the products of a matrix of historically specific material conditions. These 
conditions are structured by conflict. Crime is one expression of this conflict. It 
is neither an aberration nor a pathology. It is a dramatic, often violent, outburst of 
the discord which lies at the heart of every class society. Delgado declares: 
80 Delgado op cit 770. See also Crawford & Clear op cit 133. 
81 See Delgado (ibid) who argues that' in a society like ours, tensions among groups may be 
normal, and not a sign of social pathology'. See also Abel (1981: 248-249) who accuses 
legal informalism (of which restorative justice is a variant) of identifying 'conflict 
exclusively with threats to stability, obscuring the fact that many people experience the 
status quo as oppressive and see themselves as the victims of constant conflict.' 
'Surely, in such a society, one would expect the have-nots to attempt to 
change their social position (by legal or illegal means), and the haves to 
resist these attempts. Conflict is a logical and expected result.' 82 
For every capitalist social formation, disequilibrium is an existential exigency. 
Class struggle is inscribed in the social relations of production. 
3.7.4 The Class-Singular Community 
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Let us examine the functionalist aspirations of restorative justice for the 
single-class community. It may be conceded, of course, that such a community is 
not plagued by class struggles, other than perhaps in the form of non-fundamental 
class fractional disputes. The single-class community would thus be united in 
terms of its own real class interests. It is conceivable that in such communities 
crime does sunder the collective equilibrium to which restorationists refer. Here it 
is indeed possible that community participation in the restorative process may 
lead to the recovery of social harmony. Again, however, it all depends on the 
class comprising the community. 
A bourgeois or petite bourgeois community typically possesses a high level 
of collective class consciousness and displays abundant class solidarity.83 Its 
members are generally acutely aware of their class privileges and are amenable to 
co-operation with their fellows to secure their positions and property. Social 
relations in such a community are usually cordial. It is an affective community. 
The trouble is that its cohesion is structured by its class composition. The 
collective morality which such a community espouses is necessarily derived from 
its relation of contradiction to its class enemies. In other words, its affectivity is 
class bound and constituted in class conflict. Restorative justice does not attribute 
82 Delgado ibid 770-771. 
83 See Repo (1977a: 51-52) and Abel op cit 250. 
any analytical significance to the class basis of community equilibrium. It is 
concerned only to ensure that such equilibrium is restored after the criminal 
episode. It has no critical interest in the nature of that equilibrium. The 
inescapable conclusion is that, in relation to this community, the restorative 
justice project is dedicated objectively to the reproduction of the culture, 
entitlements, and prerogatives of its constituent class. 
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The notion of equilibrium is not pertinent to a proletarian community, 
despite the fact that, like its bourgeois and petite bourgeois counterparts, it is 
class-singular. Such a community is permanently wracked by the effects of 
exploitation and oppression. It is structurally dysfunctional. For it, discord is an 
existential condition.84 Whatever affectivity it may possess for participation in the 
restorative process is entirely tenuous. The proletarian community is both horne 
to the bulk of the criminal population and itself the victim of incessant 
criminality. Restorative justice requires such a community to believe that the 
crime has disturbed its natural balance. And it asks this community to accept that 
the restorative process will repair the damage caused by the crime. Community 
consensus will be restored.85 
There is a fundamental non sequitur here, namely, restoration of that which 
cannot be restored, the non-existent. It is logically impossible to return the 
community to a state of equilibrium if it was not in such a state before the 
84 Proletarian disorganization is the price of bourgeois and petite bourgeois sodality. That is 
the dialectic of the struggle in which these classes are locked. 
85 Takagi & Shank (op cit 161) are sceptical about restorationist promises to proletarian and 
lumpenproletarian communities: 'Yet, what does "colUrmmity" mean in a place like West 
Oakland, which is populated with Ellisonian invisibles? When over half of those housed in 
homeless shelters are African American women and children, and others not in shelters are 
waiting in food kitchen lines? What does community mean for those begging in front of 
restaurants and grocery stores, for the people searching in garbage cans, and for those 
working day and night filling shopping carts with recyclables? When night falls, we see the 
homeless sleeping in the recesses of doorways of buildings. All of this is invisible, in the 
sense that we choose not to acknowledge their existence and thereby their humanity.' 
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commission of the crime. The rejoinder might be that the restorative justice 
project aims, if not to restore, then to create proletarian community harmony. 
That, however, is another matter altogether, which will be canvassed elsewhere in 
this chapter. Suffice it to say, at this point, that to restore a working-class 
community to its pre-crime situation is to affirm the conditions of its 
exploitation. 86 
The working class is expected not only to police itself but also to contribute 
to the maintenance of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. That is the real import of 
proletarian community participation in the restorative process. Both the criminal 
and the rest of his class are implicated in the legitimation of the capitalist system 
and hence in the defence of the material conditions on which is based the 
dominance of its class enemy. The point is that for the proletarian community, 
restorative justice is likely to make a bigger contribution to securing proletarian 
consent to the rule of the bourgeoisie than to solving the crisis of criminality.87 
Restorative justice cannot restore equilibrium to such a community, but it can 
encourage it to acquiesce in the profound disequilibrium of the capital-labour 
relation which structures its existence. 
86 See Delgado op cit 763-764: 'One difficulty with restorative justice inheres in the concept 
itself. Restorative justice, like tort law, attempts to restore the parties to the status quo ante 
~ the position they would have been in had the crime not occurred - through restitution and 
payment. But if that status quo is marked by radical inequality and abysmal living 
conditions for the offender, returning the parties to their original position will do little to 
spark social change.' See also Findlay (2000: 407). 
87 Abel (op cit 250 & 262) distinguishes between conservative and liberating conflict. The 
former 'preserves the structures of domination that characterize capitalist society', the latter 
'challenges those structures of domination'. He argues that legal informalism (which would 
include restorative justice) tends to render criminal conflict conservative, thereby 
contributing to the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. 
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3.7.5 The Class-Dyadic Community 
Much the same can be said of the class-dyadic community of restorative 
justice, where the offender and victim are members of rival classes. Typically this 
community would be constituted from the proletariat, as class home ofthe 
offender, and the bourgeoisie or petite bourgeoisie, as class home of the victim. 
Here, again, it is not possible for the restorative process to re-establish the social 
equilibrium which the crime has supposedly shattered. It is not possible because 
such equilibrium did not exist prior to the commission of the crime. The 
membership of the restorative community divaricates by social class. Objectively 
the two components are class enemies. It may be accepted that they do constitute 
an affective community for the purposes of the restorative process. This 
community may thus well be integrated in its response to the crime. But it is 
simultaneously rent by inescapable and objective contradictions.88 The truth is 
that the two-class community cannot be a community of harmony. It is, literally, a 
collectivity of enemies. Restoration here means restoring the domination of the 
one part and the subjugation of the other.89 
Affectivity in respect of the crime is achieved at the expense of the class 
interests of the proletarian component of the dyadic community. The restorative 
process reconstitutes the stability of the bourgeois or petite bourgeois component, 
but simultaneously reinforces the precariousness which pervades the existence of 
88 See Repo (op cit 50) who reminds us that: 'A stroke of a pen or a game of semantics, 
however, will not abolish the existing social reality: we live in a class society with major 
class contradictions everywhere. The class differentials and conflicts can be ignored; but 
they will not vanish.' 
89 The following statement by Repo (ibid 54) about 'community control' should stand as a 
warning about the potential class biases of restorative justice: 'In the particular 
confrontation of classes that takes place in the neighbourhood organizations, the working 
class has been and continues to be systematically defeated.' See also Levrant et al op cit 
16: 'Despite their progressive underpinnings, restorative justice programs may have 
unintended class and racial biases that work to the disadvantage of poor and minority 
offenders.' 
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the proletarian component. The working-class element of the restorative 
community experiences the brutishness of crime at fIrst hand on a day-to-day 
basis. Its participation in the restorative process indicates a willingness to 
contribute to repairing the harm caused by one of its number. The trouble is that 
such participation contributes nothing whatsoever to bringing stability to its 
world. Instead, this process usually leads it to submit to the world view of its class 
enemy in the restorative community. 
In other words,the restorative process becomes a process of class 
domination. The preparedness of the proletarian component of the restorative 
community to participate in a confederated class response to crime redounds 
usually to the benefit of its class opposite. Bourgeois unity and composure are 
restored, but so are proletarian destitution and desperation. The equilibrium 
which restorative justice brings to the two-class community is the equilibrium 
which comes with the dominance of bourgeois ideology. For the working class, 
participation in the restorative community means the return of a stable milieu for 
its exploitation and oppression. 
A major the purpose of community participation in the restorative process is 
to repair the perceived dysfunctions in community relations caused by the 
criminal episode. This purpose is, however, profoundly reactionary in that it 
constitutes an apologia for the social relations of production of the capitalist mode 
of production. 90 Whether the restorative community consists of one or two 
classes, the outcome of the restorative process is commonly the same: peace is 
restored temporarily to the capital-labour relation, and routinely at the expense of 
90 See Delgado op cit 771: 'Insofar as restorative justice aims at smoothing over the rough 
edges of social competition and adjusting subaltern people to their roles, it is profoundly 
conservative. While restoration and healing are emotionally powerful objectives, it is hard 
to deny that they can have a repressive dimension as well.' 
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the working class. Despite the best intentions of the restorationists, the capitalist 
context transforms the restorative process into a process for affIrming the 
unfreedom of the proletariat. Whatever social equilibrium is restored is 
structured, for the most part, by the class interests of the bourgeoisie. And 
whatever justice is achieved is, at bottom, class justice. In Abel's terms, 
community participation in the restorative project renders the criminal conflict 
between victim and offender conservative, thereby helping to maintain and 
reproduce the hegemonic configuration of capitalism.91 
Much of what has been argued in the foregoing critique of community 
participation applies, mutatis mutandis, to the remaining elements of restorative 
justice. The operation of each one is structured by the same class conflicts and 
considerations as were identified in respect of community participation. The 
restorative sanction, the restorative process, the empowerment of the victim and 
the reconstruction of the offender are all subject, to a greater or lesser extent, to 
the exigencies of capitalism as a mode of production. The critical discussion of 
these elements need not therefore re-examine issues canvassed earlier. 
3.7.6 Class and the Restorative Sanction 
The restorative sanction is the measure of restorative justice. It is meant to 
be the expression of the resolution of the conflict triggered by the criminal event. 
It is supposed to be the mechanism to restore community equilibrium, heal the 
victim and encourage the transformation of the offender. It is the materialization 
of the non-punitive response to crime which restorative justice propounds. It is 
the key to the attairunent of justice for all 'stakeholders' in the restorative process. 
91 See Abel op cit 250. See also Crawford & Clear op cit 139: 'Making amends and restoring 
troubled relations in an unequal society may mean restoring unequal relations and, hence, 
reaffinning inequality. Moreover, restoring the preexisting equilibrium may mean 
reinstating and reaffirming relations of dominance. ' 
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It was contended earlier that the restorative process restores community 
equilibrium only in the sense that a truce is reached between class enemies, if the 
restorative community is composed of two classes, or in the sense that the 
material conditions of the existence of the class are affirmed, if the restorative 
community consists of one class. The restorative sanction is the formal outcome 
of this process, and conceals a commitment to the defence of the social relations 
of production of capitalism behind a concern for social peace and community 
harmony. The restorative sanction is, in this regard, a manifestation of class 
accommodation and a resource of class domination. It is constructed upon the 
basis of our common human aversion to crime, while reinforcing a vision of 
humanness that is uncommonly sectional. It is a mechanism which, in the final 
analysis, restores community equilibrium by confirming the structural inequity of 
the capital-labour relation. 
The restorative sanction is the privatized resolution of the conflict generated 
by the criminal episode. In the context of capitalism, privatization of the criminal 
episode entails its commodification. By extension, such privatization also 
commodifies the restorative sanction. It becomes an object of negotiation and 
exchange between the 'stakeholders'. A market injustice is created, which, like 
all commodity markets, is governed by the principle of equivalence. 92 Victim and 
offender, as primary 'stakeholders', come together as equals in this market to 
negotiate the resolution of 'their' dispute. The restorative sanction is the contract 
upon which they have settled as the consensual outcome of their deliberations. 93 
There is no imprint of a coercive authority in the restorative sanction. It is the 
bargain struck by equals. 
92 See Chapter Five below. 
93 See Weitekamp (1999: 97). 
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However, formal equality can conceal substantive inequality. Contracts are 
regularly concluded in which the parties are unequal, sometimes starkly SO.94 The 
restorative sanction may, similarly, be structured by inequality. Its terms depend, 
ultimately, upon the power - the class power - of the primary 'stakeholders' and 
their respective communities. The class power wielded by the parties to the 
restorative process is reflected, ultimately, in the restorative sanction. It is, in the 
result, entirely possible that the terms of a restorative sanction may allow the rich 
offender to 'restore' community equilibrium with a generous offer of 
compensation to the victim, and even to the community itself.95 It is also possible 
that a poor offender may have to accept a sanction that is incommensurate with 
his offence or that he does not have the means to satisfy.96 The point is that 
restorative justice does not comprehend the impact which the class position and 
power of the parties may have upon the restorative sanction. 
Certainly, then, in a two-class restorative community, the restorative 
sanction can easily become enmeshed in the machinery of unequal class power.97 
If the restorative community is class-singular, the restorative sanction, logically, 
cannot express a power differential between the primary 'stakeholders' based on 
class. However, this does not mean that the sanction is necessarily free ofthe 
impress of class power. Here the interests of the bourgeoisie constitute the 
94 The fonn contract, so ubiquitous in the capitalist world, is a typical example. The 
individual buyer generally has no say in the determination of the tenns of the contract. 
They are decided by the seller and offered to the buyer on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis. 
Bargaining is rarely an option. 
95 See Levrant et al op cit 16. 
96 See Delgado op cit 759. 
97 The following comment by Abel Cop cit 257) is instructive here: 'Informal processes 
commonly characterize their outcomes as compromise solutions in which nobody wins or 
loses. But compromise produces unbiased results only when opponents are equal; 
compromise between unequals inevitably reproduces inequality.' The fact that the 
restorative 'stakeholders' are not formally opponents does not diminish the pertinence of 
the comment to the restorative sanction. 
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decisive class context of the restorative sanction. The bourgeois ideological 
project centres upon the generalization of its sectional interests to society as a 
whole. It is a project which pathologizes all social conflict, both inter-class and 
intra-class. Crime in the class-singular community is a form of intra-class conflict 
which subverts social stability and thereby confounds the bourgeois hegemonic 
programme. In this context, the restorative sanction amounts to a device of 
equilibration. By comprehending the crime as an index of social pathology in an 
otherwise legitimate social organization, the restorative sanction becomes one 
more resource in the bourgeois ideological storehouse. Objectively, it reconciles 
the 'stakeholders' to the social mores of the bourgeoisie as ruling class, and hence 
to its ideological project to secure the reproduction of the social relations of 
production of capitalism. 
All in all, then, the restorative sanction cannot circumvent the relations of 
class which form the backdrop to the restorative process in capitalist society. Nor 
can it evade the inequalities of class power which the 'stakeholders' may import 
directly into the restorative process. Class will find its way into the structure of 
the restorative sanction. Its declared purpose may be to resolve the criminal 
dispute according to the wishes of the 'stakeholders' and with due regard for the 
dignity of all concerned. However, its undeclared purpose is always to restore to 
full functioning the capital-labour relation which the crime has disrupted. In this 
sense, there is always a justification for the extant social relations of production 
immanent in the restorative sanction. 
3.7.7 Class and the Restorative Process 
The restorative process is the road to the restorative sanction. As noted 
earlier, it is designed to involve the parties - victim, offender and community - in 
a collaborative effort to deal with the effects of the criminal episode. Fraternity is 
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the watchword of restorative procedure. The 'stakeholders' participate in order to 
find a solution - the restorative sanction - which is acceptable to all. This requires 
co-operation, not competition. Hence the procedural sodality of restorative 
justice. It is a sodality which is theorized as the negation of the antagonism which 
founds conventional criminal procedure. The irony is that the antagonism which 
the restorative process seeks to avoid can be more real than the collaboration 
which it seeks to promote. 
The oppositional structure of conventional criminal procedure has this 
virtue, at least: it accepts that conflict is at the heart of all law and every legal 
system. Restorative justice, as we have seen, has a functionalist conception of 
social and legal relations. Hence, although it understands the criminal episode in 
conflict terms, it is a conflict which is supposedly abnormal and which needs to be 
resolved by the parties inter se. In other words, restorative justice construes crime 
primarily as individual eccentricity. Whatever linkages between crime and 
structural social conflict, and hence between crime and class, it may comprehend 
are located on the periphery of its compass. The restorative process reproduces 
this mostly congenial view of social relations. It is not merely due process 
rendered non-adversarial. It is restorative justice in practice. It is in the process 
that the parties find the justice. 
However, virtually everything that has been said above about the class 
nature of the restorative sanction is applicable to the restorative process. The 
class relations which structure the restorative sanction are discernible already in 
its immediate precursor, the restorative process. The 'stakeholders' bring to the 
restorative process all the psychological, cultural and moral suppositions of their 
class. If the two primary 'stakeholders' are class enemies, it is rank idealism to 
suppose that they can really collaborate in the way that the restorationists propose. 
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From the Marxist perspective, it is axiomatic that any process can achieve only 
that which is permissible within the ambit of the material context of its operation. 
No process can ever overcome this context. The restorative process cannot make 
comrades out of class enemies. It cannot surmount objective class contradictions 
by negotiation. These infiltrate the restorative process in they same way as they 
permeate the restorative sanction. 
Restorationists value the restorative process itself as the nub of the pursuit 
of true 'justice for all'. However, class differences between the parties to the 
process can easily jeopardize the justice of the process. There is always the 
possibility that the stronger party, that is, the party who belongs to the dominant 
class, will be able to turn the process to advantage. 98 Class is the most significant 
objective fact of our social existence. Class conflict is inescapable. No amount of 
goodwill and conunitment from either the offender or victim can prevent class 
interests from asserting themselves and skewing the process. Again, no reliance 
can be placed upon conununity participation to overcome these class dichotomies 
because the conununity itself is divided by class and mirrors the class antagonism 
between victim and offender. Conununity participation is no bar to class justice. 
The restorative process will likely be properly collusive if offender and 
victim are members of the same class. Here there are no fundamental 
98 See Levrant et at op cit 16: [W]ithln the restorative justice process, might affluent offenders 
be treated more favourably? In victim-offender mediation conferences, for example, it is 
possible that offenders who are more educated, better dressed, and more skilled verbally 
will negotiate more favourable sanctions. It is instructive that mediators in YOM programs 
tend to be White, male, and better educated - traits that may converge with those of more 
affluent offenders.' See also Delgado op cit 769: 'YOM sets up a relatively coercive 
encounter in many cases between an inarticulate, uneducated, socially alienated youth with 
few social skills and a hurt, vengeful victim. This encounter is mediated by a middle-class, 
moralistic mediator who shares little background or sympathy with the offender, but has 
everything in common with the victim. To label this encounter a negotiation seems a 
misnomer, for it is replete with overt social coercion.' 
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contradictions within the process as such. If the protagonists are bourgeois or 
petite bourgeois, there is every possibility that the restorative process may well 
mean 'justice for all'. However, for the dominated classes, such procedural 
collusion reinforces the structure of their domination. Working-class offenders 
and victims may reach a genuine restorative sanction via genuine commitment to 
the restorative process. In other words, the process may actually lead to a 
mending of the harm caused by the offence and restoration of a community 
equilibrium of sorts. But it must be remembered always that the community 
restored is a community of privation and indigence, and which provides fertile 
breeding ground for legions of offenders, and victims. For the proletariat, the 
restorative process is one more way of making it complicit in its own exploitation. 
The relationship between the offender and the restorative process is 
important and needs to be examined further. Restorationists are unanimous that 
the offender be acknowledged and admitted as a 'stakeholder' into the restorative 
process. However, such 'stakeholder' status may be attained only after a 'plea of 
guilty' by the offender. The co-operation which is envisioned for the restorative 
process is premised upon a prior acknowledgement of guilt by one of the primary 
'stakeholders'. Restorative justice does not comprehend the 'plea of not guilty' .99 
One may enter the restorative process as an offender, but not as an accused. The 
condition of being an accused is too ambiguous and undetermined for it to be 
accommodated within the restorationist enterprise. Restorative justice requires 
99 See Acorn op cit 62 : 'Restorative justice provides the opportunity and the inducement for 
offenders to come out and speak up. It deals only with offenders who "admit it". Though 
our traditional rules of evidence distrust and discourage confessions induced by offers of 
advantage, the recruiting of offenders into restorative justice programs is based squarely on 
such incentives. Restorative justice exchanges mercy for conversation. See also Daly 
(2002: 57, original emphasis): 'For virtually aU legal contexts involving individual criminal 
matters, restorative justice processes have only been applied to those offenders who have 
admitted to an offence; as such, it deals with the penalty phase of the criminal process for 
admitted offenders, not the fact-fmding phase.' See further Delgado op cit 763. 
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and demands the certainty and clarity attaching to the offender. The accused must 
become the offender. The restorative process is viable only if this precondition is 
met. There has to be an admission of liability. Before anything else, the 
restorative process is a confessional. 
Restorative justice cannot tolerate silence on the part of the accused. In 
order to have access to the benefits of the restorative process, the offender must 
forego his right to silence. 100 He must not insist upon proof of his guilt. He 
cannot invoke the presumption of innocence. These are key and hard-won rights 
in the history of criminal justice. Despite their sUbsumption in conventional 
criminal procedure, they represent a historic victory over the caprices of class 
justice. For the unrepresented accused,IOI the right to remain silent may well be 
the only shield against the rapacity of a conviction-hungry criminal justice system. 
The presumption of innocence may be all that protects such an accused against the 
presumption of criminality which routinely attaches to members of the 'dangerous 
classes' . 
Restorative justice appears to have excised the very notion of the accused 
and, thereby, the recalcitrant accused from its epistemology. 102 That is, it 
comprehends only the offender who, by his mea culpa, becomes a 'stakeholder' in 
the restorative process. The transfiguration of accused into offender is achieved 
by the forfeiture of the right to silence and the renunciation of the presumption of 
innocence. These do not have to be engaged because, according to the logic of the 
restorative process, they do not matter. The restorative process supposedly takes 
100 See Acorn ibid: ' In our tell-all, talk-show era, nothing is more despicable than remaining 
silent.' 
101 In the capitalist context, the unrepresented accused is usually a member of either the 
proletariat or lumpenproletariat. 
102 Some restorationists have also sought to 'transcend' the notion of crime itself. See Acorn 
op cit 175 endnote 51. 
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us beyond such criminal procedural concerns. The demise of the accused entails 
irrelevance for the traditional rights of the accused. However, these rights are too 
important to be sidelined summarily, as part of a dated and dispensable system of 
criminal procedure. In the context of capitalist society, the rights to silence and to 
be presumed innocent are inherently valuable, at least as hedges against 
arbitrariness. 103 They do matter, at least to the accused person. And their 
trivialization needs to be justified. 
The recalcitrant accused who, for whatever reason, including the possibility 
that he is innocent, refuses to co-operate in the restorative process, constitutes a 
challenge to the entire edifice of restorative justice. Such an accused is a 
subversive obstacle to restorative healing. Whereas they may have constructed 
valid objections to many other aspects of conventional criminal justice, the 
advocates of restorative justice do not appear to have developed any systematic 
criticism of the rights to silence and to be presumed innocent. It is submitted that 
unless and until restorative justice is able to account epistemologically for the 
accused who will not readily accept offender status, there is no good reason to 
believe that the restorative process renders redundant the right to silence and 
nugatory the presumption of innocence. 
3.7.8 Class and the Victim 
The empowerment of the crime victim is a central concern of restorative 
justice. It is a restorationist first principle that the victim be installed in the 
restorative process as a primary 'stakeholder'. However, in capitalist society, 
victim empowerment may not always be the experience of healing, mutuality and 
respect which the advocates of restorative justice tell us it is. In the capitalist 
context, victim empowerment assumes an identifiable class texture. For the 
103 See Schwikkard (1999: 10-16). 
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victim who is a member of the dominant classes, victim empowerment is likely 
properly meaningful. He has access to both the material and cultural resources to 
become an agent in the restorative process. He has the capacity to participate 
fully in the process and thereby contribute to the elaboration of the restorative 
sanction. Eradication of and closure in relation to the negative effects of the 
crime are real possibilities. For the middle-or upper-class victim, then, 
victimhood can indeed be transformed into the valuable and positive resource 
which restorative justice wants it to be. There are no objective obstacles to his 
victimhood becoming a virtue to be celebrated. For such a victim, restoration of 
the status quo ante means a return to the undisturbed enjoyment of the benefits 
and privileges of a materially secure existence. Only individual psychological 
barriers may then prevent him from transcending his victimhood. 
The empowerment of the victim who comes from the dominated classes is 
more problematic. He is a victim of oppression and exploitation before he is a 
victim of crime. His victimhood is structural first, conjunctural second. 
Restorative justice may well afford him, like his middle- and upper-class 
counterparts, the opportunity to recover his pre-crime position. However, for the 
proletarian victim, restoration of the status quo ante, even if complemented by a 
range of victim services, does not put an end to the victimhood inscribed in a 
proletarian existence. Restorative justice may resolve the conjunctural dimension 
of his status as a victim. However, it leaves intact the material conditions of his 
existence and hence the structural dimension of his victimhood. For the 
proletarian, victimhood is an existential condition. It is an existential curse. 
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Notwithstanding the efforts of the ideologues of capital to defme the victim 
in atomistic terms, social class will have an impact, often a profound one, upon 
the construction of victimhood and upon the possibilities of transcending it. From 
the Marxist perspective, the empowerment of the victim is bounded by his class 
position. That is, the material conditions ofthe victim's existence determine the 
ambit of his empowerment. Restorative justice does not comprehend this 
elementary but signal relationship. It appears to accept the bourgeois notion of 
the autonomous victim, unencumbered by the incidents and inconveniences of 
social class. In other words, it operates in terms of a generic victim who has no 
specific class affiliation. 
For Marxism, it is axiomatic that victim empowerment must mean different 
things to victims from different classes. For the victim who is a member of the 
dominant classes, restorative justice may well be a true solution. He is able to 
discard his victirnhood and, healed and whole, to re-occupy his position in the 
dominion of his class. However, for the proletarian victim, the process of 
empowerment involves a quite different prospect. If he is re-inserted, healed and 
whole, into the capital-labour relation, it is always into a position of subjugation. 
A successful restorative encounter enables him to re-occupy his pre-crime 
position in the structure of exploitation of his class, free of the psychological and 
other problems which victimhood entails. Restorative justice repairs the damage 
caused by the crime, only to perpetuate the damage caused by the social relations 
of production of capitalism. For the working-class crime victim, then, victim 
empowerment is fundamentally contradictory: conjunctural empowerment 
becomes a resource of structural disempowerment. 104 
104 There is some restorationist acknowledgement of the inability of restorative justice to alter 
material conditions. See Braithwaite (2003a: 57): 'Restorative justice cannot resolve the 
deep structural injustices that cause problems like hunger.' See also Crawford op cit 123: 
'Ultimately, however, it is social and economic policies (including employment, education, 
health and housing) rather than criminal justice policy that should remain the primary 
vehicle for the construction of a just and equal social order.' 
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3.7.9 Class and the Offender 
Restorative justice seeks also to reconstruct the offender. The intention is 
that, by collaborating with the victim and the community in the restorative process 
and the construction of the restorative sanction, the offender not only repairs the 
damage he has caused but also undergoes a process of reformation and 
regeneration, in terms of which he chooses to desist from causing further criminal 
damage and to become a caring and productive member of society. Restorative 
justice is thus meant to be the salvation not only of the victim but also of the 
offender. However, like its concept of the victim, the restorationist approach to 
the offender makes no overt allowance for influence of social class. In capitalist 
society, an offender's class always precedes his criminality. The restorationist 
ambition to reconstruct him must therefore be understood in relation to the 
position he occupies in the class structure. 
For the bourgeois or petite bourgeois offender, the restorative process is a 
way of reconciling with his class. He is in disrepute with his class comrades. He 
is an offender not only because he has committed a crime but also because he has 
offended the sensibilities of the respectable majority of his class. His 
reconstruction grants him access once more to the benefits of his class position. 
He resumes his place alongside his class brethren on one side - the side of plenty -
of the capital-labour relation. There is no good reason why he should resist 
reconstruction. Whatever life changes he may undergo or have to undergo reduce, 
ultimately, to his reintegration into the entitlements of his class. For the 
proletarian offender, restorative reconstruction also means a return to his 
prescribed position in the class structure. However, unlike his upper-class 
counterpart, he does not return to a cornucopia of advantage. He does not even 
recover a relatively secure existence, as does the reconstructed middle-class 
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offender. Instead, what he can expect are the self-same conditions of deprivation 
which constituted the material context of his lapse into criminality. 
The reconstruction of the proletarian offender via the restorative process is 
in effect his re-socialization into the bourgeois order of things. He learns to 
acquiesce in the capital-labour relation and to accept his place of subjugation in it. 
The offender is reconstructed when he once again reconciles himself to his 
subaltern social status and accedes to the material conditions of the exploitation of 
his class. His negation as a criminal offender coincides with his submission to the 
ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie. His crime had exposed him to be ill-
disciplined and intolerant of the regulatory demands of the capitalist production 
process which govern proletarian life. Restorative justice shows him the error of 
his ways. He confesses his trespasses, and he undertakes to become a restrained 
and constructive member of society, and not to offend again. He consents to that 
which is as that which ought to be, and finds his salvation in yielding to the 
disciplinary regimen to which his class is subject. 105 
However, the reconstruction of even the most well-intentioned, remorseful 
and obeisant offender may founder for lack of resources. Implementation of the 
restorative sanction is here, as in all contexts, crucially dependent upon the 
availability of material means. An intellectual or emotional corrunitment by the 
105 See Foucault (1977: l35-169) and Melossi (1979). Despite the antagonism of restorative 
justice to criminal justice, it would appear that the former involves a discernible strain of 
the Foucauldian discipline which has come to be identified with the latter. Reconstruction 
of the offender is, in this regard, a disciplinary process aimed at securing offender docility 
in the face of bourgeois class power. See Minor & Morrison (1996: 126-127): 'Foucault's 
perspective challenges the uniqueness of restorative justice philosophy and indicts its 
effects. Distinctions between restorative justice and traditional corrections become difficult 
to sustain. According to Foucault, political domination through discipline is the essence of 
any form of behavioral regulation. Restorative practices promote discipline and normality 
by teaching offenders how to communicate, compromise, empathize, repair wrongs and so 
forth . Foucault's ideas are therefore a reminder that despite whatever else restorative 
justice might be, it is still a way of exercising power and social control.' 
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offender to a crime-free life is necessary, but not sufficient. Implementation 
requires, at least, that the offender have access to the necessaries of life and that 
he has the right and the opportunity to work. In other words, the reconstruction of 
the offender cannot be achieved in the sphere of the ideational only. It must have 
a foundation in the material world. Here, again, the class position of the offender 
is critical. Needless to say, the resource base of the bourgeois and petite 
bourgeois offender is much more extensive than that of proletarian and 
lumpenproletarian offender. The reconstruction of offenders from the dominant 
classes is thus likely to encounter significantly fewer hiccups than that of 
offenders from the dominated classes. 106 
The problem of resources is urgent in a capitalist context, where criminality 
is a mass phenomenon. Every day more and more working-class men, women 
and children are thrust into the criminal ranks as a result of the unending socio-
economic crisis which constitutes their lives. It is inconceivable that the 
restorative process can reconstruct even one tenth of these criminal masses if the 
conditions which spawned their criminality continue to be reproduced as the 
material context of their reconstruction. Any programme of restorative justice can 
only be as successful as the material resources with which it has to work. Late 
capitalism is penurious towards the proletariat. It has, to a large extent, survived 
the structural crisis of accumulation and profitability which has plagued it for 
years now by assaulting the living standards of the proletariat. Restorative justice 
106 See Levrant et alop cit 16: '[T]here may be class and thus racial differences in the ability 
of offenders to meet the conditions of restorative sanctions ... The most obvious example is 
the requirement of providing victims with restitution - a common feature of restorative 
sanctions - which may be difficult for disadvantaged offenders to fulfill. On a broader 
level ... it seems likely that affluent offenders will be more able to draw on family supports 
(e.g., private drug treatment, parental monitoring) to meet the conditions imposed by 
restorative sanctions. If so, then larger inequalities in society are likely to be reproduced 
within the framework of restorative justice.' See also Delgado op cit 768: "Nothing is 
wrong with requiring persons who have harmed others without justification to make 
restitution. But forcing a needy person who has stolen a loaf of bread to do so is regressive, 
unless accompanied by measures aimed at easing his poverty.' 
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needs for capitalism to invest in the welfare and well-being of the dominated 
classes, at least. This it cannot or can no longer do. The decadence of the 
capitalist mode of production is thus a major obstacle to the reconstruction of the 
offender, and hence to the success of the entire restorative justice project. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The claims of restorative justice in its comprehensive version are 
simultaneously radical and reactionary. It is radical in its anti-statism. No other 
criminological tendency has gone as far as restorative justice to reject the role of 
the state as an agent of criminal justice. 107 A proposal to privatize crime and 
sideline the state is truly radical in the context of capitalism. It calls into question 
the structure of the mode of production and portends a justice paradigm which is 
practicable only outside the parameters of capitalism. 
Restorative justice is, however, profoundly reactionary in its adherence to 
the tenets of functionalism. It is concerned to restore a supposedly pre-given 
community equilibrium disrupted by the crime. The restorative process includes 
the empowerment of the victim and the reconstruction of the offender. Both are 
thereby meant to become productive members of a peaceful and functioning 
community. Crime is a pathological blight upon community cohesion. It 
introduces conflict into a situation which was harmonious. The task of restorative 
justice is to restore that harmony, via the active collaboration of the restorative 
triad of victim, offender and community in the construction of the restorative 
sanction. 
107 See Crawford & Clear op cit 141: 'Much of the community justice and restorative justice 
literature is infused with an explicit, and sometimes implicit, antistatism. It is no 
coincidence that the rise of restorative justice and the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideology 
have unfolded simultaneously. They both proclaim an end to universality and state 
monopoly and imply a privatization of disputes and justice by prioritizing private and 
parochial fonns of control.' 
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Primajacie, this is a progressive agenda. However, its classification as 
conservative is defensible on the basis that restorative justice has failed 
conspicuously to comprehend the true character of the social relations of 
production of the capitalist mode of production. It has failed to appreciate the 
deep class fissures which run through the heart of every capitalist social 
formation. It has failed to understand that conflict, not consensus, is the defining 
characteristic of every class and hence of every capitalist society, regardless of 
how peaceful that society may appear to be. And it has failed to discern the 
crucial role of the state in the reproduction of capitalist social relations. 
These are fundamental omissions. They betoken epistemological errantry 
and analytical feebleness which render restorative justice vulnerable to the 
incursions of bourgeois ideology. Thus, the restorationist aspiration to restore 
community equilibrium amounts, objectively, to an aspiration to restore the 
standard configuration of capitalist class rule. The crime has disturbed the 
normalities of the capital-labour relation, and the restorative process is a means of 
recovering the established contours of that relation. In this connection, restorative 
justice is inculpated in the bourgeoisie's ideological project to universalize its 
particular class concerns as general social concerns. The principle of community 
restoration thus reduces to an imprimatur for capitalist class rule. 
The other two elements of the restorative triad, namely, the victim and 
offender, are similarly contaminated with the values ofthe bourgeois ideological 
scheme. Restorative justice essentially reconciles them to the operational matrix 
of the capital-labour relation. As a 'stakeholder', each is led, via the restorative 
process, to a position of accommodation with capitalism. Both are transformed 
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into 'productive' members of their communities, that is, they are able to transcend 
the debilitation of the crime and to take up or resume an active role in the 
capitalist production process. 
Whereas its reactionary aspect is encouraged by the capitalist milieu, the 
radical aspirations of restorative justice are unattainable within that milieu. 
Capitalism requires its state to be at the centre of its justice system, and cannot 
tolerate an adjudicatory system which is organized around a privatized notion of 
crime.!08 The anti-statism of restorative justice fails to comprehend this basic 
proposition. Restorative justice in its comprehensive version is thus not a serious 
possibility in any capitalist social formation. At best, capitalism can 
accommodate and will permit, perhaps even encourage, the partial version of 
restorative justice, as an appendage to the criminal justice system. Thus, insofar 
as restorative justice is practicable in capitalist society, it must abandon its 
radicality and acquiesce in the reactionary imperatives of the law of value and the 
capital-labour relation. Such is the import of its existential dialectic. 
108 See Chapter Five below. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
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Chapter Four: The Theory of Restorative Justice 
This chapter engages the theory of restorative justice. Ultimately, a practice 
stands or falls by the theory which informs it. The advocates of restorative justice 
have, however, tended to be lukewarm about grounding their practice 
theoretically. Despite the fact that restorative justice is first and foremost a new 
theory of justice, the bulk of restorationist literature is noticeably atheoretical. 
'Restorative justice is practice-led in most of its manifestations.' I 
This tendency to atheoreticism ought not to surprise. Ours is a postmodern 
(and 'post-Marxist') world in which the demise of 'grand theory' is a cause for 
celebration. As a postmodernjurisprudence, restorative justice is concerned much 
more with the exemplary story than with the theory ofjustice.2 Hence, although 
the literature of restorative justice has grown exponentially in recent years, very 
little of it is expressly theoretical. The overtly theoretical works tend to have been 
written relatively early in the short history of restorative justice, by the first 
generation of proponents. Thereafter, it appears, theory took a back seat as 
restorative justice settled into promoting its cause by refIning its operational 
principles. 
Three works are analysed in this chapter. They are Conflicts as Property by 
Nils Christie, Not Just Deserts by John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, and The 
Practice of Punishment by Wesley Cragg. Each of these works theorizes 
restorative justice, either in its comprehensive or partial aspect. In the 
bibliography of restorative justice, they are prominent for being uncommonly but 
properly theoretical. Each work proposes a theory of restorative justice. That is, 
1 Ashworth (2002: 579). 
2 See Daly (2002: 67-68). See Chapter Six below for an analysis of the relationship between 
restorative justice and postmodemism. 
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each seeks to delineate a set of epistemological axioms for restorative justice and 
to elaborate a systematic conceptual structure for it. Each offers a comprehensive 
explanation of the claims of restorative justice, less from its basic concepts than 
from the postulates in terms of which those concepts are organized. Few 
restorationist writings are grandly theoretical in this sense. Most are theoretically 
modest and content with the occasional theoretical assertion in support of 
advocacy efforts. However, because the claims of restorative justice are grand, it 
is meet that its theory be grand also. Hence the focus in this chapter upon the 
wide-ranging theories espoused in the designated trilogy. 
4.1 Christie: Conflicts as Property 
The Norwegian criminologist, Nils Christie, may justifiably lay claim to 
being the theoretical founding father of the restorative justice movement. In his 
1976 Foundation Lecture of the Centre of Criminological Studies at the 
University of Sheffield, he proposed a theory of criminal justice which has since 
come to be genetically identified with restorative justice. The lecture, published 
under the title Conflicts as Property, is easily the most quoted single piece in the 
burgeoning corpus of restorationist literature. Certainly, and despite the fact that 
it contains no references to restorative justice, references to Conflicts as Property 
abound in restorationist literature and its arguments have 'become a modern 
orthodoxy amongst RJ supporters,.3 Before any other work, it may be considered 
to contain the fundamental theoretical premises of restorative justice.4 
Christie begins his argument with the somewhat surprising assertion 
(although no commentators have remarked thus upon it) that modem society is 
characterized by too little conflict: 
3 Ashworth (2003: 171). Chapter Five below contains further references showing Christie's 
importance to and popularity within the restorative justice movement. 
4 Indeed, it is argued in Chapter Five below that Christie's theory oUght to be acknowledged 
as the definitive theory of restorative justice. 
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'[O]ur industrialised large-scale society is not one with too many internal 
conflicts. It is one with too little.,5 
This is a surprising proposition because it is an analytical truism that every 
'industrialised large-scale society' to which Christie refers is in fact a capitalist 
society, which is structured by class conflict. Socio-economic contradiction is 
endemic to the capitalist mode of production, and every capitalist social formation 
is permanently rent by class struggle. 
Christie is, of course, not ignorant of this fact. Thus he readily 
acknowledges the existence of class conflicts in contemporary capitalist society,6 
and he alludes to 'the state's need for conflict reduction,.7 His claim of a dearth of 
internal conflicts in contemporary society must, to be valid, therefore be a 
reference to a different type of conflict. Class conflicts are generally 
comprehended at a fairly high level of abstraction, typically that of the social 
formation, or perhaps the mode of production. The conflict to which Christie 
refers must be located at a level of abstraction lower than that of the social 
formation or even the classes which comprise a social formation. It appears that 
when he laments the shortage of conflicts, he is in fact alluding to conflicts at the 
inter-personal level. It is the conflicts between 'directly involved parties'S which 
are scarce in modern society. And he attributes this scarcity to the operation of 
one main factor, namely, theft. According to him there are too few such conflicts 
in our society because they have been stolen, mainly by professional thieves but 
also by structural thieves. 9 
5 Christie (1977: 1). 
6 Ibid 5. 
7 Ibid 3-4. 
8 Ibid 5. 
9 Professional thieves are lawyers and other criminal justice professionals, such as treatment 
personnel. Structural thieves are attributes of the social structure. Both these types of 
thieves are discussed below. 
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Conflicts are capable of being stolen, Christie tells us, because they are a 
form of property. Every conflict begins its existence as the property of the parties 
who are directly involved in its creation. It belongs to them. But because our 
society is apprehensive of the destructive possibilities of conflict, we allow the 
parties to be dispossessed of their conflicts, that is, of their property. We want to 
see the conflict rendered harmless or transformed into non-conflict. Hence we 
allow in the professionals, to arrogate the conflict and resolve it. 
The notion that conflicts, including criminal conflicts, are forms of property 
is, needless to say, the centrepiece of Christie's argument. It is the conflict 
generated by the criminal conduct of the offender which, to Christie, is valuable 
as property. And it is this valuable property which is stolen from the affected 
parties by justice professionals. Hence his concern to return the stolen property to 
its rightful owners or, rather, to halt its theft, so that the owners are able to deal 
with it as they see fit. Conflicts as property is thus about the direct parties being 
given the opportunity to benefit from their proprietary rights to and interests in 
their conflicts. Christie elaborates: 
'Material compensation is not what I have in mind with the 
formulation "conflicts as property". It is the conflict itself that 
represents the most interesting property taken away, not the goods 
originally taken away from the victim, or given back to him. In our 
types of society, conflicts are more scarce than property. And they 
are immensely more valuable.' 10 
The theory of restorative justice depends crucially upon the idea that the criminal 
episode entails proprietary configurations and values which are fundamental to its 
resolution. 
10 Christie op cit 7, original emphasis. 
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Christie's proprietary thesis is remarkable and subversive. It is remarkable 
in its efforts to intrude the idea of property into the question of crime and 
punishment. It is subversive in its implications for the traditionally public 
character of the capitalist criminal justice system. It amounts to a frontal assault 
upon the legitimacy of that system. Christie is arguing, essentially, that the 
criminal justice system, supposedly designed to resolve and prevent crime, has 
itself been constructed on the basis of the crime of theft. In other words, the 
criminal justice system is a product of the crisis of criminality it purports to solve. 
It is implicated in the crisis. The answer to this crisis, according to Christie, is to 
put an end to the theft and to leave all criminal conflicts in the possession of their 
true owners, who, as owners, have the capacity to resolve them in a way which no 
surrogate can. 
He constructs an aboriginal state of ownership in relation to criminal 
conflicts. Offender and victim are co-owners of the crime in which they are 
involved. It is their natural property. They created it. It is valuable to them. But 
then the state and its agents intervene, to take it away from them or to defme it 
away from them. Their property is confiscated. 
'Criminal conflicts have either become other people's property-
primarily the property of lawyers - or it has been in other people's 
interests to define conflicts away.' II 
The original owners of the crime and its consequences are dispossessed. The 
conflicts are either appropriated (by lawyers) or transformed into non-conflicts (by 
treatment personnel). The point is that valuable property is either stolen or 
destroyed, and in both cases lost to its rightful owners. The result is an insoluble 
crisis of criminality, because the parties best equipped to solve it are ejected or 
sidelined as parties. 
11 Ibid 5, original emphasis. 
In addition to the professional thieves of criminal conflicts, Christie 
identifies a category of structural thieves. These are the 'changes in the basic 
social structure' which have promoted the dispossession of the owners of the 
conflictS.12 He posits that these social changes are expressed in two types of 
segmentation: 
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• Segmentation according to space: In modem society we relate to one 
another as 'roles, not as total persons'. We migrate from role to role, in 
one-dimensional relationships, isolated from our fellows. This kind of 
segmentation is exacerbated by the 'extreme degree of division of labour' 
characteristic of our societies. 
• Segmentation according to caste attributes: Modem societies are caste 
societies, in which people are segregated according to 'biological attributes 
such as sex, colour, physical handicaps or the number of winters that have 
passed since birth'. Of these biological attributes, age is the most important. 
Christie postulates that segmentation leads to three consequences in respect of 
criminal conflicts: 
• Social life is depersonalized, rendering us less able to cope with conflicts 
and encouraging us to give them away. 
• Certain conflicts are destroyed 'even before they get going'. This applies 
especially to crimes against people's honour, which are highly personal, but 
which have decreased significantly in contemporary societies. 
• Certain conflicts are rendered 'completely invisible'. This applies to crimes 
by the powerful against the weak, for example, wife- and child-abuse, and 
crimes by large organizations against individual victims. 
12 Ibid. 
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Social segmentation thus entails the theft of criminal conflicts, as they are 
disowned, destroyed or disguised under impact of the structural organization of 
modem society. 13 
Most commentators highlight the professional theft of criminal conflicts in 
Christie's argument. The structural theft of these conflicts, which he identifies 
and discusses in some detail, is seldom, if ever, even acknowledged. This is 
unfortunate, because the structural thieves are as integral to his argument as are 
the professional thieves. Unlike so many of his followers, Christie appreciates the 
fact that human action invariably takes place within a detenninate structural 
context. Structural theft is the milieu of professional theft. It is the structural 
theft of criminal conflicts which serves to locate his argument historically, in the 
socio-economic constitution of modem capitalist society. Commentators who 
ignore or belittle the question of structural theft do Christie an injustice, and can 
hardly claim to represent his position adequately. 
Much of what Christie canvasses in his analysis of structural theft may be 
subsumed under the Marxist concept of alienation. Marxism holds that capitalist 
social relations of production have the effect of robbing people of crucial 
components of their human potentialities. Hmnans are estranged from one 
another, from the products of their labour and from themselves. The imperatives 
of capitalist production and reproduction require that we be psychologically 
atomized, and that our relations with our fellow human beings be constructed 
according to our place in the division of labour, as detennined by the exigencies 
of the world of generalized commodity production. In practice, this entails that 
we live our lives at an emotional distance from our fellows, in a one-dimensional 
13 Christie discusses structural theft on pages 5 to 7. The quotations used in my summary are 
all taken from these pages. 
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universe, and that our social connections are denuded of human content. We are 
each of us reduced to an estranged abstraction of our potential selves. 14 
When Christie describes the social segmentation which underlies the 
structural theft of conflicts, he is in effect describing the alienated social relations 
of the capitalist mode of production. He is not a Marxist and does not rely upon 
the concept of a mode of production as an analytical tool. Also, he prefers to 
comprehend the modem capitalist social divisions in caste rather than class terms. 
But he consciously links the theft of criminal conflicts to the structure of 
contemporary society. He tells us that it is the (capitalist) social structure which is 
responsible, in part at least, for the theft of criminal conflicts. This is a crucial 
insight. For it implies a crucial question: can halting the theft of criminal 
conflicts and hence solving the crisis of criminality occur within the structural 
parameters of our society? We shall return to this issue later. 
For Christie, then, 'industrialised large-scale societies' are marked by the 
theft, professionally and structurally, of criminal conflicts. They are taken away 
or enticed away from the parties who own them and to whom they matter most. 
There is, in these societies: 
'a process whereby conflicts have been taken away from the parties 
directly involved and thereby have either disappeared or become 
other people's property.' 15 
Christie contrasts this modem western pathology to the way in which pre-modem, 
non-industrialized societies perceive and resolve their internal conflicts. He 
chooses Tanzania as an example, and proposes to 'approach our problem from the 
sunny hillside of the Arusha province' .16 He suggests that such societies are not 
plagued by the theft of criminal conflicts. They are structured in such a way as to 
14 See Oilman (1976: 131-135). 
15 Christie op cit 1. 
16 Ibid 2. 
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allow the immediate parties to participate directly in resolving all conflicts that 
arise. In other words, the segmentation which encourages the dispossession of the 
parties in modem societies does not exist in these societies. Also, there are no 
professionals to poach conflicts or to transform them into non-conflicts. All 
conflicts stay where they originated, to be resolved by the parties who matter, with 
help from their fellows as and when necessary. 
Christie offers us the Tanzanian example as proof of the existence of an 
alternative way of doing justice, which does not involve the arrogation of conflicts 
either by the state and its agents, or by the structure of society. He goes further. 
He sees in the Tanzanian case an argument for the abandonment of the concept of 
criminal justice as we know it, that is, as a statist system, in favour of a civil law 
approach to criminal conflict resolution. Thus he says: 
'J have not yet made any distinction between civil and criminal 
conflicts. But it was not by chance that the Tanzania case was a civil 
one. Full participation in your own conflict presupposes elements of 
civil law. The key element in a criminal proceeding is that the 
proceeding is converted from something between the concrete 
parties into a conflict between one of the parties and the state. So, in 
a modem criminal trial, two important things have happened. First, 
the parties are being represented. Secondly, the one party that is 
represented by the state, namely the victim, is so thoroughly 
represented that she or he for the most part of the proceedings is 
pushed completely out of the arena, reduced to the triggerer-off of 
the whole thing ... The victim loses the case to the state. ,17 
Here Christie is intimating that the solution to the crisis of criminality must 
involve a move away from the 'modem criminal trial'. The criminal justice 
system is structurally biased against the parties to a criminal conflict, especially 
the victim. He suggests that the interests of the parties would be served best if, 
instead of having to endure the indignities of the 'modem criminal trial', they 
were able to enlist the resources and norms of the civil law in the resolution of 
17 Ibid 3, original emphasis. 
their conflict. Such a system would have to be anti-statist, in the sense that the 
state would have no role or, at best, a minor role as agent and party. 
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F or Christie, criminal law as practised in the western industrialized world 
has 'reduced the victim to a nonentity and the offender to a thing' .18 He seeks a 
criminal justice which is structured in terms of agency for victims and offenders. 
To this end, he refers us to the pre-industrial legal culture of village Tanzania, as 
representative of a system of conflict resolution which takes seriously the cares 
and concerns of the immediate parties. In such a system, both victim and offender 
come into their own. They are at the centre of the process of conflict resolution. 
It is their process. Others are allowed to participate only as 'resource-persons' /9 
to facilitate the process, but never to commandeer it. 
The Tanzanian model, then, is the key to the resolution of the contemporary 
crisis of criminality which plagues capitalist society. However, Christie no doubt 
realized that the simplistic transposition of a model from one material 
environment to another was a recipe for failure, even disaster. Any transposition 
had to be grounded theoretically, and had to be justifiable in relation to the 
structure of the recipient society. He thus needed a concept which would make 
the adoption of the Tanzanian model comprehensible in the context of 
contemporary industrialized societies and which rendered it adaptable to their 
structures. It is this consideration, it is submitted, which underlies his 
construction of conflicts as property. The credo of property is the ruling 
orthodoxy of capitalist society. Its reach is extensive and colours virtually every 
transaction and relation of any significance. The ideology of property is the 
definirIg ideology of Christie's 'industrialised large-scale societies'. His 
18 Ibid 5. 
19 Ibid 12. 
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conception of crime in proprietary terms fits perfectly into this ideology, and 
provides the theoretical ratio which he required to endorse the Tanzanian model 
as alternative to the state-sponsored criminal justice system. Re-defining criminal 
conflicts as forms of property was his chosen way of modernizing the Tanzanian 
model, to meet the conditions of the contemporary world. 
Christie does not argue that the Tanzanians conceive of their conflicts as 
property. He does argue that the Tanzanian case constitutes a participatory 'happy 
happening' compared to the dull, tedious and peripheral nature of the 'non-
happening' that is the criminal trial in the western criminal justice system.20 In 
other words, he does not posit, expressly at any rate, any necessary historical 
connection between conflicts as property and courts as happenings. His 
construction of conflicts as property is bounded by the structural specificities of 
capitalism. It appears that Christie considers that in order to transform capitalist 
criminal justice into a happening, it is necessary to transform criminal conflicts 
into forms of property. 
In capitalist society participation is a scarcity?l The notion of criminal 
conflicts as property is, according to Christie, the key to resurrecting participation 
and reconstructing criminal justice as the 'happy happening' it ought to be. Thus 
he says: 
'In this perspective, it will be easily seen that conflicts represent a 
potential for activity, for participation. Modem criminal systems 
represent one of the many cases of lost opportunities for involving 
citizens in tasks that are of immediate importance to them.'22 
Conflicts constitute valuable property because they afford their owners the 
opportunity to become directly involved in their resolution. Ownership is the 
20 Ibid 2. 
21 Ibid 7. 
22 Ibid, original emphasis. 
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route to participation. The alienation which pervades daily life in the capitalist 
world can be overcome by giving all of us a stake in its proprietary regime. 
Christie is telling us that the solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality lies in 
ensuring that the owners of criminal conflicts are no longer dispossessed of their 
property. 
The causes of the routine sidelining of crime victims by the criminal justice 
system are to be found in their dispossession and the theft of their conflicts. 
'The victim is a particularly heavy loser in this situation. Not only 
has he suffered, lost materially or become hurt, physically or 
otherwise. And not only does the state take the compensation. But 
above all he has lost participation in his own case. It is the Crown 
that comes into the spotlight, not the victim. It is the Crown that 
describes the losses, not the victim ... Something that belonged to 
him has been taken away from that victim.,23 
Victims need to be reinstated as participants in the criminal justice system. But, 
according to Christie, the victim as owner is a precondition for the victim as 
agent. In other words, victims will return to the centre of the criminal justice 
process only if the conflicts into which they have been involuntarily drawn are 
treated as their property, to dispose of according to an arrangement which is 
negotiated by them, and not on their behalf by the state or its functionaries. 24 
The conquest of victimhood, according to Christie, requires that victims be 
guaranteed real proprietary rights in the conflicts which have rendered them 
victims. Ultimately, he wants to see the establishment of a system of 
neighbourhood courts which are victim-oriented. These would be courts: 
'where the victim's situation was considered, where every detail 
regarding what had happened - legally relevant or not - was brought 
to the court's attention. Particularly important here would be 
23 Ibid 7-8. 
24 Ibid 11. 
detailed consideration regarding what could be done for him, ftrst 
and foremost by the offender, secondly by the local neighbourhood, 
thirdly by the state. ,25 
All of this would be possible if the crime victim were transformed, via his 
ownership of his conflict, from an object to a subject of the criminal justice 
process. 
Christie submits that for offenders, also, the recognition of criminal 
conflicts as property entails opportunities to participate directly in efforts at 
resolution: 
'The offender gets a possibility to change his position from being a 
listener to a discussion - often a highly unintelligible one - of how 
much pain he ought to receive, into a participant in a discussion of 
how he could make it good again. The offender has lost the 
opportunity to explain himself to a person whose evaluation of him 
might have mattered. He has thereby also lost one of the most 
important possibilities for being forgiven. ,26 
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The latter problem disappears if the conflict is left in the possession of the 
immediate parties, as their property. The offender, as cause of the conflict, is 
thereby given a stake in its resolution. He is invited to possess it as his own so 
that he can make a material contribution to righting that which he has disturbed. 
As property owner, the offender is offered the chance to demonstrate the value of 
his proprietary rights in the conflict by applying them to the construction of a 
reparative response. The proprietary theory of criminal conflict is thus offered as 
the salvation of both the victim and offender. 
However, whereas the victim is presumed to be a willing owner, Christie 
accepts that the offender may well be a most reluctant one. He acknowledges that 
offenders: 
25 Ibid 10. 
26 Ibid 9. 
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'prefer distance from the victim, the neighbours, from listeners and maybe 
also from their own court case through the vocabulary and the behavioural 
science experts who might happen to be present. They are perfectly willing 
to give away their property right to the conflict. So the question is more: are 
we willing to let them give it away? Are we willing to give them this easy 
way out?,27 
Christie's answer is an unequivocal no. He believes that an offender does not 
have the right to give away, deny, abandon or abrogate his proprietary right in his 
conflict.28 It is his permanently and indissolubly. It is inalienable. The offender 
must be obliged to act as owner and to participate in the resolution of his conflict, 
'quite independently of his wishes,?9 He will be an active owner, whether he 
likes it or not. He has no choice in the matter. If needs be, he will be impressed 
into the making of a happening. 
Christie takes his argument beyond the crime victim and offender. He 
contends that the appropriation of criminal conflicts by the state entails a 
significant loss also for society as a whole. 
'But the big loser is us - to the extent that society is us. This loss is 
first and foremost a loss in opportunities for norm-clarification. It is 
a loss of pedagogical possibilities. It is a loss of opportunities for 
continuous discussion of what represents the law of the land. ,30 
Lawyers, Christie tells us, possess a 'trained incapacity in letting the parties 
decide what they think is relevant' .31 Legal professionals set limits to what 
matters legally in any criminal conflict. Invariably this is very different from or 
represents only a fraction of what matters to the parties who are directly involved 
in the conflict. Lawyers are trained in curtailing conflicts while the parties usually 
27 Ibid 9, original emphasis. 
28 Ibid, footnote 2. Christie derives his position from John Locke's postulate that one 
possesses a proprietary right in one's own life which cannot be alienated. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 8, original emphasis. 
31 Ibid, original emphasis. 
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wish to expand them in order to make sense of them. The criminal justice system 
thus forecloses debate which engages with and disapproves of lines of enquiry 
which probe the delimitation of its parameters. 
Christie objects to the closed nature of contemporary western legal systems, 
where parties are routinely gridlocked into legal norms which have little bearing 
on their real interests and which show little comprehension of their real concerns. 
Once more he refers us to a 'non-western' system which is not as normatively 
exclusionary and hence not as affectively impervious to the immediate parties as 
ours. He explains: 
'Maybe Barotse law ... is a better instrument of norm-clarification, 
allowing the conflicting parties to bring in the whole chain of old 
complaints and arguments each time. Maybe decisions on relevance 
and on the weight of what is found relevant ought to be taken away 
from legal scholars, the chief ideologists of crime control systems, 
and brought back for free decisions in the court-rooms. ,32 
He identifies a 'further general loss' . He suggests that the loss of 'possibilities for 
personalised encounters' between victim and offender reinforces the 
misconceptions which each has of the other.33 The answer is to keep the state and 
its agencies and functionaries away from criminal conflicts. We - civil society -
are, according to Christie, capable of dealing with criminal conflicts, treated as 
our property, without the interventionist assistance of the state or of criminal 
justice professionals. 
When all is said and done, Christie is petitioning for a criminal justice 
system that is radically different from that which we have in contemporary 
capitalist society. He is urging a system which is structured in terms of the 
concerns and expectations of the parties who are directly involved in the criminal 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 9. 
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episode, namely, the victim, the offender and the community or local 
neighbourhood. In addition to being victim-oriented, courts should also be lay-
oriented. Thus he says: 
'The ideal is clear; it ought to be a court of equals representing 
themselves. When they are able to find a solution between 
themselves, no judges are needed. When they are not, the judges 
ought also to be their equals. ,34 
This latter proposition necessarily entails the expulsion of the state and its 
functionaries from the larger part of the criminal justice process. Whenever 
professionals are involved, they should function only as resource persons. 'They 
might help to stage conflicts, not take them over. ,35 Christie considers that we 
have much to learn from the legal systems of pre-modem, non-industrialized 
countries, where justice is fully participatory for those directly involved in 
conflict. He is eager to see that the criminal justice systems of contemporary 
industrialized, that is, capitalist societies be reconstructed along such participatory 
lines. 
Such then is the Christie thesis. The solution to the capitalist crisis of 
criminality consists in a re-defInition of criminal conflicts as property in the 
context of a criminal justice system which is structured according to the 
participatory desiderata characteristic of agrarian communities which, if not pre-
capitalist, are located on the capitalist periphery. 
4.2 Critique of Christie 
Christie's theory is coherent. It is logically consistent and does not contain 
any glaring contradictions or disjunctive lacunae. The most predictable problem 
is the recalcitrant offender. Christie has pre-empted this potential obstacle by 
34 Ibid 11. 
35 Ibid 12. 
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postulating that the offender is umbilically attached to his proprietary rights in the 
conflict which he created, and has no right to dispose of them. It may be accepted 
that, on its own terrain, the Christie thesis is theoretically unassailable. The 
critique which follows is thus an external critique, in the sense that it does not 
seek to confront the internal ratiocination of the thesis.36 That would be a futile 
exercise. Rather, it engages the philosophical premises and political assumptions 
upon which Christie relies, in an attempt to show that his thesis is ultimately 
indefensible where it matters most: in practice. 
It has already been noted that Christie advocates a radical reconstruction of 
the criminal justice system and that such a reconstruction can occur only at the 
expense of the capitalist state, which is the prime protagonist in the current 
system. For the direct parties to be empowered the state must needs be 
disempowered. However, the capitalist state is the pre-eminent institution of the 
political organization and social cohesion of the bourgeoisie. Its proposed 
eviction from the criminal justice system cannot be summary. Such a campaign 
has to be justified, in terms which either affum the social relations of production 
for which the capitalist state stands as guarantor or which anticipate the 
transcendence of these relations. 
Christie opts for the former road. He never takes issue with the legitimacy 
of the capitalist mode of production or its structural attributes. He accepts as 
uncontroversial the existence and persistence of capitalist social relations of 
production. For him, one may say, capitalism is a given. It is a constant. When 
he postulates the transformation of criminal conflicts into property he means 
capitalist property. He is concerned only to question the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system within the parameters of the capitalist system. He knows, 
36 The analysis of the theoretical offerings of Braithwaite & Pettit and Cragg undertaken later 
in the chapter will also proceed as external critiques. 
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as everyone does, that the state-centred criminal justice system has lost the bulk of 
whatever legitimacy it may once have enjoyed. He proposes to rekindle that 
legitimacy by shifting its locus from the state to property, from the public to the 
private. 
At this point we need to examine more closely exactly what Christie means 
when he classifies criminal conflicts as property. Nowhere does he provide a 
definition of property. Sometimes he appears to understand property as private 
property. Thus he talks about the victim being dispossessed of 'something that 
belonged to him,;37 and of offenders giving away 'their property right to the 
conflict' .38 At other times, however, he expressly rejects the idea of conflicts as 
private property: 
'One of the major ideas behind the formulation 'Conflicts as 
Property' is that it is neighbourhood-property. It is not private. It 
belongs to the system. ,39 
It seems, then, that Christie subscribes to a hybrid notion of conflicts as property. 
The nature of the conflict as property is dependent upon the relevant owner. 
Christie identifies three co-owners of the criminal conflict: the victim, the 
offender and the neighbourhood. A criminal conflict, it appears, is private insofar 
as it belongs to the victim and offender. It is not private insofar as it is 
neighbourhood property, belonging to the system of neighbourhood courts which 
Christie sees as a necessary aspect of the solution to the crime question. 
37 Christie op cit 8. 
38 Ibid 9. 
39 Ibid 12. See also Christie (ibid 11), where he speaks of conflicts as 'property that oUght to 
be shared'. Crawford (2002: 104-105) relies upon this aspect of Christie's notion of 
property to contend that 'a careful reading' of Christie shows that 'he is not advocating a 
privatization of disputes' and that 'the state retains a vital role balancing the interests of the 
different parties'. However, my analysis which follows shows that, despite reading him 
carefully, Crawford has also misread Christie. It would appear that Crawford's 
interpretation has much more to do with his own support of partial restorative justice than 
with what Christie actually says. 
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On the face of it, the notion that a criminal conflict, as property, is 
simultaneously private and not private appears contradictory, even illogical. The 
conventional notion of property in the capitalist world is that it is private and that 
its private nature entails the exclusion of all non-owners from asserting 
proprietary rights over it, or deriving advantage from it without the consent of the 
owner. Christie's property postulate certainly does not accord with conventional 
wisdom. But, then, it is not supposed to. He is grounding his argument in a type 
of property which is non-standard in the capitalist context, namely, common 
property. When Christie declares both that a criminal conflict is not private 
property and that it is the property of victim and offender, he is, it is submitted, 
referring to a species of capitalist property which is located outside the classically 
private. He is thereby broadening the ambit of the capitalist property regime 
beyond its traditional parameters to include common property. But, importantly, 
it is a common property to the benefits of which individuals have enforceable 
claims. In other words, and in concurrence with the individualist catechism of the 
bourgeois world, it is a common property demarcated in tenns of individual 
rights. For Christie, then, a criminal conflict is a fonn of common capitalist 
property in which all directly involved parties enjoy individual rights. 
There is, in this regard, a concordance between Christie's position and the 
work of MacPherson who, at the time, was making similar submissions about 
capitalist property in genera1.40 MacPherson argues that private property, as 'an 
exclusive, alienable, "absolute" individual or corporate right in things,41 was 
typical only of the early, developing stage of capitalism. Mature capitalism does 
not need an exclusively private concept of property as a right to things, and since 
the middle of the 20th century: 
40 Christie does not acknowledge expressly any debt to MacPherson. This is not surprising, 
since Conflicts as Property is a lecture in which one does not normally expect detailed 
references and acknowledgements. However, MacPherson's Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism is included in Christie's list of sources and is referred to in one of the only 
three footnotes appended to the lecture. 
41 MacPherson (1973: 127). 
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'property is again being seen [as in the pre-capitalist epoch] as a right to a 
revenue or an income rather than as rights in specific material things' .42 
MacPherson forecasts that the notion of capitalist property will be broadened 
further to include, ultimately, the 'right to a kind of society or set of power 
relations which will enable the individual to live a fully human life' .43 
The crux of MacPherson's argument is twofold: firstly, that capitalist 
property is not to be conceived solely as rights in material things; and secondly, 
that capitalist property is not to be equated exclusively with private property. 
Capitalism is capable of accommodating a notion of property that goes beyond 
rights in material things. These include the right to a job, the right of access to the 
means of labour, the right to a share of political power, and the right to the means 
of a fully human life. Capitalism is also able to incorporate property that is not 
exclusively private. Common property, which entails rights not to be excluded 
from its use or benefit, is the typical example here.44 MacPherson thus seeks to 
expand the idea of capitalist property and thereby to transcend the limitations of 
form traditionally associated with it. However, although he champions a wide 
concept of capitalist property he is insistent upon one thing, namely, that capitalist 
property is ultimately about rights vested not in groups or collectivities but in 
individuals. This is true also and even of common property, which he defmes 
expressly as an individual right not to be excluded from the use or benefit of said 
property.45 In the fmal analysis, for MacPherson, capitalist property, whatever its 
form, is 'a valuable individual right' .46 
42 Ibid 13l. 
43 Ibid 136. 
44 Ibid 134. 
45 Ibid 124. 
46 Ibid 137. 
232 
Christie, it is submitted, replicates the essentialia of the MacPherson thesis 
in his construction of criminal conflicts as property. Thus, his argument that 
conflicts are a species of property is clearly based upon the idea that property does 
not consist merely of rights in material things. Also, his proposition that conflicts 
are common property is derived from the notion that modem capitalism does not 
require an exclusively private property regime. What is more, Christie's apparent 
vacillation between conflicts as private property and neighbourhood property is an 
expression of the view that, under capitalism, common property too is an 
individual right. There is an unmistakeable and intimate affInity between the 
MacPherson and Christie theses. The latter is essentially an extension and 
application of the former to criminal conflicts. Both see in capitalist property the 
key to the solution of the specific problems they are addressing. 
This last point requires elucidation. MacPherson addresses the problem of 
democracy. He argues for an extensive concept of capitalist property because he 
perceives it as the road to real democracy, where property is the basis of the 
'broader claims' to a set of social relations47 which will 'enable individuals 
equally to use and develop their human capacities' .48 Indeed, he considers that the 
quest for a properly free and fully human life must, in the conditions of 
contemporary capitalism, necessarily be informed by the spirit of property. He 
explains: 
'1 am suggesting that the broader claims will not be firmly anchored 
unless they are seen as property. For, in the liberal ethos which 
prevails in our liberal-democratic societies, property has more 
prestige than has almost anything else. And if the claims are not 
brought under the head of property, the narrow idea of property will 
be used, with all the prestige of property, to combat them. ,49 
47 Ibid 138. 
48 Ibid 122. 
49 Ibid 138. 
MacPherson appreciates fully the complete dominance of property in the 
ideological life of every capitalist social formation. He considers its 
authority to be so comprehensive and absolute that the only feasible way 
of obtaining satisfaction of the broader claims of real democracy is to 
construe these claims in proprietary terms. Any other strategy will 
invariably founder before the omnipresent might and resistance of 
capitalist property. For MacPherson, capitalist property in its extended 
aspect is the only road to true democracy. Property will permit no other 
way. 
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Christie's approach to criminal justice reproduces the fundamentals of 
MacPherson's position. He seeks a criminal justice system that is properly human, 
that is, dedicated and responsive to the needs and expectations of the people who 
matter. He considers that the key to his search is property. If criminal conflicts 
are treated as property they will become amenable to solutions which address the 
affected people as human agents. For him, too, capitalist property in its extended 
aspect is the road to restorative justice. 
Christie never professes that the 'broader claim' of restorative justice must 
necessarily be made in proprietary terms. But he does make an unequivocal 
theoretical choice in this regard. And he does so because, like MacPherson, he 
understands the almost religious attachment which the bourgeoisie has to the 
institution of property. A popUlist property credo is the ideal justification for his 
programme. 
As intimated earlier, Christie's solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality 
hinges upon the ousting of the state from its command position over the criminal 
justice process. However, in the context of the structure of the capitalist mode of 
production, this is a radical step. Christie's construction of criminal conflicts as 
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property is, in this connection, an inspired piece of theorizing. The nature of 
capitalist production requires a property regime which is not overly encumbered 
by statist constraints. Hence, while capitalist property is sacrosanct, the rights of 
the owner to transact with his property as he sees fit are largely immune from state 
intervention or control. The owner enjoys more or less absolute dominion. 50 It is 
this freedom of property, as an attribute of ownership, which is central to 
Christie's thesis. For it implies that the owners of a criminal conflict are legally 
entitled, qua owners, to dispose of it as they see fit, without reference to or 
without the oversight of the state. 
Christie is proposing a theory of criminal justice which is a logical 
extrapolation of MacPherson's theory of property in the epoch of late capitalism. 
It entails a radical rejection of the formal statist criminal justice system which has 
hitherto been emblematic of capitalism. If a criminal conflict is a form of 
common capitalist property, then the state has no legitimate interest in its 
resolution. The disposition of a criminal conflict is then within the competence of 
its joint owners, all of whom enjoy it as an individual right. The Christie road 
thus leads to the privatization of criminal justice, in which the state has no or, at 
best, a minor role as party. Christie believes that property brings justice. He sees 
in the construction of the criminal conflict as property the key to satisfying the 
claims of the direct parties to a responsive criminal justice system. He considers 
this route to justice important enough to impose upon unwilling offenders. In the 
Christie scheme of things, our transformation into property owners and our 
participation in the new dispensation will be an enforced one, if necessary. 
50 See MacPherson ibid 126: 'Modem private property is indeed subject to certain limits on 
the uses to which one can put it: the law commonly forbids using one's land or buildings to 
create a nuisance, using one's goods to endanger lives, and so on. But the modem right, in 
comparison with the feudal right which preceded it, may be called an absolute right in two 
senses: it is a right to dispose of, or alienate, as well as to use; and it is a right which is not 
conditional on the owners performance of any social function.' 
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From a Marxist perspective, the Christie postulate is a sophisticated attempt 
to devise a solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality in terms which proceed 
from an acceptance of capitalist social relations of production as licit and 
legitimate. It is, in other words, an exercise in capitalist reconstruction, 
considered necessary to deal with a problem which has overrun the extant 
regulatory arrangements. In this regard, Christie's thesis, albeit unambiguously 
radical, is also eminently and unassailably petite bourgeois in character and 
aspiration. He is committed to the central ideal of petite bourgeois political 
philosophy, namely, a society of property owners. 
For the petite bourgeois, property is both his gateway to the bourgeois world 
and his bulwark against the threat of proletarianization. Christie raises this 
middle-class neurosis to the level of a theory. He would replace the state with that 
which the state exists to warrant. He would substitute the central juridical feature 
of capitalism for its central political feature in the constitution of the criminal 
justice system. While reducing the sway of the latter he would extend 
significantly that of the former, to include criminal conflicts. Christie is offering a 
solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality which, to be sure, spurns all 
conventional assumptions about the composition of the criminal justice system 
but which, as surely, embraces all the conventional assumptions about the 
composition of the social system. He is the petite bourgeois radical par 
excellence. His thesis is bold and sweeping but completely compatible with the 
bourgeois view of the world and the material conditions which sustain it. 
MacPherson tells us that 'all roads lead to property' .51 He forgets to add 
that all property leads to the commodity, that elemental cell of capitalist 
production. In the capitalist mode of production, property relations are the 
juridical form taken by commodity relations. To widen the ambit of capitalist 
51 Ibid 121. 
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property is to widen the sphere of influence of the commodity. Thus, when 
MacPherson construes democracy and Christie justice in terms of property, they 
are each performing an act of commodification. MacPherson is commodifying 
political relations and Christie legal relations. The process of commodification is 
an exercise in internal colonization, which widens and deepens the proprietary 
content and culture of the capitalist mode of production at every step. 
When MacPherson and Christie present capitalist property as a catholicon in 
their respective theories, they are both objectively advancing the cause of 
capitalism and its bourgeoisie. Both display an unnecessary obeisance to the 
ubiquity and perceived omnipotence of property. It is true that each of them 
expresses some form of dissatisfaction with the limitations encoded in the idea of 
private property. But both of them are concerned to liberate capitalist property 
from these limitations, to broaden its reach beyond the exclusively private, and 
thereby to ratify the kingdom of property. However, there is no logical link, not 
even in formal logical terms, between the supreme prestige enjoyed by property in 
the capitalist world and according property the supreme status of theoretical 
panacea. Such a link can be made only on the assumption, which would be an 
ontological choice, that capitalism and its worldview are, if not desirable, then 
certainly not impugnable. 
There is, as argued in Chapter Two, a quite remarkable coincidence between 
Christie's notion of tonflicts as property and the precepts of popular capitalism. 
His thesis is, essentially, popular capitalismjuridified. He would have us all 
transformed into property owners, at least of our conflicts. Each of us would be 
given a proprietary interest in a new criminal justice system. In the same way as 
the ideologues of popular capitalism promise that capitalism can be a people's 
mode of production, so Christie promises that criminal justice can be a people's 
mode of justice. The solution to the capitalist economic crisis, according to the 
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popular capitalists, is to invite all of us to participate in the magic of the free 
market. The solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality, according to Christie, 
is to offer all of us title in a popUlist property regime of criminal conflicts. 
It appears that Christie perceives that the remedial attributes of capitalist 
property go beyond the problem of crime and may in fact rank as a crucial factor 
in solving the problem of capitalist alienation. 52 As is evident from his discussion 
of the structural theft of criminal conflicts, Christie is fully cognizant of the 
alienated and alienating nature of capitalist social relations of production. 
Following MacPherson's faith in the liberating and humanizing potentialities of 
capitalist property, he suggests that his own proprietary theory of conflict may 
contain the ingredients for vanquishing alienation. He posits that 'much of our 
trouble stems from killed neighbourhoods or killed local communities', and 
informs us that the transformation of criminal conflicts into neighbourhood-
property: 
'is intended as a vitaliser for neighbourhoods. The more fainting the 
neighbourhood is, the more we need neighbourhood courts as one of 
the functions any social system needs for not dying through lack of 
challenge. ,53 
For Christie, then, property as conflicts not only holds the key to solving the 
capitalist crisis of criminality but also constitutes a way out of the structural 
sources of capitalist alienation. This is a large claim. Of course, it sidesteps the 
larger prior question: why are our communities and local neighbourhoods 
'killed'? The answer is painfully obvious: they are the victims of the exploitation, 
oppression and alienation inscribed in the social relations of production of the 
capitalist mode of production. Yet Christie would rely upon an expanded notion 
of capitalist property, the juridical heart and ideological soul of the capitalist 
52 Here Christie appears to concur with MacPherson's idea of property as the ultimate right to 
a fully human life. 
53 Christie op cit 12. 
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mode of production, as their salvation. He proffers his conceptual transformation 
as the begetter of a social transformation. 
Marxism considers that capitalism does not and cannot possess those 
resources which are required to solve its own structural crises, and that it has long 
ago become necessary to dismantle capitalism as a mode of production to prevent 
it from eventually plunging all humanity into social anarchy and cultural 
barbarism. Christie demurs. Despite his concerns about the inequities which it 
has produced, he continues to believe that capitalism can offer equal opportunities 
to all. Despite his attack upon the role of the capitalist state in the criminal justice 
system, he continues to believe that the capitalist system is able to provide a 
justice which is properly responsive to human needs and concerns. Despite his 
radicality, he shares the bourgeois worldview and continues to believe that 
capitalism is able to solve its own crises. In the end, Christie remains a true 
believer in the reformability of capitalism. 
Needless to say, Marxism condemns such an attachment to the notion of a 
good capitalism on both political and philosophical grounds. However, perhaps 
the major objection to the Christie thesis is its utopianism. He asks us to accept a 
conceptual transformation in the nature of criminal conflicts as the well-spring of 
a New Jerusalem of criminal justice. He wants us to ignore the fact that 
capitalism is class-riven, and to consent to becoming proprietors of criminal 
conflicts. He appears to believe that the superior rationality, the benevolent 
morality and the logical solidity of his position are sufficient to convince that his 
vision should be implemented. 
Christie avoids engagement with the class character of (and the class 
struggle which defmes) our society and chooses instead to conceive of everybody 
as equals, at least in relation to the ownership of criminal conflicts. It is, 
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according to him, via the re-definition of conflicts as property that the transition to 
a responsive and reparative criminal justice system will be achieved. However, it 
is a basic Marxist postulate that all social change is rooted, ultimately, in the 
material conditions of class struggle. Every capitalist transformation of 
significance is sponsored by one of the major contending social classes, the 
proletariat or the bourgeoisie, in the sense that the class pledges its social power to 
the cause of that transformation. Christie takes a supra-class position. He appeals 
to all of us for the implementation of his thesis. A reliance upon the class power 
of the proletariat would necessarily have entailed an acceptance of the subversion 
and ultimate transcendence of the bourgeois worldview. That is not part of the 
Christie thesis. However, in the capitalist context, a general appeal which seeks 
to avoid class distinctions invariably becomes an appeal to the good sense of the 
ruling class. That is what the Christie thesis reduces to. He is offering capital a 
way out of a crisis which has plagued it for a considerable time now. He hopes 
that the bourgeoisie has the moral sensibility and political maturity to appreciate 
its rationality, recognize its sagacity, and implement it. 
Unfortunately, Christie reckons without the class sensibilities of the 
bourgeoisie. As a ruling class, the bourgeoisie is concerned with notions of 
rationality and morality only insofar as they operate to protect and promote its 
class interests. A planned economy designed to meet the needs of all its citizens 
has long been urged, often by non-Marxists, as the most rational and moral way to 
organize a social formation. The bourgeoisie has consistently ignored or poured 
scorn upon the idea for the simple reason that it is not in concert with its 
fundamental interests as a class, which interests require a private economy. The 
Christie thesis is in more or less the same position as the idea of a planned 
economy: it is unimplementable within the parameters of the capitalist mode of 
production. And because it is unimplementable, it is utopian. 
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The bourgeoisie does not care for schemes which make inroads into its 
power and prerogatives, as Christie's would. It has no patience for plans which 
would have it relinquish one of its most significant power bases in the hope of not 
losing society further 'opportunities for norm-clarification'. The bourgeoisie 
supports and promotes popular capitalism because it offers a method of 
implicating all classes directly in the affirmation of capitalist social relations of 
production and in the defence of the valorization of capital. It will not do the 
same for restorative justice because it has little interest in creating 'pedagogical 
possibilities'. As the ruling class, it is concerned to prescribe norms for the 
dominated classes rather than to engage them in a process of 'norm-clarification'. 
Christie makes the cardinal mistake of assuming that what is good for 
capital in the economic sphere is automatically good for it in other spheres as 
well. It has never been part of the agenda of the capitalist class to transform 
everybody into property owners. That has been the dream of the middle classes. 
The bourgeoisie is the capitalist proprietor and knows that the middle-class dream 
is a pipe-dream. Popular capitalism is really about increasing the property 
holdings of the bourgeoisie, not about making capitalist property accessible to the 
other classes. Privatization is really about extending bourgeois ownership of the 
means of production, not about sharing such ownership with the proletariat or the 
petite bourgeoisie. Christie believes, idealistically, that he can convince the 
bourgeoisie to take seriously the petite bourgeois project and create a society of 
property owners in relation to criminal conflicts. He supposes, hopefully, that the 
bourgeoisie will consent to the privatization the criminal justice system as easily 
and enthusiastically as it has consented to the privatization of the economy. He 
presumes, optimistically, that the bourgeoisie can transcend its class limitations 
and agree to make its justice as popular as it has sought to make capitalism itself. 
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Today, more than a quarter of a century after he fust pronounced them, 
MacPherson's high hopes for capitalist property as the fundament of a revitalized 
and properly human democracy have come to nought. The bourgeoisie was 
simply not interested. The extended concept of property has been largely still-
born, as capital has clung to the 'narrow' idea that property is private property. It 
is too early to declare Christie's thesis dead, since it enjoys much support amongst 
the proponents of restorative justice. However, the bourgeoisie and its state have 
shown little enthusiasm for it, even though it purports to hold the solution to the 
crisis of criminality. And it is highly unlikely that Christie's proposal to tum all 
criminal conflicts into forms of property will go beyond the theoretically 
inventive. 
Property is a social relation for the appropriation of material values. 
Invariably, the property relation is expressed and lived juridically, as proprietary 
rights in the object of appropriation. 54 The bourgeoisie understands property in 
terms of entitlements to appropriate value: its ownership of the means of 
production confers upon it the legal right to appropriate the surplus-value 
produced by the proletariat. Privatization of state assets is a means of increasing 
such rights of appropriation. Commodification of relations traditionally outside 
the commodity circuit is a means of extending property as appropriation. 
However, the transformation of criminal conflicts into property has nothing to do 
with the appropriation of value. This is the basic reason why the bourgeoisie will 
not implement Christie's proposal, given that it also entails the expulsion of its 
state. Christie misunderstands what property means for capital. It enjoys so much 
prestige because it is the key to capital accumulation, not because it is a cure-all 
for social problems. Christie wants capitalist property to be what it is not or, 
54 See Suvorova & Romanov (1986: 35). 
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rather, what capital will not have it be. That, in the end, is the practical undoing 
of his theory. 55 
4.3 Braithwaite & Pettit: Not Just Deserts 
John Braithwaite has long been acknowledged as one of the premier 
contemporary theorists of restorative justice. The fundamental ingredients of his 
theory are contained in Not Just Deserts, a book written with Philip Pettit, and 
published in 1990. Since then Braithwaite has promoted and popularized the 
tenets of restorative justice in a spate of journal articles and other writings. 
Indeed, his output of advocacy literature is prolific. However, none of these later 
offerings has been properly theoretical, at least not in the way that Not Just 
Deserts is. I therefore take this book as representative of Braithwaite's theoretical 
position, and hence as the subject of my assessment. 
Not Just Deserts is subtitled A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice. It is 
an apt choice, for it encapsulates precisely what Braithwaite & Pettit have 
constructed. Firstly, like Conflicts as Property, Not Just Deserts is a theoretical 
work, and refreshingly so. As noted earlier, we live in an intellectual milieu 
which is dominated by a 'post-Marxist' antipathy to so-called grand theory and to 
the supposed vacuous posturings of theoretical discourse.56 It is inspiriting to 
55 As a theory of comprehensive restorative justice (which it intends to be), Christie's is thus a 
practical non-starter. However, it is arguable that all partial restorative justice programmes 
amount to the partial implementation of Christie's thesis. In other words, it is possible to 
comprehend the conflicts which are resolved by these programmes in proprietary terms. 
Since they are mostly minor conflicts, they may be seen as forms of personal property 
which are not pivotal to the capitalist property regime, and thus may be readily removed to 
the jurisdiction of restorative justice. I am indebted to my supervisor, Professor Dirk van 
Zyl Smit, for this insight. 
56 The anti-theory position was first elaborated in the areas of social and literary analysis. It 
has since emerged also in the criminological literature. See, for example, Von Hirsch & 
Ashworth (1992: 98 and 1993: 27-28) who include in their critique of Not Just Deserts the 
quite astonishing allegation that it is too comprehensive theoretically! 
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encounter a work in this climate which is overtly theoretical, and, according to the 
authors, comprehensively theoretical to boot. 57 Secondly, the theory espoused by 
Braithwaite & Pettit is a republican one. Republicanism is fIrst and foremost a 
political philosophy, rooted in pre-Enlightenment morality and distinct from both 
liberalism and communitarianism.58 In Not Just Deserts, the authors seek to 
develop a theory of criminal justice based four square upon the fust principles of 
republicanism. Thirdly, the theory which Braithwaite & Pettit advance is not a 
theory of punishment. It is a general theory of criminal justice. The 
establishment of this difference is important, for as the authors note, they thereby 
'open up for analysis the presumption that punishment is the pre-eminent way of 
dealing with crime' .59 
Braithwaite & Pettit have to be commended for their efforts to comprehend 
the criminal justice system and to agitate for its transformation in terms of a 
coherent theoretical perspective. Their perspective is by no means representative 
of the restorative justice movement. While Braithwaite's writings are frequently 
cited as authority for restorationist propositions, few of his colleagues pay more 
than incidental attention to the theoretical perspective informing his work. Even 
fewer would commit to the politics of republicanism. The importance of Not Just 
Deserts is thus not to be found in any populist appeal. Rather, it deserves serious 
analysis because it tackles the one issue which the advocates and practitioners of 
restorative justice have generally avoided, namely, a theoretical justifIcation for 
their claims. 
A large part of Not Just Deserts constitutes a sustained negative critique of 
the fundamental postulates of retributionism and its emphasis upon the desert 
57 See Braithwaite & Pettit (1990: 12-24). 
58 Pettit (1994) contains a short but useful exposition of the relationship of republicanism to 
liberalism and communitarianism by one of the authors of Not Just Deserts. 
59 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 1. 
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principle in punishment. From the beginning Braithwaite & Pettit are at pains to 
distance themselves from the retributionist resurgence which took root in 
criminology from the 1970s. They perceive a direct connection between 
retribution and political reaction.6o The last two chapters of the book are devoted 
to demonstrating that retributionism is inferior to republicanism, both in theory 
and in practice. They are strident in their stance against retributionism and for 
consequentialism.61 I shall not defend retributionism. That is best left to the 
retributionists themselves. Von Hirsch and Ashworth, the doyens of modem 
retributionism, have taken up the challenge issued by Braithwaite & Pettit, and 
have advanced a coherent and oftentimes potent counter-critique of Not Just 
Deserts.62 My purpose at this point is not to intervene in the retributionist-
republican debate. Rather, it is to evaluate the republican theory of criminal 
justice as a theory of restorative justice. 
The theory of criminal justice proposed by Braithwaite & Pettit is founded 
upon a single and omnipotent concept, which they name dominion. The single 
and omnipresent aim of their ideal criminal justice system is to maximize 
dominion. They introduce their notion of dominion in the following terms: 
'Dominion is freedom, holistically conceived: not the liberal 
conception of freedom as the condition of the atomistic individual, 
but a republican conception of freedom as the freedom of the city, 
freedom in a social world. Dominion is constituted by the 
enjoyment of certain rights and by the infrastructure of capacity and 
power which this involves. Crucially, it has a subjective element: to 
enjoy dominion you must know that you enjoy all that it otherwise 
involves (the rights, etc) and this indeed must be a matter of 
common knowledge. Dominion is nothing less than the republican 
conception of full citizenship. ,63 
60 Ibid 2. 
61 They devote chapter 3 (pages 24 to 40) to an argument explaining why a theory of criminal 
justice should be consequentialist (as opposed to deontological). 
62 See Von Hirsch & Ashworth (1992 and 1993). 
63 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 9. 
This general description of dominion makes clear a number of its 
characteristics: it is a republican concept, not a liberal one; it is an 
essentially social concept, not an asocial one; it is about enjoying franchise 
in the company of one's fellows, not about enjoying individual freedom as 
a solitary condition; and it requires a citizenry conscious of the entailments 
and entitlements of franchise. Dominion, then, is a kind of grundnorm of 
a republican theory of criminal justice. The leitmotif of the criminal 
justice system should be the protection and promotion of dominion. The 
goal is full dominion. 
Braithwaite & Pettit provide the following comprehensive three-part 
definition of full dominion: 
'A person enjoys full dominion, we say, if and only if: 
1. she enjoys no less prospect of liberty than is available to other 
citizens. 
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2. it is common knowledge among citizens that this condition obtains, so 
that she and nearly everyone else knows that she enjoys the prospect 
mentioned, she and nearly everyone else knows that the others 
generally know this too, and so on. 
3. she enjoys no less a prospect ofliberty than the best that is compatible 
with the same prospect for all citizens.,64 . 
Dominion expresses the republican ideal of citizenship or franchise. Whereas 
liberalism is founded upon liberty, republicanism turns upon dominion. 
Dominion is the republican version of the idea of negative liberty, which is the 
core value ofliberalism. It is about enjoying libertas, in the ancient Roman sense 
of the term, where: 
'the bearer of dominion has control in a certain area, being free from 
the interference of others, but has that control in virtue of the 
recognition of others and the protection of the law' .65 
64. Ibid 64-65. 
65. Ibid 60. 
In other words, republican freedom or liberty is coincident with the 
attributes of citizenship. Essentially, Braithwaite & Pettit comprehend the 
concept of dominion as a resurrection of the Roman equation of libertas 
with civitas. 
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They identify three desiderata which, they say, 'every consequentialist 
theory of criminal justice, in particular every consequentialist target, ought to 
exemplify' .66 Any candidate target of such a theory should be uncontroversial, 
stabilizing and satiable. They tell us that a target is uncontroversial if it 'can be 
fairly naturally assigned the role of directing the criminal justice system' in the 
relevant communities. They specify 'the Western-style democracies of the 
modern world' as their relevant communities.67 A target is stabilizing ifit is able 
to 'generate a stable allocation of the rights which are uncontroversial,.68 A target 
is not stabilizing, that is, it accommodates an unstable allocation of rights if 'it 
fails to provide the criminal justice authorities with reason to take the rights 
seriously, attaching moral as well as legal force to them' .69 Finally, a target is 
satiable if it motivates 'respect for uncontroversiallimits on the powers associated 
with the criminal justice system' and if it does 'not make voracious demands on 
the system, demands which put the limits at risk' .70 
According to Braithwaite & Pettit the pursuit of full dominion is a 
legitimate target for the criminal justice system because it satisfies all three 
identified desiderata. They believe that, in 'Western-style democracies', 
dominion is an uncontroversial target of the criminal justice system. They appear 
to think that there can be no serious objection to a strategy aimed at minimizing 
66 Ibid 42. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid 42-43 . 
69 Ibid 44. 
70 Ibid 45 . 
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the invasion of dominion which crime entails.71 They contend also that the 
pursuit of dominion is a stabilizing target in that it is the kind of target which 
encourages agents of the criminal justice system to take seriously the rights 
allocated to people by that system. Dominion motivates criminal justice 
personnel to internalize respect for these rights and to assign them a deliberative 
significance in the decision-making process.72 The promotion of dominion is also 
a satiable target for criminal justice: it supports the observation of determinate 
limits upon the scope of acceptable criminal justice practice. It does not make 
voracious demands which promote the breach of such limits. It rejects excesses, 
and upholds the principle of parsimony in punishment. 73 
Dominion, then, according to Braithwaite & Pettit, is a concept which 
encompasses all the desiderata of republican criminal justice, and hence is 
theoretically defensible as the target for the criminal justice systems of' Western-
style democracies'. They posit, further, that the pursuit of full dominion as the 
target of the criminal justice system entails 'three ordered tasks', corresponding to 
the elements of the definition. These are: 
• creating the maximum possible equality in liberty-prospects (equality); 
• ensuring the maximum possible common knowledge of such liberty-
prospects (assurance); 
• maximizing the available liberty-prospects for all (liberty).74 
These three ordered tasks constitute the implementation agenda of full dominion 
as the goal of the criminal justice system. The promotion of dominion requires 
the maximization of levels of equality, assurance and liberty, in that order. 
Presumably, full dominion will be attained with the successful implementation of 
the third ordered task. 
71 Ibid 69-71. 
72 Ibid 71-78. 
73 Ibid 78-80. 
74 Ibid 68. 
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For Braithwaite & Pettit, the promotion of dominion requires the 
establishment of republican institutions via which the target will be pursued. 
They identify these desired institutions as formative ones, that is, institutions 
'designed to affect people in such a way that they behave as if they were primarily 
concerned with the public benefit, not with their own particular interests' .75 In 
addition, such formative institutions must not be coercive but socializing. In other 
words, they should be institutions which base public-benefit directed behaviour 
not upon legal penalties but upon the construction of 'virtuous habits of 
deliberation,.76 The socializing formative institution promotes such habits: 
'by bringing home to people the admirable character of such deliberation, 
creating in them an appropriate sense of right and wrong; and by ensuring 
that if agents deliberate and act in a non-virtuous way, there is a good 
chance that they will be exposed before their peers and subjected to public 
disapproval. ' 77 
Republican criminal justice requires the socializing formative institution. It is the 
institution which 'affords the best protection for citizens against crime,78 and 
which guarantees the right to a fair tria1.79 It is the institution necessary for 
creating the 'system of mutual assurance of non-interference' on which dominion 
is founded. 80 
Braithwaite & Pettit then turn to the question of interpreting their republican 
theory of criminal justice. They identify four presumptions of republican criminal 
justice, namely, parsimony, checking of power, reprobation and reintegration. 
They explain that: 
75 Ibid 8l. 




80 Ibid 83. 
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'These presumptions serve as middle-range principles for interpreting the 
abstract goal endorsed by republicans: the promotion of dominion. ,81 
The presumption in favour of parsimony prescribes' less rather than more 
criminal justice activity' .82 The presumption in favour of the checking of power 
requires that citizens be protected from official arbitrariness by the existence of 
mechanisms which provide assurance to them that they will receive fair and equal 
treatment under the law.83. The presumption in favour of reprobation requires that 
the criminal justice system be so structured as to visit upon offenders the moral 
disapproval of the community.84 The idea is that we will not commit crimes 
because we are ashamed of doing so. Our sense of shame is fostered by the 
socializing fonnative institution which inculcates in us, in relation to choosing 
criminality, 'the deliberative habits of virtuous citizens' .85 Reprobation, then, is 
the republican alternative to the traditional penalties. It attacks criminality not by 
coercion but by mobilizing social disapproval. 
The [mal presumption, in favour of reintegration, requires that the criminal 
justice system make provision for community reintegration 'for those citizens who 
have had their dominion invaded by crime or punishment,.86 Crime undermines 
dominion, for both victims and offenders. Hence, according to this presumption, 
'the restoration of victims and ex-offenders to the enjoyment offull dominion 
must be a priority' .87 However, the reintegration of the victim is more important 








'The victim's dominion can be restored in a number of ways but the 
most effective is likely to be when the relevant community acts 
symbolically and tangibly to assure the victim that she is not a 








Symbolically, this is done by condemning the crime and the criminal 
- reprobation. Tangibly it is done by restitution or compensation for 
the victim. ,88 
Although secondary to the victim, the reintegration of offenders is also a 
prominent concern of republican criminal justice. By offending, they too have 
suffered a loss of dominion. They need to be shamed for what they have done. 
However, republicanism also considers that they need to be restored as 
functioning members of the community, who possess their own dominion and 
respect that of others. 
250 
Of the four presumptions, the fIrst one, in favour of parsimony is, according 
to Braithwaite & Pettit, 'the master presumption' .89 It is the one presumption 
which applies to the full range of criminal justice issues.9o However, it is also the 
one presumption which is not specifIcally republican in character. Its 'minimalist 
quality' is compatible with both liberalism and libertarianism. The presumptions 
in favour of checking power, reprobation and reintegration are the ones which 
bring a 'republican stamp' to criminal justice: 
'They mean that the criminal justice system favoured by republicans 
will place restraints on, and require accountability of, those who 
have power within the system; that the system will respond to 
convicted offenders in a way that brings home to them the 
community's disapproval rather than having blind recourse to the 
instruments of punishment; and fInally that the system will seek to 
restore to the enjoyment of full dominion those who have been 
deprived of it by crime or punishment. ,91 
88 Ibid 93. 
89 Ibid 87. 
90 Braithwaite & Pettit (ibid 12-15) identify the following ten issues as the main issues of 
criminal justice: behaviours to be criminalized; sentences to be permitted or enjoined; 
allocation of resources to and within the system; kind and intensity of permitted 
surveillance; cases to be targeted for investigation; cases to be selected for prosecution; 
making of pre-trial decisions; adjudication procedures; sentences to be imposed on the 
guilty; and administration of sentences. 
91 Ibid 203-204. 
These latter three presumptions thus exemplify the motif of the republican 
theory of criminal justice. 
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However, it is the presumption in favour of parsimony which governs the 
implementation of the republican theory.92 The principle of parsimony is a 
presumption against increasing criminal justice activity. According to Braithwaite 
& Pettit, the implementation of the republican theory requires that there should be 
less, not more criminal justice intervention in our interrelations. Republican 
criminal justice should operate according to a strategy of decrementalism. This is 
a strategy based upon incremental reductions in punishments and all other aspects 
of the criminal justice project. There should be a progressive narrowing of the 
criminal justice net until such time as there is palpable evidence that the crime 
rate has increased, at which point the strategy should be re-assessed. They 
elaborate the argument thus: 
'When the fIrst evidence is produced which justifIes the belief that 
the accumulation of criminal justice cuts has lifted crime rates, 
further cutting should be stopped. There should not be a rush into 
reinflating the criminaljustice system, but a freezing at that point to 
allow time for more rigorous empirical work to be done and public 
debate to occur. Then, guided by that research and public 
discussion, a decision should be made on whether increments or 
further decrements are called for. ,93 
Such is the strategy of decrementalism. It is a strategy designed to protect and 
promote aggregate dominion. It is practically possible, according to Braithwaite 
& Pettit, to narrow incrementally the net of criminal justice intervention for a 
considerable period without producing an increase in crime rates. The effect of 
the strategy can be monitored, and when the critical point is reached where 
decrementalism does cause a rise in crime, the strategy can be halted easily and 
reconsidered. Until that point is reached, decrementalism enhances dominion. 
92 Ibid 137. 
93 Ibid 142. 
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Despite catering for it, Braithwaite & Pettit believe that the critical point at 
which decrementalism results in more crime will never in fact be reached. They 
explain: 
'We believe this because the entrenched interests in maintaining 
wide nets of state control are so strong that a struggle for 
decremental refonn would never succeed in cutting the system to 
anywhere near the point where the dominion loss of victims from 
crime was sufficiently strong to outweigh the certain loss of 
dominion to citizens constrained in various ways by the net of state 
control. ,94 
The threat to dominion from the state will thus always be greater than the 
threat from crime. The strategy of decrementalism is therefore a strategy 
of reformism. It is the practice of republican criminal justice. 
Republicanism establishes the theoretical guidelines for 'the Rea/politik of 
exploiting opportunities for incremental refonn' .95 Decrementalism is the 
preferred strategy of implementing the republican project to promote 
dominion. 
It remains to note that there is, in the republicanism of Not Just Deserts, no 
patent espousal of restorative justice. The authors never proclaim allegiance to 
the restorative justice movement. However, nobody can seriously dispute that 
their theory is indeed restorationist, and unmistakeably so. Certainly, 
Braithwaite's work since Not Just Deserts has focused upon defending and 
promoting the precepts of restorative justice. And he has subsequently equated 
republican justice expressly with restorative justice.96 The republican theory of 
criminal justice is thus simultaneously a restorative theory of criminal justice. 
94 Ibid 143. 
95 Ibid 154. 
96 See Braithwaite & Parker (1999) and Braithwaite & Pettit (2000). See also Walgrave 
(2000). 
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This identity is confIrmed by the four presumptions which Braithwaite & 
Pettit establish for their theory of criminal justice. The presumption in favour of 
parsimony, actualized in the strategy of decrementalism, coincides with the anti-
statist posture of restorative justice. The progressive reduction of criminal justice 
activity entails reduction of state involvement in and, ultimately, its ejection from 
the criminal justice system. So does the presumption in favour of checking 
power. It implies a challenge to the conventional notion that criminal justice is 
necessarily state justice. The fIrst two republican presumptions thus portend a 
system in which the state is not the dominant party that it currently is. The 
presumption in favour of reprobation mirrors the restorationist commitment to a 
non-punitive regime and to proper community participation in crime control. 
Reprobation is the restorative sanction republicanized. The presumption in favour 
of reintegration expresses a fundamental premise of restorative justice. It is about 
victim empowerment, offender reconstruction and community participation. 
The republican institutions which Braithwaite & Pettit recommend would be 
conduits to operationalize the fraternal relations and collaborative interfacings of 
the restorative process. In true restorationist tradition, they are inveterate enemies 
of modem retributionism, and seek a solution to the contemporary problem of 
crime in the criminal justice practices of the ancients. Finally, their restorationism 
emerges most powerfully in their attitude towards state punishment. In this 
connection they declare that: 
'Most human action which fits criminal categories is best dealt with 
by refraining from invoking a punitive response. This is not to say 
that we think assaults, for example, should never be punished. It is 
to say that we need a theory of criminal justice which allows us to 
respond in the best way to harmful conduct, where responding in 
that way sometimes will, and more often will not, entail 
punishment. ,97 
97 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 2. 
Although guarded in the best academic tradition, this statement amounts to 
an unequivocal commitment to a non-punitive society. Their very next 
sentence is definitive in this regard: 
'Our aspiration, then, is for a theory of criminal justice that does not 
impel us to think about harmful conduct in terms of crime and 
punishment. ,98 
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There is thus a complete general coincidence between restorative justice and 
republicanism on the question of punishment. Both want an end of it. At the start 
of their book Braithwaite & Pettit questioned whether punishment was the most 
effective response to crime. By the end one is left with no doubt that it is not, and 
that the non-punitive regime of restorative justice is the republican way of doing 
justice. 
Not Just Deserts is as much a restorationist tract as it is a republican one. 
Braithwaite & Pettit are theorizing restorative justice. Their central concept of 
dominion and their target of full dominion articulate fully the restorationist 
ambition to mend the harm to victims, offenders and communities caused by 
criminal behaviour. The pursuit, protection and promotion of dominion are the 
republican route to restorative justice. In a word, then, Braithwaite & Pettit offer 
republicanism as the theoretical foundation and rationale of restorative justice. 
4.4 Critique of Braithwaite & Pettit 
At the start of this assessment I welcomed the fact that Braithwaite & Pettit 
had produced an overtly theoretical work in an atmosphere which was heavy with 
an anti-theory disposition. However, approval of such theoretical engagement 
must not be conflated with approval of their theory. There is much to object to, 
from a Marxist perspective, in Not Just Deserts. Despite their declared devotion 
98 Ibid. 
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to a republicanism which has pre-capitalist origins, in the end Braithwaite & Pettit 
do little more than construct a theoretical accommodation with capitalism. 
The crucial flaw in Not Just Deserts is its failure to engage the issue of the 
socio-economic conditions in which a republican theory of criminal justice would 
have to be actualized. I am not suggesting that Braithwaite & Pettit are blind to 
the inequities which mark so many aspects of existence in each and every 
capitalist social formation. In Chapter Nine of Not Just Deserts they show 
themselves to be accomplished political sociologists. They present an extended 
and perceptive analysis of the problem of white-collar crime, and demonstrate a 
quite profound appreciation of the class character of and the power relations 
embedded in this form of criminality. They conclude with the penetrating insight 
that a policy of equal punishment in fact increases 'class-based inequality in 
punishment' .99 However, these considerations do not feature as theoretical 
considerations for Braithwaite & Pettit. They remain conceptually peripheral, an 
aspect of the authors' assault upon retributionism. Material conditions are not 
accorded any epistemological credence and hence do not inform the theory which 
is constructed. In the result, Braithwaite & Pettit take a position of complete 
subservience to the political culture of capitalism and their repUblicanism emerges 
as one grafted onto the existing capital-labour relation. 
Theirs is a capitalist republicanism. They take it for granted that the extant 
mode of production is the only possible one. Even though they turned to ancient 
Rome for their theoretical inspiration, they appear to believe that history has now 
ended and that the bourgeois world is the only possible world. Not Just Deserts 
was written at a time when the absurdities of Fukuyaman endism100 reigned 
supreme as the oracle of philosophical engagement in 'the Western-style 
99 Ibid 199. 
100 See Fukuyama (1992). 
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democracies of the modem world'. Braithwaite & Pettit appear to have been 
infected with the same, almost millennial belief in the final victory of the political 
constitution of these 'Western-style democracies of the modem world' over all-
comers, especially the recently defeated Stalinist regimes of eastern Europe. As 
professed republicans, they may not share Fukuyama's faith in liberal democracy. 
But they, too, appear to believe that humankind has reached the terminus of its 
History. 
Thus, in explaining why white-collar criminals are treated more leniently 
than their blue-collar counterparts they tell us that there are so many of these 
upper-class criminals that any attempt to prosecute 'even the tiniest proportions of 
them would bankrupt the wealthiest governments in the world'; and that white-
collar crime is so complex that investigators are 'led to drop the case in 
exasperation, and return to the less frustrating work of punishing small_fry . .lOI 
Number and complexity are supplemented by the inexorabilities of class power: 
'While there are important differences of degree, there is almost a 
sociological inevitability that ruling-class constituencies will 
mobilize their political and economic power so that enforcement 
directed against them will be more muted than that which the police 
deliver against the working class. ,102 
Earlier they had declared, in similar vein, that it is 'a sociological inevitability that 
most of those in our prisons will have blue collars or black faces'. 103 These last 
two statements amount to a submission that the social relations of production of 
the capitalist mode of production are themselves' a sociological inevitability'. 
Braithwaite & Pettit are in effect asserting that the capital-labour relation is 
ineluctable and hence that the bourgeois social organization and all its 
accoutrements are inescapable. There is no other way but the capitalist way. 
101 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 190. 
102 Ibid 191. 
103 Ibid 183-184. 
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There is thus a discernible positivist epistemological tenor to the republican 
theory which they advocate. 104 They accept the existence and reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production as if it were a natural phenomenon. 105 They reifY 
capitalist social relations of production and endow them with an existence and 
power beyond the reach of human beings. 106 Political activity is reduced to the 
stratagems of a realpolitik which accords an apriority to extant social organization 
and makes short shrift of its historicity. They genuflect before the supposedly 
inescapable actuality of bourgeois class rule and give no credence to the role of 
social and political practice in both the formation and the destruction of class 
society. For them, the nature of society is pre-determined, according to rules 
which do not rely upon or require human intervention. Such intervention is 
limited to taking what opportunities do or may arise to promote the republican 
ideal of dominion. 
Their condonation of the structure of capitalist exploitation and oppression 
is expressed in their argument that it is acceptable that white-collar criminals 
receive mercy. They believe that it is in the interests of society as a whole that we 
do not attempt to prosecute each and every such criminal. Thus they state: 
'The hard fact of life is that white-collar offenders often have some 
things of real value to offer the community in exchange for legal 
immunity. It is a sad reality of power that cannot be wished away by 
pious sloganeering about justice. The most regular occurrence of 
this sort occurs with fmancial institutions deserving of criminal 
prosecution, where regulators are reluctant to prosecute for fear of 
causing a run on the institution, ruining small investors who are slow 
to get their money out.' 107 
They conclude by pronouncing that: 
104 See Hughes (1990: 16-23) for a useful discussion of the meaning and elements of 
positivism. See also Kolakowski (1972: 9-19). 
105 See Wilson (1983: 8). 
106 See Fay (1975: 58-9). 
107 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 194. 
258 
'the reality of enforcing the law against business violations which are vast in 
number, complex in nature, and formidably defended, is that there is no 
society, and never will be a society, that can allow the dispensation of 
deserved punishments to be the principle which guides efforts to secure 
business compliance with the law.' 108 
The remarkable thing about these statements, besides the resolute repetition of the 
sociological inexorability of capitalist culture, is the resolute exclusion of the 
working class and its contribution to the production of social wealth. Braithwaite 
& Pettit do not comprehend the first principle of political economy, namely, that it 
is the labour-power of the proletariat that is the real source of 'real value' in the 
capitalist mode of production. It is the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie, that 
creates value. It is the unpaid labour of the workers that is expropriated by the 
capitalists as surplus-value. When Braithwaite & Pettit plead the case of white-
collar criminals because they 'often have some things of real value to offer the 
community' they display a disconcerting ignorance of the nature of the capital-
labour relation and hence of the true role of each of its components in the 
reproduction of that relation. 
If any class of criminals should be entitled to legal immunity it is the blue-
collar criminals, for it is they who have so much 'real value to offer the 
community'. It is an aspect of the class mythology of capital that the bourgeoisie 
is the productive class: it is portrayed as the class which invests in the economy, 
generates employment for workers, and is responsible for the creation of wealth. 
This same mythology would have us believe that white-collar criminals have 'real 
value to offer the community'. Certainly, Braithwaite & Pettit set great store by 
the 'value' of the members of the upper-classes. They are, according to these 
authors, such valuable social assets that they deserve to be treated with leniency 
when they break the law. Here Braithwaite & Pettit concur fully with capital's 
108 Ibid 196. 
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claim that its sectional interest coincide with the general social interest. Such is 
the power of bourgeois ideology. 
In Marxist tenns, the dominant classes are parasitic upon the value produced 
by the proletariat. White-collar criminality is an expression of the material 
realities of the capital-labour relation. The dominant classes have nothing to offer 
the community other than an enthusiastic, and oftentimes violent, commitment to 
the reproduction of that relation. The legal immunity which Braithwaite & Pettit 
believe white-collar criminals deserve is an immunity which they are able to 
arrogate for themselves by virtue of their class power and their concomitant 
access to state power. The popular belief that the rich and powerful are above the 
law has its origin in the 'hard fact of life' that they constitute the class which 
controls the state and whose interests the state exists to guarantee. Immunity or 
leniency for white-collar criminals is 'a sociological inevitability' within the 
parameters of a society structured by the capital-labour relation. The notion that 
'there is no society, and never will be a society' able to deal with white-collar 
criminality by 'the dispensation of deserved punishments' is valid only if 'society' 
is qualified by the epithet 'capitalist'. It is capitalist society that is unable and 
unwilling to confront and condemn white-collar criminality in the way it does 
blue-collar criminality. 
There is a world of difference between explaining why white-collar 
criminals are treated leniently and proposing that they should be treated leniently. 
The fonner deals with what is, the latter with what ought to be. Braithwaite & 
Pettit resort to the idea of sociological inevitability to explain the impunity of 
white-collar criminality. They then proceed to argue that such impunity is 
deserved, on the basis of the social 'value' of upper-class criminals. This is a leap 
which defies even the laws of fonnallogic. It is a non sequitur, a sort of 
syllogistic fallacy. They seek to make a virtue of the accomplished fact. They tell 
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us, in effect, that because they do get mercy, therefore most white-collar criminals 
ought to get mercy. They offer the same mercy to blue-collar criminals as a 
means of reducing class-based inequality in punishment. 109 
This is a quite astonishing position. It is premised upon an acceptance of 
the perceived permanence of what is. It denies development and change. It takes 
the existing social relations of production as the only possible array of such 
relations. History, they seem to be saying, reached its destination with the rise 
and triUmph of the capitalist system. Capitalism is the end of the line. It is an 
inescapable reality, to which theory must adapt. Theory must stay within the 
bounds of bourgeois possibility. Braithwaite & Pettit evince an almost fawning 
obeisance to the hard realities of class oppression and exploitation. Whereas 
Christie ascribed a transformative role to his theory of criminal justice, 
Braithwaite & Pettit espouse a realpolitik of acquiescence in and accommodation 
to the facticity of capitalist relations. The very concept of decrementalism, which 
constitutes the strategic pivot of their project, entails a denial and rejection of the 
possibility of a post-capitalist world. 
Braithwaite & Pettit's rapprochement with capitalism and their assent to the 
naturalness of its culture, including its culture of white-collar criminality, is 
extremely problematic for the republicanism which they advocate. Their 
philosophical positivism and political endism coalesce in a major, arguably fatal, 
methodological error: they theorize republican ideals from capitalist postulates. 
Capitalism is intrinsically and definitionally anti-republican (despite the fact that 
very many capitalist social formations are formally republics). In this regard, it 
needs to be recalled that republicanism is not merely a pre-liberal political 
philosophy; it is also a pre-capitalist political philosophy. It derives from a 
109 Ibid 200. 
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historical era which precedes the rise of individualism as the defining 
characteristic of capitalist political culture. And it is infused with a sociality 
which runs counter to the fundamental atomist tenets of the bourgeois worldview. 
There is a very good reason why republicanism is not the bourgeois political 
philosophy of choice, and that is because it is organized around a concept of the 
social being which is anathema to the needs and demands of the capitalist mode of 
production. Capitalism is inherently anti-republican because republicanism is 
genetically pre-capitalist and constitutionally anti-capitalist. 
It is liberalism which is the representative political philosophy of capitalism. 
Liberal ideas suffuse capitalist culture and morality. The 'Western-style 
democracies of the modem world' which Braithwaite & Pettit identifY as their 
target communities are communities which have been constructed upon the 
principles and values of liberalism. 110 There is, as Braithwaite & Pettit 
themselves make abundantly clear, a fundamental discordance between liberalism 
and republicanism regarding the constitution of the person and her relationship to 
the body politic. I II This discordance summates in what they refer to as 'the 
asocial-social distinction, .112 Liberalism occupies the first element of the 
distinction, republicanism the second. They have only one point of overlap: in the 
concept of negative liberty or freedom. Otherwise, they are philosophical and 
theoretical contraries, which envision societies which are radically divergent in 
the nature of their social relations. 
The capitalist social formations which constitute the 'Western-style 
democracies' are liberal (of late, neoliberal) democracies. Their state structures 
110 Ramsay (1997) contains a readable presentation and critique of the main tenets of 
liberalism. 
111 See Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 54-61 for a discussion of the elementary ontological and 
epistemological differences between liberalism and republicanism. 
112 Ibid 56. 
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have been erected upon liberal fundamentals. They have embraced the core tenets 
of liberalism as the governing principles of their social matrices. The atomistic 
individual enjoys ontological primacy and constitutes the elemental cell of 
sociological analysis. Social relations are theorized and lived as individual 
relations, in which conceptions of solidarity and collective citizenship have no 
natural or necessary role. There is a fit between capitalism and liberalism which 
is rooted in the deep structure of the mode of production and its superstructural 
concomitants. This collaboration is, for the most part, exclusive. There is no 
room for interlopers, except when a capitalist crisis demands a non-liberal 
solution. 113 Republicanism is such an interloper. Its emphasis upon social 
personhood and virtuous citizenship does not accord with the exigencies of 
capitalist social relations of production. 
The liberal bias of capitalism entails an anti-republicanism. The recent shift 
to neoliberalism in the 'Western-style democracies' has exacerbated the 
antagonism. In its pursuit of economic growth via the global market, 
neoliberalism is more staunchly anti-social than classical liberalism. Politically, it 
represents a move to the right, expressed in fiscal austerity, privatization 
programmes and the dismantling of the welfare state. We are told, day in and day 
out, to make our way and our fortunes as unencumbered and enterprising 
individuals in the globalized arena of the free market. If liberalism is intrinsically 
anti-republican, neoliberalism multiplies the antithesis manifold. There is, in a 
word, no room in the political firmament of contemporary capitalism for 
republicanism. The sociality and solidarity which defme the latter hold and can 
hold no attraction for the neoliberal champions of the former. 
113 Within the parameters of capitalism, such a solution routinely is expressed in political terms 
as a lurch to the right, towards neoliberalism, authoritarianism and sometimes as far as 
fascism. 
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Braithwaite & Pettit do not comprehend this very basic reality and its 
implications for their theory of criminal justice. They do not appreciate that their 
commitment to the continued existence of the 'Western-style democracies' must 
needs undermine definitively the opportunities for their republican strategy to take 
root. It is true that they foresee nothing more than incremental reform towards a 
republican system of criminal justice. However, even this modest programme, as 
they themselves concede, has but a slim chance of success within the parameters 
of the capitalist system. The current criminal justice system is a product of the 
liberalism which is the philosophical font of the bourgeois worldview. The 
police, courts, prisons and other criminal justice agencies as we know them are 
the products of a liberal conception of criminality and victimhood. That 
conception insists that both the perpetrator and the victim of crime are fust and 
foremost autonomous individuals. The former has gone beyond the permissible 
bounds of individual autonomy; the latter has suffered a corresponding invasion 
of his autonomy. 
Liberal capitalist criminal justice is centrally concerned with punishing the 
offender who has violated the credo of individualist autonomy. The victim has 
only of late been accorded a measure of attention, after being sidelined for 
decades. The reasons for this development have been discussed in Chapter Two. 
However, the emergence ofvictimology has not signalled any major shift in the 
focus of the criminal justice system. It remains dedicated to disciplining 
offenders, for it is they who, by their excesses, threaten the stability of the liberal 
concord. The preferred agent of punishment remains the state. And the preferred 
method of punishment remains imprisonment or the threat thereof. This 
configuration of liberal criminal justice is derived from capitalism's formal 
commitment to equality in all exchange relationships, including the exchange 
between offender and victim. 1 14 
114 See Chapter Five below. 
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Republican criminal justice, as theorized by Braithwaite & Pettit, is 
dedicated to the promotion of dominion or, more accurately, the protection of 
dominion from invasion by criminal justice agencies. Dominion is essentially a 
social concept and is intended to be a social condition. It is achieved in concert, 
by a society whose members have been socialized into a deliberative posture 
towards their own and others' freedom. As intimated earlier, republican dominion 
shares with liberal autonomy only the idea of negative liberty. They are antitheses 
in all other respects. This means that, in a bourgeois world structured by a 
juridical outlook which is liberal, there is no latitude for and there can be no 
indulgence of a jurisprudence which is properly repUblican. The domination of 
liberal autonomy entails the expulsion of republican dominion. 
In this connection, Braithwaite & Pettit's claim that the pursuit of dominion 
as a target of the criminal justice system is uncontroversial, stabilizing and 
satiable calls for comment. In a liberal context, any strategy which undermines 
the core value of individual autonomy is decidedly controversial. The promotion 
of dominion is predicated upon a social notion of personhood, and hence cannot, 
as they would have it, 'be fairly naturally assigned the role of directing the 
criminal justice system' in a capitalist social formation predicated upon the liberal 
worldview. The discrete elements of dominion may not appear to be especially 
controversial. But as a concept it embodies, for the most part, the converse of the 
liberal idea of freedom. It is hard to see how the bourgeoisie can or will accede to 
dominion replacing autonomy, albeit gradually, as the primary target of its 
regulatory project. It is thus not a foregone conclusion that the promotion of 
dominion is an uncontroversial target for the criminal justice system. 
Much the same applies to the claim that the promotion of dominion is a 
stabilizing target. It will be recalled that Braithwaite & Pettit hold that a target is 
stabilizing if it motivates criminal justice agents to internalize a commitment to 
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taking people's rights seriously. In practice this means that criminal justice 
authorities do not arbitrarily trample on people's criminal justice rights. In other 
words, the target of dominion is circumscribed by legal restraints to protect the 
citizen from unfair and illegal state action. According to Braithwaite & Pettit, 
taking the promotion of dominion seriously must necessarily mean taking the 
protection of rights seriously. I IS That is an attractive proposition. But it is also 
problematic. For it implies that the stabilizing quality of dominion as a target is 
dependent upon the commitment of criminal justice personnel. In other words, 
there is nothing intrinsic in the composition of dominion which makes it a 
stabilizing target. It all depends on the co-operation of the police, prosecutors, 
judges, prison officials and the like. Essentially, the stabilizing nature of 
dominion requires that criminal justice agents all be convinced republicans. 
This is unrealistic and idealistic. We live in a world dominated by the 
liberal perspective and its neoliberal transmutation. However, few analysts would 
claim seriously that our criminal justice authorities are all, or even in the main, 
committed liberals. There is an objective reason for this. Criminal justice 
personnel are agents of the state. They function on the borderline of the violence 
which is the legal monopoly of the state. Often, at least some of them invoke or 
have to invoke their right to deploy the force which they may have at their 
disposal. A milieu of violence is not conducive to the growth of the rights-
respecting aspect of dominion. Those who accept and subscribe to the liberal 
outlook do so despite the structural pressures towards reaction. Republicanism is 
politically to the left of liberalism, if only in its focus upon the social conditions 
of existence. It is, in this regard, difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is but 
little scope for republicanism to become the chosen political philosophy of 
criminal justice agents. There is thus little chance of the promotion of dominion 
even becoming their target, let alone being a stabilizing one. 
115 See Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 73 & 76. 
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The final target identified by Braithwaite & Pettit is satiability. They claim 
that the promotion of dominion is a satiable target for the criminal justice system, 
in the sense that it does not encroach upon the limits of a rights-based criminal 
justice practice. Here, again, the nature of the state is important. The capitalist 
state is the final guarantor of the existence of the capitalist mode of production, 
and violence is its ultimate means of performing this function. The capitalist state 
is a totalizing institution of coercion. As a pivotal facet of the state, the criminal 
justice system is always immanently insatiable. It may be possible to set a 
satiable target for the criminal justice system. However, the system itself cannot 
tolerate such a target, except in a contingent sense. It is structurally voracious and 
will threaten always to violate the limits of any satiable target. The nature of the 
political under capitalism thus gives the lie to the possibility that republican 
dominion can be a satiable target for the criminal justice system. Capitalist 
criminal justice is insatiable in principle and cannot accommodate a satiable 
target. It therefore cannot accommodate dominion. 
It remains to cast a critical eye upon the concept of dominion itself. Here 
my argument is that dominion, as defined by Braithwaite & Pettit, entails a 
proprietary postulate, not unlike Christie's proprietary notion of criminal conflicts. 
Braithwaite & Pettit do not themselves make any express connection between 
their theory and Christie's. It is submitted, however, that such a connection does 
exist, theoretically at least. It is plausible to conceive of dominion as a form of 
property in the same way as Christie has done for conflicts. Etymologically, 
dominion is derived from the Latin dominium, which translates variously as 
'power' or 'ownership' or 'lordship' and as 'property' or 'absolute property'. 
Needless to say, etymological commonality is no guarantee of conceptual 
commonality. However, it is remarkable that Braithwaite & Pettit should have 
chosen to give their central concept a name which is, notionally at least, property 
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based. It is submitted that this terminological choice is not entirely coincidental. 
The proprietary lineage is to be detected in the nature of dominion itself. 
According to Braithwaite & Pettit dominion is very different from (and 
much more than) the right to negative liberty or non-interference. Thus, they state 
that: 
'Dominion, freedom in the republican sense, requires more than the bare 
fact of exemption from interference by others; more than the liberal notion 
of freedom. Although it starts from a negative rather than a positive 
definition of freedom, it requires equal liberty-prospects with others and the 
knowledge shared with others of having those prospects; it has a social and 
a sUbjective side.' 116 
I want to suggest that the difference between negative liberty and dominion is of a 
proprietary sort. The concept of dominion which Braithwaite & Pettit describe 
resonates with a sense of ownership: having dominion entails a consciousness of 
having a valuable entitlement, which gives one standing and protection. i17 It is a 
prized asset bringing to its holder the assurance that he enjoys a demarcated 
domain of inviolability. In this connection there is a patent coincidence between 
dominion and capitalist property. Both engender or are supposed to engender 
feelings of security and safety against the intrusions of a prehensile state. Like 
proprietary rights, dominion is, in principle at least, 'valid against the whole 
world' .118 It is not contingent. It is, like property, a comprehensive relation 
which structures one's social interactions and political access. X has dominion in 
the same sense as she owns property: she has a valid expectation that her fellow 
citizens will respect her entitlement; and that it will be legally enforceable in the 
case of interference. 
116 Ibid 203. 
117 Ibid 64. 
118 Olivier et af (1992: 23-24). See also Schoeman (1983: 38). Van der Merwe (1987: 37, 
original emphasis) says that: 'The fact that A is the owner of a house implies that all other 
persons should respect his rights with regard to his house. ' 
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Christie would have us transformed into a society of property owners. 
Braithwaite & Pettit would have us transformed into a society of dominion 
holders. There is a discernible analogue between Christie's proprietary conflicts 
. and Braithwaite & Pettit's republican dominion. They themselves note a 
correspondence between 'the invisible hand of the market institution', to which 
republicans have no principled objection, and 'the intangible hand of formative 
institutions' , about which republicans are positively enthusiastic. 119 The 
formative institution is, according to Braithwaite & Pettit, the type of institution 
required for the promotion of dominion or freedom of the city. It is notorious that 
the market institution is the emblematic expression of the freedom of property. 
Both market and formative institutions are, for Braithwaite & Pettit, vehicles of 
freedom. The modes of freedom are, respectively, property and dominion. It is 
suggested that the latter may legitimately be comprehended as a species of the 
former. 
It will be recalled that Christie's construction of conflicts as property relied 
upon an unconventional form of capitalist property, namely, common property. It 
is submitted that dominion, too, may be understood as a category of common 
capitalist property. It is a form which emerges from the formative institutions 
envisaged by Braithwaite & Pettit. Whereas market institutions promote private 
self-interest, formative institutions support public mindedness and the common 
weal. 120 Dominion is the common property associated with the socializing 
formative institution. It is a social relation which is shared by all but to which 
each has rights of enjoyment, security and protection, as an individual. 
119 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 82. 
120 Ibid 81. 
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Needless to say, Braithwaite & Pettit have not embraced expressly 
MacPherson's expanded notion of capitalist property. However, the 
republicanism which they espouse is a capitalist republicanism. It proceeds from 
the capitalist mode of production as a given. What is, therefore, being suggested 
is that their theoretical pivot, dominion, is imbued with the spirit of property, the 
ideological premise of capitalism. The republican freedom which Braithwaite & 
Pettit propose can be reconciled without too much difficulty to the wide concept 
of property as the right to a fully human set of social relations. Freedom of the 
city is, in the capitalist context, consonant with the MacPhersonian notion of 
proprietary rights as the foundation of real democracy. Dominion is property 
republicanized. It is the citizen's key to and guarantee of a virtuous life. It is the 
road to membership of the true republic. 
The above argument may appear speculative and controversial. It is, 
however, defensible in terms of Braithwaite & Pettit's elaboration of dominion, 
and its maximization, as the prime target of republican criminal justice. In this 
regard, they tell us that: 
'dominion is the social status you perfectly enjoy when you have no 
less prospect of liberty than anyone else in your society and when it 
is common knowledge that this is so.' 121 
Their classification of dominion as a social status is important. It is not a right or 
a benefit or a reward. It is more than that: it is a social status. That is, it is a 
complex of class, cultural and other relations which defmes one's quality of life 
and life chances. In the capitalist world there is one relation which is 
indispensable to the proper comprehension and fundamental to the scientific 
analysis of any social status, and it is the property relation. Bourgeois morality 
prescribes that everything we are or can be is dependent, in the fmal analysis, 
121 Ibid 85 . 
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upon our proprietary endowments. We each of us take our place in the bourgeois 
scheme of things first and foremost as men or women of property. It is in this 
connection that dominion, as a social status in the capitalist world, has to be 
theorized in proprietary terms. 
Macpherson was right about one thing: that in every capitalist social 
formation 'property has more prestige than almost anything else' .122 Christie's 
theorization of conflicts as property evinces a clear appreciation of this 
ideological fact. Braithwaite & Pettit's republicanism also takes cognizance of 
this fact, if somewhat obliquely. Their analysis of and approach to white-collar 
crime are based squarely, albeit not expressly, upon the superior social weight 
accorded those who own and control that most valuable of all capitalist property, 
the means of production. Their attempt to construct a rapprochement between 
white-collar crime and the pursuit of dominion is a reliable index that they, like 
MacPherson and Christie, appreciate the power wielded by property in the 
ideological constitution of the capitalist mode of production. 
The etymology of Braithwaite & Pettit's central concept is thus important 
and, it is contended, not accidental. They turned to republican Rome in their 
search for a virtuous citizenship. They brought back not only libertas and civitas, 
but also dominium. The republican Roman idea of citizenship was one intimately 
connected with property. Slaves were not citizens; they were a species of property 
themselves. Plebeians were citizens; but they were, for the most part, not or 
meagrely propertied and their citizenship was thereby reduced to a second-class 
one. It was only the propertied patricians for whom civitas was properly 
coterminous with libertas. Political power in republican Rome belonged to the 
landowning nobility. 123 Property was the route to the republican franchise as 
122 MacPherson op cit 138. 
123 See Chapter Two above. 
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understood by Braithwaite & Pettit. Republican Roman history is littered with the 
struggles of plebeians and the revolts of slaves against the social and political 
dominance of the patricians and their monopoly of the freedom which was 
supposed to be a generalized attribute of citizenship. 124 The civis Romanus was a 
man of property, a man who enjoyed dominium, 'the ultimate legal title beyond 
and above which there was no other'. 125 
The historical vector of Braithwaite & Pettit's dominion goes back not only 
to the Roman civitas. Its trajectory also encompasses the Roman dominium, 
which was 'the most extensive right to property that Roman law conferred' .126 In 
other words, contemporary republican domillion is derived from the ensemble of 
Roman republican social relations, in terms of which citizenship was denied to 
those who were property and entailed substantive freedom, in the sense of 
freedom ofthe city, only for those who were abundantly propertied. The vast 
majority of the Roman population did not have dominion because they did not 
have dominium. 
Braithwaite & Pettit would, by definitional fiat, endow us with the 
dominium which the Roman masses lacked, and hence the libertas which they 
count as the proper target of their theory. Their concept of dominion is, in this 
regard, deeply proprietary in nature. They make the following statement of 
summation of their core concept: 
'We hope that the term [dominion] has the connotations required to 
suggest that the bearer of dominion has control in a certain area, 
being free from the interference of others, but has that control in 
virtue of the recognition of others and the protection of the law.' 127 
124 See Novack (1979: 34-37) and Manfred (1974: 90-111). 
125 Thomas (1981: 134). 
126 Spiller (1986: 101). 
127 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 60. 
This is a proprietary formulation: from control and non-interference to 
publicity and legal protection. It is as if Braithwaite & Pettit are 
attempting to confer upon the populace of 'the Western-style democracies 
of the modem world' the property required to enjoy republican freedom. 
They appear to be accepting that the link between capitalist citizenship and 
republican freedom needs to be a proprietary one, and that dominion is 
such a link. 
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Over and above the etymological and the historical, the connection between 
dominion and dominium is thus also a theoretical one, in the sense that dominion 
is constructed in terms which are identifiably proprietary. In Roman law: 
'The most comprehensive right which anyone could have in respect 
of a thing was certainly the right of ownership, a right which even 
today forms the basis of all capitalistic legal systems.' 128 
Braithwaite & Pettit, it is submitted, have incorporated this proprietary texture of 
capitalist law directly into their construction of dominion. The republican theory 
of criminal justice elaborated by them turns on a concept which exemplifies the 
expansive form of property championed by MacPherson as the route to real 
democracy and adopted by Christie as the panacea for the crisis besetting 
contemporary criminal justice. They are proposing that the crisis of criminal 
justice will be solved if we all become bearers of dominion. I am proposing that 
dominion is a form of property and hence that Braithwaite & Pettit, like Christie, 
have formulated a proprietary solution to the crisis of criminal justice. The only 
significant difference is that whereas Christie believes that all of us already have a 
proprietary stake in the criminal justice system, Braithwaite & Pettit believe that it 
should be the target of the system to provide us with such a stake. 
128 Van Zyl (1983: 132). 
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The arguments comprising my critique of the Christie thesis apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to Braithwaite & Pettit ~nsofar as dominion is comprehended as a form 
of property. It is submitted, further, that the bourgeoisie has even less interest in 
Braithwaite & Pettit's republicanism than in Christie's petit bourgeois radicality. 
For, whereas the latter wants no more than to extend the operation of the core 
liberal value of freedom of property to the criminal justice system, the former 
seeks to reconstruct that system according to an overtly anti-liberal prescription. 
It is true that Braithwaite & Pettit attempt to tone down the implications of 
their theory by opting for a 'strategy of incremental implementation' attuned to 
Realpsychologie and Rea/politik. 129 It is, however, also true that the bourgeoisie 
is singularly attuned to the protection and promotion of its own interests and will 
not to be taken in by incrementalism which aims, by stealth, to replace its criminal 
justice system. The capitalist rulers will, in a word, not allow republican 
incrementalism to be implemented. It will be stillborn as a strategy because 
republicanism is unacceptable to the bourgeoisie as a principle of social 
organization. 
Capitalism is synonymous with the catechism of individualism. In the 
liberal bourgeois scheme of things, and even more so in the neoliberal version 
thereof, the individual precedes the community always. Republicanism seeks to 
reverse or, at least, to restructure this most fundamental of bourgeois 
presumptions. Braithwaite & Pettit believe it can be done unobtrusively. They 
underestimate seriously the astuteness of the bourgeoisie when it comes to 
spotting and despatching schemes subversive of its worldview. It matters nothing 
that Braithwaite & Pettit entertain no ambition whatsoever of transcending the 
parameters of capitalist social relations of production. It matters nothing that they 
proceed from these relations as given. Objectively their republican aspirations 
129 Braithwaite & Pettit op cit 204. 
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stand opposed to the ideological universe of capitalism and threaten to undermine 
its coherence. It is a foregone conclusion that the bourgeoisie will not 
countenance the creeping republicanism which Braithwaite & Pettit advocate. In 
the end the republican theory of criminal justice is mired in a utopianism not 
unlike Christie's. Braithwaite & Pettit believe that their theory is 
comprehensive l3o and practical, 13l and hence that it ought to be implemented. 
They perceive no insuperable obstacle to the construction of a republican criminal 
justice system according to the precepts of their republican criminal justice theory. 
They believe that the realpolitik of gradualism will overcome or, at least, 
neutralize whatever political opposition an implementation programme might 
encounter. However, the reality of political power in the capitalist world makes 
nonsense of this faith and renders a republican criminal justice a non-starter 
within the parameters of capitalism. 
This much would have been patent had their theory been properly 
comprehensive. They claim that theirs is: 
'a comprehensive theory of criminal justice, not just a theory of 
punishment or a theory of police powers or a theory of prosecutorial 
discretion. ,132 
They eschew sub-system theories and opt for a general theory of the whole 
system. 133 However, their theory is not general enough. Despite the allegation by 
Ashworth & Von Hirsch of over-comprehensiveness, from the Marxist 
perspective the theory contained in Not Just Deserts is not comprehensive enough. 
It is a sociological truism that the problem of criminal justice cannot be 
comprehended fully in terms of a theory of criminal justice per se, no matter how 
general or systemic or comprehensive or coherent in relation to criminal justice 
130 Ibid 12-24. 
131 Ibid 204. 
132 Ibid 7. 
133 Ibid 8. 
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such a theory purports to be. The problem of criminal justice is a product of and 
implicated in the extant social relations of production. A properly comprehensive 
theory of criminal justice should at least begin by situating the criminal justice 
system in its socio-economic context. 
Throughout Not Just Deserts the authors demonstrate often quite profound 
insights into the power configuration and class composition of contemporary . 
capitalist society. However, these insights are never comprehended theoretically 
and hence are not incorporated into the theory which they generate. Politics and 
the state exist on the periphery of their theory, as practicalities to be negotiated 
and not as relations for analytical engagement. Braithwaite & Pettit have chosen 
to locate the theory at a fairly low level of abstraction, namely, that of the criminal 
justice system. It is comprehensive at this level. However, republicanism is first 
and foremost a political and social philosophy. On the first page of the book they 
themselves classify' dominion as a political goal' . 134 Dominion is concerned with 
the way society is structured and organized, and with the quality of the relations 
amongst the citizenry. It makes no sense to formulate a republican theory of 
criminal justice which does not comprehend such a criminal justice as an aspect of 
a society organized according to republican principles. In other words, a properly 
comprehensive republican theory of criminal justice needs to be located at a level 
of abstraction which is high enough to include the relationship between the 
criminal justice system and the social system. 
Braithwaite & Pettit have not attempted to be comprehensive in this sense. 
They apparently consider that it is analytically legitimate to separate the pursuit of 
republican criminal justice from the vision of a republican society. One suspects 
that it is a methodological choice informed by the spirit of the same realpolitik 
which they identify as the implementation context of their theory. It is a choice 
134 Ibid vii. 
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which is infonned by the positivism which colours so much of Not Just Deserts. 
For them capitalism is an ontological datum, and hence it does not feature as an 
epistemological issue in the production of their theory. From a Marxist 
perspective, this procedure is, of course, invalid. 
Criminal justice is a superstructural effectivity. The Marxist method of 
social analysis requires that it be apprehended in its relation to the material 
conditions of its existence. Primarily this entails an effort to comprehend the 
nature of the relationship between republicanism and capitalism and to grasp the 
meaning of and potential for republican criminal justice in a capitalist milieu. 
This methodological imperative prescribes that the construction of a theory of 
criminal justice should, at least, commence at a high level of abstraction, namely, 
the level of the mode of production. The specificities of the theory can thereafter 
be elaborated at a lower level of abstraction, that of the criminal justice system. 
Braithwaite & Pettit have, ab initio, severed the criminal justice system 
from the social system. The result is that they find themselves in the curious 
position of advocating the establishment of a republican system of criminal justice 
in a society which is structurally anti-republican. This curiosity means that their 
theory is not practical, as they proclaim it to be. Implementation, even the gradual 
and piece-meal implementation proposed by them, requires the co-operation of 
the state and the assent capital. However, there is nothing in the political culture 
of either to suggest that they will allow a republican criminal justice to take root. 
That political culture has in recent times shifted right from liberalism to 
neoliberalism, under pressure of the enduring and deepening structural crisis of 
capital accumulation and profitability. Neoliberalism, with its penchant for 
welfare cutbacks and privatization, is even more incompatible with republicanism 
than liberalism. There is no room for a republican criminal justice system in this 
epoch of decadent capitalism. Like Christie's, Braithwaite & Pettit's theory is 
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unimplementable within the parameters of the capitalist mode of production. Von 
Hirsch & Ashworth are correct when, in their critique of Not Just Deserts, they 
conclude that its project is utopian. I35 
4.5 Cragg: The Practice of Punishment 
Wesley Cragg's The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of 
Restorative Justice completes the trilogy of theoretical works which constitutes 
the subject matter of this chapter. Cragg's offering is akin to Christie's and 
Braithwaite & Pettit's in that it, too, is an exercise in sustained theorizing about 
restorative justice. However, it is also very different from the other two in that it 
never ventures analytically beyond the bounds of the existing criminal justice 
system. 
Christie advocates, radically, the complete eviction of the state from 
criminal justice matters. Braithwaite & Pettit are somewhat more circumspect 
and settle for a creeping republicanism. However, they also anticipate the 
eventual replacement of state punishment. Cragg is, comparatively, the most 
conservative. He takes state punishment as a necessary given. His theoretical 
agenda is to make over state punishment along restorationist lines. In the result, 
he produces a theory of restorative justice which is simultaneously an effort to 
rescue and reinvigorate criminal justice. Whereas the theories of Christie and 
Braithwaite & Pettit may be classified as theories of comprehensive restorative 
justice, Cragg's is a theory of partial restorative justice. 
Already in the preface, Cragg makes evident the position which he will 
adopt, develop and defend throughout The Practice of Punishment. Thus, he 
declares: 
135 Von Hirsch & Ashworth (1992: 97 and 1993: 27). 
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'The function of law, I argue, is to reduce justified recourse to violence in 
the resolution of disputes. Understanding the implications of this for 
coercing compliance with the law allows the construction of a theory of 
punishment built on principles common to policing, adjudication, 
sentencing, and corrections, an account, furthermore, that is able to capture 
the strengths of the traditional theories of punishment while avoiding their 
defects. ,136 
Like Braithwaite & Pettit, Cragg seeks to articulate a comprehensive 
theory, not of punishment, but oflaw enforcement as a system, of which 
punishment or, more correctly, sentencing is one aspect. 137 However, 
unlike Christie, he eschews abolitionism. He separates himself from 
Christie very early on by rejecting the 'radical' notion that 'punishment 
should in principle be abolished and replaced with a humane alternative' 
as 'thoroughly impractical or utopian' .138 He avers that 'punishment could 
be said to be a natural feature of human existence' 139 and is categorical in 
his submission that state punishment is 'an unavoidable feature of the 
criminal law' .140 
Cragg's aim, then, is not to replace but to reform the penal practices of 
'contemporary western European and North American societies' .141 He is 
concerned to develop a theory of such a reformed practice of punishment. And 
his preferred methodology is to import into his theoretical endeavour some of the 
commonsense, everyday insights which we have apparently developed about such 
penal practices and which we have apparently integrated into our belief system. 
Thus he states: 
136 Cragg (1992: ix-x). 
137 The other two are policing and adjudication. 
138 Cragg op cit 2. 
139 Ibid 10. 
140 Ibid 8. 
141 Ibid 3. 
279 
'I shall argue that reforming penal institutions and correctional practices can 
only succeed where widely held informal understandings and formal 
patterns of punishment are brought into harmony with each other.' 142 
Cragg wants to avoid the supposed pitfalls of 'abstract theorizing' .143 He seeks, 
instead, to solve the problem of punishment via 'a dialogue between theory and 
practice,.I44 That dialogue depends upon a marriage between the formal and the 
informal, between philosophy and common-sense. The current practice of state 
punishment needs to be commixed with our 'everyday accounts of 
punishment' .145 The former requires 'significant reforms'; 146 the latter provides a 
legitimate foundation for constructing a reformed practice. 
For Cragg, the primary outcome of the interaction between the formal and 
the informal is the necessity of punishment. As already noted, he refers to 
punishment as 'an unavoidable feature of the criminal law' . This assertion is in 
fact the founding tenet of the theory of restorative justice which he goes on to 
develop. It must be noted that when he refers to punishment he means state 
punishment, operating through the formal institutions of the official criminal 
justice system. The inevitability of punishment in this sense is entailed, for 
Cragg, in the origin and nature of law itself. He states his position in the 
following terms: 
142 Ibid 2. These 'informal understandings' are, according to Cragg (ibid 6-7), expressed in 
four 'deeply held beliefs about punishment'. They are that: 
• 'Something like punishment as we understand it is an unavoidable element of modern 
social life.' 
• 'The practice of punishment, reflecting as it does the evolution of our criminal justice 
system and the kind of penalties it typically imposes for criminal acts, from 
imprisonment to fines, is in principle defensible and understandable.' 
• 'Punishment as it is practised in North American and western European societies is in 
need of significant reforms.' 
• 'Any account of punishment to be useful must provide us with criteria for evaluating 
whether current practices are in need of reform, and whether concrete proposals for 
reform constitute genuine improvements.' 
143 Ibid 6. 




'Legal systems arise ... in response to a universal human need for 
cooperation as well as human vulnerability to violence, or to the use of force 
as a means for achieving human objectives. Law provides a potentially 
useful way of resolving disputes in a manner that encourages cooperation 
and reduces recourse to the use of force in the settling of disputes. Legal 
systems seek to accomplish these goals by giving designated officials the 
authority to make, change, interpret, and enforce laws. The use of this 
authority is morally justified ... when it reduces recourse to the morally 
justified use of force in dispute settlement.' 147 
Law, in this connection, implies the monopolization of force by the state. Every 
legal system turns on the state's ability to deploy force to settle disputes. The 
alternative is an informal system which leaves the right to use force in the hands 
of the individual, who is free to resort to it according to his moral sensibilities. 
The formal-informal dichotomy is replicated in Cragg's distinction between 
the legal point of view and the moral point of view. He defmes the legal point of 
view as follows: 
'It is the view that the law is a system of overriding rules, rules that 
take precedence over competing obligations or desires where there is 
a conflict. From the legal point of view individuals are not free as 
individuals to decide: what the law is; what interpretation of the law 
shall prevail; when the law is applied to particular cases; and 
whether to do what the law requires.' 148 
The legal point of view can only be operationalized within a formal criminal 
justice system, which in turn necessarily eliminates the use of violence as an 
individual right. It is a view which, in a word, holds the law and its cognate 
institutions supreme. 
147 Ibid 8. Cragg's explanation of the historical genesis oflegal systems is fraught with the 
foUies of common sense. Historically, the birth of the legal system coincided with the 
demise of the original co-operation of the pre-historic commune, and with the narrowing of 
the right to use force from the commune to the state. See Chapter Two above. Cragg 
transposes present and past. The current need for co-operation and protection against 
violence is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the rise of the legal system. 
148 Ibid 83. 
The moral point of view, by contrast, is premised upon the overriding 
quality of moral rules: 
'It is a point of view that makes the individual the final authority in 
determining her own conduct. That is to say, from the moral point 
of view individuals have a responsibility to determine: what the 
content of morality is; how particular values or principles apply in 
particular situations or cases; and then to act on their own 
assessment of what, morally speaking, they ought to do.' 149 
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The moral point of view, then, raises each individual to 'the status ofan 
autonomous moral agent' .150 This status includes the right to use violence to 
resolve disputes. The moral agent is endowed with the right to use violence as an 
individual right. 
The legal and moral points of view are or, at least, appear to be logical 
incompatibles. 151 The one is viable only to the extent that the other is overridden. 
The legal point of view requires a formal system of dispute resolution, whereas 
the moral entails an informal system. The latter is premised upon individual 
moral autonomy, the former upon the subsumption of such autonomy under the 
legal authority of the state. Cragg's solution to this 'striking difficuity,152 is to 
defend the legal point of view against the moral point of view on moral grounds. 
In this regard he suggests that there might be: 
'reasons for thinking that under certain conditions moral 
considerations might justify shifting from a moral to a legal point of 
view.,)53 
He thus seeks to ground his support for a formal criminal justice system in moral 
argument. The legal point of view triumphs over the moral point of view because 
it is morally desirable that it should. 




153 Thid 86. 
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What are the conditions under which morality favours the legal point of 
view over the moral point of view? For Cragg, it is essentially the moral 
problems posed by the random use of violence to settle disputes which make the 
case for the legal point of view. He argues that unregulated violence has both an 
immoral and an anti-moral character. 154 It is immoral because it leads invariably 
to harm which is unjust. It is anti-moral because it undermines responsible moral 
agency and threatens the moral status of its victims. Despite the immoral and 
anti-moral nature of violence, it is justifiable on moral grounds when it is used to 
defend moral principles or positions. ISS Thus, says Cragg: 
'morality can be and frequently is used to justify a method of 
resolving disputes that is implicitly both immoral and anti-moral.' 156 
Institutional violence, then, is a morally defensible method of dispute resolution. 
Its moral superiority over free violence validates the law's reliance upon it, despite 
its inherently anti-moral and immoral character. 
It is here that the legal point of view becomes morally significant. It puts an 
end to 'the free use offorce,.157 Unregulated, informal violence gives way to a 
formal system of adjudication which operates 'by shifting authority to use force in 
settling disputes from private individuals to the state' .158 According to the legal 
point of view only the state is competent to use force to settle disputes. Indeed, 
according to Cragg, the right of the state and its criminal justice personnel to use 
force to ensure compliance with the law is 'a necessary feature of legal 
systems' . 159 
154 Ibid 88. 
155 Ibid 90. 
156 Ibid 91. 
157 Ibid 88 . 
158 Ibid 91. 
159 Ibid. 
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Cragg acknowledges that there is a central contradiction here. He terms it 
the paradox of coercion. It is a paradox generated by the fact that legal systems 
rely upon violence to dissuade legal subjects from resorting to violence. As he 
puts it: 
'The function of coercion in legal contexts is to ensure that disputes 
are settled in accordance with the law.' 160 
The authority of law requires that individuals, if necessary, be forced to comply 
with the legal parameters of dispute resolution. The legal point of view rests, in 
the final analysis, upon the power of the state to enforce its adjudicatory regime 
violently. This is indeed a paradox. A system designed to prevent violence stands 
or falls by the efficacy of its potential for violence! 
Cragg does not consider this paradox to be fatal to his argument that 
criminal conflicts be adjudged from the legal point of view. He considers that a 
moral justification for law and the legal point of view exists, in that law reduces 
the individual's propensity to resort to violence in situations where such a course 
of action may be morally justified. He puts the argument thus: 
'A shift from the moral to the legal point of view would be justified 
... where it could be shown that approaching the resolution of 
disputes from a formal, i.e. legal, perspective rather than an informal 
one would reduce the free use of force that would be morally 
justifiable otherwise.' 161 
For Cragg, then, law is morally defensible because it functions as a brake upon 
indiscriminate and uncontrolled violence. Of course, this function is successful 
only because the law itself is a violent construct. But that is an acceptable and 
legitimate price to pay for freedom from the regime of arbitrary violence entailed 




Despite his restorationist aspirations, Cragg is unequivocal about coercion 
as a necessary element of the legal point of view. Thus, he posits that 'the 
compulsory character of law, formally insisted upon, is an essential characteristic 
of legal systems' .162 Law must, by definition, be rooted in coercion. The 
authority of the law depends upon its enforcement ability. A regulatory system 
which cannot compel obedience is not a legal system. 'Without this, the law is 
not binding and hence not law.' 163 Legal systems cannot tolerate moral objections 
to their authority. Such objections reduce to an assault upon the viability of the 
system. Hence Cragg's proposition that: 
'Legal systems must remove from individuals the right to choose not 
to obey the law even on moral grounds and must be prepared to 
compel compliance where compliance would otherwise not 
occur. ,164 
There is, in other words, no place for the sovereignty of the moral point of view in 
a legal system. To the extent that there is a contradiction between law and 
morality, the legal point of view trumps the moral point of view. The supremacy 
of the legal point of view is, however, based in morality, for the compulsion 
which it brings to bear upon the recalcitrant subject serves to reduce recourse by 
individuals to the free use of morally justifiable force. 165 
From law, Cragg moves on to law enforcement. He argues that the 
enforcement of law can be morally justified in much the same way as law itself 
can be morally justified. Thus, he submits that: 
'A morally justifiable reason for enforcing the law is to reduce 
morally justifiable recourse to the free use of force in the resolution 
of disputes. ,166 
162 Ibid 100. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid, original emphasis. 
165 Ibid 101. 
166 Ibid 106. 
This is simply the justification of law taken a step further. Law 
enforcement is, in this regard, law put into practice; it is the activation of 
the moral justification of law; it is the operationalization of the legal point 
of view. But it is also the servant of the law. The ultimate goal oflaw 
enforcement is 'to build public confidence in the law' . 167 
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There are, according to Cragg, three functions which may be performed by 
law enforcement. These are: 
• The demonstrative function: to demonstrate wide respect for the law by both 
legal subjects and law enforcement authorities. 
• The persuasive function: to persuade legal subjects to obey the law. 
• The enablement function: to enable legal subjects to obey the law. 168 
Cragg is concerned with the sentencing component of law enforcement. He 
argues that, as such, the sentencing process should exhibit the demonstrative, 
persuasive and enablement functions of law enforcement. In respect of 
sentencing, 'all three functions become a part of a single focused action or process 
directed as a rule at a single individual' .169 
However, the pursuit of these functions must occur within the precincts of 
three principles of constraint. These are: 
• The respect for moral autonomy principle: This principle recognizes that the 
use of force undermines the moral autonomy of the participants, and hence 
seeks to reduce recourse to the use of force. 170 
• The minimum force principle: This principle requires that whenever its use 
becomes necessary, force should .be kept to a minimum. Hence, 'to use 
167 Ibid 132 & 147. 
168 Ibid 116-117. 
169 Ibid 146. 
170 Ibid 132. 
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more force than is required to accomplish legitimate enforcement objectives 
is morally unjustifiable' .171 
• The diversion principle: This principle is an anti-coercion principle, a 
'restraint in the use of force' .172 It requires that 'when faced with the need 
to resolve a dispute or end a conflict, an authority ought to use the least 
coercive method available of ensuring compliance with the law' .173 
These principles coalesce in a commitment to the minimization of state violence. 
Whenever possible, a law enforcement agent should avoid recourse to violence. If 
violence is unavoidable, only so much should be deployed as is morally 
defensible. 
It is in the context of the interaction of the triad of functions of law 
enforcement and the triad of constraints upon law enforcement that Cragg 
proceeds to construct his theory of sentencing. His approach to sentencing is 
derived directly from his submission that 'the basic function of law is to reduce 
recourse to violence in the resolution of disputes' .174 Law enforcement is thus, 
logically, about resolving disputes with minimal force and hence 'sentencing is 
properly regarded as an activity whose goal is conflict resolution' .175 For Cragg, 
then, criminal behaviour entails conflict, which has to be resolved. Direct 
engagement and discussion between the parties is 'the preferred method of 
resolving disputes' .176 
However, Cragg's approval of the application of dispute resolution to 
criminal justice is bedevilled by his recognition that its conventional context is 
informal or non-legal. He appreciates that dispute resolution is, genetically, a 
171 Ibid 103. 
172 Ibid 132. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid 178. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid 179. 
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privatized conception. Its modus operandi is mediation which, too, is 
constitutionally conjoined to a non-public notion of conflict regulation. Cragg 
does not hesitate to opine that the attempt to transfer the mediation process to a 
fonnal or legal context is fundamentally problematic: 
'There have been many attempts to find a place for mediation within 
the sentencing and correctional process. Most involve attempting to 
introduce mediation between the offender and victim and/or the 
offender and the authorities. The essential problem with the model 
is that it conflicts with basic features of the fonnallegal process. It 
is an attempt to divert disputes from a fonnal, i.e. legal, to an 
informal, i.e. non-legal setting. In many cases it is advanced as an 
alternative to the law and implies a lack of confidence in law as a 
way of resolving disputes.'177 
For Cragg, mediation is not to be countenanced as 'an alternative to the law'. The 
private resolution of criminal disputes is unacceptable. The integrity of the law 
and its ability to deal with criminal conflict are not negotiable. It is not an option 
to replace the public and legal process of dealing with crime with a procedure 
which is non-public and non-legal. He is adamant that the law provide the 
definitional setting within which criminal conflict is resolved: 
, A criminal offence ... brings an offender into conflict with the law 
itself. The law defines the dispute and stipulates appropriate 
responses. To introduce genuine mediation is to move the dispute 
from the jurisdiction of the law and make the applicability of the law 
a matter of negotiation, an approach which is an alternative to the 
law, not a development of it. It would seem therefore that the 
criminal law itself is an obstacle to the direct application of a 
mediation model.' 178 
The relation of criminal justice to mediation is thus fundamentally antagonistic. 
The advance of the one necessarily entails the demise of the other. Cragg is the 
champion of criminal justice and hence will not brook the insinuation of the 
mediation model into the criminal justice paradigm. 
177 Ibid 180. 
178 Ibid. 
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Cragg's critique of mediation does not, however, imply an abandonment of 
the conflict resolution theory of sentencing. His objection is to mediation, not to 
conflict resolution per se. His concern is to ensure that mediation does not oust 
the law. Criminal justice is the domain of the state and must remain so. Thus he 
declares that: 
'It is the idea that the mediation might replace formal sentencing or 
that the role of the court could be changed to that of mediator 
between offender and victim that is inappropriate. The dispute is 
with the law. The court is a party to the dispute and is committed to 
the legal point of view. The court as sentencing authority is not 
neutral; neither is it equal.' 179 
For Cragg, then, the legal point of view must inform sentencing practice. 
Mediation is a manifestation ofthe non-legal point of view and is thus 
incompatible with upholding the authority of the law. 
At this point, Cragg is faced with a conceptual dilemma: he needs to 
reconcile his rejection of the anti-law impetus of mediation with his approval of 
the pro-law potentialities of sentencing as conflict resolution. His solution is 
simple. He draws an analytical separation between mediation and conflict 
resolution. There is, for Cragg, no necessary coincidence between the two. He 
submits that 'the principles of conflict resolution apply whether there is mediation 
or not' .180 Mediation is merely a particular application of the principles of 
conflict resolution; 181 it is 'a strategy for introducing the principles of conflict 
resolution into a dispute' .182 Cragg argues that these principles are compatible 
179 Ibid 181. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Cragg (ibid 181-182) identifies four basic principles of conflict resolution: 
• 'Be friendly but firm'; 
• 'Undertake to understand the opponent's position and to communicate one's own'; 
• 'Focus on common interests and propose solutions that an opponent is likely to have an 
interest in accepting'; 
• 'Be prepared to make unilateral gestures of cooperation'. 
182 Ibid 181. 
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with the legal point of view and may be mobilized without recourse to mediation. 
In other words, they can be implemented without challenging either the 
jurisdiction or the sovereignty of the law. 
He submits that the principles of conflict resolution are consistent with the 
demonstrative, persuasive and enablement functions of law enforcement. Each of 
the functions of law enforcement is simultaneously a principle of conflict 
resolution. Hence, both conflict resolution and law enforcement seek to 
demonstrate respect for the law; both seek to persuade people to obey the law; and 
both seek to enable people to live within the law. 183 
Of the three functions of law enforcement which he identifies, Cragg 
allocates the primary position to persuasion. He states: 
'If the purpose of sentencing and corrections is conflict resolution, 
then a central purpose of sentencing and correction is persuasion.' 184 
The aim is to convince people to comply with the law voluntarily. Sentencing 
practice should impel legal subjects towards the conclusion that legal obedience is 
an admirable desideratum. The priority of persuasion is founded directly upon the 
three principles of constraint which Cragg considers ought to govern sentencing 
practice, namely, the moral autonomy principle, the minimum force principle and 
the diversion principle. These principles determine that law enforcement ought to 
be first and foremost about persuasion, and certainly always before it is about 
coercion. Cragg makes the point thus: 
'It is the need to control the free use of force that justifies the use of 
force in enforcing the law. Hence, the goal of enforcement must be 
to achieve compliance through moral suasion, that is to say, by 
bringing those not otherwise disposed to obey the law to the view 
that compliance with the law is warranted. ,185 
183 Ibid 183-184. 
184 Ibid 185. 
185 Ibid 187. 
Cragg's approach to sentencing may thus be summed up as follows: it is an 
exercise in conflict resolution directed at convincing offenders, via moral 
suasion, to respect and obey the law. The ultimate objective is to develop 
public confidence in the law. 
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Trust, according to Cragg, is a crucial component of all human 
relationships.186 Crime undermines trust, and leads to a loss of confidence in the 
law. Resolving the conflict engendered by non-compliance with the law helps to 
rebuild trust, and hence to restore public confidence in the law's ability to protect 
people from harm. Sentencing as conflict resolution is in large part an exercise in 
affording the offender the opportunity to re-establish the trust which his offence 
has subverted. 187 It seeks to communicate that people can and should be trusted to 
obey the law. 188 The rebuilding of trust requires that the offender repair the harm 
he has caused. Sentencing which aims at resolving conflict allows for this, and is 
thus an expression restorative justice. 
The conflict resolution approach to sentencing implies that 'non-custodial 
sentences are clearly the preferred sentencing option' .189 Capital punishment and 
-incarceration are at odds with a conflict resolution model and should be avoided 
whenever they are not required to protect the public and to maintain confidence in 
the law. Cragg considers that the non-custodial sentence ideally should be a 
negotiated sentence. The negotiated sentence is most consistent with the 
principles of conflict resolution and is thus able to represent the views and 
interests of all affected parties, namely, the offender, the victim, the state and the 
public. However, for Cragg, the negotiated sentence is not an expression of the 
186 Ibid 142. 
187 Ibid 184. 
188 Ibid 189. 
189 Ibid 192. 
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supremacy of the moral point of view and its concomitant informalism over the 
legal point of view. Thus, he states: 
'The search for a negotiated solution is carried out in the context of a 
commitment to the legal point of view. The purpose of negotiated 
sentences is to find a solution consistent with the law.' 190 
The negotiated sentence, born of the intersection between the principles of 
informal conflict resolution and the formalism of the legal point of view, is 
Cragg's answer to the problem of punishment. It is his version of the restorative 
sanction. 
The fmal part of Cragg's argument concerns the identification of the theory 
of punishment that is consistent with his notion of sentencing as conflict 
resolution. It is worth noting here that he draws a distinction between sentencing 
and punishment. Sentencing is the penal response of a law enforcement authority 
to offences, and is aimed at maintaining or rebuilding confidence in the law. 
Punishment is the infliction of suffering upon an offender; it entails 
unpleasantness or harsh treatment for the offender. Cragg interrogates the 
relationship between sentencing and punishment thus: 
'First, is punishment an unavoidable component of law 
enforcement? Second, does just law enforcement require that 
sentencing authorities deliberately or intentionally inflict punishment 
on offenders for their offences?' 191 
His answer to these questions rests upon his differentiating between two 
definitions of punishment: a philosophical definition and a popu1ar one. The 
former defmition, constructed by philosophers of punishment, conceives of 
punishment as fundamentally painful, and posits such pain as its aim. The latter 
defmition, expressing the commonsense view, understands punishment as 
190 Ibid 194. 
191 Ibid 210-211. 
something which is generally unpleasant, but which is not imposed with the 
express intention of inflicting pain. 
292 
According to Cragg, his theory of sentencing as conflict resolution accords 
with the popular defInition, not the philosophical one. He acknowledges that in 
most cases offenders will experience the sentencing process as punishment which 
is unpleasant and painful. He continues: 
'But if the goal is conflict resolution, the penalties will be imposed 
or agreed not with the aim of causing suffering, but with the aim of 
resolving conflict. It is true that the process will be engaged in with 
the knowledge that the outcome will probably be experienced as 
painful by those subjected to it. But it will not be engaged infor the 
purpose of causing suffering. And the solutions arrived at will not 
be advanced because of their pain-causing character.'l92 
Sentencing will involve a form of hard treatment for offenders. For those who are 
unwilling to participate in the restorative process, sentencing will be an unwanted 
imposition of control by means of hard treatment. For the co-operative offender, 
the restorative process is necessarily 'burdensome and unpleasant in some 
respects' .193 All conflict resolution involves an element of pain. Thus, 
punishment is an 'unavoidable component' or a 'logical concomitant' of 
sentencing conceived as conflict resolution. But, that is 'not its proper 
purpose' .194 The answer to his first question is thus affIrmative; to his second, 
negative. 
For Cragg, then, the philosophical defInition of punishment, which 
embraces the intentional infliction of suffering, has no place in the restorative 
justice project. The commonsense or popular definition, which recognizes some 
form of pain as part of conflict resolution, is the approach which accords with the 
192 Ibid 213, original emphasis. 
193 Ibid 214. 
194 Ibid 216. 
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pursuit of restorative justice. It accepts that most sentences may have a punitive 
aspect for the offender. But it rejects the notions that sentencing is punishment 
practice and that the rationale of a sentence is to punish the offender. In the 
popular view, sentencing oUght to be a restorative justice practice. It ought to be 
the restorative sanction. 
Cragg approaches restorative justice from the legal point of view. This view 
entails a formal, state-run criminal justice system, which is necessarily coercive in 
at least some of its aspects. State punishment is one such coercive aspect. In 
response to the perennial difficulties of justifying state punishment, Cragg 
suggests an alternative approach which re-conceptualizes the problem: 
'If punishment is hard to justify, perhaps we should set aside 
attempts to justify it. This is not the same as arguing that it should 
be abolished. However, what it does suggest is that we should seek 
to understand the function of sentencing in other terms.' 195 
His alternative is to understand crimes as conflicts between the state and the 
offender, and to recast sentencing as an exercise in conflict resolution. According 
to him, this approach allows for the importation of the informalities of conflict 
, 
resolution into the formal criminal justice process. In this way state punishment is 
divorced from its traditional associations with imposition of intentional suffering, 
and the legal point of view becomes compatible with restorative justice. He 
describes his theory of restorative justice as one that: 
'accepts the inevitability of punishment as a feature of criminal 
justice, but goes beyond the traditional accounts by suggesting that, 
while punishment is unavoidable, imposing hard treatment is not the 
purpose of sentencing but rather its result. The purpose of 
sentencing is and ought to be restorative justice. ,196 
195 Ibid 142. 
196 Ibid 9. 
And the key to actualizing the restorative motif of sentencing and of law 
enforcement in general is to comprehend and harness the principles of 
conflict resolution as the defining attribute of the practice of punishment. 
4.6 Critique of Cragg 
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Cragg wishes to see the emergence of a state-sponsored restorative justice. 
The theory which he constructs in The Practice of Punishment is designed to 
develop and defend this vision. He wants the existing criminal justice system to 
take on a restorative tenor. He believes that the primary deficiency of the criminal 
justice system is its sentencing practice, which is currently aimed at punishing the 
offender. He theorizes the demise of sentencing as punishment and its 
replacement with sentencing as restorative justice. 
This approach puts him at odds with the likes of Christie and Braithwaite & 
Pettit who theorize a comprehensive restorative justice which, ultimately, would 
be completely independent of the state and its institutions. Cragg adheres to the 
partial version of restorative justice, in terms of which the state would continue to 
hold the position of prime protagonist. He envisages a transformation from 
criminal justice to restorative justice within the institutional parameters of the 
extant system. He also suggests that the non-custodial restorative sanction is not 
appropriate for all crimes. Certain crimes may cause such extensive harm or lead 
to so profound a breach of trust 'that only a long period of incarceration could 
begin to restore the damage caused and the fear engendered,.197 For Cragg, then, 
restorative justice is statist and partial. It is to be implemented via the 
institutional apparatus of the criminal justice system, and it is to be applicable 
only to those offences which are not serious enough to place themselves beyond 
the bounds of the restorative sanction. 
197 Ibid 217. 
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Varona has classified Cragg's as 'a conservative theory of restorative 
justice',198 in relation to those theories envisaging a restorative justice which is 
premised upon the abolition of the criminal justice system. This classification is 
correct. Whereas comprehensive restorative justice would eject the state as a 
party, Cragg insists that the state has to be an integral component ofthe 
restorative process. To be sure, he devotes considerable attention to analysing 
critically the traditional theories of punishment, including those which seek to 
promote a hybrid of retributionism and utilitarianism.199 But he never questions 
the statist premise which forms the bedrock of all theories of punishment. Indeed, 
he accepts a pivotal role for the state as both necessary and unavoidable. His 
confrontation with criminal justice is not radical, in the sense that Christie's is and 
Braithwaite & Pettit's can be. He leaves intact and unchallenged the first 
postulate of the criminal justice system. He is, in this regard, indubitably 
conservative in his proposals for a regime of partial restorative justice. However, 
he merits consideration because he has theorized the middle road which he has 
chosen. There are very many restorationists who subscribe to the same basic 
position taken by Cragg.2oo They, too, proceed from the premise of state 
commitment to restorative justice. He is, however, one of the few who has 
elaborated a coherent theory of partial restorative justice. 
The partial restorative justice project reduces to the pursuit of a via media 
between the regimes of state-sponsored criminal justice and non-state 
comprehensive restorative justice. The objective is to construct a compromise, in 
terms of which the state becomes the patron of restorative justice. Cragg's theory 
198 Varona (1996: 49). 
199 See Cragg op cit chapters 1-3. 
200 Indeed, it appears that most of the advocates of restorative justice adhere to its partial 
variant. The initial enthusiasm for Christie has subsided somewhat. Whereas his basic 
argument that criminal conflicts are forms of property which have been stolen from their 
owners remains a restorationist orthodoxy, its abolitionist implications have been sidelined 
for the most part. 
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of partial restorative justice is one such notable attempt. He tries to produce a 
theory which combines the statist essentials of criminal justice system and the 
anti-statist tenets of restorative justice. He forgets, however, that restorative 
justice is genetically opposed to criminal justice, and makes sense only in its 
relation of contrariness to the statist postulate. He does not comprehend that the 
relationship between criminal justice and restorative justice is a dialectical one: 
their composition is always fundamentally antagonistic. In his quest of a via 
media, Cragg seeks to construct a unity of criminal justice and restorative justice 
which suppresses the ontological contradictions between their elements. 
He deals with the anti-statist impulse of restorative justice by trivializing it. 
He suggests that punishment is 'a natural feature of human existence' and 
considers that state punishment is an inevitability of contemporary social life. 
Attempts to abolish it are invariably dismissed as 'impractical, or silly, or 
hopelessly utopian' .201 Cragg constructs this argument empirically, on the 
strength of what he perceives to be the 'common sense picture of punishment 
based on everyday experiences' of crime and criminaljustice.202 For him, 
experience teaches that we cannot do without state punishment, and common 
sense dictates a conjoining of statism with those tenets of restorative justice which 
are compatible with it. 
This defence of the necessity of the statist postulate is but one instance of 
the empiricism which runs like an unbroken thread through The Practice of 
Punishment. Cragg transforms common sense into a theoretical resource. He 
does not trust 'abstract theorizing' and seeks to locate his theoretical project in the 
common sense of' everyday accounts of punishment'. The appeal to and reliance 
upon common sense is a hallmark of the empiricist epistemology, which 
comprehends experience as the crucial source of knowledge. Benton explains: 
20 I Cragg op cit 10. 
202 Ibid 11. 
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"'Seeing is believing"; "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"; "I saw it 
with my own eyes" ... These are the common-sense attitudes which 
empiricism articulates into a philosophical theory. Central to empiricism, 
then, is the conception of a human subject whose beliefs about the external 
world are worthy of the description "knowledge" only if they can be put to 
the test of experience. ,203 
Cragg is a true believer in the production of experience-based knowledge. For 
him the commonsensical and the quotidian are the necessary counterweights to 
the dangers of' abstract theorizing'. He is suspicious of formalism and seeks to 
avoid its excesses by enlisting the informalism of the sensuous as a theoretical 
resource. Hence, his argument is suffused with references to such typically 
empiricist notions as common usage, everyday discourse, wide consensus, the 
popular mind and the proposition which has the character of a truism. He also 
places much analytical reliance upon such standard empiricist linguistic devices as 
'we all know', 'we assume', 'normally we expect', and 'is seen by many'. 
Cragg's theoretical programme is essentially to construct an empiricist guardrail 
around the supposedly speculative fancies of abstract theory. 
Of course, as suggested by Benton, such a strategy is itself an exercise in 
theorizing. If empiricism is anti-theory, it is by no means atheoretical. The 
concept of common sense, by which Cragg places so much store, is a profoundly 
theoretical concept and is central to the empiricist epistemology. Common sense 
is experience raised to a category of knowledge, it is the concrete rendered 
conceptual. As should be evident from the expository section above, there is 
much and often sophisticated theorizing contained within the pages of The 
Practice of Punishment. But Cragg's stated goal throughout his theoretical 
meanderings is 'to construct an approach to punishment that was consistent with 
common sense' ?04 His endorsement of informalism is, in this regard, an 
203 Benton (1977: 21). 
204 Cragg op cit 204. 
endorsement of common sense born of day-to-day experience. And the theory 
which he articulates is a theory steeped in the presuppositions of empiricism. 
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From a Marxist perspective, empiricism and its epistemological strategies 
are methodologically incapable of producing coherent knowledge of the object of 
analysis. The epistemological crux of empiricism consists in the belief that 
knowledge is 'defined by the object of which it is knowledge,205 In other words, 
knowledge of the object exists in the object as a condition which antedates the 
intervention of the subject. This is a profoundly undialectical and, ultimately, 
reactionary approach to the production of knowledge, for it uncritically accepts as 
truth whatever is given by experience and validated by common sense. 
Empiricism takes no account of the SUbject-object dialectic, and hence of the 
centrality of contradiction in the development of knowledge. 
When Cragg employs 'everyday accounts of punishment' as a 
methodological tool in the elaboration of his theory of restorative justice he is 
marking that theory with the imprint of empiricism. He is saying that such 
accounts are the commonsensical derivations of the day-to-day practice of 
punishment, and that restorative justice is to be comprehended in terms of the 
knowledge which such practice produces. The knowledge thus gained, according 
to Cragg, is the truth that crime is best dealt with in terms of conflict resolution, 
and that the purpose of sentencing is not punishment but restorative justice. 
The theory of restorative justice which Cragg constructs highlights the 
poverty of the empiricist epistemology upon which he relies. I shall discuss three 
overlapping aspects of the Marxist critique of empiricism. Firstly, the empiricist 




focus on experience implies that 'all knowledge is reducible to atomic 
propositions which correspond to discrete impressions, sense data, and the 
like,.206 Knowledge, on this account, is 'mechanically constructed out of a series 
of "concrete" experiences' .207 Empiricism, then, theorizes knowledge production 
as a process by which a pre-existing truth is extracted by the subject from the 
object which contains it.208 The mode of such extraction is experience and the 
knowledge so obtained is validated according to the precepts of common sense. 
Empiricism imports into knowledge production the same credo of atomism which 
characterizes commodity production. Such a theory of knowledge is directly 
opposed to dialectical materialism, the Marxist epistemology, which holds that 
knowledge is produced in the confrontation between subject and object within the 
parameters of a determinate configuration of the social relations of production. 
There is, in other words, always a material particularity and historical specificity 
to the production of knowledge. 
Cragg's discussion of the element of trust in human relationships is 
illustrative here. He believes that we place much reliance upon trust but that the 
extent to which we do so is 'not always noticed' ?09 He considers that criminal 
conduct entails a breach of trust and that restorative justice is about the healing of 
that breach. He offers no especial argument for the centrality of trust in human 
affairs, except the implied one that he has noticed it. In other words, he has seen 
it, he has sensed it, he has encountered it. For him, it is an uncomplicated and 
uncontroversial truth, an immanent aspect of human nature and derived therefrom 
empirically, by common sense. It is a discrete datum which he has gained by 
experience and observation. Such is the empiricist production of knowledge. 
206 McLennan (1982: 147). 
207 Pilling (1980: 27). 
208 See Althusser (1970: 35-36). 
209 Cragg op cit 142. 
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The material and historical conditions in which trust is created or destroyed 
matter nothing; neither do the contradictions between individual trust and class 
power. For Cragg, all that matters is the knowledge of the role of trust in human 
relationships which he has perceived and procured empirically. For Marxism, any 
such knowledge needs to be comprehended critically, in relation to the social 
relations of production which constitute its material milieu, and with a view to 
discerning its internal contradictions. The empiricist epistemology is 
fundamentally uncritical. The cubits of knowledge which it produces are 
unreliable as analytical resources or explanatory tools. Unless it is apprehended 
critically, the trust by which Cragg sets so much store has as much potential to 
obfuscate the nature of human relationships as it has to clarify it. 
Secondly, empiricism entails the fetishization of common sense. It raises 
common sense to the status of an analytical category and endows it with the 
power of explanation. Explanans is transfigured into explanandum and becomes 
the portal to the acquisition of knowledge and the discovery of truth. This is 
methodological aberrancy, even in terms of the precepts of formal logic: an effect 
of the object of analysis cannot legitimately be incorporated into mapping the 
aetiology of such object. Everyday accounts of punishment are a commonsense 
response to the problem of criminality. Like all lay accounts and ordinary 
appraisals, they need to be explained.2!O They are problematic in that they 
constitute an aspect or a variable of the problem of criminality. They cannot, 
therefore, be relied upon as an analytical tool. 
Recall one of the 'deeply held beliefs about punishment' identified by Cragg 
above: 'Something like punishment as we understand it is an unavoidable element 
210 The importance of exp iaining everyday accounts is highlighted in Antaki (1988), a 
collection devoted to the elaboration of methods of analysing such accounts. 
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of modem social life.' The veracity of the statement may be granted and need not 
detain us. It is a commonsense proposition which occupies a key place in the 
theory of restorative justice which Cragg goes on to construct. It is the basis upon 
which he dismisses as misguided calls for the abolition of punishment. And it 
provides him with a rationale for his defence of the extant criminal justice 
institutions. However, we do not know why people believe in the inevitability of 
punishment and how they came to hold this belief. Presumably, the belief has 
developed empirically and has been distilled from the popular experience of crime 
and punishment. But that experience needs to be interrogated. We need to 
understand the material conditions of 'modem social life' in order to understand 
the process by which experience engenders a commonsense belief in the necessity 
of punishment. We need to understand why and how the social relations of 
production of the capitalist mode of production beget a general belief in the 
inevitability of state punishment. Cragg does a methodological somersault. He 
begins at the end, that is, he takes as his premise that which is comprehensible 
only asa conclusion. The commonsense conviction that punishment is 
unavoidable has no inherent analytical value. To think otherwise, as Cragg 
appears to do, is to fetishize it. 
Thirdly, empiricism is unable to go beyond the form of the relations which 
it encounters. Their content remains a mystery. The empiricist operates at the 
level of appearances, and the common sense upon which he relies routinely 
transfigures form into content. Sumner makes the point thus: 
'The practice of empiricist epistemology tends to push etiological 
social science into a cul-de-sac. It seems to divert attention from the 
specificity of a thing and direct research towards its forms of 
appearance. ,2li 
211 Sumner (1979: 189). 
This is a direct result of the atomism which suffuses its epistemology, and 
of its failure to pursue the structural context of the discrete empirical 
events which purportedly deliver knowledge. 
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Marxism, by contrast, understands that concrete experience seldom reveals 
the true content of the social relations to which it pertains, and that commonsense 
verdicts are invariably located at the formal level. Sumner again: 
'Dialectical materialism, the method of Marxian analysis, demands 
that things be grasped not only as they appear in a particular manner 
and context in a given social practice, but also, and most importantly 
for the purposes of explanation, in their condition of existence and 
forms of development. ,212 
For Marxism, form and content are dialectically conjoined. Hence, knowledge of 
the relation is to be acquired by analysing the process by which its content 
necessarily gives rise to a form which, more often than not, has the effect of 
concealing or distorting the content.213 Sumner explains the difference between 
empiricism and Marxism in the following terms: 
'It was one thing for Saint-Simon and Proudhon to observe 
spontaneously that poverty and misery appeared to be endemic to 
modem Western economies. But it was another thing altogether 
when Marx explained that the inner logic of the capitalist mode of 
production necessitated the existence of poverty and misery on a 
national and on, eventually, a global scale. ,214 
Empiricism relies upon and responds to the appearances derived from experience; 
Marxism seeks to comprehend the material basis from which such appearances 
necessarily arise. 
212 Ibid 190. 
213 Ibid 188. 
214 Ibid 187. 
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The meagreness of Cragg's empiricism is illustrated in his discussion of the 
nature of state and law in the social formations which constitute his analytical 
terrain. Unlike so many legal analysts, Cragg does perceive the essentially violent 
character of the state and the fundamentally coercive constitution of the law. The 
conventional approach concedes, as Atiyah does, that 'in any modem state there is 
a practical need for the use of force in the last resort to enforce much of the 
law' .215 But the violence of state and law is invariably recognized only in an 
ultimate sense, as an attribute which acquires relevance only in the fmal analysis, 
when persuasion fails. Cragg has the merit that he breaks with this conventional 
wisdom and foregrounds the compulsion upon which law and state are founded. 
He is one of the few non-Marxists to comprehend the state as a structure-in-
violence, and to discern that law is inherently coercive in its regulatory and 
adjudicatory practices. 
However, this advanced insight does not correspond to an advanced theory 
of restorative justice. Indeed, as intimated earlier, Cragg's effort is theoretically 
impoverished in comparison to the theories produced by Christie and Braithwaite 
& Pettit, who do not grasp the violent architecture of legal relations in the way 
that he does. This is a curiosity which is attributable directly to the fact that Cragg 
procured his apprehension empirically, as the commonsense product of a keen 
(but empiricist) observation of political experience and legal practice. To 
'discover' that the state is really a fundamentally violent institution and that legal 
relations are coercive not in the final but in the first analysis is, to mimic Sumner, 
one thing. However, it is another thing altogether to explain how this has come to 
be so and why it should necessarily be so. The 'contemporary western European 
and North American societies' to which Cragg refers are each and every one 
capitalist social formations. They are permanently rent by a class conflict which 
structures their social relations of production. Their economies are exchange 
215 Atiyah (1995: 81). 
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economies demarcated by the commodification of labour-power. Their states are 
bourgeois states and their legal relations are bourgeois legal relations. These are 
sociological traits which cannot be comprehended empirically. They therefore do 
not feature in Cragg's analytic endeavours. 
The consequence of this omission is an analysis which does not move 
beyond the level of appearances and which preswnes, incorrectly, that the form 
which it encounters is the form of the content. Cragg thus produces a theory of 
restorative justice which turns upon the formalistic acceptance of the inevitability 
of institutional legal violence. It is a theory which asswnes an original violent 
hwnan nature, and which justifies capitalist state violence morally, with no regard 
to its structural sources in the social relations of production of capitalism and its 
role in the reproduction of these relations. It is a theory which embraces the 
capitalist state as a necessary and rational institution and which intrudes the 
bourgeois worldview into the problem of criminality. It is a theory which 
ultimately affmns the relations of oppression and exploitation which reach into 
virtually every aspect of the social existence of the dominated classes. Cragg's 
efforts to construct a via media amounts, in fine, to an empiricist exercise in the 
embourgeoisement of restorative justice. 
It must, in this regard, be noted that Cragg's legal point of view is virtually 
coterminous with what Engels refers to as the juridical world outlook. This is the 
bourgeois worldview. It is the view which holds that law is the fundament of 
hwnan affairs. It is the ideological expression of the political economy of the 
commodity. The predominantly theological world outlook of the pre-capitalist era 
was an obstacle to the free development of the commodity economy. It had to be 
replaced. The bourgeoisie found the juridical world outlook to be the most 
appropriate ideational expression of its class interests. Engels explains: 
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'The economic and social relations, which people previously believed to 
have been created by the Church and its dogma - because sanctioned by the 
Church - were now seen as being founded on the law and created by the 
State.,216 
The juridical worldview replaced church with state and religious dogma with law. 
It was, according to Engels, the theological worldview secularized.217 It enabled 
the bourgeoisie to present the commodification and sale of labour-power as 
transactions between legal equals. The economic exploitation and political 
oppression of the proletariat were secreted behind their juridical forms of equality 
and right. 
The legal point of view upon which Cragg relies is a re-presentation of the 
juridical world outlook. Whereas the original target of the bourgeoisie was the 
power of religion, Cragg sets his sights on the claims of morality. Since Engels's 
day, the legal equality which the bourgeoisie had championed has been exposed as 
little more than a form of bourgeois class power. The dominated classes live the 
fact that equality before the law is no protection against the ravages of the 
substantive inequality inscribed in the social relations of production of capitalism. 
The moral point of view is, in this connection, a programme to call the law to 
account for its failure to make good on its promise of equality. 
Proponents of the moral point of view place morality above legality because 
they perceive the law to have been patently complicit in the reproduction of 
inequality. They have lost faith in the law and in the juridical world outlook. 
Cragg has kept the faith. He remains convinced of the continued viability and 
validity of the legal point of view and has even managed to construct a moral 
216 Engels (1990: 598). 
217 Ibid. 
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argument in its defence. He has countered the moral point of view by impressing 
its precepts into service of the legal point of view. 
Cragg does not confront the contradiction, at the heart of the juridical world 
outlook, between formal legal equality and substantive social inequality. This 
omission is a direct and expected consequence of his empiricism, which 
discourages analytical ventures beyond form. He is both satisfied with and 
determined to defend the legal point of view for what it is: the ideological form 
befitting the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. If the juridical worldview is the 
theological worldview secularized, then Cragg's legal point of view is the juridical 
worldview modernized. If religion is a remnant of the pre-capitalist era, then 
morality is the harbinger of a post-capitalist epoch. Cragg's interest is in the 
capitalist present, and the defence of the law against the incursions of morality. 
He has no use of religion; and he engages morality solely to bolster the legal point 
of view. He is concerned only to ensure the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and the 
integrity of its worldview. 
Christie is the petite bourgeois radical, who locates the wellspring of 
restorative justice in a regime of conflicts as property, and who comprehends 
restorative justice as the antithesis of criminal justice. Cragg, by contrast, is the 
epitome of the bourgeois radical. For him, restorative justice is simply a variant 
of criminal justice, an improved version thereof. There is no fundamental 
opposition between the two. Crimes are conflicts which require resolution, but 
they are not forms of property. They cannot therefore be disposed of privately, 
according to the wishes or inclinations of their supposed owners. Crimes 
represent a challenge to the public authority and hence must be resolved in 
accordance with the adjudicatory competence of the state. Whereas Christie 
theorizes a restorative justice liberated from the burden of state management, 
Cragg relies upon the statist postulate to prescribe the conceptual limits of his 
theory of restorative justice. 
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The direct confrontation between Cragg and Christie occupies only a few 
paragraphs of the text The Practice of Punishment?18 However, most of what 
Cragg argues is, in one way or another, an indirect response to the Christie thesis. 
Indeed, it is arguable that all theories of restorative justice are debates with 
Christie, in much the same way that all modem (and postmodem) social theories 
are debates with Marx. Christie is the theoretical doyen of the restorationist 
movement. Cragg is the neophyte, seeking to make his theoretical mark, as he 
must, in relation to Christie?19 
Cragg is simultaneously attracted and repelled by the notion of the private 
disposition of criminal conflicts. His attraction is evident in his approach to 
mediation. It will be recalled that he rejected mediation formally because of its 
inherently private character. However, he then went on to approve the principles 
of conflict resolution, together with the negotiated sentence, as the preferred road 
to restorative justice. This amounts to an attempt to overcome the somewhat 
strained and contrived separation which he erects between mediation and conflict 
resolution, and to incorporate the advantages of privatization into his theory. His 
repulsion is apparent from his dedication to the legal point of view and his 
commitment to the statist postulate of criminal justice. He will not countenance 
the eviction of the state from the criminal justice process, which eviction is the 
218 See Cragg op cit 140-14l. 
219 Every new theory has a history. It is constructed in relation to and in terms of its 
predecessors. No theory is pure, in the sense that it is free of influence of other competing 
theories. Every new theory is genetically linked at least to the range of theories which 
traverse more or less the same terrain. The genetic map of Cragg's theory of partial 
restorative justice is manifest and uncontroversial. Christie is at the beginning, and Christie 
is at the end. 
logical conclusion of Christie's proprietary thesis. Cragg is content with things 
capitalist, both proprietary and political. 
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His theory of restorative justice must not challenge or disturb either the 
capitalist property regime or the central role occupied by the capitalist state in the 
disposition of criminal conflicts. In the end, he wants to take the benefits which 
attach to the Christie thesis but seeks to avoid the negative implications it holds 
for the statist postulate. He is aware of the deep crisis besetting capitalist criminal 
justice. He knows that something serious has to be done to deal with the problem. 
However, he cannot conceive of a solution which strays outside the institutional 
structure of the criminal justice system. Any change must proceed from the 
premise of the inviolability of the system. Any change must be founded upon the 
continued primacy of the state in criminal justice matters. Assuring the integrity 
of the law means ensuring that restorative justice does not call into question the 
validity of criminal justice. 
Cragg wishes to reform the criminal justice system in order to stave off its 
destruction. Marx & Engels noted a similar impulse behind the reforming zeal of 
certain elements of the ruling class: 
'A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, 
in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society. ,220 
They continue in inimitable cutting style and critical vein: 
'To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, 
improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of 
charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to 
animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every 
imaginable kind.,221 
220 Marx & Engels (1967: 113). 
221 Ibid. 
Cragg's theoretical endeavours to improve the criminal justice system 
mark him for a place in this catalogue of bourgeois radicals. 
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The bourgeois radical is troubled by his own perspicacity. He cannot stand 
to see the dangers to which his less caring fellows are prepared to expose 
capitalist society by their rampant greed. He knows that bourgeois rapacity 
encourages proletarian dissatisfaction, and wants nothing more than to free his 
world of the spectre of proletarian revolution. He champions reform in order 
obviate revolution. Marx & Engels say of such campaigners that: 
'They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary and 
disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a 
proletariat. ,222 
Cragg replicates all the cares and aspirations of the bourgeois radical in his 
construction of his theory of restorative justice. His objective is to ensure the 
reproduction of the criminal justice system and its institutions, but he wants to see 
also the implementation of those improvements required to prevent the current 
crisis from becoming the prelude to collapse. He wants a restorative justice which 
is able to remove the perils which criminal justice is facing. He wants Christie 
sans Christie's dangerous idea that the state is dispensable. 
Cragg is aware of the fact that legal systems are historical constructions. He 
acknowledges that certain societies 'existed and flourished after their own fashion 
without formal legal rules' .223 What is more, for him 'it is clear that laws are not 
a necessary feature of social life' ?24 Such admissions must entail an appreciation 
of the transient nature of bourgeois law and of the possibility that a post-capitalist 
mode of production may be lawless. This is dangerous knowledge. It is the kind 
of knowledge which, in the end, leads those who take it seriously to a loss of faith 
222 Ibid. 
223 Cragg op cit 83. 
224 Ibid 84. 
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in the law and legal systems of bourgeois society. This is what occurred with 
Christie and, to a lesser extent, with Braithwaite & Pettit. Cragg is different. He 
has neither incorporated the dangerous knowledge into nor confronted it in his 
theoretical work. He treats bourgeois law and state as metatheoretical givens. 
This is, ultimately, why his theory of restorative justice is a partial one, and why 
his radicality is bourgeois. 
Despite the poverty of its empiricism, it is Cragg's theory of restorative 
justice that is likely to have the most practical success. He capitulates completely 
to the sovereignty of the capitalist state. Paradoxically, it is this capitulation 
which makes his theory practicable, within the parameters of the crirninaljustice 
system. Capital will be far more disposed to a restorative justice which defers to 
the primacy of its state than one which questions that primacy and requires the 
dismantling of the crirninaljustice system. However, bourgeois indulgence comes 
at a high theoretical price. 
Anti-statism is the fust principle of comprehensive restorative justice. 
Cragg's entire project may be seen as one dedicated to discovering a theoretical 
route around this principle, and to construct a state-friendly restorative justice. 
This is an unenviable, arguably unattainable, task. Theoretical debilitation and 
analytical obliquity are more or less inevitable for the person who strives, 
simultaneously, to advance a cause and to jettison its defining postulate. This is 
exactly what happens with Cragg. In the end, he claims to have solved the 
problem of punishment simply by redefining its purpose as restorative. His 
version of restorative justice will cause pain to the offender (in the same way as 
criminal justice does) but this pain is not punishment because it was not intended 
to be painful! This is a formulation which borders on the incoherent and veers 
towards the idealist delusion that change can be achieved by definitional fiat. 
However, it is apparently the only solution which Cragg is able to offer to the 
theoretical problem engendered by his faith in the juridical institutions of the 
bourgeois state. 
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Be that as it may, Cragg has already succeeded where the theoreticians of 
comprehensive restorative justice have failed. Every restorative justice 
programme operating in the world today is necessarily informed by a version of 
his theory of partial restorative justice. These programmes exist with the 
imprimatur and function under the aegis of the national state in their respective 
countries. Cragg is the theoretician of these partial restorative justice 
programmes. The Practice of Punishment is a sustained attempt to provide partial 
restorative justice with the anti-anti-statist theory it requires to justify its 
obeisance to the hegemonic project of capital. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
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Chapter 5: Marxism and Restorative Justice 
This chapter presents a Marxist critique of the theoretical constitution of the 
restorative justice movement. Therefore, it is itself necessarily a theoretical 
endeavour. It is concerned to elaborate a theoretical critique of comprehensive 
restorative justice. This is the version of restorative justice which matters 
theoretically. Partial restorative justice is a pale fraction of comprehensive 
restorative justice. Whereas the latter was conceptualized as an alternative to 
criminal justice, the former has been fashioned as an adjunct thereto. I 
Comprehensive restorative justice thus represents a radical departure from the 
established presumptions and practices of criminal justice. It constitutes also a 
decisive theoretical rupture with the conventional approach to the problem of 
criminality. It therefore demands rigorous theoretical analysis. This chapter 
attempts such an analysis from a Marxist point of view. 
The viability of any doctrine turns, in fine, upon its theoretical premises. 
Any fundamental critique must therefore engage the doctrine theoretically. A 
critique which is located at or remains confined to the level of doctrinal principles 
may uncover operational lacunae or organizational contradictions, but invariably 
leaves unconfronted the theory underpinning such principles. Despite the 
theoretical radicality of comprehensive restorative justice, most analyses of it are 
not properly theoretical, at least not in the way that the trilogy of works analysed 
in Chapter Four above are. 
Whatever contradictions exist between partial restorative justice and criminal justice are 
non-antagonistic, and concern primarily defining the sphere of operation of each. By 
contrast, the contradictions between comprehensive restorative justice and criminal justice 
are antagonistic, in the sense that the one becomes or remains viable to the extent that the 
other remains undeveloped or degenerates. They are mortal enemies. 
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The bulk of the 'theoretical' literature tends to focus critical attention upon 
the principles of restorative justice and their implications, without interrogating 
their theoretical presuppositions. A notable example in this regard is Minor & 
Morrison's A Theoretical Study and Critique of Restorative Justice. 2 Despite its 
titular focus upon theory it is, in the main, concerned with assessing not the theory 
but the principles of restorative justice. To be sure, it does this in terms of three 
rival theoretical perspectives, namely, the Dukheimian, Marxist and Foucauldian. 
But that is not the same as a critical comprehension of the theory of restorative 
justice. Another illustrative example is Mind the Gap by Daly in which, 
according to her subtitle, she purports to examine 'restorative justice in theory and 
practice,.3 However, her notion of theory and practice is the everyday notion of 
how the stated ideals of restorative justice programmes compare to their actual 
practices.4 She does not devote any attention to theory proper, that is, to the 
epistemological foundations of the stated ideals. 
The efforts of Minor & Morrison and of Daly are good indices of the state 
of restorative justice criticism. It is in a parlous state theoretically. 
Restorationists have been concerned primarily to expound and popularize the 
basic principles which constitute their doctrine and have shown but scant 
commitment to making explicit their own theoretical presuppositions. Analysts of 
restorative justice have adhered somewhat slavishly to this trend. They have 
invariably focused their critical comments upon the overt claims ofthe 
restorationists and have given but meagre attention to probing their theoretical 
postulates. The critics have accepted the terrain demarcated by the proponents, 
with unhappy consequences for the practice of restorative justice criticism. 
2 Minor & Morrison (1996). 
3 Daly (2003). 
4 Ibid 220 ff. 
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Of course, no doctrine is ever theoretically unfounded. Even those which 
profess atheoreticism or which claim to be averse to the supposedly speculative 
detractions of theory are profoundly theoretical, albeit covertly. The supposedly 
anti-theoretical idea that the facts should speak for themselves, uncoloured by the 
structure of a theoretical paradigm, has long been exploded as a theoretical 
device.s Despite its emphasis upon practice, restorative justice is, of course, a 
theory of criminal justice. And although the theoretical output of its adherents is 
not its most prominent feature, restorative justice has been theorized, and from 
more than one perspective. 
5.1 Proprietary and Non-Proprietary Schools 
These theoretical endeavours divide conveniently into two categories, which 
may be designated proprietary and non-proprietary. The proprietary approach 
takes the notion of ownership as its theoretical premise. It theorizes criminality in 
terms of the imperatives of property. In other words, it comprehends criminal 
justice as a sphere of interaction between property owners, where exchanges are 
made and settlements are reached according to the private interests of the 
contending parties. Christie's famous formulation of criminal conflict as forms of 
property epitomizes the proprietary school. And as argued in Chapter Four above, 
the republican theory of Braithwaite & Pettit may also be comprehended in 
proprietary terms and hence as part of the proprietary school. For adherents of 
this school, the doctrinal edifice of restorative justice is rooted in the proprietary 
regime of contemporary capitalist society, and proprietorship is the theoretical key 
to the doing of justice. 
5 See Robertson (1977: 16-17): 'Although it is sometimes thought that "the facts speak for 
themselves", facts do nothing of the kind. They are silent. They have no meaning until we 
give meaning to them, and that meaning is given by theory. We are often prone to poke fun 
at "theorists" and to regard more highly the "practical" person. But theory and practice 
cannot be separated; virtually every practical decision you make and every practical opinion 
you hold has some theory lying behind it.' 
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The non-proprietary theories generally attempt to ground restorative justice 
upon premises reputedly loftier than the claims of mere property. It appears that 
they do not wish to entangle justice in proprietary baseness and appeal instead to 
humankind's putatively higher ethical sensibilities. They seek to link restorative 
justice, a purportedly higher form of justice than criminal justice, to the higher 
moral potentialities of the human condition. Hence they construct their theories in 
terms of such concepts as virtue, goodness, mutuality and trust. 6 Many rely 
heavily upon the precepts of the Christian worldview, and justify restorative 
justice according to such idealogies as love, forgiveness, reconciliation, respect 
and the like.? The non-proprietary school thus tends to anchor its theories in 
universals, that is, those desired and transcendental values which are supposed to 
hold good for all time and for all forms of human social organization. 
As seen in Chapter Two above, most proponents include an appeal to 
history in their advocacy of restorative justice. By comprehending restorative 
justice in relation to the proprietary specificities of the capitalist mode of 
production, the proprietary school incorporates this historicism theoretically. The 
non-proprietary school, by contrast, is apt to be ahistorical in its theoretical 
production and to favour the kind of supra-historical notions itemized above.8 
Non-proprietary theorists believe, for the most part, that the notion of privatized 
restorative justice is simply a better way of doing justice than the extant public 
criminal justice. And they have made theoretical touchstones, infer alia, of the 
above-mentioned universals which, they would have us believe, constitute us as 
ethical beings. However, like its proprietary counterpart, the non-proprietary 
6 Cragg's theory of restorative justice, discussed in Chapter Four above, falls squarely within 
this school. 
7 See, for example, Zehr (1995) and Consedine (1999). For a useful discussion of the 
Christian theories, see Varona (1996: 26-41). 
8 This is not to say that they do not seek to justify their theories historically. Rather, it is to 
say that their theories are not historicist. 
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school too considers criminal justice a private matter, to be engaged in and 
negotiated by the parties themselves.9 In this connection, the two schools have a 
common theoretical antipathy to the state as the organizational centre and 
institutional fulcrum of criminal justice. Both are committed unequivocally to 
restorative justice as privatized criminal justice. 
5.2 The Primacy of Property 
This chapter is dedicated to the critical appreciation of the proprietary 
approach, as represented by the Christie thesis. This is a focus which emerges 
logically and inevitably from the relationship between the proprietary and non-
proprietary approaches. All theories of comprehensive restorative justice, whether 
proprietary or non-proprietary, are at one that crime and the response thereto 
should be privatized completely. If comprehensive restorative justice has a 
theoretical watchword, it is privatization. 1O It is at the root of the confrontation 
between restorative and criminaljustice. ll It is the theoretical postulate which 
imbues restorative justice with its anti-statism. The non-proprietary school 
embraces and promotes the notion of privatization as easily and eagerly as the 
proprietary school. However, it avoids or fails to comprehend the necessary 
theoretical implication of such a position, namely, that in order for criminal 
justice to be privatized it must be comprehended in proprietary terms. 
9 Even Cragg, who otherwise is eminently statist, postulates that (partial) restorative justice 
be founded upon the principles of privatized conflict resolution. 
10 Of course, partial restorative justice also posits a privatized justice within its sphere of 
operation. Although it accepts the overall supremacy of public criminal justice, it does 
expect the state to withdraw from those areas of criminality which are designated for 
restoration. This partial privatization is subsumed theoretically within the complete 
privatization required by comprehensive restorative justice. 
11 The first target of restorative justice is retribution. However, this is a strategic manoeuvre 
which derives from the theoretical commitment to privatization. Retribution exemplifies 
the penal philosophy of statist justice. It is the natural target of choice for restorative 
justice. 
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A crime cannot be a private affair unless it is conceptualized as a form of 
property. Privatization entails property. It is an inherently proprietary notion 
which summates in private property. Only that which may be owned privately can 
be privatized. Privatization is about reducing public assets and resources to 
private ownership and presumes property to be an aboriginal and natural human 
relation. Privatization which does not produce private property is a conceptual 
non-starter. It is therefore necessary that the notion of privatized criminal justice, 
to which the restorationist project is wedded, be founded theoretically upon a 
proprietary conception of criminality. The non-proprietary school can have no 
theoretical credence in this regard. Absent privatization, restorative justice is 
emasculated; and absent private property, privatization is incomprehensible. All 
roads lead to property. 
The matter reduces to this: every theory of restorative justice which takes 
seriously the argument for the privatization of criminal justice oUght to embrace 
the proprietary postulate. The non-proprietary theories of restorative justice do 
not comprehend this theoretical imperative and are thus all beset by a basic 
contradiction, between their avowed commitment to a privatized criminal justice 
and their evasion of a proprietary notion of crime. This contradiction cannot be 
resolved within the confines of the non-proprietary approach, for acceptance of 
the proprietary concept of criminality is fatal to the integrity of any non-
proprietary theory. 
When all is said and done, the non-proprietary theories are nothing more 
than exercises in theoretical circumvention. They abstract justice from its socio-
economic and historical milieu. They do not confront the fact that the very 
concept of privatization is, at its core, a proprietary one. The efforts of the non-
proprietary school to fmd theoretical justification for restorative justice outside 
the parameters of property demonstrate a signal failure to appreciate that the idea 
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of privatized crime is loaded with assumptions about ownership of property, and 
makes sense only if property is presumed to be the constitutive social relation of 
production. The contradiction in which the non-proprietary school is caught is a 
constitutional one. Its resolution entails total victory for the proprietary approach. 
Subscribers to the non-proprietary approach will no doubt object, some 
vehemently, to the proprietary imperative. It does not accord with their self-
image. That is an image of crusaders in the name of justice. For them, restorative 
justice is about doing justice to all parties implicated in a criminal episode. It has 
nothing to do with the supposed evils of private property or with importing the 
morality of capital into criminal justice. They would point to the strong Christian 
motif in many restorationist programmes, a motif which is incompatible with the 
profit-making principles of private enterprise. Restorative justice is, in this 
regard, clearly not just another case of laissez faire penology. Instead, so the 
argument would go, it is a method of doing justice which truly does attempt to 
treat all persons as persons, and which seeks to remove the sense of worthlessness 
with which both victim and offender are routinely left in the traditional criminal 
trial. 12 
The non-proprietary school will, of course, also contend that, logically, the 
fact that Christie has theorized restorative justice in proprietary terms cannot 
automatically mean that his position is a representative one. In other words, there 
is no necessary theoretical nexus between restorative justice and property. It is 
entirely possible to ground restorative justice theoretically in non-proprietary 
12 Here it is worth noting that adherents of the non-proprietary approach habitually refer to the 
persons for whom they aspire to obtain justice as 'stakeholders', a tenn heavy with 
proprietary overtones. The collection edited by Zehr & Toews (2004), for example, 
devotes more than a hundred of its 400-odd pages to what are called 'stakeholder issues'. 
This trend appears to be derived from the popular capitalist idea of a 'stakeholder society' , 
in the success of which everyone is supposed to have a proprietary interest. It would appear 
that property will find its way even to those who would deny it. 
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concepts, such as trust or respect or virtue. Therefore, the Christie thesis is not 
authoritative. It is the construction of one theoretician, and is by no means to be 
understood as paradigmatic. In other words, the assessment of restorative justice 
cannot begin and end with Christie. Any sensible and defensible assessment must 
proceed from the premise that the Christie thesis is not coterminous with 
restorative justice and hence that the critique of Christie is not the critique of 
restorative justice as a whole. Restorative justice is so much more complex than 
the notion that criminal conflicts are a form of property. These are some of the 
objections which are to be expected from the non-proprietary school against the 
proprietary approach. 
However, no school of thought can ever expect to be assessed solely in 
terms of its self-image. Any theoretical critique of restorative justice, whether 
Marxist or not, must needs go beyond and behind what the proponents themselves 
say about or think of (or what they are likely to say about or think of) their project. 
A Marxist critique must seek to uncover the relationship between restorative 
justice and the material circumstances of its genesis and existence. It is in the 
comprehension of restorative justice as the expression of a determinate material 
context that its objective meaning is to be discerned. This may overlap with its 
self-image to a degree. But the correspondence between the self-image of a 
school of thought and its objective assessment is hardly ever complete, and much 
of the self-image may have to yield to insights which offer a quite different 
picture. In this regard, the self-image of restorative justice must be relegated to 
the basement of comprehension. For, despite the anticipated objections, itis 
submitted that the proprietary approach formulated by Christie does indeed 
contain the key to a materialist understanding of the theoretical precepts of 
restorative justice. 
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5.3 Morality and Property 
The various concepts upon which the non-proprietary theories of restorative 
justice rely may all be gathered under the rubric of morality. These concepts are 
meant to express the values which we, as ethical beings, ought to embrace or, at 
minimum, those to which we ought to aspire. However, as Engels has shown, the 
idea of morality is by no means either universal or uncontested. 13 What is right 
and what is not depends not upon some transcendental moral imperative but upon 
the material circumstances in which the question has to be answered. And these 
material circumstances are demarcated invariably in class terms. Thus Engels 
declares that: 
'men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their moral ideas in the 
last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is 
based - from the economic relations in which they carry on 
production and exchange.' 14 
There is no universal morality, valid for all time. There is only the morality of 
class at a specific historical conjuncture. Engels continues: 
'We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma 
whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable moral law 
on the pretext that the moral world too has its permanent principles 
which transcend history and the differences between nations. We 
maintain on the contrary that all former moral theories are the 
product, in the last analysis, of the economic stage which society has 
reached at that particular epoch.' 15 
The point is that moral codes are derived from and structured by material 
relations. Our ethical ideals are not given by or inscribed in moral absolutes. For 
the most part, they are determined by our material circumstances, not least 
amongst which are the class interests of their advocates. 
13 See Engels (1934: 106-108). 
14 Ibid 107. 
15 Ibid 107-108. 
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Lafargue shows that the historical roots of our moral sense of justice are to 
be found in the evolution of the institution of property. 16 It was the operation 
. property which prompted the transition from blood revenge to the principle of 
equivalence, which principle remains the foundation of the ideal of justice. And it 
was the development of property that put an end to primitive prehensility and 
instilled into us the belief that justice is coterminous with the right to and freedom 
of property. In a word, 'property brought justice to humanity' . 17 Pashukanis 
agrees that: 
'the concept of justice is itself inferred from the exchange relation and has 
no significance beyond this. Basically, the concept of justice does not 
contain anything substantively new, apart from the concept of the equal 
worth of all men.' 18 
From the Marxist perspective, then, our notion of justice is deeply contaminated 
with the spirit of property. 
However, it is not only justice that is proprietary to the core. Pashukanis 
considers that property founds the idea of morality itself. For him, every legal 
subject is simultaneously a moral subject, that is, 'a personality of equal worth'. J 9 
And, to anticipate the discussion which is to follow, the ethical form, like the 
legal form, is rooted in the social relations of the commodity economy. Morality 
as we know it is comprehensible only in relation to the commodity form, which is 
the perfect form of private property. And the moral subject: 
'embodies the principle of the essential equivalence of human 
personalities for, in exchange, all forms of labour are equalised and 
become human labour in the abstract. ,20 
16 See Lafargue (1975: 161-188). 
17 Ibid 184. 
18 Pashukanis (1978: 161). 
19 Ibid 151. 
20 Ibid 152. 
In bourgeois society, then, every person has at least two personalities, one 
legal and one moral. Both are structured by the principle of equivalence. 
And both are born of the exchange relation which defines the commodity 
form. 21 Pashukanis again: 
'Moral being is a necessary complement of legal being; they are both 
modes of intercourse used by commodity-producers. ,22 
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Our ethical proprieties are all intimately linked to our proprietary constitutions.23 
And our moral sensibilities are all rooted in our adherence to the principle of 
equivalence. Property brought us not only justice but also every other moral ideal 
which we have come to value as an expression of our equal worth as human 
beings in commodity-producing society. 
Theorists of the non-proprietary school of restorative justice have reckoned 
without the proprietary character of morality in the bourgeois epoch. Whatever 
high-minded ethical concept they may choose as theoretical keynote cannot detach 
their theorization from the spirit of property. For the ethical form which underlies 
each such concept is the conjugate of the commodity form. Twist and tum it as 
they will, the morality of our theorists will find its way back to property. There is 
no escaping the proprietary postulate. The theorist who seeks to comprehend 
restorative justice in non-proprietary terms invariably lapses into idealism. It may 
be an objective idealism,24 in the sense that it seeks to analyse restorative justice 
in terms of one or another ethical universal. But it is idealism no less. 
21 The relationshlp between the legal form and the commodity form constitutes the theoretical 
crux of this chapter and is discussed in detail below. 
22 Ibid 155. 
23 It is surely not entirely coincidental that 'propriety' and 'proprietorshlp' are etymological 
conjunctives. 
24 See Chapter One for a discussion of objective idealism as compared to subjective idealism. 
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5.4 Restoration and Property 
Indeed, the very idea of restoration is an inherently proprietary idea. That 
which is restored to a person must have belonged to that person originally. 
Property is the natural object of restoration. Its natural subject is the owner. 
Restoration presumes the unlawful loss or deprivation of that which one is legally 
entitled to have. It is about making good the loss or deprivation, and returning 
that which was taken, usually by means foul. The goal is unambiguous: to re-
unite the owner with his property or an equivalent replacement, and thereby to 
recover the status quo ante. The Chambers 2Ft Century Dictionary offers a 
definition of 'restore' which includes the expressly proprietary 'to return 
something lost or stolen to the rightful owner'. The definition contained in the 
Oxford Universal Dictionary is equally, if not as patently, proprietary: 'To give 
back, to make return or restitution of (anything previously taken away or lost)'. 
Property is entailed in restoration. It is the relationship between the owner 
and his property which has to be restored. That relationship has been disturbed, 
and has to be reinstated. What is more, the proprietary relationship is a natural 
one which has to be recovered. Thus the Chambers 2 rt Century Dictionary adds 
that 'restore' also means 'to bring someone or something back to a normal or 
proper state or condition'. The Concise Oxford Dictionary includes a similar 
definition of 'restore': 'replace, put back, bring to former place or condition'. The 
established meaning of the nominal 'restorative' as a health-restoring agent 
reinforces the idea of a natural or normal relationship which requires repair. 
There is embedded in the notion of restoration an idea that a natural 
proprietary relationship has been rent, and that the aim of restoration is to repair 
that relationship. The premise is that a person has been deprived of something or 
access to something that is his or hers. The person may have a right of ownership 
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in the thing or a right of possession. In either case, it is a proprietary right. And it 
is a taken-for-granted proprietary right. In other words, the relationship between 
the person and the thing is understood to be an organic one. Restoration is, in this 
regard, about re-establishing this relationship when it has been sundered 
unlawfully. It is about repairing what is considered to be normal and proper, 
namely, the fundamental proprietary relationship. 
Christie grasped this. He understood that restoration was, by defInition, 
about recognizing that the relationship which had been severed and which had to 
be restored was, fIrst and foremost, a proprietary relationship. One cannot be 
restored that in which one does not have rights of ownership or, at least, rights of 
possession. Christie comprehended this simple fact and theorized it as the basis 
of restorative justice. It is precisely this insight which makes the Christie thesis 
archetypal. It is an insight which enabled Christie to discard all non-essential 
factors and focus exclusively upon the relationship which is essential to the 
comprehension of restorative justice. 25 
All other theories of restorative justice are, at least, one step removed from 
the crucial proprietary relationship which Christie discerned. Those approaches 
which theorize restorative justice in terms of notions such trust or respect or virtue 
all fail to address the necessary prior question pertaining to the nature of the 
relationship that needs restoring. The non-proprietary theories all present more or 
less coherent cases as to why the sundered relationship ought to be restored. Such 
arguments invariably reach the conclusion that restorative justice is the only 
viable answer to the crisis of criminality gripping contemporary society. But only 
Christie tells us, in clear and certain terms, what it is that is being restored or that 
25 The isolation of the essential elements of a relationship is achieved by a process of 
abstraction. The idea of abstraction and its place in the Marxist methodology is discussed 
further below. 
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ought to be restored. Only Christie has understood the relationship which 
constitutes the fundament of restorative justice for what it is, namely, a 
relationship which is definitionally a proprietary one. The non-proprietary 
theories represent a regression in the theorization of restorative justice. Christie's 
was a major theoretical advance. It established the groundwork for the scientific 
analysis of restorative justice and is a necessary component of any such analysis. 
The theorist who seeks to proceed without Christie's insights or to jettison the 
proprietary fundamentals of restoration must inevitably produce an impoverished 
theory of restorative justice. 
In truth, and despite their supposed aversion to property, the non-proprietary 
theories of restorative justice are themselves all profoundly, albeit clandestinely, 
proprietary. Here it is well to recall the dictum of Alford & Friedland to the effect 
that: 
'what is not treated in a work is as theoretically significant as its 
explicit assumptions and hypotheses. Silence carries the corollary 
that the expected audience will accept or be blind to the absence of 
treatment of certain issues as historical realities. ,26 
What the proprietary school makes patent, the non-proprietary school 
presupposes. Their penchant for ethical universals notwithstanding, non-
proprietary theorists proceed from property. It is their unspoken theoretical 
prologue. They begin where the proprietary school leaves off. They theorize 
restorative justice as privatized justice without giving a second thought to the 
proprietary fundamentals of their cause. They are able to do so because that 
which is a first principle does not merit a second thought. When all is said and 
done, however, all theories of restorative justice, qua privatized justice, are 
genetically steeped in the ethos of property. 
26 Alford & Friedland (1985: 2). 
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In this connection, Christie's thesis is primordial. He seeks to comprehend 
precisely that which is an epistemological apriority for the non-proprietary 
theorist. And by doing so, he is able to pierce the veil of appearance and reveal the 
material core of the doctrine of restorative justice to be a proprietary one. The 
non-proprietary theorists all forget that justice can never be higher than right, and 
that right, in the final analysis, as Marx reminds us, 'can never be higher than the 
economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby,.27 
Christie does not so forget. He comprehends this fundamental materialist 
postulate. That is why his thesis must be given primacy over all others. His is the 
only thesis which attempts to make theoretically intelligible the ontological 
premises of restorative justice. It is this that makes him the theoretical founding 
father of the restorationist movement. And it is this that dictates that his theory be 
the cardinal object of any Marxist critique of restorative justice. 
5.5 Pashukanis: Law and Marxism 
The analysis and argument presented in this chapter rely heavily upon the 
work of Evgeny Pashukanis, the famous Bolshevik jurist, who was murdered by 
agents of the Stalinist regime in 1937. · Pashukanis is one of a handful of Marxists 
to have taken law, and hence the legal form, seriously as a field of study and his 
27 Marx (l978: 531). 
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Law and Marxism: A General Theory has deservedly become a classic of Marxist 
jurisprudence.28 No subsequent Marxist has come even close to matching the 
theoretical advances made by him in the materialist comprehension and critique of 
the legal fonn. Given the potency of his thesis, it is altogether surprising that 
Pashukanis's general theory has not become conventional Marxist wisdom in the 
analysis of legal relations. Yet, Pashukanis is nowadays rarely even 
acknowledged in the Marxist legal oeuvre, and the general theory has been 
28 Law and Marxism was first published in Russian in 1924. Second and third Russian 
editions appeared in 1926 and 1927 respectively. The third edition was also published in 
German in 1929. Throughout this dissertation I use the third edition, as translated from the 
German by Barbara Einhorn in 1978 and edited by Chris Arthur. The third edition was the 
last one approved by Pashukanis and appeared before he was constrained, by the victory of 
Stalinism and the imperatives of physical survival, to attempt various recantations in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. It was also the edition which he relied upon to introduce his 
general theory to the world outside the Soviet Union. Finally, as Warrington (1983: 66) 
suggests, the third edition is a more complete work than the first and second. 
Not unexpectedly, the first edition generated considerable interest and controversy within 
legal circles in the Soviet Union. It appears to have been at the centre of a division of 
Bolshevikjurisprudents, most of whom were adherents of the so-called commodity 
exchange/form approach, into two gradations, moderate and radical. Their differences 
centred upon the ambit of the commodity exchange/form approach. According to 
Schlesinger (1946: 153-156) the moderate wing, led by Piotr Stuchka, restricted the 
commodity exchange approach to civil law, whereas the radical wing, led by Pashukanis, 
applied it to law in general. In this regard, see also Beirne & Sharlet (1979: 15-17) and 
Butler (2003: 74-75). 
Stuchka led the critique of the first Russian edition of Law and Marxism, to which 
Pashukanis (op cit 37-45) responded in a fairly lengthy preface to the second Russian 
edition. And although he made certain concessions to his critics (for example, he granted 
the existence of pre-capitalist law) he did so 'with certain reservations' (ibid 44). 
Pashukanis himself considers that the second edition of Law and Marxism preserved 'its 
original character in the main'. Thus, he declares (ibid 38): 'All I have done is to make 
those additions which were necessary, occasioned in part by suggestions made in the 
reviews' . The preface to the third Russian edition occupies less than a page and opens with 
the following observation: 'There are no substantive changes in this third edition of the 
work as compared with the second.' 
It would appear, then, that despite certain amendments of detail, Pashukanis remained 
faithful to his fundamental thesis throughout the three editions of Law and Marxism which 
were published with his imprimatur. That is, he continued to rely upon the homology 
between the legal form and the commodity form as the basis of his general theory oflaw. 
Whatever revisions Pashukanis made to his general theory were proposed in separate 
articles after the publication of the third edition. These modifications are usefully traced by 
Beirne & Sharlet (ibid: 12-14 & 20-23). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, then, I rely upon the third edition of Law and Marxism 
as the most comprehensive and unadulterated statement ofPashukanis's general theory. 
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roundly disowned by contemporary western Marxist legal analysts. 29 
Instead, these analysts have tended, in the main, to focus their critical efforts 
upon the comprehension of legal relations in terms of the base-superstructure 
problematic. They have been suspicious of or dissatisfied with Marx's own 
classification of law as a superstructural specificity and have invested 
considerable intellectual ingenuity into efforts to rescue legal relations from a 
'mere' superstructural existence. Some of their efforts have been detailed in 
Chapter One above. Pashukanis has no such concerns about the place of law in 
the Marxist analytic. In this regard, he adheres to the classical Marxist 
comprehension oflaw. Indeed, he defmes his analytical terrain as the 'legal 
superstructure as an objective phenomenon'. 30 
It needs to be remembered always that Pashukanis's project was to construct 
a general theory of law according to the precepts of Marxist materialism. He was 
not concerned to examine the workings of legal relations as an aspect of ruling-
class ideology. Nor was he especially interested in the impact which law, as a 
superstructural phenomenon, may have upon its material base. Marxists before 
Pashukanis had already confronted these issues and, even if he could, he was not 
interested in adding to their insights. His was a quite different ambition: to 
produce a Marxist theory of the legal form or, at least, to identify the elements of 
such a theory. In other words, he was concerned to theorize law as law, that is, as 
a superstructural specificity, and not as a mere ideological cloak for class relations 
29 Pashukanis did enjoy authoritative status in Bolshevik Russia, but lost it under the Stalinist 
regime. There was also a brief revival of interest in Pashukanis in the 1970s. See Butler 
(1988: 32). He continued to enjoy support amongst some analysts well into the 1980s. 
See, for example, Melossi & Pavarini (1981), Norrie (1982), Sayer (1987) and lakobowski 
(1990). However, reliance upon or reference to his general theory all but ceased in the 
1990s. Today Pashukanis is well and truly passe. Certainly, he is no longer part of the 
mainstream Marxist approach to law. Some of his severest critics would consider 
themselves to be Marxists. 
30 Pashukanis op cit 39. 
of oppression and exploitation. It was a grand aspiration. And in Law and 
Marxism he succeeded, and grandly, in making the crucial theoretical 
breakthroughs required for the elaboration of a general theory of law. 
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Despite his theoretical sophistication, Pashukanis remains anathema to most 
jurisprudents, including large numbers who would classify themselves as 
adherents of one or other variant of Marxism. The reasons for his sidelining 
cannot detain us here but are to be found, of course, in the deleterious impact of 
Stalinism upon the Bolshevik heritage and the subsequent ambiguous relationship 
of West em Marxism to this heritage. Like Trotsky's, Pashukanis's contribution to 
Marxism has never been properly recovered from the distortions and falsifications 
of the Stalinist degeneration, the post-1956 supposed de-Stalinization 
notwithstanding. What is indubitable, however, is that contemporary Marxist 
jurisprudence is the poorer for its shabby treatment of Pashukanis. In this 
connection, Balbus has made the perceptively telling observation that: 
'Almost all subsequent Marxist work on the law is, unfortunately, a 
regression from the standard established by Pashukanis's pioneering 
effort. ,)1 
This chapter is therefore necessarily, in part, a contribution to the belated 
renascence of the classical Marxist jurisprudence, of which Pashukanis is, after 
Marx and .Engels, the most creative and truest representative. 
The conventional Marxist approach to law was to identify and expose the 
class content of legal relations. In other words, the Marxist critique of law was 
about tracking the links between the constitution of the legal superstructure and 
the material interests of the contending classes. Marxists before Pashukanis 
tended to approach law as a 'mere' superstructural aspect of the social relations of 
31 Balbus (1978: 88). 
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production. They focused on the class character of the law. For the most part 
they comprehended law in instrumentalist and reductionist terms, that is, as a tool 
in the hands ofthe ruling class in its struggle against the ruled. For them the legal 
superstructure was a reflection, more or less direct, of the material interests of the 
dominant social classes. 
Latter-day radical jurisprudents, in response to the tenacity of such 
instrumentalism-reductionism, have argued for the relative autonomy of law. This 
approach has highlighted the ways in which legal relations are not direct 
reflections of ruling class interests, and how law may at times be harnessed to the 
cause of the dominated classes. It has also included an argument which endows 
law with a significant, sometimes even decisive, influence upon the constitution 
of the relations of production. In other words, the proponents of relative 
autonomy have sought to re-present the base-superstructure problematic in non-
instrumentalist and anti-reductionist terms. 
The conventional Marxist analysis of law in terms of the base-superstructure 
schema oscillates between two poles. On the one side there is instrumentalism, 
which denies law any autonomy from class interests. On the other side there is 
formalism, which grants law complete independence from such interests.32 The 
fundamental choice is between absolute legal subservience to the relations of 
production and absolute legal autonomy from them. The argument for the relative 
autonomy of law, as described above, is a via media. It seeks to comprehend legal 
relations in terms which deny instrumentalism without promoting formalism. It is 
32 This opposition is discussed by, inter alia, Balbus (ibid), Collins (1984) and Tushnet 
(1983). 
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the classic position of compromise. 33 
For Pashukanis, there is a fundamental problem with all analyses of law -
instrumentalist, formalist or relative autonomist - which adhere to the base-
superstructure problematic. None of these analyses is able to comprehend the 
form of law. They cannot explain why legal relations take the form they do. 
Analyses which are located within the parameters of the base-superstructure 
dichotomy are unable to distinguish consistently between law, on the one hand, 
and sociology and politics, on the other. Legal analysis is subsumed under social 
analysis, and the distinctiveness of the legal form is sacrificed in pursuit of the 
class content or otherwise of legal relations. Even the relative autonomist project 
to construct a more nuanced relationship between base and superstructure is 
unable to supersede the definitional bounds of this relationship and engage the 
form of law. Like its crasser variants, it has no need of a general theory oflaw. 
Its objectives are easily and fully met by a general theory of society. 
In his consideration of the question of the existence of a Marxist theory of 
law, Tushnet suggests, contra Pashukanis, that 'a Marxist theory [oflaw] must be 
sociological' .34 Such an argument presumes, at least, a rough identity between the 
theory and sociology oflaw, and thereby collapses the analysis of the legal form 
into the sociology oflaw. It privileges social analysis at the expense oflegal 
analysis, and directs us away from a materialist comprehension of the 
fundamental juridical concepts required for the construction of a general theory of 
law. 
33 See Hunt (1993: 166): 'Between the Scylla of autonomy and the Charybdis of determinism 
lies the haven of relative autonomy.' Balbus (ibid 75) has a different view of the relative 
autonomy of law. For him, it is not a position of compromise between formalism and 
instrumentalism. Instead, it 'purports to transcend the opposition between these positions 
by rejecting the corrunon conceptual terrain on which they are based and elaborating a 
wholly different theoretical terrain'. He goes on to construct a theory of law which is 
essentially Pashukanian. Unsurprisingly, Balbus's approach is not the conventional 
argument for relative autonomy. 
34 Tushnet op cit 172. 
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Tushnet's position also entails the rejection of 'large abstractions such as 
"bourgeois law'" as the subject matter of a Marxist theory of law.35 He considers 
the law of a determinate social formation at a specific historical juncture to be the 
legitimate subject matter of a Marxist theory of law. However, such a proposition 
fails to appreciate that a general theory of law cannot be derived from anything 
but 'large abstractions'. For such a theory, the large abstraction of bourgeois law 
is a genetic imperative. Law is a product of social evolution and is an attribute of 
all social formations which have developed class divisions. However, mature law 
is bourgeois law, that is, the law of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class. Bourgeois 
law is, in this regard, the high-water mark of legal evolution. It is the culmination 
of law as form. Only in bourgeois society does the juridical outlook triumph 
completely. Only in bourgeois society are the social relations of production 
articulated in legal terms. Only in bourgeois society are human relations fully 
structured according to the principle oflegal subjectivity.36 The 'large 
abstraction' of bourgeois law is thus the natural and necessary object of a Marxist 
general theory of law. And such a theory cannot be simply or even mainly 
sociological. Its primary concern must be to comprehend the constitution of the 
legal form. 
Pashukanis was, of course, critical of those Marxist theories in which ' the 
concept of law is examined exclusively from the point of view of its content'. 37 
These, he complained, were nothing more than bourgeois sociological theories 
of law into which the 'element of class struggle' has been injected.38 They were 
not properly juridical, and whatever juridical concepts they did engage were 
treated as obfuscations which had to be decoded in order to uncover their class 
content. The concepts themselves did not merit any sustained theoretical 
35 Ibid 182. 
36 See Pashukanis op cit 40-45. 
37 Ibid 54. 
38 Ibid 53. 
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attention. Pashukanis considered this approach to be fatal to the construction of a 
general theory of law. For him the Marxist analysis of law had to comprehend 
legal relations for themselves, and not merely as the receptacle of class interests. 
This necessarily implied a focus upon law as form. In other words, the key to the 
construction of a Marxist theory of law lay in a 'materialist interpretation of legal 
regulation as a specific historical form' .39 
Needless to say, Pashukanis accepted the traditional Marxist position that 
the legal form conceals a content which is structured by the inequities of the 
capital-labour relation. And he granted the importance of exposing the class or 
economic content of legal relations. But he was adamant that the proper object of 
Marxist jurisprudence had to be the legal form and its associated juridical 
concepts. Thus, he warns: 
'If, however, we forgo an analysis of the fundamental juridical 
concepts, all we get is a theory which explains the emergence of 
legal regulation from the material needs of society, and thus provides 
an explanation of the fact that legal norms conform to the material 
interests of particular social classes. Yet, legal regulation has still 
not been analysed as a form. ,40 
Most Marxists have surrendered to the impulse to dismiss the form of law as an 
obfuscation and, relying upon the analytical resources of Marxist political 
economy, have sought to lay bare the relations of domination and exploitation 
which constitute the content of the legal relation. Pashukanis departs radically 
from this conventional Marxist wisdom. He realized that the customary focus 
upon the content of the legal relation was the source of the poverty of Marxist 
legal theory. He perceived that the traditional Marxist aversion to analysis of the 
legal form was the major obstacle to the construction of a general theory of law. 
Thus he set himself the task of elaborating such a theory on the basis of a 
39 Ibid 54. 
40 Ibid 55. 
materialist analysis of the legal form. The result was the so-called commodity 
form theory oflaw.41 
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Pashukanis's central thesis is disarmingly straightforward, namely, that the 
historical origins of law as we understand it are to be found in the process of 
commodification.42 In other words, law is an attribute of the commodity 
economy, that is, the economy in which the raison d'etre of production is 
exchange. The natural economy, in which production is for use by the producers, 
does not need law. For as long as the products of human labour remain primarily 
use values, custom is an adequate regulator of social relations. The appearance of 
the legal form on the historical stage is coterminous with the transformation of the 
products of human labour into commodities. The world-historic transition from 
production for use to production for exchange is simultaneously the world-historic 
transition from custom to law. The genesis of the legal form is thus to be located 
in the genesis of the commodity form. Commodification spawns legality; the 
commodity form is the harbinger of the legal form. Pashukanis reminds us that it 
was Marx himself who unveiled 'the deep interconnection between the legal form 
and the commodity form' .43 Hence his methodological dictum: 
'The critique of bourgeois jurisprudence from the standpoint of 
scientific socialism must follow the example of Marx's critique of 
bourgeois political economy.,44 
41 See Warrington op cit and Fine (1984). The theory is also sometimes referred to as the 
commodity exchange theory oflaw. See Fuller (1949) and Norrie (1882). Pashukanis 
himself did not name his theory. He was constructing a general theory of law. His Law and 
Marxism is exemplary of the theoretical advances and analytical sophistication achieved by 
the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. Interestingly, Pashukanis's 
objections to proletarian law echo Trotsky's denial of the possibility of proletarian culture. 
42 This is the process whereby the products of human labour are transformed into 
commodities, that is, exchange values. Commodification begins in the pre-capitalist epoch 
but becomes generalized under capitalism, when labour-power itself is transformed into a 
commodity. 
43 Pashukanis op cit 63. 
44 Ibid 64. 
He considered Law and Marxism to be an extrapolation of the elements of 
the Marxist theory of law developed in Capital, Anti-Diihring and other 
Marxist classics.45 
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The relationship between law and the commodity is a necessary one. Since 
exchange is its logical conclusion, commodification entails the market. In other 
words, production for exchange requires the emergence of the conditions for 
exchange, that is, market relations. These must be or must at least appear to be 
human relations. Only human beings are capable of triggering the exchange 
process. The market in commodities must therefore necessarily operate as one 
staffed and directed by human beings. Marx explains the matter in more detail 
thus: 
'It is plain that commodities cannot go to market and make 
exchanges of their own account. We must, therefore, have recourse 
to their guardians, who are also their owners ... In order that these 
objects may enter into relation with each other as commodities, their 
guardians must place themselves in relation to one another, as 
persons whose will resides in these objects, and must behave in such 
a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and 
part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual 
consent. They must therefore recognise in each other the rights of 
private proprietors. This juridical relation .. . is but the reflex of the 
real economic relation between the two. It is this economic relation 
that determines the subject-matter comprised in each such juridical 
act. ,46 
The market requires perfect equality, not only amongst commodities but also 
amongst their owners. 
Commodity equality is obviously necessary and is achieved in the 
calculation of exchange value in terms of the socially necessary labour time 
required to produce the commodities. The equality of commodity owners (who 
45 Ibid 38. 
46 Marx (I954: 88). 
are naturally unequally endowed with talents, potentialities and the like) is 
necessary to ensure that the process is indeed one of exchange and not of 
appropriation or robbery. Marx again: 
'Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual 
B, he does not appropriate by force, nor vice versa, but rather they 
recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose 
will penetrates their commodities. Accordingly, the juridical 
moment of the Person enters here '" No one seizes hold of another's 
property by force. Each divests himself of his property 
voluntarily. ,47 
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There can be no market in commodities unless each and every owner recognizes 
and accepts each and every other owner as an equal. Owner equality is a 
necessary concomitant of commodity equality. Both are demanded by the market 
in commodities. 
Owner equality is achieved legally. The aboriginal legal transaction is the 
invention of the legal subject. The transition from custom to law is exemplified in 
the concept of legal subjectivity. The legal subject is the disembodied commodity 
owner, disembodied, that is, of all natural advantage or disadvantage. According 
to Pashukanis: 
'At the same time, therefore, that the product of labour becomes a 
commodity and a bearer of value, man acquires the capacity to be a 
legal subject and a bearer ofrights.,48 
In other words, commodification and juridification are parallel historical 
processes. The commodity owner enters and participates in the market as a legal 
subject, perfectly equal, in terms of rights and duties, to every other commodity 
owner. 
47 Marx (1973: 243). 
48 Pashukanis op cit 112. 
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It is the rise of the notion oflegal subjectivity which abolishes the natural 
inequality ofpeople.49 Every legal subject is deemed to be exactly equal to every 
other legal subject. Such equality, as intimated above, is a necessary attribute of 
the market. It is the guarantor of the exchange relation and hence of the 
reproduction of the commodity economy. It, in its turn, is guaranteed by the state, 
which possesses the capacity to enforce the law. As Harvey notes, the juridical 
moment: 
'supposes not only a solid legal foundation to exchange but also the 
power to sustain private property rights and enforce contracts. This 
power, of course, resides in "the state". The state in some form or 
another is a necessary precondition to the establishment of values.' 50 
Pashukanis, similarly, discerns a definite historical interrelation between the 
development of the commodity economy and the development of 'bourgeois 
statedom', which, he tells us: 
'can be traced to a single principle, according to which neither of 
two people exchanging in the market can regulate the exchange 
relation unilaterally; rather this requires a third party who personifies 
the reciprocal guarantees which the owners of commodities mutually 
agree to as proprietors, and hence promulgates the regulations 
governing transactions between commodity owners. ,51 
The legal subject who asserts or attempts to assert himself as superior to his 
fellows and not to respect their right to equality usually has to answer (or be made 
to appear to answer) for his opportunism to the law enforcement agencies of the 
state. 
49 Formally, it also abolishes social inequality. Of course, in practice the legal subjectivity of 
a peasant or proletarian is seldom of consequence against the social power of the ruling 
elite. For, as Pashukanis (ibid 127) reminds us, 'the capacity to be a legal subject is a purely 
formal capacity'. 
50 Harvey (1982: 18-19). 
51 See Pashukanis op cit 148-150. The class nature of the capitalist state is never far from his 
mind. Thus he adds almost immediately that 'the bourgeoisie has never, in favour of purity 
of theory, lost sight of the fact that class society is not only a market where autonomous 
owners of commodities meet, but is at the same time the battlefield of a bitter class war, 
where the machinery of state represents a very powerful weapon' . 
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Law, thus, is the ethos of the market generalized to human relations. The 
idea that, regardless of our de facto natural and socio-economic differences, we 
are all equal before the law has its origins in the equality which forms the bedrock 
of all market relations. The idea that we all have certain inalienable rights which 
are enforceable against all comers is derived historically from the rights of the 
commodity owner. The commodity economy is the fans et origo of the concept of 
legal equality. It is the logic of this economy which produces the legal relation. 
Pashukanis puts it thus: 
'The legal relation between subjects is simply the reverse side of the 
relation between products of labour which have become 
commodities. ,52 
The birth of law is structured by the transition from the natural to the commodity 
economy. Our notion of equality is a fundamentally legal one, and it derives from 
our transformation into legal subjects. We had to acquire legal subjectivity, and 
hence legal equality, in order to become successful commodity owners, that is, in 
order to warrantee the integrity of the market. The juridical worldview rests upon 
the idea of equality. Concepts and interactions which do not embrace equality 
have to be comprehended as non-juridical. Exchange is the fundamental juridical 
relation. It is the hallmark pfthe commodity economy. And it is the source ofthe 
transformation of every natural person into a juridical person. 53 
Such are the essentialia of the general theory of law constructed by 
Pashukanis. It is a theory which, despite the objections of detractors, is founded 
surely and consistently upon the precepts of classical Marxism. Pashukanis 
undertook to do what Marx himself had never had the opportunity to produce, 
namely, a Marxist general theory of law. He made use of the episodic remarks on 
the critique of the legal relation left by Marx and Engels to fashion a Marxist 
52 Ibid 85. 
53 Marx op cit 246. See also Harvey op cit 18-19. 
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theory oflaw that is derived directly from the Marxist theory of value. Law and 
Marxism is to the critique of legal relations what Capital is to the critique of 
economic relations. 
The crucial elements of Pashukanis' s theory may be summarized in the 
following terms: 
• The subject-matter of a general theory of law is the legal form, that is, the 
legal superstructure constituted in terms of the fundamental juridical concept of 
legal subjectivity.54 The emergence of the legal subject expresses the historic 
transformation of human relations into legal relations.55 
• The genesis of the legal form, and hence of the legal subject, is to be found 
in the relations of exchange which accompanied the rise of commodity 
production. 56 The natural economy is a pre-juridical era of human social 
evolution. The juridical era commences with petty commodity production and 
summates in generalized commodity production, that is, capitalism. 
• The legal form is the homologue of the commodity form. The legal subject 
is the cell-form oflegal relations in the same way as the commodity is the cell-
form of economic relations.57 The analysis of the legal form must therefore 
proceed from the analysis of the commodity form.58 
• The legal subject is a commodity owner and vice versa. They coalesce in 
the process of exchange. The circulation of commodities could not occur without 
every commodity owner becoming also a legal subject, for it is only as a legal 
subject that the commodity owner could make his products available for exchange 
in the market. In other words, the birth and development of commodity exchange 
54 Pashukanis op cit 47. 
55 Ibid 40. 
56 Ibid 43. 
57 Ibid 111-113. 
58 Ibid Ill. 
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entailed the birth and development of the legal subject.59 
• The phenomenon of law, then, arises in tandem with the economic category 
ofvalue.6o Legal relations are, in this connection, the form in which exchange 
relations materialize. The legal subject is the quotidian purveyor of the spirit of 
the commodity. The core legal principle of equality is the law of value 
juridified.61 The general theory of law must therefore be concerned, first and 
foremost, with mapping the interconnections between the legal form and the 
commodity form. 
The theory of law developed by Pashukanis has every claim to be regarded 
as the Marxist theory of law. It was Marx and Engels who developed the 
materialist conception of history upon which Pashukanis' s theory is so 
meticulously based. It was Marx and Engels who made the analytical distinction 
between base and superstructure which led Pashukanis to the conclusion that the 
form oflaw should be the object of the Marxist theory oflaw. It was Engels who 
taught us that the bourgeois world outlook is fundamentally a juridical one. It was 
Marx who showed us that legal subjectivity and its accompanying ethos of 
equality are necessary properties of the market in commodities.62 Pashukanis 
himself was clear about the aetiology of his work. Thus, he tells us: 
'In Marx, the analysis of the form of the subject follows directly 
from the analysis of the commodity form. ,63 
He knew that he was simply developing and synthesizing the real discoveries 
made by Marx and Engels. He was able to elaborate the so-called commodity 
59 Ibid 112-113 . 
60 Ibid 117. 
61 Ibid 38. 
62 Ibid Ill. 
63 Ibid. 
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exchange theory of law only because Marx and Engels had long ago provided all 
the signposts required for such an elaboration.64 
5.6 In Defence of Pashukanis 
Despite his rather weighty Marxist credentials, criticism of Pashukanis is 
widespread, not least amongst analysts who would consider themselves Marxist. 
There are four objections to the general theory of law which stand out for being 
repeated by various critics. They are, firstly, that the theory is too fonnal and 
hence too abstract; secondly, that it is methodologically incorrect to theorize law, 
as Pashukanis does, in terms of the relations of commodity exchange (instead of 
commodity production); thirdly, that the theory incorrectly comprehends law as a 
specifically capitalist phenomenon; and fourthly, that the theory encouraged a 
form of legal anarchism which provided a favourable milieu for the rise of 
Stalinism. 
5.6.1 Essential versus Non-essential 
The first charge was levelled against Law and Marxism as early as 1930 by 
Karl Korsch, who complained of the 'extraordinarily abstract nature of this work' 
which, he adds, 'in parts intensifies to become downright scholasticism,65 Fine 
concludes that 'the real problem .. . in Pashukanis's intervention lay in its 
abstractness,.66 And Young has adjudged that his 'emphasis upon the form oflaw 
64 Lowy (1981: 8) says of the scattered comments by Marx and Engels on the theory of 
permanent revolution that 'it is not possible to speak ofa coherent and systematic theory of 
permanent revolution in Marx and Engels. Rather, there is a series of fragmentary 
conceptions, prophetic intuitions and inchoate perspectives, which intermittently appear and 
reappear but are never ordered in a rigorous doctrine or global strategy. Their importance 
is above all methodological.' Virtually the same may be said of Marx and Engels on the 
general theory of law. And in the same way as it was left to Trotsky to fashion their 
remarks into the theory of permanent revolution, so it was given to Pashukanis to produce 
the general theory ofIaw. 
65 Korsch (1978: 193-194). 
66 Fine op cit 163. 
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and punishment produces ... a strangely abstract explanation' .67 The alleged 
divorce between Pashukanis's theory and reality has prompted Hirst to label his 
concept of law idealist,68 Warrington to liken his theoretical propositions to 'wild 
flights of fancy' ,69 and Hunt to allege the correspondence between the commodity 
form and punishment to be 'nothing more than the verbal equation achieved by 
the dual usage of equivalence and the assertion that the verbal correspondence 
evidences a real correspondence'. 70 Even the sympathetic Sayer, who credits 
Pashukanis with developing Marx's insights into the legal form 'with 
considerable brilliance', feels constrained to refer to his 'at times, undue 
abstractness' .71 
It is submitted that, despite its popularity, the accusation of abstractness 
against Pashukanis is misplaced. It derives from a shared misunderstanding 
amongst the critics of the role of abstraction in the Marxist method. Marx taught 
us that: 
'In the analysis of economic forms ... neither microscopes nor 
chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace 
both.,n 
This same has to be true also of the analysis of the legal form. The only 
instrument available for the construction of a general theory of law is the force of 
abstraction. The process of abstraction is crucially about the separation of the 
essential from the non-essential. Hegel, from whom Marx learned the dialectic, 
understood that scientific comprehension requires that 'the essential be 
distinguished and brought into relief in contrast with the so-called non-
essential' .73 The analyst must be able to get to the heart of the matter, so to speak. 
67 Young (1980: 116). 
68 Hirst (1979: 111). 
69 Warrington op cit 64. 
70 Hunt op cit 81. 
71 Sayer op cit 108. 
72 Marx (1954: 19). 
73 Hegel (1956: 65). 
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And, in analytical terms, the heart is to be found, not in the body, but in the cells 
comprising that body.74 In other words, the analysis of a social form such as law 
must be located at the cellular level. This level cannot be reached other than by a 
process of systematic abstraction from those properties of the form which 
constitute it above the cellular level. 
Marx perceived the commodity to be 'the economic cell-form,75 of the 
capitalist mode of production and devoted the bulk of the fIrst volume of Capital 
to its analysis, at the expense of such 'non-cellular' economic aspects as price, 
profIt, rent, business cycles, crises, and the like. A general theory of law must, 
similarly, discard all that is secondary and include in its ambit only those relations 
which are constitutive of the legal form. Pashukanis understood this. Not only 
does he expressly refer to Marx's statement cited above, but he extends it to the 
analysis of the legal form: 
'The theory of law makes use of abstractions which are no less 
'artifIcial ' [than those used by Marx in the analysis of economic 
forms]: the research methods of natural science cannot discover a 
'legal relation', or a 'legal subject' either, yet behind these 
abstractions too lie perfectly real social forces.' 76 
Pashukanis knew that in order for him to generate a general theory of law he had 
to isolate the fundamental juridical concepts from the myriad of legal rules and 
regulations. He understood that a general theory of law had to comprehend the 
purifIed legal form, unencumbered by the diversions of 'law in practice' or 'law in 
society' .77 
74 Marx op cit 19. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Pashukanis op cit 59. 
77 See Sweezy (1942: 19). 
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The general theory of law constructed by Pashukanis is abstract only in the 
sense that, in tenns of the Marxist method, it is located at a high level of 
abstraction. The avowed Marxist critics who charge abstractness do not appear to 
comprehend this most basic of Marxist methodological tenets. They 
misunderstand both the purpose and process of abstraction. They confuse the 
identification, for analysis, of an unadulterated aspect of social reality with an 
alleged escape from that reality. Sweezy sets the record straight in this regard: 
'The legitimate purpose of abstraction in social science is never to get away 
from the real world but rather to isolate certain aspects of the real world for 
intensive investigation. When, therefore, we say that we are operating on a 
high level of abstraction we mean we are dealing with a relatively small 
number of aspects of reality; we emphatically do not mean that those aspects 
with which we are dealing are not capable of historical investigation and 
factual illustration. ,78 
Pashukanis's general theory of law operates at such a high level of abstraction. In 
order to analyse it, he had to engage the legal fonn as a pristine insularity. He had 
to make a number of simplifying assumptions which reduced the legal relation to 
its 'purest fonn' and 'free of all unrelated disturbances' .79 
This meant downplaying the social aspects of law and de-emphasizing its 
class content in favour of an analytical focus upon: 
'the development of the most fundamental and abstract juridical 
concepts, such as 'legal nonn', legal relations', 'legal subject' and so 
on' .80 
These are the abstractions Pashukanis required for the construction of his general 
theory of law. They are the abstractions with which he was able to separate the 
essential from the non-essential, and to subject the essential relations of the legal 
78 Ibid 18. 
79 Ibid 17 & 20. 
80 Pashukanis op cit 47. When he refers to these juridical concepts as fundamental and 
abstract, he is identifYing them as the concepts which have been identified, using the force 
of abstraction, as those which will provide insight into the purified legal form. 
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fonn to the rigorous analysis from which the general theory could emerge. As a 
general theory it is necessarily situated at a high level of abstraction. But it is by 
no means an abstract theory, in the sense that it is divorced from the real world of 
the legal fonn. In point of fact, it is the only theory of law which has been able to 
provide a scientific link between the legal fonn and the capital relation, and which 
thereby comes closest to comprehending that world, in historical materialist 
tenns, for the bourgeois world that it really is. 
The allegation of abstractness therefore does not withstand scrutiny and 
must be rejected. Pashukanis sought to theorize law as form, and to do so from a 
materialist perspective. The use of the force of abstraction led him to identify a 
number of juridical concepts as fundamental, with the concept of the legal subject 
being primary amongst these. His interrogation of this concept led him to uncover 
a correspondence between the legal subject and the commodity, Marx's 
fundamental economic abstraction. Despite the fact that it operates at a high level 
of abstraction, the relationship between the commodity fonn and the legal form is 
a very real one. The legal form is derived directly from the commodity form. 
This relationship is not apparent at a lower level of abstraction, such as the class 
content of the law. It becomes evident only at the high level on which 
Pashukanis's theory operates. 
Every property of the legal relation which does not contribute to the 
comprehension of the legal cell-form must be regarded as non-essential and must 
therefore be excluded from the elements of a general theory of law. This is what 
Pashukanis did. And he was able thereby to achieve the analytical coup which 
illuminated the real genesis of the legal form and which fonned the basis of his 
elaboration of the general theory of law. Those who decry the theory as being too 
abstract or too formal or too fanciful appear not to appreciate the role of the force 
of abstraction in the construction of theoretical paradigms. They appear, also, to 
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be requiring that, in order to avoid the charge of abstractness, the elaboration of a 
theory be an activity infonned by the articles of empiricism and the methods of 
positivism. Such a requirement, of course, violates every epistemological 
postulate of Marxism and cannot be taken seriously as a supposed deficiency of 
Pashukanis's general theory. 
It is not possible to construct a theory of any aspect of social reality without 
resorting to abstraction. Every theorist, whether Marxist or not, must rely upon 
the force of abstraction to make sense of the relation being analysed. We are 
never able to comprehend any social phenomenon in its full complexity, and must 
necessarily dismantle it in order to be able to think about it in a way which will 
allow us conceptually to approximate its reality. If we do not do so, that is, if we 
do not separate essential from non-essential aspects by abstraction and focus our 
analytical attention upon the essentials, the relation which we seek to comprehend 
will forever remain beyond our ken. Abstraction is, in a word, a universal 
theoretical injunction.81 Pashukanis understood this and produced a theory of law 
which, because it is a general theory, is necessarily located at a high level of 
abstraction. It is his reliance upon the force of abstraction which explains the 
alleged abstractness of the general theory. 
Critics who expect him to be less abstract are, in reality, demanding that the 
theory operate at a significantly lower level of abstraction. They forget, of course, 
that a general theory requires law to be abstracted at the level of generality of, 
81 See OUman (1993: 24-27). It bears noting here that process followed earlier in this chapter, 
according to which partial restorative justice was rejected as an object of analysis and the 
proprietary theory was identified as primordial for the analysis of comprehensive restorative 
justice, was such an exercise in abstraction. It was an attempt to segregate those aspects of 
the theory of restorative which are essential for critical assessment from those which are 
incidental. The proprietary theory emerged as essential from this process. But the process 
of abstraction also led to the non-proprietary theories being classified as non-essential, and 
it was concluded that they could not make any substantive contribution to the 
comprehension of comprehensive restorative justice. 
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firstly and primarily, the capitalist mode of production; and thereafter the 
abstractions of class society and of human society have to be given their 
epistemological due.82 Features such as specific laws or even the law ofa given 
social fonnation in the capitalist epoch need to be shifted out of focus in order to 
bring into focus the anatomy of the legal fonn itself. In other words, the key to 
the comprehension of the legal fonn is to be found outside the operations of the 
legal system; rather, it is to be found in the relationship between the fundamental 
juridical concepts and the fundamental concepts of political economy. The charge 
of abstractness is, in this context, a nonsense. 
It is also disingenuous. It is the kind of charge which the accused can never 
rebut. For the criterion of abstractness is always a subjective one, chosen by the 
accuser. And it is the accuser who decides, ultimately, whether any attempt by the 
accused at concretization has been successful.83 It is the classic fall-back 
allegation, made by the critic who has had little or no success in his efforts to 
invalidate the core propositions of his object of criticism. 84 Such a critic usually 
has been bested theoretically and attempts to avoid capitulation with the cynical 
charge of abstractness. 85 Disingenuous allegations deserve only to be dismissed 
for the fabrications that they are. Certainly, the charge of abstractness is of no 
moment in relation to Pashukanis's general theory of law. 
82 Oilman (ibid 55-58) identifies seven levels of generality in the process of abstraction. 
Marx's abstractions are primarily at level 3, focusing on the peculiarities of capitalist 
society. Class and human society are level 4 and level 5 abstractions respectively. Levell 
and level 2 concern the individual, while level 6 and level 7 deal with the animal and 
natural worlds. 
83 The charge of abstractness also takes no account of the difference between mode of 
investigation and mode of exposition in theoretical work. The former is usually an 
intensely empirical and intensively concrete exercise upon which the latter is based. The 
allegation that theory is abstract cannot be sustained on the strength of the apparent features 
of the mode of exposition. 
84 See Sparkes (1991: 17). 
85 It is a charge of the same order as labelling a troublesome opponent fascist or communist or 
bourgeois or even racist because one cannot sustain a substantive argument against that 
opponent. 
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5.6.2 Exchange versus Production 
The second recurrent criticism of Pashukanis is that, contrary to the Marxist 
method, he has derived his general theory of law from exchange. It is an 
argument which is compressed in the idea that Pashukanis's is a commodity 
exchange theory of law.86 The critical consensus appears to be that, in order to 
qualify as Marxist, the theory of law must be rooted in production, not exchange. 
Despite differences in detail, most left critics posit that the Marxist theory of law 
should be informed by the relations of commodity production and not, as 
Pashukanis believes, the relations of commodity circulation. For them, law as a 
superstructural effectivity, has to be theorized in terms of its relationship to the 
process of commodity production. They claim that this was Marx's method and 
ought to have been Pashukanis's. His detractors are not reluctant to condemn him 
as unMarxist for this alleged deviation from the received canons of Marxism. 87 
86 The origin of this nomenclature is uncertain. It was neither chosen nor used by Pashukanis. 
See Norrie op cit 43 I. 
87 This criticism ofPashukanis is derived from a larger charge of economism against him. In 
other words, it is a criticism which is rooted in the allegation that his general theory is the 
product of an economic reductionism purporting to explain legal relations as epiphenomena 
of the economic base. The charge of economism was made by Stuchka (cited in Beirne & 
Sharlet op cit 16) as early as 1927 when he attacked Pashukanis' s theory for' its one-
sidedness insofar as it reduced all law to only the market, to only exchange as the 
instrumentalization of the relations of commodity producers'. Subsequently, Kelsen (1955: 
89 & 93) has accused Pashukanis of 'reducing, in the field of jurisprudence, legal 
phenomena to economic phenomena'. Collins (op cit 23 & 109) has concluded that 
Pashukanis subscribed to an economism which resulted in his producing a 'crude materialist 
explanation of the content oflaw'. Davis (1988a: 70-71), too, has registered a strong 
objection to the alleged 'economism ofPashukanis' and Sumner (1979: 252-253) has 
adjudged Pashukanis's work to be 'a classic example of economism in Marxist theory of 
law'. 
It is submitted that there is nothing economistic about Pashukanis's general theory. He did 
not reduce the juridical to the economic, nor did he seek to derive legal changes directly or 
exclusively from economic changes. His concern was to produce a Marxist theory of law. 
His theoretical endeavours were, of course, informed by the materialism of classical 
Marxism (See Chapter 1 above). However, they had nothing whatsoever in common with 
any crude materialism which engenders economic reductionism. The charge of economism 
betrays a crucial misunderstanding ofPashukanis 's method. He was not interested in 
theorizing the content of law or of comprehending legal relations in terms of the class 
struggle. Indeed, for him, it was precisely these concerns which, till then, had diverted the 
development of the Marxist theory oflaw away from a necessary and proper focus upon the 
legal form. Such a focus, Pashukanis understood, would have to be located at a level of 
abstraction high enough to bring into unadulterated relief the relation between the economic 
and legal cell-forms. To be sure, there is a one-sidedness here, but only in the sense of a 
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Again, one of the earliest assaults along these lines came from Korsch who, 
in his 1930 review of Law and Marxism, highlighted Pashukanis's 'extremely 
strange - for a "Marxist" - overestimation of "circulation"'. 88 Young's suggestion 
that Pashukanis's approach entails a 'deviation from the commonly accepted 
notions of the relationship between law and economy,89 falls squarely within the 
purview of this line of criticism. Lloyd & Freeman join the chorus of critics with 
the allegation that 'Pashukanis's theory concentrates on the exchange of 
commodities, as if this were all capitalism was about' .90 Warrington identifies the 
'dominance of exchange' as one of his objections to Pashukanis, and submits that 
he 'appears to have written production out of the law' .91 He continues: 
'Pashukanis has failed to make the logical allowances necessary for 
the importance of the production process itself in the development of 
a social system. Legal theories which attempt to base themselves on 
"social reality", as Pashukanis claimed, must incorporate the 
production process into their legal analysis or make sufficient 
allowances for its importance in relation to the legal system as a 
whole. Pashukanis's theory is based on a society of commodity 
production, yet almost eliminates the process of production from 
history. ,92 
methodological imperative required to lay bare the materialist sources of the legal form. 
Certainly, that is not the same as positing a relation of slavish operational dependence of 
law upon economy. Pashukanis did not reduce law to the market. Instead, he extrapolated 
Marx and Engel's discovery that the legal fonn has its genesis in the market into a general 
theory of law. 
The speciousness of the charge of economism is acknowledged even by Fine (op cit 163), 
one ofPashukanis's more vocal critics, in the following extract: 'Pashukanis traced the 
logic of the connection between commodity exchange and legal regulation, and on this basis 
argued for the twofold nature of the transition to communism: it was to be both an 
economic process involving the replacement of market relations by planned production and 
distribution, and a juridic process involving the replacement of legal regulation by what 
Pashukanis called "technical" forms of regulation. In this respect the charge that 
Pashukanis was "economistic" is not strong, since he conceived of the transition as 
comprising not only a transformation of economic relations but also a self-conscious and 
planned transformation of authority relations.' 
88 Korsch op cit 195. 
89 Young op cit 117. 
90 Lloyd & Freeman (1985: 989). 
91 Warrington op cit 53. 
92 Ibid 53. 
The idea that this concern with exchange constitutes an unMarxist 
deviation is pressed home by Fine, who tells us that: 
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'Whereas Marx derived law from relations of commodity production, 
Pashukanis derived it from commodity exchange. This was the essence of 
their difference.'93 
He concludes that Pashukanis in effect aligned himself with the methods of 
bourgeois jurisprudence when he abstracted exchange from the relations of 
production. The result was an approach to law which had 'an entirely different 
coloration from that of Marx's' .94 Collins opines that: 
'Pashukanis indulged in all the vices of reductionism, that is, he 
purported to explain all legal rules as reflections of commodity 
exchange' .95 
Stone concurs with this assessment, and accuses Pashukanis of being 'crudely 
reductionist' .96 
Generally, the critics agree that Pashukanis has misread Marx on the 
question of exchange and production relations97 and that his focus upon exchange 
is an index of considerable theoretical confusion.98 The argument has been potent 
enough to prompt even Norrie, who is a staunch supporter of Pashukanis against 
the criticisms of Warrington especially, to express a measure of concern about the 
apparent dominance of exchange: 
'It must be conceded that Pashukanis does concentrate on the 
relationship between exchange and law in the General Theory. ,99 
It is submitted that this kind of concession is quite unnecessary and gives the 
93 Fine op cit 157. 
94 Ibid 159. 
95 Collins op cit 109. 
96 Stone (1985: 45). 
97 See Warrington op cit 57-58. 
98 See Fine op cit 158. 
99 Norrie op cit 426. 
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criticism much more credence than it deserves. For, as will be shown below, the 
claims that Pashukanis misunderstands Marx and is theoretically confused are 
petty, and prove only that the critics misunderstand both Marx and Pashukanis. 
Marx (in the Preface) taught us that property relations are the legal 
expression of the relations of production. In other words, he held that there was 
an especially close relationship between the economic base and the legal 
superstructure. A fuller discussion of the meaning of Marx's statement is to be 
found in Chapter One above.100 However, Marx did not hold that law is to be (or 
even can be) derived directly from the process of production. He did not say that 
the genesis of the legal form is to be found in the production of commodities, as 
Pashukanis's critics would apparently have us believe. He spoke, it will be 
recalled, of the totality of the social relations of production constituting the 
economic base upon which arises the superstructure. As a superstructural 
effectivity, law is obviously to be derived from the relations of production. But 
the relations of production are not coterminous with the process of production. 
Nowhere does Marx even hint at such an equivalence. In other words, nowhere is 
there any suggestion that the legal form is an expression of or arises from the 
process of production. The totality of relations of production obviously and 
necessarily encompasses the process of production. But it also incorporates the 
process of circulation or exchange, just as obviously and necessarily. In the 
capitalist mode of production, by the totality of the social relations of production 
is meant, therefore, the articulation of commodity production and commodity 
exchange. 
The point is that the Preface does not admit of the conclusion that, for 
Marx, the origins of the legal form are to be sought in the process of production. 
Nor, it should be observed, does the Preface imply that the genesis of the legal 
100 See also Jakubowski op cit 46-50. 
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form is not to be found in the process of circulation. Marx's 'guiding principle' 
does not, in this connection, specifY the relationship between the components of 
the relations of production. There is, in other words, nothing in the Preface on 
which the critics may rely to press home the accusation that Pashukanis is 
mistaken to privilege the circulation component or that he is wrong to derive the 
legal form from the process of commodity exchange. This criticism that 
Pashukanis illegitimately elevates exchange above production is presented as a 
materialist argument from Marxist first principles. However, these principles do 
not include the invariable primacy of production over exchange. And, by 
extension, they do not exclude the possibility that, in certain circumstances and 
for certain purposes, exchange may well be prior to production. 
The Preface does not engage the legal form analytically. It is useful for 
situating law in general as a superstructural element, and to comprehend its 
relation to the production process in general. But it does not provide significant 
insight into the constitution of the legal form. For this we need to look to works 
such as the Grundrisse and Capital, where Marx does delineate the materialist 
rudiments of the general theory of law. The most striking feature of Marx's 
juridical ruminations is the frequency and consistency of the thesis that, of the 
totality of the relations of production, it is the relations of exchange which provide 
the material source of the legal form. The extracts from Capital and the 
Grundrisse cited earlier in this chapter typifY Marx's approach to the legal form. 
Selected further extracts exemplifYing this approach are given below: 
'The exchange of commodities of itself implies no other relations of 
dependence than those which result from its own nature. On this 
assumption, labour-power can appear upon the market as a 
commodity, only if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose 
labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity. In 
order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his disposal, 
must be the untrammelled owner of his capacity to labour, i.e., of his 
person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal 
with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference 
alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the 
eyes of the law.' 101 
'This sphere [ of exchange] is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights 
of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. 
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of 
labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They 
contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the 
form in which they give legal expression to their common will. 
Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a 
simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. 
And Bentham, because each looks only to himself.' 102 
[W]hen the economic form, exchange, posits the all-sided equality 
of its subjects, then the content, the individual as well as the 
objective material which drives towards the exchange, is freedom. 
Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based 
on exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the 
productive, real basis of all equality and freedom. ' 103 
'In Roman law, the servus is therefore correctly defmed as one who 
may not enter into exchange for the purpose of acquiring anything 
for himself. It is, consequently, equally clear that although this legal 
system corresponds to a social state in which exchange was by no 
means developed, nevertheless, in so far as it was developed in a 
limited sphere, it was able to develop the attributes of the juridical 
person, precisely of the individual engaged in exchange, and thus 
anticipate the legal relations of industrial society, and in particular 
the right which rising bourgeois society had necessarily to assert 
. d' al . ,104 agamst me lev SOCIety. 
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Marx may not have written a major treatise on law. But whenever, in his 
economic and political writings, he devotes any serious analytical attention to the 
specificity of the legal form he locates it squarely within the compass of exchange 
relations. His scattered theses on the legal form all reduce to the single 
101 Marx (1954: 165). 
102 Ibid 172. 
103 Marx (1973: 245). 
104 Ibid 245-246, original emphasis. 
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proposition that law takes the form it does because it is an expression of the 
exchange relations of the relations of production. This is made crystal clear in the 
last extract cited above, in which Marx, literally and emphatically, equates the 
'juridical person' with 'the individual engaged in exchange'. 
Engels's legal writings reproduce Marx's position. In this regard, it must be 
recalled that Pashukanis himself cites Engels's submissions on the legal form 
contained in Anti-Duhring as a source of the general theory. He relies specifically 
on chapter titled Morality and Law. Equality and explains that: 
'In it, Engels gives an absolutely precise formulation of the link between the 
principle of equality and the law of value, with the footnote that ''this 
derivation of the modem idea of equality from the economic condition of 
bourgeois society was fust expounded by Marx in Capitaf'.' 105 
Even a casual reading of the cited chapter readily confums Pashukanis's 
assessment of it. For Engels, the bourgeoisie subscribed to a world view which 
was legal in its essentials. 106 As a class, the bourgeoisie was composed of 
'producers of, and traders in, commodities' .107 They understood that the 
'exchange of commodities on the level of society and in its fully developed form' 
was vitally dependent upon the existence of 'universally valid regulations' or legal 
norms. lOS This is why 'equality before the law became the bourgeoisie's main 
battlecry' in its struggle 'against the feudal lords and the absolute monarchy' .109 
Here we see Engels asserting, exactly as did Marx, that it is in the sphere of 
commodity circulation that the genesis of the legal form is to be located. 
In other words, the founding fathers of Marxism were at one in their 
comprehension of the legal form as the materialization of the exchange relations 
105 Pashukanis op cit 38. 
106 Engels (1990: 598). 
107 Ibid 597. 
108 Ibid 598. 
109 Ibid. 
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of bourgeois society. Pashukanis's achievement was to perceive the pattern in the 
pronouncements of Marx and Engels, and to spot the outlines of a theory of law in 
them. Thereafter, as he himself owns, 110 it was an easy matter to extrapolate and 
elaborate the Marxist fundamentals into a coherent Marxist general theory of law. 
In light of the above, it can hardly be denied that Pashukanis' s position has 
impeccable Marxist credentials. Even the hostile Korsch, who is often virulent in 
his criticism, concedes that: 
'all these revolutionary ideas put forward by Pashukanis are not actually 
new, but restore and renew the same ideas expressed by Marx himself, 
partly by implication, but to a large extent explicitly as well, as many as 
eighty years ago in his critique of German Ideology, in the Communist 
Manifesto, and repeated decades later in Capital and the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme. ' 111 
The argument that Pashukanis is unMarxist because he foregrounds exchange at 
the expense of production must, in this context, be rejected as a trivial one. As 
demonstrated above, neither Marx nor Engels derived the legal form from the 
process of commodity production per se. Critics who claim that this is what 
Pashukanis ought to have done obviously have failed to notice that both Marx and 
Engels did exactly what Pashukanis did, and that is to anchor the analysis of the 
legal form in the relations of commodity exchange. 
The truth of the matter is that the legal form cannot be derived from the 
process of production. The Marxist epistemology does not countenance a 
production-centred derivation, for the reasons which follow. Production is a 
necessary and natural human activity. It is the prime condition of human 
existence. Human history is the history of successive modes of production. 
110 Pashukanis op cit 38-39. 
111 Korsch op cit 190. 
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Production preceded the emergence of law and will, in the long view of history, 
survive the demise of law. I 12 Law is an attribute of a determinate stage in the 
development of production, namely, the stage at which production becomes 
infused with the ethos of exchange. Tbis is the epoch of generalized commodity 
production. It is the epoch in which the raison d'etre of production becomes 
exchange. It is the epoch in which the production process itself is premised upon 
the constant sale and purchase labour-power, that is, the constant exchange of the 
only value-producing commodity. The point is that the legal form emerges when 
production is no longer natural, when it has become production for exchange. 
And the legal form expresses this transformation in the nature of production, from 
use to exchange. Indeed, the legal form becomes necessary precisely when this 
transformation occurs. It stipulates the transformation. 
In this context the legal form must needs be derived from the exchange 
relationsbip. It is called into existence by the transformation from the natural to 
the commodity economy. That transformation is characterized by the 
establishment of exchange as the new purpose of production. It is entirely 
appropriate and expected that the analytical interrogation of the legal form should 
proceed from this bistorical fact. Law as we know it did not exist before the 
exchange economy. It is sensible to look to the new relations of exchange to 
comprehend the new legal relations which were generated by them. Indeed, there 
was no other rational basis on which to delimit the legal form. Any attempt to 
derive it from the process of production was doomed to failure unless it 
comprehended that that process was exchange-driven. 
112 The idea that law is an aboriginal and eternal feature of human society is a popular piece of 
bourgeois idealism. Of course, this is to be expected from a class whose rise was 
synchronous with the rise of the legal form. The bourgeoisie cannot admit of the historical 
specificity of law without admitting of its own historical transitoriness. Hence its 
mythologizing of the legal form as a universal. See Pashukanis op cit 144. 
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In the commodity economy, production leads ineluctably to exchange. An 
exchange relation stands at both the beginning and at the end of the commodity 
production process. l13 Generalized commodity production is simply and 
singularly about exchange. It is the stage in the development of the forces of 
production in which the motif of production changes from production for use to 
production for exchange. Marx and Engels understood this. So did 
Pashukanis. 114 That is why they turned to the exchange relation as the premise of 
their analysis of the legal form. And that is why the charge that Pashukanis is 
unMarxist for elaborating a so-called commodity exchange theory of law is a 
spurious one. 
There is a connection between the charge of abstractness and the allegation 
of methodological waywardness in that the force of abstraction is a vital element 
of the method used by Pashukanis to construct the general theory. The exchange 
relation is the commodity relation purified. The sphere of circulation is the site at 
which the true nature of the commodity is to be comprehended, free of non-
economic diversions or distractions. Capitalist relations of production are 
invariably demarcated in terms of an articulation of economic and non-economic 
features. The analysis of the legal form needs to abstract from the non-economic 
features of the economic structure. The process of abstraction led Pashukanis, as 
it did Marx and Engels before him, to the exchange relation as the unencumbered 
source of the legal relation and hence as the key to the analysis of the legal form. 
The process of abstraction enabled him to set aside those aspects of the relations 
113 The process starts with the sale and purchase of labour-power and ends with the sale and 
purchase of the finished commodity. 
114 This is why Pashukanis (op cit 119) readily qualifies his discussion of the relationship 
between the commodity and legal forms with the remark that: 'All of this presupposes the 
appropriate level of development of the productive forces.' The issue for him was not 
whether the legal form should be derived from production or exchange. The real issue was 
that the legal form emerges with the break-up of the natural economy, when the forces of 
production have developed to the stage where production becomes production for 
exchange. 
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of production which do not advance the comprehension of the legal form, and to 
identify the exchange relation as the core relation in the delimitation of this form. 
The 'abstractness' of the general theory is, in this connection, not only 
unavoidable but necessary. Pashukanis needed to set aside all factors which 
would have contaminated the integrity of the exchange relation and hence 
detracted from his theoretical project. A general theory of law cannot be 
sidetracked into the day-to-day struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. It 
cannot even be concerned about the class composition of the legislature or the 
class prejudices ofthe judiciary. It needs to be located at a level of abstraction 
which will facilitate a materialist explanation of the existence of and need for the 
legal form itself. That is why Pashukanis had to work at the 'rarefied' level of 
exchange relations, where the commodity subsists in its ideal milieu, unimpeded 
by social and political device, and relying upon human intervention only as the 
motor of its own movement. 
It has already been noted that Pashukanis himself never referred to his 
theory as the commodity exchange theory or the commodity form theory of law. 
These are descriptions invented by commentators. As a Marxist, he knew that the 
legal form had to be derived from the relations of production (and not from the 
process of production). 1 15 And, by employing the force of abstraction, he was 
able to isolate the exchange aspect of the relations of production as the true 
material source of the legal relation, and to delineate the legal form as a 
historically specific form which could be comprehended only as the necessary 
non-economic expression of the commodity form. 
115 The parenthetical reminder is necessary because the critics seem to have reduced the 
relations of production, which is a binary of production and exchange, to the singularity of 
production. 
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Pashukanis was thus entitled to claim to have discovered the structure of a 
general theory of law which was true to the materialist conception of history 
discovered by Marx and Engels. His submission that the legal relation is 
stipulated by the exchange relation is the conclusion which he reached in his quest 
for a general theory of law informed by the principles of the materialist 
conception of history. His detractors routinely ignore the method he used to reach 
his conclusion. They tend to start their critique were he ends his investigation, 
and then claim that he is unMarxist for supposedly considering exchange to be 
prior to production. Any serious reader of Law and Marxism knows that the 
critics have done Pashukanis an unwarranted injustice. The general theory was 
constructed according to the fIrst principles of the Marxist methodology and the 
conclusions reached, albeit distasteful to many (as so many Marxist positions 
invariably are) are entirely plausible and defensible within the Marxist 
paradigm.116 
5.6.3 Capitalism and the Legal Form 
The third criticism of Pashukanis, derived from the second, is that he 
understood law to be a specifIcally capitalist phenomenon and hence denied the 
existence of law in pre-capitalist social formations. Warrington's statement of the 
issue is representative: 
116 It is remarkably ironic that one of the most sympathetic appreciations of Pashukanis comes 
from the non-Marxist Fuller (1949: 1159), who has the following to say of Law and 
Marxism: 'In this short book Pashukanis expounds with clarity and coherence an ingenious 
development of Marxist theory that has been called the "Commodity Exchange Theory of 
Law." His work is in the best tradition of Marxism. It is the product of thorough 
scholarship and wide reading. It reaches conclusions that will seem to most readers 
perverse and bizarre, yet in the process of reaching these conclusions it brings familiar facts 
oflaw and government into an unfamiliar but revealing perspective. It is the kind of book 
that any open-minded scholar can read with real profit, however little be may be convinced 
by its main thesis.' 
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'Pashukanis held that law was a peculiarly capitalist problem. This is a 
result of his commodity form theory. As Pashukanis defined all law as 
merely the outgrowth of the exchange of commodities, it follows that to be 
consistent, social arrangements prior to the commodity form of society were 
not legal.' 117 
This is a comparatively minor criticism when set against the first two and need 
not occupy us unduly. However, once again the critics have misunderstood 
Pashukanis. 
The capitalist mode of production is the apotheosis of the commodity 
economy. Capitalism is generalized commodity production. The beginnings of 
the legal relation may be perceived in the milieu of petty commodity production. 
But it is only with the advent of generalized commodity production that we see 
the development of the legal relation proper, that is, the development of the 
relation founded upon the perfect equality of all legal subjects. While the 
existence of a pre-capitalist legal subjectivity may be granted, it was rudimentary 
and fragmentary, and did not include equality before the law. Marx has this to 
say: 
'Equality and freedom presuppose relations of production yet 
unrealized in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages. ,J 18 
Pashukanis adds that with primitive peoples 'it is difficult to distinguish law from 
the total mass of normative social phenomena' and that 'even in medieval Europe 
only embryonic legal forms existed' .119 
The juridical person was, at best, an infans in the world of petty commodity 
production and undeveloped exchange. Legal subjectivity, in this connection, 
may indeed be understood as a specifically capitalist phenomenon. Its 
117 Warrington op cit 59. See also Stone op cit 43, and Collins op cit 110-111. 
118 Marx (1973: 245). . 
119 Pashukanis op cit 58. 
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development was prescribed by the structural requirements of the development of 
the capitalist mode of production. Thus, Pashukanis writes that: 
'in bourgeois society, in contrast to societies based on slavery and 
serfdom, the legal form attains universal significance, legal ideology 
becomes the ideology par excellence, and defending the class 
interest of the exploiters appears with ever increasing success as the 
defence of the abstract principle of legal subjectivity.' 120 
The 'juridical moment of the Person' identified by Marx is thus a specifically 
bourgeois moment. It is emblematic of the generalization of commodity 
production, the destruction of the natural economy and the victory of capitalist 
social relations of production. 
The juridical person comes of age with the capitalist mode of production. 121 
Law, then, is the most immediate superstructural conjugate of the social relations 
of production of the commodity economy. And legal SUbjectivity is the animus of 
the commodity relation. The following explanation by Norrie sets matters right 
and disposes of Warrington's allegation easily: 
'Pashukanis did not say that there was no law in the middle ages. 
He said that there was no conception of the abstract legal subject but 
that there were "embryonic legal forms" in existence at that time. 
Thus Pashukanis did not say that law was a peculiarly capitalist 
problem. What he said was that law in its purest and most 
developed form ... was a peculiarly capitalist phenomenon.' 122 
What is more, this is an aspect ofPashukanis's argument which is not especially 
complicated or obscure. It is completely accessible to anyone who has a mind to 
engaging it. Certainly, the non-Marxist Fuller has no difficulty whatsoever with 
understanding fully this aspect of the general theory. He states: 
120 Ibid 45. 
121 According to Pashukanis (ibid 61), its demise will mirror the demise of the capitalist mode 
of production. 
122 Norrie op cit 430, original emphasis. 
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In truth, the only law is bourgeois law. To be sure, legal institutions in 
embryo can be found in a feudal or slave society, where they are intertwined 
with religious and military elements. Modern scholars are likely to 
misinterpret these rudimentary legal elements in a pre-capitalist society as 
the equivalent of modern law. Actually, these embryonic and 
undifferentiated legal elements are like the fust tentative gropings toward a 
capitalistic organization that can be detected in even the most primitive 
societies. The full inner logic of the conception of law can assert itself only 
under capitalism.' 123 
It is revealing surely that a non-Marxist should understand Pashukanis on this 
issue without difficulty, while so-called Marxist critics seem to founder, ending 
up attempting to present their own failure to comprehend Pashukanis as a failure 
in comprehension by Pashukanis. 
5.6.4 Pashukanis, Anarchism and Stalinism 
The fourth criticism of Pashukanis, albeit not as popular as the three 
discussed above, is as important for being overtly political. The basic argument, 
as explained by Beirne & Sharlet, is that Pashukanis' s general theory was 
'a left communist, or perhaps anarchist, theory which~ if implemented, 
would greatly impede the construction and reproduction of socialist 
relations of production in the USSR.' 124 
Schlesinger makes the argument thus: 
'It is not difficult to understand why the Soviet dropped a theory which 
could only be interpreted as an apology either for capitalism or for 
lawlessness, in the sense of anarchy or arbitrary rule. ,125 
Pashukanis, it would appear, is deemed by some to be the theoretician of a kind of 
lawless anarchy in Bolshevik Russia. This is a line of criticism which was 
championed by Vyshinsky, who was to become Stalin's chief prosecutor in the 
infamous Moscow Trials. 126 And it is linked directly to Pashukanis' s liquidation 
123 Fuller op cit 1161. 
124 Beirne & Sharlet op cit 23. 
125 Schlesinger op cit 164. 
126 Vyshinsky (1954: 53-57). 
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as a supposed enemy of the people in 1937. 127 
This criticism does not stop with the charge of anarchism. It goes further, to 
implicate Pashukanis and his general theory in the rise of the very Stalinist regime 
which liquidated him. Thus, for example, Beirne & Sharlet argue that his theory 
entailed a legal nihilism which SUbjected the judicial process to political ends and 
which 'inevitably contributed to the growth of a jurisprudence of terror' so 
characteristic of Stalinism. 128 
It is submitted that this criticism is entirely without merit, in both its 
aspects. The accusation of anarchism was long ago disposed of by Stuchka who 
analyzed it as a reactionary agitation for bourgeois legal certainty in the 
turbulence of a proletarian revolution, which revolution necessarily had to smash 
the legal system and abolish the laws of the bourgeoisie. 129 He insisted that the 
Bolshevik assault upon bourgeois law did not entail lawlessness and anarchy. The 
Bolsheviks subscribed to a revolutionary legality administered by the People's 
Courts. Thus he declares: 
'No, we are not anarchists. Quite the contrary. We attribute a great deal 
of significance to laws, perhaps even too much at the moment, but only to 
laws of the new order. And those laws correspond to the old laws only 
insofar as the new order can agree with the atrophying, repudiated 
order.,l3o 
The Bolsheviks were Marxists in the classical tradition, and were thereby 
implacable opponents of anarchism. Pashukanis was a Bolshevik and, despite 
127 Hazard (1957: 385-386) says ofPashukanis's liquidation: 'No overt act of treachery was 
disclosed. He was criticized primarily for having preached a philosophy of law which, had 
it been followed to its conclusions, would have undermined the foundations of the Soviet 
state, and it was hinted that his theory had been developed for the purpose of bringing about 
the end of the Soviet system of government.' 
128 Beirne & Sharlet op cit 21-23. See also Warrington op cit 60. 
129 See Stuchka (1990b: 187-188 and 1990c: 190). 
130 Stuchka (1990a: 162). See also Stuchka (1990c: 190): 'Of course, the Bolsheviks did not 
reject the significance of laws. They perhaps even believed in them too much.' 
their other differences, shared with Stuchka the Bolshevik commitment to a 
revolutionary legality. 
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The charge that Pashukanis' s theory of law encouraged the rise of Stalinism 
is a particularization of the well-worn argument that Stalinism is the direct heir of 
Bolshevism and which would blame, for example, Lenin's democratic centralism 
or Trotsky's internationalism for Stalin's betrayal of the revolution. It is an 
argument which no Marxist can take seriously, simply because there was nothing 
Stalinist inherent in the politics of Bolshevism. Pashukanis's theory was, if 
anything, an impediment to the anti-Bolshevik agenda of Stalinism. This is why 
he had to be liquidated. Thus Lipson says: 
Whatever the merits of this approach in theory, it could not please the rulers 
of the Soviet Union, especially in the 1930s: the authorities practising their 
kind of lawlessness under label of a search for stability were not able to 
countenance the scholarly justification of the transcendance of law.' 131 
Even Warrington, who is one ofPashukanis's most uncomplimentary critics, 
discounts this argument, in the following terms: 
'Some commentators have argued that Pashukanis' s attitude paved the way 
for Stalinism. But Pashukanis tried, however inadequately, to produce a 
theory that would reach beyond the confines of the restraints of all forms of 
legality. It seems a little unfair to blame Pashukanis's theory for the terror 
that followed merely because Pashukanis himself was politically inept, and 
later even wilfully blind. Only by assuming that if a society shakes off the 
need for law that it must then regress to a dark age is it possible to see 
Pashukanis's General Theory as a step towards arbitrary power. ,132 
Pashukanis was neither a crypto-anarchist nor a latent Stalinist. He was a 
Bolshevik who elaborated a Marxist general theory of law which embraced a 
revolutionary legality while anticipating the demise of the legal form in a future 
classless society. 
131 Lipson (1983: 193-194). 
132 Warrington op cit 60-61. 
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5.7 The Legal Subject and the Commodity 
Of the fundamental juridical concepts which he identifies, Pashukanis 
places the legal subject at the heart of his theory, as emblematic of the legal form. 
Comprehension of law requires comprehension of the legal subject, as the prime 
component of the legal relation. For Pashukanis, there is a structural coincidence 
between the commodity as the elemental economic unit and the subject as the 
elemental legal unit. In a capitalist economy, every person is transformed into a 
legal subject exactly equal to every person. Legal subjectivity is the great leveller 
amongst people in the same way as labour time is the great leveller amongst 
commodities. The legal subject and the commodity are, in this regard, umbilically 
linked. However, too many critics understand this connection as a purely logical 
one, made by Pashukanis in a flash of brilliance. 133 Hence the oft-heard allegation 
of abstractness. 
However, the transformation of the person into the legal subject is not 
simply the logical analogue of commodity exchange. The commodity form and 
the legal form are not mere logical counterparts. The transformation of the person 
into a legal subject was historically determined by the transition from natural to 
commodity economy. Pashukanis is unambiguous on this matter: 
'Like the majority of jurists, Dernburg tends to treat the legal subject 
as 'personality in general', that is to say, as an eternal category 
beyond particular historical conditions. From this point of view, 
being a legal subject is a quality inherent in man as an animate being 
graced with a rational will.' 134 
He continues: 
133 See, for example, Stone op cit 43 and Warrington ibid 48. 
134 Pashukanis op it 117. 
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'Historically, however, it was precisely the exchange transaction which 
generated the idea of the subject as the bearer of every imaginable legal 
claim. Only in commodity production does the abstract legal fonn see the 
light. ,135 
In other words, the homology between the commodity and the legal fonns is given 
historically, by the development of capitalist relations of production. The capacity 
to become a legal subject is inscribed in the evolution of human society into a 
society of generalized commodity production. The history of the development of 
law is the history of the development ofthe legal subject. Marx and Engels 
recognized this fact long before Pashukanis did. When, therefore, Pashukanis 
bases his general theory of law upon the legal subject he is systematizing what 
Marx and Engels had opportunity to state only episodically. This is why nothing 
in his theory violates any of the fundamental tenets of Marxism. It is also why, 
for the purposes of this dissertation, his theory is accepted as definitively and 
indefeasibly Marxist. 
5.8 Pashukanis and the Criminal Law 
The last chapter of Law and Marxism is titled Law and the Violation of Law 
and is devoted to an analysis of criminal law and criminal justice. Pashukanis 
always made it clear that the historical basis of the general theory is private law, 
specifically the law of contract. The legal fonn itself is first posited as a contract 
between two legal subjects. The law of contract is the branch of law which is 
both the historical and logical repository of the notion of equivalence. 136 By 
contrast, the criminal law appears to be far removed from the constitutional 
fundamentals of the legal fonn. There is seemingly no natural connection, as 
there is with private law, between criminal law and the notion of equivalence, 
which Pashukanis classifies as the 'fust truly juridical idea'. 137 
135 Ibid 118. See also Arthur (1978: 14). 
136 See Pashukanis ibid 121. 
137 Ibid 168. 
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However, and despite Warrington's arguments to the contrary,138 he 
conceived his theory as properly general and hence applicable to the legal form in 
all its manifestations, including all its public law manifestations. 139 Lipson sums 
up Pashukanis's position on the matter cogently: 
'He maintained ... that law as a general form - not merely piece by 
piece, but as a general form - was linked in history to that economic 
relationship that he said Marx said was at the bottom of all societies 
that obtained in the interval between the end of primitive family 
subsistence and the beginning of true socialism: namely, the 
relationship of commodity exchange.' 140 
For Pashukanis, then, the homology between the commodity form and the legal 
form is valid also for criminal law, 141 that is, the notion of equivalence which is a 
structural feature of every contract is also a structural feature of every crime. 142 
138 Warrington (op cit 62) has the following to say about the 'general' aspect of the general 
theory: 'Pashukanis's theory is really concerned with private law and the chapter on 
criminal law is only added to attempt a spurious theoretical consistency. Pashukanis merely 
tries to apply his commodity form theory which had a certain logical force for private law, 
to criminal law, where in the formulation ofPashukanis at least, it clearly has no place.' He 
goes on to dismiss the theory of equivalent punishment as 'faintly comic'. However, Stone 
(op cit 44-45), who is no friend ofPashukanis, finds nothing wrong with or comic about his 
analysis of criminal law. Indeed, he opines that Pashukanis's 'views on criminal law are 
insightful' and submits that they 'may be analogized to many other areas oflaw'. See also 
Norrie (op cit 432-434) who shows conclusively that it is Warrington's argument which is 
spurious. 
139 See Pashukanis op cit 40. 
140 Lipson (1983: 192). See also Norrie (op cit 434) who finds 'good grounds for taking 
seriously Pashukanis's claim that his is a general theory oflaw, and not one illicitly 
generalized from private civil law' . 
141 Jakubowski (op cit 49), who adheres to Pashukanis's central arguments, holds that: 'Public 
law regulates the relations between the state and public institutions, and between these and 
the citizens; it serves to execute and protect private or civil law by means of the power of 
the state. The foundation of all these relations is still legal subjectivity and the recognition 
of the legal capacity of man, which give the relations of domination a general form.' 
142 See Arthur op cit 15, Stone op cit 44 and Jakubowski ibid 49. 
368 
In this regard, he submits that crime is a particular form of contract. It is a 
retrospective contract. 
'Felony can be seen as a particular variant of circulation, in which the 
exchange relation, that is the contractual relation, is determined 
retrospectively, after arbitrary action by one of the parties.' 143 
The party who has taken the arbitrary action is the offender. The offender does 
not wish the contract. He intends his conduct to be free of any obligations for 
himself. He wishes a one-sided relation, from which he is the sole beneficiary and 
in terms of which the victim is an utter loser. The criminal law intervenes to 
abolish the privilege of asymmetry claimed by the offender. The state impresses 
him into a contract after he has already had his satisfaction. Faced with the might 
of the state, he is forced to keep his side of the bargain and render performance to 
his victim. By his crime, the offender has violated the principle of equivalence 
which defmes all things juridical. The criminal law exists to reinstate this 
juridical prime directive whenever it has been so infracted. 
The principle of equivalence is foundational to the commodity economy and 
hence to the nature of bourgeois justice. As the principle which stipulates the 
commodity and legal forms and their interrelation, it is a centrepiece of the 
general theory of law. It thus also governs the comprehension of crime and 
punishment. When Pashukanis defines a crime as a retrospective contract, he is 
invoking the principle of equivalence. He is doing the same when he analyses 
punishment as an exchange transaction. In other words, criminal justice is about 
equivalent requital. For Pashukanis, then, the principle of equivalence is a 
theoretical imperative. His general theory stands and falls by it. 
143 Pashukanis op cit 168. Melossi & Pavarini (op cit 2) refer to this formulation as 'the 
famous thesis of Pashukanis'. 
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Whereas the criminal law is not as conspicuously linked to the principle of 
equivalence as is the law of contract (and private law in general), it is the branch 
oflaw in which the legal form is most conspicuously present. For, it is in the 
criminal law that the legal subject is found in its most impersonal and abstract 
form. It is in the criminal trial that 'the juridical element first and most crudely 
detaches itself from everyday life and becomes fully autonomous'. 144 It is here 
that the juridical moment peaks, in the 'transformation ofthe actions of a concrete 
person into the proceedings of a legal party, that is of a legal subject'. 145 In other 
words, criminal law sets the high-water mark for legal intercourse. It is the 
branch of law which depersonalizes actors most fully in order to equalize them as 
legal subjects most completely. 
In this regard, the criminal law is synecdochic for the law itself.146 It 
represents, in telescoped terms, all the characteristics of the legal form. There is 
no more loyal commitment to the notion of equivalence than the literal 
replacement of the victim by the state in a criminal matter. Prior to the 
replacement, the offender, as individual, had lorded it over the victim, as 
individual, and had unilaterally violated the principle of equivalence. With the 
entry of the state into the criminal proceedings, both offender and victim are 
transformed from specific individuals into general legal subjects, the advantage of 
the offender is eradicated by his impressment into a retrospective contract, and the 
principle of equivalence is thereby rehabilitated. 
144 Pashukanis ibid 167. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid 168. 
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5.9 Punishment and the Principle of Equivalence 
The criminal sanction epitomizes the operation of the rule of equivalence in 
the criminal law. It is the perfonnance due by the offender under the contract 
which he has concluded with the victim. If crime is the violation of the principle 
of equiValence then punishment is its vindication. Punishment is an inherently 
juridical notion. As such, its genesis coincides with the genesis of the commodity 
fonn. And its development mirrors the development from petty to generalized 
commodity production. 147 In prehistoric times, justice was blood revenge, 
initially indiscriminate but moderated over time by the lex talionis or the principle 
of equivalent requital. 148 The lex talionis developed out of the material conditions 
of existence of the primitive commune, and meant, essentially, the customary 
regulation of blood revenge according to the primitive communist commitment to 
equality in all things. The modem principle of equiValence has its historical roots 
in the system of composition. This was one of the consequences of the break-up 
of the primitive commune under the influence of the development of commodity 
production. Composition is the lex talionis commodified. Till then the principle 
of equivalence had been operationalized in exclusively physical tenns. With the 
advent of composition, equivalence took on an economic character. Literal 
equivalence gave way to economic equivalence, and biological fonnulae were 
replaced by calculation of abstract values. 149 
The transition from talionic blood revenge to talionic composition is a 
qualitative one. It corresponded with the historic transition from the natural to the 
commodity economy. It marked the movement from custom to law, that is, from 
the pre-legal to the legal epoch in the evolution of human society. The juridical 
147 See Chapter Two above for a survey of the evolution ofpunishrnent. 
148 Pashukanis op cit 168. 
149 Ibid 170. See also Melossi & Pavarini op cit 2-3: 'The transition from private vendetta to 
retributive punishment, that is, the transition from an almost "biological" phenomenon to a 
juridical category, requires as a necessary precondition the cultural dominance of the 
concept of equivalents based on exchange value.' 
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moment arrives when the principle of equivalence is detached from its aboriginal 
biological roots and redefined in abstract economic terms. The concept of the 
juridical is defined in terms of the principle of equivalence. For an institution to 
be juridical it must, therefore, be characterized by the exchange of equivalents. 
Punishment, in its evolutionary aspect, is such an institution. The offender has to 
pay for the harm he has caused, and the payment must be commensurate with the 
degree of harm suffered by the victim. In this context, the criminal sanction 
becomes' a form of exchange, a peculiar form of circulation, which has its place 
alongside "normal" commercial circulation' .150 Criminal law is thus as much 
subject to the principle of equivalence as is contract law or any other branch of 
private law. Indeed, for Pashukanis: 
'the characterisation "criminal law" becomes utterly meaningless if 
this principle of the equivalent relation disappears from it,.151 
Such is the intended reach of the general theory oflaw. 
Like law itself, punishment is an attribute of the commodity economy. It, 
too, is governed by that property which is at the heart of the value of every 
commodity, namely, labour time. Historically, the form of punishment in which 
criminal justice has summated is imprisonment, that is, the exchange of a 
determinate portion of the offender's freedom, measured in time, for the harm his 
crime has caused the victim. As Pashukanis demonstrates, it is not a difficult 
thing to understand the jail term as a variant of the exchange transaction which 
underlies the legal form. Despite the emergence of many other forms of criminal 
sanction, incarceration has remained the dominant form of punishment in the 
capitalist world, including the advanced capitalist social formations. Compared to 
150 Pashukanis ibid 176. 
151 Ibid. 
the other available forms of punishment, imprisonment has turned out to be the 
hardy perennial. 152 
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There is a natural connection between imprisonment and the commodity 
economy. This is because it articulates the principle of equivalence most 
completely, more so even than the fine. Not every offender can afford to pay a 
fine. But every offender can be incarcerated. The prison (despite whatever sordid 
conditions the offender may have to endure) is the flagship of equality in the 
criminal justice system. Imprisonment is the penal materialization of the principle 
of equivalence. It is the paradigmatic means whereby the state is able to recover 
the juridical relation which the crime had infracted, and to secure the preservation 
of the legal form. 
The commodification of punishment is no more evident than in the prison 
sentence to be served in terms of hard labour, symbolized by the image of the 
chain gang. 153 Such a sanction is a pure exchange transaction. It commodifies the 
harm suffered by the victim and demands from the offender an amount of abstract 
labour time equivalent to the harm he has caused. There is, of course, no material 
difference between imprisonment with and without hard labour. The latter is a 
simply a 'humane' variant of the former. The former merely makes express the 
link between the penal regime and the commodity. In any event, most 
imprisonment regimes include the performance of a certain amount of work by the 
prisoner, either in the prison or in the community. 
152 See Melossi & Pavarini op cit 185, original emphasis: 'Punishment in prison - as the 
deprivation of a quantum of liberty - becomes punishment par excellence in a society 
producing commodities; the idea of retribution by equivalent thus fmds in prison 
punishment its most complete realisation precisely in so far as (temporary) loss of liberty 
represents the most simple and absolute form of "exchange value".' 
153 Hudson (2002: 251) notes 'the return of hard labour' in contemporary imprisonment 
regimes. 
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Imprisonment, in any fonn, including contemporary periodical 
imprisonment, is essentially an exchange transaction, in which the currency is 
freedom, measured in determinate time periods. Pashukanis makes the point thus: 
'Deprivation of freedom, for a period stipulated in the court 
sentence, is the specific fonn in which modern, that is to say 
bourgeois-capitalist, criminal law embodies the principle of 
equivalent recompense. ,154 
He presses home the point in the following vein: 
'The offender answers for his offence with his freedom, in fact with 
a portion of his freedom corresponding to the gravity of his action. 
This conception of liability would be quite superfluous in a situation 
where punishment has lost the character of an equivalent. Were 
there really no trace of the principle of equivalence remaining, then 
punishment would entirely cease to be punishment in the juridical 
sense of the word.' 155 
It is a logical requisite of the commodity economy that its penal regime be centred 
upon the prison sentence. All other fonns of punishment so far devised are 
supplementary to the prison tenn. None of the other fonns expresses the principle 
of equivalence quite as faithfully as does the prison sentence. It is the great 
leveller, not only as regards the inequality between offender and victim, but also 
as regards offenders inter se. 
Incarceration removes all differences between offenders at a stroke. It 
creates the abstract offender, the offender who is the generic criminal, who 
concentrates in his person all manner and method of criminal behaviour. The 
prison tenn is thus a device of equalization. It ensures that the offender gives 
satisfaction to the victim, and that he does so on tenns which are equal relative to 
every other offender. The expanded reproduction of the commodity economy 
depends crucially upon the ordered reproduction of the legal fonn. The prison 
154 Pashukanis op cit 180-181. 
155 Ibid 179. 
374 
sentence is the one form of punishment which has proved itself indispensable thus 
far to the reproduction of the legal form in the sphere of criminal justice. 
Punishment, then, is necessarily about equivalent requital. It is a conception 
which is derived historically from the dissolution of the natural economy and the 
concomitant evolution of generalized commodity production, that is, of an 
economy of labour time. Pashukanis explains: 
'For it to be possible for the idea to emerge that one could make recompense 
for an offence with a piece of abstract freedom determined in advance, it 
was necessary for all concrete forms of socia:I wealth to be reduced to the 
most abstract and simple form, to human labour measured in time.' 156 
The offender forfeits that portion of his freedom which corresponds to the harm 
suffered by his victim. In this regard, imprisonment is not only freedom negated 
but also labour time negated. For, ordinarily, freedom would include the freedom 
to sell one's labour power to a capitalist, to be put to use for a determinate time in 
the production of commodities. Imprisonment, as deprivation of freedom, is thus, 
for the period of the imprisonment, simultaneously the consumption of potential 
labour time. 
The archetypal capitalist form of punishment is thus intimately linked to the 
archetypal capitalist form of production and exchange. The spirit of the 
commodity is so ubiquitous that it penetrates even the steel gates and concrete 
walls of the prison. The offender will pay for his transgression. And he will do 
so according to the dictates of the commodity economy which is ruled by the 
principle of equivalence and which will not countenance any formal violation of 
this principle. In other words, crime and punishment are subject to exactly the 
156 Ibid 181. See also Melossi & Pavarini op cit 184-185: 'The idea of the deprivation of an 
abstractly detennined quantity ofliberty, as the dominant form of penal sanction can in fact 
only be realised with the advent of the capitalist system of production, that is, in that 
economic process which reduces all forms of social wealth to that most simple and abstract 
form of human labour measured in time.' 
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same juridical imperative as any legal transaction, namely, the principle of 
equivalence. This principle is, as Pashukanis put it, the 'juridical soul' of criminal 
proceedings. 157 
As the penal manifestation of commodity exchange, the notion of equivalent 
requital applies also to all forms of punishment other than imprisonment, 
including such non-custodial sanctions as the fine, correctional supervision, 
property forfeiture, and community service. They, too, are structured according to 
the desideratum of parity which makes of state punishment the juridical 
phenomenon that it is. Pashukanis captures this idea in the following comment: 
'In principle, punishment in keeping with guilt represents the same 
form as retaliation in proportion to the injury. Its most characteristic 
feature is the arithmetical expression of the severity of the sentence: 
so and so many days, weeks, and so forth, deprivation of freedom, so 
and so high a fIne, loss of these or those rights. ,158 
The form of the criminal sanction is thus of little consequence. The essence of 
each form, whether custodial or non-custodial, is given by the principle of 
equivalent requital. As Pashukanis notes, this principle is an 'essentially absurd 
idea' from the non-juridical point of view. But it is an absurdity which cannot be 
avoided for 'so long as the commodity form and the resultant legal form continue 
to make their mark on society' .159 A rational basis for punishment is possible 
only if and when it may be reconstructed outside of the juridical paradigm. And it 
will take a social revolution to transcend this paradigm and deprive it of its 
current authoritative status. 
157 Pashukanis ibid 177. 
158 Ibid 180. 
159 Ibid 185. 
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5.10 Class and the Criminal Law 
The criminal law transaction is, of course, a public one, in the sense that the 
state is always a party to it. The offence is construed as a contravention of a state 
nonn, the state steps into the shoes of the actual victim, initiates the criminal 
prosecution of the offender and generally directs the criminal justice process. 
Criminal justice is, in a word, an affair of state. But the state in question is the 
bourgeois state, and criminal justice is thus also bourgeois justice. In other words, 
in the capitalist era, state hegemony over the criminal justice system is one of the 
weapons at the disposal of the bourgeoisie to protect its own class rule and to fend 
off the demands of the dominated classes. 160 Indeed, Pashukanis tells us that 
'criminal justice in the bourgeois state is organised class terror' .161 Such is the 
class content of the criminal law. It is that branch of the law which expresses 
most directly the violence immanent in the rule of the bourgeoisie as a class, 
including that rule in its most advanced legal fonn of the Rechtsstaat. 162 
Hunt considers that Pashukanis's highlighting the class content of the 
criminal law means that: 
'he introduces a sharp polarity between two modes of law, the criminal law 
as a means of securing class domination and the civil law as the mechanism 
governing the exchange relations between atomized legal subjects.' 163 
The implication of such an alleged dualism is, of course, that the fit between the 
so-called commodity fonn theory of law and the criminal law is, at best, an 
awkward one. Indeed, it would appear, from Hunt's perspective, that the criminal 
160 Ibid 173. It must be noted that the class nature of the state is not Pashukanis' s primary 
concern. He deals with it only after he has established the role of the state in the 
reproduction of the commodity and legal forms. These two aspects of 'bourgeois statedom' 
operate at distinct levels of abstraction, the latter at a higher level than the former. It is the 
latter aspect which is integral to the general theory oflaw. 
161 Ibid. 
162 See Jessop (1982: 84-85). 
163 Hunt op cit 81. 
law is not subsumed within the homology between the legal fonn and the 
commodity fonn and, hence, that the general theory is, after all, not really 
general. 164 
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Hunt is mistaken. He appears not to comprehend that the role of the state as 
an instrument of class control has to be assessed on a quite different level of 
abstraction from the place of the state in the general theory oflaw. Certainly, the 
fact that the criminal law is readily available as a weapon of bourgeois class rule, 
even terror, by no means implies its exclusion from the ambit ofthe general 
theory. The making of such a connection is not entailed even in the postulates of 
fonnallogic. What is readily implied, however, is that the criminal law, as 
suggested by Jakubowski, harnesses the power of the state 'to execute and protect 
private or civil law' . 165 In other words, whereas the criminal law may have had 
very little to do with the production of the legal fonn, it is imbricated 
comprehensively in the reproduction of that fonn. 
The legal fonn summates in the Rechtsstaat, the exemplar of 'market 
relations among fonnally free and equal individuals', 166 and the criminal law is its 
most conspicuous guarantor. Whatever schism exists between private law and the 
criminal law is of Hunt's making, not Pashukanis's. He understood a crime to be 
a variant of a contract, and therefore considered the criminal law to be as readily 
incorporated into the general theory as the law of contract. 167 The criminal law 
164 Hunt's position is close to Warrington's, who, it will be recalled, considers the general 
theory to be a theory of private law, onto which criminal law has been somewhat artificially 
grafted. 
165 Jakubowski op cit 49. 
166 Jessop op cit 85. 
167 This also makes nonsense of Hunt's (op cit 81) subsequent argument that in an attempt to 
overcome the alleged dualism between private and criminal law, Pashukanis 'subsumes his 
attempt to theorize state and criminal law into a theory of punishment'. His theory of 
punishment is nothing more nor less than a theory of punishment, and one which is entirely 
consonant with his general theory of law. 
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may be possessed of a special status as the branch of law which is most obviously 
associated with the coercive competence of the bourgeois state. 168 But that status 
does not entail a qualitative difference from private law or from the other 
branches of public law. And, certainly, it does not disqualify the criminal law as a 
component of the legal form to be comprehended under Pashukanis's general 
theory of law. 
5.11 Criminal Law as Public Law 
There is another charge against Pashukanis's analysis of the criminal law 
which requires some comment. It is the allegation made by Stone, to the effect 
that: 
'Pashukanis's approach does not explain why the state, and not the 
victim or his or he relatives, is the plaintiff in criminal cases' .169 
Pashukanis, it would appear, is unable to account for the public nature of the 
criminal law. 
However, like Hunt, Stone is mistaken. As is apparent from the preceding 
paragraphs, Pashukanis understood the criminal law to be essentially coercive in 
its operations. However, the fundamentally juridical nature ofthe commodity 
economy, exemplified in the concept of legal subjectivity, requires coercion to be 
public, in the sense that it is formally separated from the exercise of personal 
power. Thus, Pashukanis writes: 
'Coercion as the imperative addressed by one person to another, and 
backed up by force, contradicts the fundamental precondition for 
dealings between the owners of commodities ... For in the society 
168 Of course, all branches of law rely ultimately upon state violence (or the threat thereof) for 
their efficacy. 
169 Stone op cit 45. Ignatieff(op cit 96-99) has raised the same issue by challenging the 
'assumption in Marxist social theory' that capitalism requires the 'state penal sanction', and 
suggesting that the threat offorce is not necessary for the reproduction of 'exploitative 
social relations'. 
based on commodity production, subjection to one person, as a 
concrete individual, implies subjection to an arbitrary force, since it 
is the same thing, for this society, as the subjection of one owner of 
commodities to another.' 170 
The core principle of equivalence which defInes the commodity economy 
formally is violated, and the reproduction of the commodity economy is itself 
rendered precarious, if the coercion which structures it is personalized or 
privatized. Pashukanis again: 
This is also why coercion cannot appear here in undisguised form as a 
simple act of expediency. It has to appear rather as coercion emanating 
from an abstract collective person, exercised not in the interest of the 
individual from whom it emanates ... but in the interest of all parties to 
legal transactions.'l7l 
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In other words, a public authority with coercive competence is inscribed in the 
constitution of the commodity economy. So too, by extension, is the public nature 
of the criminal law, as the branch of law which is most, and most conspicuously, 
concerned with the exercise of that coercive competence. It should, in this regard, 
be recalled that when Pashukanis classifIed the criminal law as a weapon of class 
rule he referred to organized class terror in the bourgeois state. In other words, for 
him the public nature of the criminal law was patent, derived directly and 
necessarily from the structure of the Rechtsstaat. 
Pashukanis's position reduces to the proposition that capitalism needs a 
public criminal justice system. That is the answer to Stone's complaint. 172 
Private law may well be the 'natural' law of the commodity economy, and may 
well provide the foundation of every legal transaction. But it is public law, and 
the criminal law in particular, which secures the conditions for the expanded 
reproduction of capitalist mode of production. It is not possible for the 
170 Pashukanis op cit 143. 
171 Ibid. 
172 It is also the answer to Ignatieffs challenge to the necessarily statist texture of criminal 
justice. 
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bourgeoisie to entrust its criminal justice system to the operations of private law, 
as it has its contractual and proprietary regimes. In other words, criminal justice 
in the commodity economy cannot be privatized justice. It is necessarily statist in 
its essentials. 173 
Justice in the Rechtsstaat must proceed from the principle of equivalence. 
The parties to a legal transaction may not be equal in fact (as is so often the case 
even in private law transactions) and one may have at his disposal many more 
resources than the other. But the stronger party cannot expect to rely upon this 
power differential being translated into an automatic legal advantage. Formally, 
at least, he has to accept an equality postulate, namely, that his counterpart is his 
equal at law. 174 This is the necessary consequence of their legal SUbjectivity. 
However, by his committing the crime the offender declares his rejection of 
the basic juridical principle of equivalence, and violates the substance of the 
concept oflegal subjectivity. And in so doing, he debauches the integrity of the 
very idea of privatized justice. His crime is a declaration of resistance against the 
equality postulate. He thereby refuses to acquiesce in the consequences of his 
own legal subjectivity. He rends the legal subjectivity of his victim and, by 
necessary implication, undermines the cohesion of the universe of legal subjects. 
His crime does violence not merely to the interests of the victim but to the very 
notion of the juridical and calls its existence into question. Indeed every crime 
plunges the idea of legal subjectivity and its accompanying equality postulate 
anew into crisis. Every crime is an exercise in inequality. Every crime is a 
practical failure of the equality postulate. It takes a power superior to the offender 
173 There has been a recent rapid growth of private prisons. See Bates (1999: 595) and 
Morgan (2002: 1147-1149). However, this development does not entail a move away from 
the basic idea of state punishment. The private prison, like the state prison, continues to 
enforce a public disposition of criminal matters. 
174 See Pashukanis op cit 143-144. 
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to re-assert the idea of the juridical and to re-affIrm its general validity. That 
power, as Pashukanis has made clear, is the bourgeois state. Only the state is able 
to enforce the principle of equivalence against the offender. Only the state can 
insist, and mean it, that the offender not benefit at the expense of the victim and 
that he perform his side of the bargain which he initiated by his criminal conduct. 
Criminality constitutes a recurrent assault upon the founding principles of 
the legal form. A crime is a rebuttal of the presumption of equality inscribed in 
the legal form. The offender introduces an inequality postulate into legal 
intercourse. His crime is an assertion that he is no mere legal subject, formally 
equal to every other legal subject. Indeed, his conduct is a manifesto of personal 
power against the juridical principle of equivalence. He asserts his interest to be 
prior to those of his fellow legal subjects, and thereby approves 'the sUbjection of 
one owner of commodities to another' .175 His crime is a revolt against the 
levelling effect of legal subjectivity in the commodity economy. He is a true 
champion of 'the concrete individual' (as opposed to the abstract legal subject)176 
and is not averse to one such concrete individual lording it over another. The 
criminal offender is, in this connection, an inveterate anti-egalitarian, a devotee of 
the pre-legal, who lives, instinctively, by Marx's famous dictum that equal right 
is, in its content, a right of inequality. 177 Thereby he repudiates the very notion, 
that is, of legal subjectivity which underpins the legal form and structures all 
private law relations. 
175 Ibid 143. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Marx (1978: 530). The offender is, of course, likely blissfully Wlaware of both the man and 
his dictum. 
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It follows, necessarily, that the response to the crime cannot be a privatized 
one. The crime has destroyed the legal equality between victim and offender, and 
has placed a question mark over the efficacy of legal subjectivity as a juridical 
fundamental. By committing the crime, the offender has adjudged the constraints 
upon arbitrariness inscribed in sphere of privatized legal relations to be inadequate 
to the defence of and, by the same token, the re-assertion of the equality postulate. 
The fate of the latter thus becomes a public concern, that is, a matter for state 
action. That which the offender has sundered cannot, logically, be relied upon to 
reconstruct him as a compliant legal subject. Criminal justice is thus necessarily 
public justice. Only the state has the capacity to extract from the offender the 
conformity which is required to reconcile him to the idea of legal subjectivity, 
both his own and everybody else's. It is one of the dialectical ironies of the legal 
form that the efficient reproduction of the private sphere is dependent, ultimately 
and unavoidably, upon the public power. The public is the true guarantor of the 
private. 
All juridical phenomena begin as private affairs. They do not, however, all 
end as such. Criminal justice is the example par excellence of a juridical 
phenomenon which must be or must become a public affair. Without the 
intervention of the state, the rule of equivalence, once violated, could never be re-
established as guiding principle of the legal transaction which is in progress. And 
if the rule of equivalence is not re-instated, then the fabric of the entire 
commodity economy is called into question. The legal subject who will not obey 
the rule of equivalence is challenging his necessary existence as a legal subject. 
He is claiming a status which does not conform to the fundamental stipulations of 
the commodity economy and its Rechtsstaat. He is refusing to be a legal subject. 
He is impugning the concept at the heart of the legal form. He is, in a word, 
challenging the logic of the juridical worldview born of the capitalist mode of 
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production. Objectively, that places him in the company of the revolutionary who 
is consciously devoted to demolishing the commodity economy root and branch. 
The criminal, like the revolutionary, is a recalcitrant legal subject. He will be 
encouraged in his recalcitrance ifhe is not subjected to the authority of the state as 
abstract legal subject and hence representative of all legal subjects. The state is 
the embodiment of the acquiescent legal subject, but with the power to subdue all 
its non-acquiescent fellows. 
Of all the branches of law, it is criminal justice that is perhaps the most 
eminently public. It is in this sphere where the violent nature of the law is most 
evident, and it is hence in this sphere where it is necessary to restrict the use of 
coercion to the formal organs of the state. 178 The private settlement of criminal 
disputes is not properly legal, in the sense that it is not an organ of state that has 
the final say in the disposition of the matter. Such private resolutions either hark 
back to a pre-legal past or portend a post-legal future. Criminal justice is 
thoroughly legal. Not only is it dispensed by the state, but it is also the only 
variant of justice which involves the state as a party. It cannot be otherwise. 
Civil and criminal cases differ essentially in the fact that the former involve 
private parties on both sides while the latter involve a public party on one side. 
This difference is a necessary one, entailed in the nature of crime. Both civil and 
criminal infractions violate the principle of equivalence which lies at the heart of 
all legal relations. However, the civil litigant typically is relying upon or seeking 
an interpretation of the principle of equivalence which serves his interests. He is, 
on the face of it, concerned to uphold the principle of equivalence. The plaintiff 
will argue that the defendant has violated the principle, while the defendant will 
urge that it is the plaintiff who is in breach. The point is that both parties to a civil 
matter proceed from the premise that the principle of equiValence is a valid one. 
178 Seagle (1946: 6-7). 
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Of course, each is operating from self-interest. Each submits that the other has 
violated the principle and both impress upon the court the need for a decision that 
will re-establish the operation of the principle inter se. While the submissions of 
either are entirely self-serving, there is no argument in such matters about the 
validity or legitimacy of the juridical relation. Civil disputes are about using that 
relation to self-advantage. They do not require state intervention, except as 
ultimate arbiter as to the interpretation of the principle of equivalence. 
The criminal offender has no such agenda. He does not seek to use the 
principle of equivalence to his advantage. Instead, he rejects the principle, albeit 
for the most part unthinkingly or unwittingly. Whereas a civil infraction may 
begin as an attempt to evade of the principle of equivalence, there is generally no 
question about the validity of the principle itself. By contrast, a crime is a 
negation of the principle itself. It is an overt denial of the founding term of the 
legal relation. The offender asserts a claim to operate outside the parameters of 
law, and not only in the sense of breaking the letter of the law. Objectively, a 
crime is, therefore, an act of outright subversion of the legal relation. The 
offender has no interest in harnessing the principle of equivalence to his cause. 
By committing the crime, he has renounced it. And he has no stake in co-
operating or even competing with the victim in a court case to settle the 
interpretation of the principle. In these circumstances, it is necessary for the state 
to become a party to the matter and to compel the offender to respect the validity 
of the principle of equivalence and to participate in its operation. 
The crime is a repUdiation of the principle of equivalence. The criminal 
trial is an afflrmation of the principle, during which the state deploys its power to 
make the offender 'play the game' which his crime has rubbished. Minor & 
Morrison conclude that: 
'From a Marxist perspective, state control over deviance is an integral 
feature of modern capitalism and is not likely to be relinquished.' 179 
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The truth is that 'state control over deviance' cannot be relinquished. The 
capitalist social formation requires a criminal justice system which operates under 
the aegis of its state. The notion of a private criminal justice does violence to the 
idea of the legal subject who lives (and dies) by the principle of equivalence. 
Despite their private origins, the legal form and its concomitants cannot survive 
without the patronage of the state. 180 Pashukanis's general theory oflaw 
comprehends the statist necessaries of criminal justice. 
5.12 Pashukanis and Christie 
It is time for an assignation between Christie and Pashukanis. If, according 
to its self-image, restorative justice is to be comprehended as the negation of 
criminal justice and a crime is to be understood as a private legal transaction, then 
it is Christie's notion of conflicts as property that continues to provide the 
theoretical springboard for the restorationist project. There has been no other 
major theoretical advance or proposition since Christie's. The contribution of 
Braithwaite & Pettit injected a republican aspect into the theory of restorative 
justice, but did not depart fundamentally from the proprietary concept of 
criminality developed by Christie. And, as argued in the opening section of this 
chapter, all non-proprietary theories of restorative justice founder for failing to 
make explicit the genetic concordance between privatized justice and property. 
The remainder of this chapter will therefore be concerned to assess Christie's 
179 Minor & Morrison op cit 124. 
180 Only the state possesses the resources to defend the principle of equivalence and to compel 
the offender to abide by its imperatives. Every criminal trial is about making the offender 
pay for his indifference to the principle and extracting from him the required, albeit 
retrospective, obeisance to the principle. The state is the only institution capable of doing 
this on a large scale. 
proprietary theory, as the epistemological fundament of restorative justice, in 
tenns ofPashukanis's general theory of law. 
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It will be recalled that, according to Pashukanis, the legal form is the 
materialization of the relations of commodity production, specifically of 
generalized commodity production. In other words, law proper is an attribute of 
the capitalist mode of production; the pre-capitalist modes of production were 
also all pre-legal societies in the sense that none of them evinced a juridical 
worldview. Every properly legal system is founded upon the fundamental idea of 
the legal subject, as bearer oflegal rights and duties, who is the motor force of the 
legal relation. The legal subject begins as a commodity owner and acquires his 
status as a subject in order to trigger the circulation of commodities. In other 
words, every legal subject is simultaneously a proprietor, at least ofthe value-
producing commodity, labour power. Legal subjectivity, then, comes into 
existence as the correlative of commodity exchange. It is, in this connection, an 
eminently private-law concept, structuring the circulation process according to the 
specificities, especially, of the law of contract and the law of property. The legal 
form is, in Pashukanis's terms, the analogue of the commodity form, and the legal 
subject the conjugate of the commodity owner. Juridification and 
commodification are complements, both diachronic and synchronic, of each other. 
Unlike Pashukanis, Christie is not a Marxist, nor does he demonstrate any 
knowledge ofPashukanis and his general theory of law. Yet, the theory of 
restorative justice which Christie propounds is, in many respects, remarkably 
affined to Pashukanis's position. Christie does not share Pashukanis's critique of 
the legal form. But he does show a strong intuitive grasp of the place of the 
process of commodification in the constitution of the legal form. Christie, it will 
be recalled, is concerned with criminal justice in 'industrialised large-scale 
society'. In other words, he is concerned with criminal justice in bourgeois 
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society. And he agitates for crimes in bourgeois society to be redefmed as forms 
of property. Since bourgeois society is a society of generalized commodity 
production governed by the legal regime of private property, it follows that 
Christie's argument that criminal conflicts be comprehended as property forms is, 
in fact, an argument for their commodification. I8I 
Christie embraces the process of commodification as his basic theoretical 
premise. According to him, restorative justice must be theorized in terms of the 
extension of the process of commodification to criminal behaviour itself. Crime 
is, or must become, a commodity. Of course, Christie would likely reject as 
absurd any suggestion that his advocating for crime to be treated as property 
implies that he supports the viewpoint of Pashukanis. What is indubitable, 
however, is that Christie's theoretical submissions confer credence upon 
Pashukanis's general theory of law, and place restorative justice squarely within 
the purview of that theory. Christie's work is primarily about grounding 
restorative justice theoretically. However, in his elaboration of a theory of 
restorative justice he grasps the truth of Pashukanis' s essential argument - that 
legal relations are the superstructural manifestation of commodity relations, and 
that the legal form is, at bottom, a proprietary form which is suffused with the 
ethos ofthe market. 182 
Indeed, and despite their quite contrary origins and conclusions, Christie's 
idea of criminal conflict as property is a quite stunnirJg vindication of 
181 See Pashukanis op cit 126: 'Private property first becomes perfected and universal with the 
transition to commodity production, or more accurately, to capitalist commodity 
production. ' 
182 The organic relationship between law and property seems to have been apparent to most 
earlier political philosophers. Thus, for example, Bentham (cited in Weitekamp, 1999: 88) 
says: 'Property and law are born together and die together.' The arguments of both Christie 
and Pashukanis are thus well-grounded in the history of political philosophy. 
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Pashukanis's analysis of the legal form. 183 The criticism ofPashukanis by neo-
Marxists notwithstanding, in Christie we see a respected member of the non-
Marxist criminological community proffering an analysis of crime and 
punishment which is spontaneously but uncannily Pashukanian in its essentials. 
And it is an analysis which has been validated by a significant proportion of the 
restorative justice community. 184 After Christie, the argument that Pashukanis's 
approach to law is too abstract or formal can no longer be entertained as serious 
criticism. Christie's achievement is that he discerned that the crisis of criminality 
had its material basis in the crisis of capitalism and fashioned a theory which 
comprehended the pivotal position occupied by proprietary relations in the 
political economy of capitalism. His achievement is all the more impressive in 
that he reached his conclusions - demonstrably Pashukanian in so many respects -
without, it would appear, any conscious reliance upon the analytical resources of 
Marxism. 
Christie's accord with the Pashukanian perspective encompasses not only 
the concept of crime but also that of punishment. Although Conflicts as Property 
contains nothing of substance in respect of the analysis of punishment, Christie's 
subsequent Limits to Pain makes it clear that he understands the principle of 
equivalent requital which founds the bourgeois penal regime. Thus, he says: 
183 There are, of course, major differences between Pashukanis and Christie, which will be 
discussed below. 
184 See Wright (1991 : 54): 'Few contributions have been as widely quoted in the literature on 
mediation as the Norwegian Professor Christie's lecture in Sheffield in 1976, Conflicts as 
property.' See also Johnstone (2003: 24): 'Christie's paper is rightly regarded as essential 
reading for anybody wishing to understand the restorative justice perspective.' Hudson 
(2003: 177) refers to 'Christie's classic article' as 'paradigmatic', and Braithwaite (cited in 
Bottoms, 2003: 80) considers it 'the most influential text of the restorative tradition'. 
Bottoms (2003: 82 & 80 footnote 2) refers to it as 'this key foundational text' and informs 
us that: 'The subsequent major influence of Christie's paper would have been predicted by 
very few of those who first heard it. It was initially regarded as an extremely interesting 
intellectual argument, but one that was unlikely to have much subsequent practical impact. 
How wrong first impressions can be! ' 
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'In penal law, values are clarified through a gradation of inflicting pain. 
The state establishes its scale, the rank-order of values, through variation in 
the number of blows administered to the criminal, or through the number of 
months or years taken away from him. ,185 
He understands also the connection between punishment and the commodity 
economy as an economy of labour time: 
'It is correct that our prisons are by and large filled with poor people. We let 
the poor pay with the only commodity that is close to being equally 
distributed in society: time.' 186 
Christie clearly appreciates the true meaning of the notion of 'doing time'. And 
again, as with his analysis of crime, his pronouncements on punishment have 
about them a palpably Pashukanian tenor. 
It is well known that in their studies of the constitution of the primitive 
commune, Marx and Engels relied heavily upon the anthropological discoveries 
of Morgan. 187 Similarly, Lenin, in his analysis and critique of imperialism, made 
extensive use of the work of Hobson. 188 Although Pashukanis was murdered forty 
years before Christie's 1976 lecture, Christie occupies a position in relation to 
Pashukanis which is in many respects comparable to that occupied by Morgan in 
relation to Marx and Engels and Hobson in relation to Lenin. Certainly, it would 
not be inappropriate to say of Christie that in his analysis of restorative justice, he 
185 Christie (1981 : 94). 
186 Ibid 95. 
187 In the Preface to his The Origin o/the Family, Private Property and the State, Engels 
(1940 : 1) tells us that Morgan 'in his own way had discovered afresh in America the 
materialistic conception of history discovered by Marx forty years ago'. Also, in 1884 
Engels (cited in Terray, 1972: 21) wrote to Kautsky that: 'Within the limits set by his 
subject, Morgan spontaneously discovered Marx's materialist conception of history, and his 
conclusions with regard to present-day society are absolutely communist.' 
188 In his Imperialism , Lenin (1977: 176,235 & 240) often praises 'the non-Marxist Hobson', 
whose work he accepted as presenting 'a very good and comprehensive description of the 
principal specific economic and political features of imperialism' . The Bolshevik leader 
put greater store by Hobson's analysis of imperialism than that of Marxists such as Kautsky 
and Hilferding. 
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rediscovered the core elements ofPashukanis's materialist theory oflaw. It 
would, similarly, be entirely legitimate to say that the non-Marxist Christie's 
comprehension of the constitutive features of the legal fonn is superior to that of 
avowed Marxists such as Fine and neo-Marxists such as Warrington. 
When Christie conceptualizes crime as a fonn of property, he is 
commodifying it. Pashukanis discerned virtually the same thing some 50 years 
earlier, in his classification of a crime as a retrospective contract. For, inscribed 
in such a classification is the notion of an exchange relation which lies at the heart 
of the juridical idea of a contract. In other words, Pashukanis realized that, in the 
capitalist context, a crime is as much about commodity exchange as any other 
private-law contract. Given that the commodity is the elemental fonn of capitalist 
property, it becomes patent that Pashukanis adhered to a decidedly proprietary 
notion of crime. Almost half a century had to elapse before this Marxist 
discovery was publicly affinned by an 'independent' source in the shape of 
Christie's decidedly non-Marxist theory of restorative justice. It would appear 
that all roads do, after all, as MacPherson would have it, lead to property. That is 
the capitalist way. 
The Christie thesis lays to rest, and definitively, all notions that 
Pashukanis's analysis of crime and punishment in terms of commodity exchange 
is somewhat farfetched, abstract and contrived. There can no longer be any 
serious or sustained argument that while Pashukanis' s theory of law may be able 
to explain private law adequately, it cannot do the same for public law. Nor can it 
any longer be contended that his theory does not qualify as a general theory of 
law. Christie has, in this regard, proved Pashukanis. His theorization of 
restorative justice has confinned that Pashukanis's theory of law is properly 
general, in the sense that its application to criminal justice is as valid, at least, as 
its application to the law of contract. When Christie decided to theorize crimes as 
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fonns of property he was, needless to say, unaware of how close this would take 
him to Pashukanis. It took him as close as a non-Marxist can approach a Marxist 
position without actually embracing it. The proximity is such that the spirit of 
Pashukanis's general theory of law is embedded in the soul of Christie's 
proprietary theory of restorative justice. 
Christie appreciates the proprietary bias of contemporary bourgeois society 
and celebrates it as the cornerstone of the theory of restorative justice. As a 
Marxist, Pashukanis's comprehends fully the centrality of property in the political 
economy of capitalism, and theorizes it, in its unadulterated commodity fonn, as 
the key to the analysis of the legal fonn. There can, in this regard, be no 
gainsaying the likelihood that, had Pashukanis been required to analyse restorative 
justice in his day, he would have done so in tenns not unlike Christie's. Of 
course, he would have given the analysis an expressly materialist colour, but he 
would almost certainly have left Christie's fundamental theoretical insights 
largely intact. The focus would have been upon incorporating, extending and 
deepening the Christie thesis in tenns of the Marxist method rather than upon 
dismissing it for its non-Marxist genesis. The Marxist theory of law takes the 
commodity as its premise and comprehends legal relations as the fonn necessarily 
taken by commodity relations, and the legal subject as the necessary alter ego of 
the commodity owner. It is, in this connection, indisputable that Pashukanis 
would have comprehended restorative justice in proprietary tenns. He understood 
crime and punishment as exchange transactions and would invariably have 
applied this insight to the analysis of restorative justice. Of course, the 
commodity is at the heart of every exchange relation and would have had to be 
central to the Marxist comprehension of restorative justice also. 
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However, the Marxist critique of restorative justice in a capitalist context 
does not imply that Marxism is blind to the liberatory potentialities of restorative 
justice in a post-capitalist milieu. It is, in this regard, instructive to consider 
briefly the revolution in law which took place in the first decade or so of 
Bolshevik rule in the Soviet Union. It was a revolution which was informed by 
the commodity exchange theory of law, 189 and which had Pashukanis and Stuchka 
as theoretical doyens. Bolshevik jurists understood that the Soviet Union was a 
proletarian dictatorship, that is, a transitional form of state between capitalism and 
communism. And in the same way as the proletarian state was expected to wither 
away as the classless society approached, so too was the law of the transition 
period expected wither away. 190 Communism, then, would be 'lawless', in the 
sense that the very notion of law would have been rendered a historical and 
institutional anachronism.191 The Bolshevik jurists were tasked with the 
responsibility of formulating a legal regime which expressed the requirements of 
the transition period. 192 While they accepted that the period would have a 
juridical character, they conceived of the juridical itself in transient and 
disintegrative terms. Certainly, they recognized no obligation to respect the 
relationship between the commodity and legal forms which, in terms of the 
189 See Rosenberg (1990: 153). 
190 The nature of this transitional law was the subject of constant debate within Bolshevik legal 
ranks in this period. Pashukanis insisted that it was bourgeois law on the basis that the 
transitory nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat rendered the idea of proletarian law 
totally untenable. Stuchka (1990a: 159-161), by contrast, accepted that the law of the 
transition was proletarian law. Stuchka's view eventually prevailed. See Warrington op cit 
59-60 and Berman (1963: 28). 
191 See Pashukanis op cit 61: 'The withering away of certain categories of bourgeois law in no 
way implies their replacement by new categories of proletarian law ... The withering away 
of the categories of bourgeois law will, under these conditions, mean the withering away of 
law altogether, that is to say the disappearance of the juridical factor from social relations.' 
See also Stuchka (cited in Berman ibid 26): 'Communism means not the victory of socialist 
law, but the victory of socialism over any law, since with the abolition of classes with their 
antagonistic interests, law will die out altogether.' See further Kozlovsky (1990: 171): 
'With the final suppression of the bourgeoisie, proletarian "law" will gradually lose its own 
functions and will be changed into rules for the organization of economic life - production, 
distribution and consumption. Organs of law will be turned into economic and 
administrative organs.' 
192 See Berman ibid 29, Schlesinger op cit 156 and Rosenberg op cit 154-155. 
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commodity exchange theory, constituted the juridical moment. Indeed, inasmuch 
as the Bolsheviks were theoretically committed to transcending the juridical, they 
were also practically disposed to subverting the legal relation. The revolution in 
law over which they presided was, in this regard, fundamentally destructive of 
bourgeois legality and its institutional apparatus. 193 
The Bolshevik revolution in law included a profound transformation of the 
criminal justice system. In this connection, the first step of the revolutionary 
regime was to dismantle the pre-revolutionary courts and replace them with 
People's COurtS. 194 These new courts had jurisdiction over most crimes, except 
crimes of counter-revolution which fell within the province of Revolutionary 
Tribunals. They were staffed by elected personnel: a President (usually a legal 
professional) and two or more lay People's Assessors. The latter had the same 
rights as the President in matters of fact and law, and also had the power to 
remove him. People's Courts were enjoined to have recourse to pre-revolutionary 
laws only insofar as they had not been abolished and did not contradict 
revolutionary conscience and consciousness. 195 For Stuchka this injunction was a 
proclamation of' class principles of justice' .196 These principles entailed a 
rejection ofthe formalism characteristic of bourgeois rules of evidence and 
procedure. Such matters were secondary to the task of fmding ways, including the 
193 See Rosenberg ibid 156 and Berman ibid 32. 
194 This was achieved by way of the Decree of the Soviet of Peoples's Commissars on the 
Court of November 1917. See Stuchka (l990b: 185), Schlesinger op cit 62 and Butler 
(2003: 149). 
195 Article 5 of the Decree of the Soviet of Peoples's Commissars on the Court. For further 
discussion of the People's Courts and Revolutionary Tribunals see Berman op cit 31, 
Stuchka ibid 187-189, Butler ibid 149-150 & 577-588 and Schlesinger ibid 60-73. 
196 Stuchka (1990c: 193). 
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consideration of non-legal issues, to resolve the case according to socialist criteria 
of justice. 197 
The punitive policy of the transition was intended to 'break completely with 
the principles of retribution' .198 Instead, the purpose of punishment was to be 
social defence, that is, the defence of the revolutionary social order against 
criminal encroachments. 199 The type and scale of punishment depended upon the 
extent of 'the degree and character of the danger for society of both the criminal 
himself and the act' ?OO The class position of the offender was identified as the 
primary factor in determining punishment.201 Early Bolshevik criminal justice was 
thus expressly class-based, breaking decisively with the principle of equivalence 
which had informed the pre-revolutionary dispensation?02 
The constitution and operation of the revolutionary courts outlined above 
evince a discernible restorationist flavour. 203 Elements such as significant lay 
participation and powers, the rejection of retribution as the purpose of punishment 
and the ready reliance upon extra-legal factors in the resolution oflegal disputes 
197 See Rosenberg (op cit p 157): 'Procedures governing the relevance of evidence and 
testimony were also altered to allow the introduction of wide-ranging material concerning 
social background, political attitudes, character and the like.' See also Schlesinger (op cit 
72): 'Not in elaborate legal machinery but in thorough investigation of all relevant 
circumstances of the case is Justice sought.' 
198 Kozlovsky op cit 173. 
199 See Articles 8 and 10 of the Guiding Principles of Criminal Law in the RSFSR (1919). 
200 Article 11 of the Guiding Principles of Criminal Law in the RSFSR (1919). 
201 Article 12 (a) of the Guiding Principles of Criminal Law in the RSFSR (1919). See also 
Schlesinger op cit 75. 
202 See Kozlovsky op cit 176: 'The mathematically exact yardstick "from-to", adopted by 
bourgeois legislators, rests on the fiction of a "nonnal", "average person" .. , Proletarian 
justice does not need fictions for concealing its class character, as does the bourgeoisie, and 
does not operate with a fictitious ''median'', lacking correspondence to a living and diverse 
reality. Proletarian justice, guided in the defence of the socialist system only by the 
principle of expediency, grants a free hand to its courts in calculating the amount of 
repression, in accord with the diversity and many-sidedness of criminal activities.' 
203 I must thank Professor Piers Beirne, one of my examiners, for drawing my attention to the 
potential affmity between early Bolshevik criminal justice and restorative justice. 
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may all be comprehended as prefigurations of restorative justice. To be sure, 
Bolshevik criminal justice, as the criminal justice of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, was eminently statist. But it also presaged the justice of a future 
communist society in which the state, as an institution of class rule, had withered 
into insignificance. The Bolshevik innovations in criminal justice portended a 
restorative justice which transcended the commodity form and its attendant 
principle of equivalence. Pashukanis's general theory of law not only contains the 
conceptual necessaries for the Marxist critique of contemporary restorative 
justice, but also formed the theoretical backdrop to an incipient post-capitalist 
restorationism inscribed in the Bolshevik revolution in law. 
5.13 Pashukanis contra Christie 
Despite their mutualities, there remains a series of unbridgeable differences 
between Pashukanis and Christie. The divergences between them stem directly 
and inevitably from the fact that the former is a Marxist and the latter not. And 
they traverse the core elements of the Marxist critique of restorative justice. 
There are three such items of difference which require comment. 
The first major difference concerns the legal form itself. Notwithstanding 
its centrality to his general theory, Pashukanis is an unrelenting critic of the legal 
form and theorizes its eventual disappearance from human relations, along with 
the commodity form. For him the key to the comprehension of both forms and of 
the relationship between them lies in their historicity. The lives of both are 
intimately connected with the life of the capitalist mode of production, and their 
demise is expected to follow the demise of capitalism. Pashukanis considers that 
law proper is a bourgeois relation and he looks forward to the installation, in the 
wake of the emergence of a post-capitalist social order, of a world in which the 
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legal form has no purchase, one in which human relations are not structured by 
the juridical perspective. In other words, he anticipates that the next historical era 
in the evolution of human society will be a post-legal one.204 
Christie, by contrast, is an unapologetic believer in the notion of the 
juridical, and takes the legal form for granted as an aspect of human relations. 
What is more, his position entails the re-conceptualization of criminal law as a 
direct materialization of the commodity form, from which is derived the legal 
form. His submission that criminal conflicts are forms of property amounts to an 
argument for the commodification of crime and punishment. Indeed, it is an 
argument for intensifYing the process of commodification, with a view to 
transforming the criminal law landscape so that the interrelation between the legal 
form and the commodity form is unequivocal. This is the juridical approach par 
excellence. However radical Christie may be in relation to the conventional 
notion of criminal justice, such radicality does not extend to the legal form itself. 
He presumes its permanent existence. The question of the historicity of the 
juridical is outside the ambit of his theory. The future of the legal form does not 
feature in his theoretical constructions. This is a crucial omission which, as will 
become clear later, imports into the restorative justice project a quite disabling 
contradiction. 
The role of the state, as a public power, is the source of the second major 
difference between Pashukanis and Christie. Pashukanis analyses the criminal 
law as a branch of public law which is premised as securely, if not as obviously, 
as private law upon the exchange transactions of the commodity economy. He 
seeks to explain criminal justice on the basis of his general theory oflaw. He 
204 For Pashukanis (op cit 133), 'the legal form only encompasses us within its narrow horizon 
for the time being. It exists for the sole purpose of being utterly spent.' 
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attempts to theorize the criminal law, as a public law phenomenon, in terms of the 
relationship between the legal form and the commodity form. As a Marxist, 
Pashukanis comprehends the necessity for the state to administer criminal justice 
in class society in general and bourgeois society in particular. The public nature 
of crime and criminality is thus an issue for him only insofar as it needs to be 
harmonized with a theory of law which presumes the genesis of the legal form to 
be essentially 'private'. Pashukanis therefore takes as given the fact that the 
criminal law is public law, to which the state is necessarily a party. He accepts 
that in a commodity economy, criminal justice is perforce state justice. His 
concern is to develop his general theory from its origins in private law to 
encompass also those branches of the law which are generally accepted to be 
public, foremost amongst which is criminal law. In a word, Pashukanis's project 
in respect of crime and punishment is to discover and clarify the nature of the 
legal form, qua public law form, in the context of an economy of generalized 
commodity production. 
It has already been established that Christie's theory of restorative justice is 
anti-statist. He wishes to remove the state from the criminal justice matrix by 
privatizing the criminal episode and establishing a patent link between the 
criminal law and the commodity form. Indeed, he appears to believe that, 
hitherto, crime and punishment have been insufficiently commodified and hence 
that the legal form has not reached the level of development in the criminal law 
that it has in the different branches of private law, such as the law of contract, the 
law of delict and the law of property. A state-sponsored criminal justice system is 
considered by restorationists to be an impediment to the resolution of the crisis of 
criminality. Hence Christie's advocating that the legal relations governing crime 
and punishment be removed from the public arena and relocated in the private 
arena. If restorative justice is to be the key to solving the crisis of criminality, 
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then the key to restorative justice is the complete privatization of crime and 
punishment, in the sense that the state has no say in the disposition of criminal 
matlers.205 This, of course, implies a radical break with criminal justice. It is his 
strident anti-statism which separates Christie's restorative justice from 
conventional criminal justice (and from partial restorative justice). However, as 
will be argued later, it is this self-same anti-statism which constitutes perhaps the 
biggest obstacle to the success of the restorative justice project. 
Christie's anti-statism rests upon the twin legs of the commodity and the 
community. For criminal conflicts to become property which can be disposed of 
according to the will of their owners, they must, of necessity, be transformed into 
commodities. When Christie agitates for a world of property owners he is 
therefore agitating for a world of commodity owners. In such a world, the crime 
becomes a commodity in the hands of its co-owners, the offender and the victim. 
In concert, they work out an exchange, according to which the offender will make 
the reparation required and the victim will accept such reparation as will allow 
them to relinquish ownership. They are equal participants in an exchange relation 
which consumes the crime. The exchange has the effect of using up the criminal 
episode. Things can then return to normal. And the principle of equiValence 
stands vindicated. 
While Christie's theory does entail a privatized system of restorative justice 
it does not envisage that the exchange transaction which disposes of the crime be 
exclusively private as between victim and offender. The theory requires a third 
party or 'stakeholder', in the form of the community as the site of the transaction 
between victim and offender. The property owners must face each other in the 
205 Restorationists appear to embrace the privatized notion of crime in the same way that 
Thompson (1975: 266) embraces the public notion of human rights, that is, as an 
'unqualified human good'. 
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community. They must make their dealings subject to the inspection and 
involvement of the community. The community is, in this regard, the guardian of 
the principle of equivalence in the restorative process. Its participation ensures 
that the transaction between offender and victim is an equal one. The restorative 
process needs a milieu in which the parties will respect each other as equals. The 
community provides that milieu. 
It must be noted that Christie does not conceive of the restorative 
community as a 'mere' replacement for the state. His theory is properly anti-
statist and allows no room for a public authority of any kind. It is true that 
community involvement imbues the restorative process with a public aspect, in 
the sense that it is open to public scrutiny. But that is not the same as having 
criminal dispositions decided by a public authority. Indeed, community 
participation in the restorative process is supposed to be an expression of the 
radically private character of that process. The community is able to become 
involved precisely because the state, as public power, has been ejected. If crime 
and punishment are commodities which, like all commodities, are exchanged in 
the market, then the community is the marketplace of restorative justice. It is the 
site where victim and offender, as men or women of property, as commodity 
owners, enter into an exchange transaction governed by the principle of 
equivalence according to which the market is structured. In this regard, the 
community is, to mangle Marx, a veritable Eden of equality. 
Restorative justice seeks to go beyond criminal justice. It seeks to establish 
a true market in criminality, operating according to the laws which govern the 
market in commodities. Such a market is, archetypally, a private sphere, where 
participants meet as and are recognized as equals. In other words, the principle of 
equivalence is not imposed, as it is by the state in the arena of criminal justice. 
Here it is an attribute of the restorative process. That process summates in the 
restorative sanction, which is supposed to express the principle of equivalence 
upon which restorative justice rests. Unlike the criminal sanction, it is not 
decided or fashioned by one party?06 It is a solution devised by victim and 
offender, facing each other as equals in the community. 
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For Christie the restorative sanction is conceived as the end result of the 
process of equalization which the parties undergo. It is they, not the state, who 
decide what the qUid pro quo for the harm suffered by the victim should be. The 
restorative sanction is the outcome of a transaction which occurs according to 
market principles. The parties negotiate, as equals, and settle upon the restorative 
sanction as the best and most fair result of their negotiations. Unlike the criminal 
sanction which is foisted upon the offender by the state,207 the restorative sanction 
emerges naturally from an exchange between parties whose relationship is 
structured by the principle of equiValence. The criminal sanction is an enforced 
implementation of the ethos of the commodity economy whereas the restorative 
sanction is a celebration of that ethos. 
In sum, Christie's project in respect of crime and punishment is to theorize 
them as private interactions between property owners in the community. The 
crime becomes a commodity to be disposed of in the community marketplace. 
And state punishment gives way to the restorative sanction, representing the 
206 The criminal sanction amounts to an enforced equivalence, backed by the power of the 
state. As Pashukanis shows, it is the power of the state which stands behind the 
construction of the crime as a contract made by the offender, whether he intended it or not, 
and whether he wants it or not. It is in the face of the might of the state that the offender 
has no choice but to uphold his part of the bargain which he imposed upon the victim 
unilaterally. 
207 Of course, here state coercion is deployed in defence of the principle of equivalence. 
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outcome of the exchange transaction between victim and offender, according to 
the principle of equivalence.208 
Of course, as a Marxist, Pashukanis, too, is anti-statist. But whereas 
Christie objects to the state as a party to the criminal justice system, Pashukanis 
objects to its very existence as a public authority in human society. The one 
wants to restrict the ambit of state power; the other wants to destroy it. The one 
accepts bourgeois society but seeks to replace its criminal justice system; the other 
accepts the criminal justice system as a necessary aspect of bourgeois society but 
seeks replace that society. 
The third significant divergence between Pashukanis and Christie concerns 
their approaches to the fundamental juridical notion of legal subjectivity. It will 
be recalled that Pashukanis seeks the genesis of legal subjectivity in the 
commodity economy, and specifically in the imperatives of commodity exchange. 
For him, the legal form is a homologue of the commodity form, the former being 
the ideal superstructural expression of the latter. Legal subjectivity is derivative. 
Its existence is stipulated by the exigencies of the commodity economy. The legal 
subject emerges as the actualization of the commodity owner. They are similar in 
form; but remain conceptually distinct, with the latter taking analytical precedence 
over the former. Besides being historically given, the contingent character of 
208 Like all proponents of restorative justice, Christie rejects retributionism. Indeed, antipathy 
to retributionism has acquired the status of an article of faith in restorationist lore. Yet, 
retributionism is the only conventional theory of punishment which embraces overtly the 
principle of equivalence, the self-same principle to which restorative justice is theoreticaUy 
wedded. The restorative process and sanction are about restoring the status quo ante. 
Restorationists accept that, prior to the crime, the relationship between the offender and 
victim was one as between two equal legal subjects. In other words, equivalence is the 
norm, which the crime has disturbed and which the restorative process must reinstate. If 
retributionism is about equivalent requital, then restorative justice is about equivalent 
recompense. Thus, despite their supposed contradictions, there is much more that 
restorative justice shares with retributionism than the proponents of the fonner would care 
to admit. 
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legal subjectivity is prescribed also by the philosophical materialism which 
informs Pashukanis's general theory of law. Since the Marxist epistemology 
stipulates the juridical concepts to be superstructural categories, it follows that 
their analysis ought to proceed from the material conditions of their genesis and 
development. 
Christie inverts Pashukanis, and hence the materialist premise. He begins 
with the legal subject and ends with the commodity owner. For him, legal 
subjectivity, if not a natural condition, is certainly a prior condition. The legal 
subject becomes a commodity owner by virtue of the commodification of the 
crime to which he is a party. The former determines, the latter is determined. 
Both victim and offender become owners because they are legal subjects. In other 
words, he proceeds from a presumption of legal subjectivity. Such a presumption 
is, of course, rank idealism. Restorationists, including Christie, are quick to 
proffer historical justifications for their project. Yet, they make no effort to 
uncover the historical origins of the foundational juridical concept. Christie, too, 
avoids this avenue of investigation and embraces the legal subject as a 
suprahistorical universal. That is nothing other than a variant of the idealist 
postulate.209 
The triad of differences between Pashukanis and Christie discussed above 
may be summarized as follows: 
209 Christie comprehends the relationship between the legal subject and the commodity owner 
as an identity and not, as does Pashukanis, as a homology. He transforms the crime itself 
into property, thereby collapsing the conceptual distinction between legal subject and 
commodity owner. This theoretical construction entails the most complete unity of the 
legal subject and the commodity owner. The commodification of the crime melds the 
subjectivity and proprietorship of each party. These attributes become definitively fused in 
the restorative process, to spawn the perfect subject-owner, for whom legal SUbjectivity and 
ownership are conterminous. The ambit of the idealist postulate is thus extended, to include 
the immortality of the commodity. 
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• Christie embraces the legal form as a natural and inevitable dimension of 
human social organization, past, present and future; whereas Pashukanis 
comprehends it in historically specific terms, as an attribute of bourgeois 
society, and theorizes its eventual disappearance from human social 
intercourse. 
• Pashukanis understands the state to be a necessary party to bourgeois 
criminal justice and hence that such justice is necessarily public justice; 
whereas Christie takes a robust anti-statist stance, and theorizes restorative 
justice as privatized justice. Christie advocates the demise of the bourgeois 
state as a 'stakeholder' in the criminal justice system; Pashukanis advocates 
the demise of the state as a social institution. 
• Pashukanis derives legal subjectivity from the structure of the commodity 
economy, and hence the legal subject from the commodity owner; whereas 
Christie presumes the timeless legal subject and, in the conditions of 
'industrialised large-scale society', seeks to re-make him as a proplietor, 
that is, as commodity owner. 
As intimated earlier, these differences also range across the essential features of 
the Marxist critique of restorative justice. 
5.14 The Political Economy of Restorative Justice 
The material roots of the restorative justice movement are to be found in the 
economic crisis which has ravaged the capitalist world, more or less unabated, for 
the past three decades. The severity and depth of the crisis have given rise to the 
neo-liberal drive to unburden the state of the social and welfare responsibilities 
which it had to assume after the Second World War. Privatization is the 
watchword of this project, and is touted as the answer to public waste and 
bureaucratic inefficiency which supposedly underlie the crisis of capitalist 
profitability . 
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The neo-liberal project is about rejuvenating the free market, unencumbered 
by the 'dead hand' of public claims and responsibilities. Its proponents argue that 
private enterprise will achieve the levels of profitability and general prosperity 
which have hitherto evaded those who make public policy. The state and its 
agencies are perceived as impediments to the blossoming of the free enterprise 
system. Hence the neo-liberal credo that the state ought to step aside and leave 
the business of the economy to those who have their lives invested in making it 
functional. These are not salaried state officials, for whom economic concerns are 
little more than an item in a job description, but the entrepreneurs for whom the 
health of the economy and the stability of the social order are absolutely vital. 
They are the true believers in the goodness of capitalism as a people's mode of 
production?1O In other words, from the neo-liberal perspective it is the private 
sector, not the public, which holds the key to the solution of the structural crisis of 
capitalism and to its expanded reproduction as a mode of production. 
Restorative justice is the penological correlate ofthe neo-liberal economic 
vision. There is an undeniable correspondence between the crisis of profitability 
and accumulation besetting the economy and the crisis of criminality and penality 
besetting the administration of justice. Restorative justice represents the incursion 
of the spirit of the market into the arena of criminal conflict. Whereas this arena 
has been an eminently statist one hitherto, the advocates of restorative justice have 
taken an expressly anti-statist position. For them, restorative justice is a sphere of 
privatized justice in which the state has no place. They view the criminal justice 
system as a state asset which needs to be privatized, as so many others already 
have been. Privatization is necessary because the state has been unable to 
210 The idea of popular capitalism does suggest a certain 'publicness'. However, it is a 
dimension which is entirely subsumed under the popular capitalist drive towards 
privatization. See Chapter Two above. 
administer the criminal justice system 'profitably', and has earned but minimal 
returns upon its investments on the anti-crime bourse. 
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The restorationist argument is that the state has failed in its bid to solve or 
even manage the crisis of criminality which continues to run amok in most 
capitalist social formations, and now needs to hand it over to those who can. In 
this regard, restorative justice seeks to bring to criminal justice a remedy of the 
order which neo-liberalism has brought to the economy. A crucial feature of this 
remedy is the transfer of hitherto public assets to the private sector, and the import 
of the principles of the market into existing state institutions. Restorationists are 
the free-marketeers of the criminal justice system. They seek to sever the link 
between the state and criminal justice. They wish to remove criminal conflicts 
from the public sphere and reconstruct them according to the precepts of the 
private sector. They are convinced, more or less, that it is the entrepreneurial 
spirit which holds the answer to the world-wide crisis of criminality. 
The restorationist antagonism to statist criminal justice is a radical one. 
Comprehensive restorative justice is the first and only criminological movement 
to advocate that the state be entirely ejected from criminal justice process. 
However, it is a localized radicality. It is concerned to re-organize the manner in 
which bourgeois society deals with crime. It proposes that such re-organization 
be founded upon the privatization of criminal justice, which, in terms of the 
proprietary approach pioneered by Christie, entails the extension of the process of 
commodification to the criminal conflict itself. In other words, restorative justice 
appropriates the defining form and process of the capitalist economy as its 
theoretical touchstone. What is more, it thereby also embraces the legal form 
which arises from the commodity form. 
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The restorationists may be true radicals in their rejection of a state-
sponsored criminal justice and their agitation for a privatized restorative justice. 
However, they turn out to be true conservatives about the notion of the juridical 
which underlies both criminal justice and restorative justice. Restorationists 
relate to criminal justice in the same way as anarchists relate to bourgeois law. 
Pashukanis says of anarchists: 
'Whilst they do, of course, reject the external characteristic of 
bourgeois law - state coercion and the statutes - they preserve its 
inner essence, the free contract between autonomous producers. ,211 
Insofar, therefore, as its opposition to the state is a parochial one which never 
ventures outside the conceptual confmes of the bourgeois worldview, the 
radicality of restorative justice is overwritten in reaction. The restorationist 
demand for the demise of criminal justice is simultaneously a vote of confidence 
in the perpetuity of the commodity and legal forms . 
Even within the parameters of the juridical, the radicality of restorative 
justice soon runs aground upon the tenacity with which the state holds its position 
in the criminal justice system. There is here a debilitating contradiction between 
the theoretical premise of restorative justice and the nature of capitalist criminal 
justice, which has the effect of undoing the former. For it is a vain hope that, 
within the confines of the social relations of the capitalist mode of production, it 
is possible to construct a response to the problem of crime which does not rely 
upon state participation. Christie and his fellows do not understand that bourgeois 
criminal justice is necessarily state justice. Policing might be privatized. 
Corrections might be privatized. But, in the capitalist world, crime and 
punishment must remain public. They must retain their statist fundamentals. The 
regime of criminal justice as we know it is a thoroughly juridical regime, in the 
211 Pashukanis op cit 124. 
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Despite the intersections between the proprietary theory of restorative 
justice and the Marxist general theory of law, there remains an unbridgeable 
chasm between the two. Restorative justice is about harnessing the legal form to 
its cause to supersede the criminal justice system. Marxism is about confronting 
the legal form in order to supersede it. Restorative justice is about removing the 
state from its supervisory role in the criminal justice process. The Marxist 
analysis of law is about the total destruction of the bourgeois state (and the 
withering away of its proletarian successor). Restorative justice is about turning 
all of us into men and women of property. Marxism is about unrelenting struggle 
against the regime of bourgeois property. Restorative justice is about 
commodification. Marxism is the mortal enemy of the commodity economy. 
When all is said and done, restorative justice will not supplant criminal 
justice. But it is not the Marxist critique of its theory which is the undoing of 
restorative justice. The social relations of production themselves constitute the 
insurmountable barrier to its success. The radicality of restorative justice 
dissipates in the face of bourgeois class power. That same power reduces Christie 
to a petite bourgeois revolutionary clinging to the vain belief that crime will 
disappear if only we were all to become proprietors, even if only formally. And 
the comprehensive restorative justice project ceases to be a viable alternative to 
criminal justice. Instead, it is broken up into so many discrete pieces, each 
operational only at the behest and under the auspices of the bourgeois state and its 
criminal justice system, but never combining into a restorative justice system. 
The only future for restorative justice within the parameters of capitalism is a 
partial one. 
It remains to assess restorative justice in relation to the postmodern precepts 
which have come to be identified with contemporary or late capitalism. The idea 
of popular capitalism, canvassed in Chapter Two above, was part of an 
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ideological response to the economic crisis of the mode of production. The idea 
of postmodernism may be comprehended as popular capitalism extended to the 
superstructure as a whole. The next chapter thus seeks to interrogate the 
relationship between restorative justice and postmodernism. 
CHAPTER SIX 
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Chapter 6: Restorative Justice and Postmodernism 
Postmodernism is predatory. It has long superseded its origins in art, 
architecture and literary theory, and has wended its way voraciously through a large 
number of disciplines. It has conquered even the famously conservative defences of 
the law and has already begun to make a noticeable imprint upon the analysis of legal 
relations. Indeed, it has implanted a colonizing presence in the legal form. There are 
today not a few legal academics who challenge the perceived certainties of legal 
modernism and have begun subjecting law and justice to new and destabilizing 
interrogations through the postmodern lens. 1 
The postmodern invasion of law has now reached the gates of restorative 
justice. Legal analysts have begun to deploy some of the postulates of 
postmodernism in the comprehension and critique of restorative justice? However, 
restorationists appear, for now at least, to have kept their distance from the 
postmodern allurement. There is no evidence of any widespread and overt reliance 
by the theorists of restorative justice upon the work of postmodern luminaries such as 
Lyotard, Foucault, Baudrillard, Derrida, Lacan and Barthes.3 As a rule, its 
proponents do not claim inspiration for their commitment to restorative justice in the 
tenets of postmodernism or to be arguing from a consciously postmodern perspective. 
See, for example, Edgeworth (2003), Davies (1996), McVeigh (2002), Hunt (1990), Stacy 
(2001) and Feldman (2000). 
2 See, for example, Edgeworth (2003), Thomson (1997) and Cwmeen (2003). It is worth noting 
that Delgado (2000), a well-known postmodernist, has produced an analysis of restorative 
justice which reads like a modernist tract. 
3 To my knowledge, Pavlich (2003 & 2004) is one of the few restorationists expressly to have 
incorporated postmodern principles into his writings, via the work ofDerrida especially. I shall 
not engage Pavlich because he is concerned to use the resources ofpostmodernism to refine 
restorative justice, whereas I am concerned to criticize restorative justice as a postmodern 
phenomenon. 
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Most attempts to theorize restorative justice do not engage postmodernism, and it is 
rare for restorationists to acknowledge postmodern sources as authority for their 
arguments. The two movements are largely synchronous.4 Yet, the advocates of 
restorative justice have, hitherto, not reciprocated the interest displayed by the 
postmodernists.5 
6.1 Restorative Justice as Postmodern Justice 
The divide between the restorative justice movement and postmodernism is, 
however, more apparent than real. Besides the obvious fact that they are 
contemporaries, there is enough constitutional intersection between them to justify 
restorative justice being theorized as a genus of postmodern justice, that is, as a form 
of criminal justice informed by the premises of a postmodern jurisprudence. There is 
a patent, almost natural, correspondence between postmodernism and restorative 
justice, in the sense that all the major tenets of restorative justice have a decidedly 
4 Postmodernism precedes restorative justice by at most a decade. 
5 It is unlikely that the advocates of restorative justice are unaware of the tandem growth of a 
postmodern jurisprudence. The new tends to seek out the new and there is no basis upon which 
to suppose a restorationist ignorance of postmodernism. Certainly, it is unthinkable that the 
architects of a self-consciously new way of doing justice should be oblivious to the advent and 
advance of a self-consciously new way of comprehending the world, especially if this new way 
of comprehending the world has already infiltrated the critique of juridical relations. It may 
therefore be presumed that restorationists have not sought to harness the insights of legal 
postmodernism to their cause because they have chosen not to do so. It would appear that they 
consider an avowedly postmodern justification of restorative justice neither desirable nor 
necessary. The rationale for such a choice is difficult to discern. As will be argued below, 
restorative justice is indeed postmodern in many of its essential tenets. The explanation that 
comes to mind readily is that, in the change-resistant world of law, restorationists sought to 
avoid association with the excesses ofpostmodernism. Hunt (op cit) has postulated a 'big fear' 
in legal circles of postmodern relativism and nihilism. Perhaps restorative justice shares this 
fear. 
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postmodern flavour about them. And the language of postmodernism has begun to 
infiltrate the restorative justice lexicon.6 
It is the argument of this chapter that the concordance between the two is 
neither episodic nor accidental. It is genetic. It is submitted that restorative justice is 
one of the many progeny of post modernism. If, as Heartney puts it, postmodernism is 
modernism's unruly child,7 then restorative justice is postmodernism' s introverted 
child who is embarrassed by its parent's unruliness. Certainly, a postmodern 
jurisprudent would be hard-pressed to construct a postmodern criminal justice that is 
not also fundamentally restorationist in character. In other words, if there is a 
postmodern criminal justice, it is restorative justice. The rest of this chapter is thus 
devoted to a critical explanation and exploration of restorative justice as a 
postmodern presence in the criminal justice system. 
6.2 Tbe Ambit of tbe Investigation 
Postmodernism is notoriously resistant to definition,8 as befits a worldview 
which celebrates relativism and leads the charge against essentialism and truth-talk. 
The postmodern perspective is a hold-all one, committed to indeterminacy and 
dislocation, and suspicious of the perceived tyrannical propensities of certainty. It 
would appear that, in postmodern terms, the pursuit of definition is an exercise in 
exclusion and, ultimately, oppression. It entails a temptation to acquiesce in the 
6 See, for example, Toews & Zehr (2003: 261-264) who posit that justice is not 'a generalizable 
experience' and argue for 'multiple perspectives on a crime event' and hence for 'multiple 
interpretations of the same event'. 
7 Heartney (2001 : 6). 
8 See Heartney ibid: 'Like the concept of a God who is everywhere and nowhere, 
"postmodernism" is remarkably impervious to definition.' See also Hutcheon (1988: 3) 
413 
follies and dangers of the metanarrative, towards which, as Lyotard so famously 
pronounced, the postmodemist is incredulous.9 To be a postmodemist is to reject 
totalization. And it would be, as one commentator suggests, 'very unpostmodem' to 
attempt to impose order by way of a single defmition. \0 Hence, the eclecticism, 
anarchy, ephemerality and fragmentation which mark the postmodem adherence to a 
plurality of perspectives. Hence, too, the difficulties of approximating the reality of 
postmodemism definitionally. 
No attempt will therefore be made here to produce a conventional definition of 
postmodemism. Suffice it to say that this chapter considers postmodemism to be the 
worldview that corresponds to postmodemity, and that postmodemity is the political 
economy of the historical era constituted by the current conjuncture (which began in 
the early 1970s) of the capitalist mode of production. As a mode of production, 
capitalism is in historic decline. It is in the grip of a structural crisis of capital 
accumulation which goes to the vital issue of its reproduction as a mode of 
production. Postmodemism is the intellectual-cum-cultural mood accompanying the 
contemporary stage of the capitalist crisis. It is the economic crisis expressed in non-
economic terms. It is the generalized superstructural conjugate of the material 
contradictions embedded in the marrow of the capitalist mode of production. 11 
9 Lyotard (1992: 138): 'Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives. ' 
10 Liebenberg (1988: 274). 
11 The relationship between postmodernism and capitalism is crucial to the analysis undertaken in 
this chapter, and will be revisited for critical purposes later. 
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Certain commentators have, sensibly, avoided the problem of definition and 
analysed postmodernism in terms of its prominent principles or themes. For 
example, Sardar has produced six general principles l2 and Liebenberg has identified 
three dominant themes l3 of post modernism, while Feldman has settled upon eight 
themes of postmodern jurisprudence. 14 This chapter will follow their lead. It will 
thus seek to illuminate the relationship between postmodernism and restorative 
justice by way of an analysis of a set of six theses, derived from and structured 
according to the materialist premise outlined in the previous paragraph. 
The discussion which follows makes no attempt to be comprehensive. 
Certainly, it does not purport to be a definitive exposition of the postulates of 
postmodernism. The aim is much more modest, namely, to identify and engage those 
aspects of postmodemism which seem pertinent to the analysis of restorative justice 
as a postmodern way of doing justice. Thus, the precepts of postmodernism which 
are singled out for analysis below are those which appear to be most helpful in tracing 
the intersections between postmodernism and restorative justice. They are not 
presented as any finished description of postmodemism, and even less as any catholic 
elaboration of the constitution of postmodemism.15 In other words, the six theses in 
12 Sardar's (1998: 8-11) six principles ofpostmodernism are: 1. rejection of modernism; 2. denial 
of reality; 3. dominance of the simulacrum; 4. meaninglessness; 5. doubt; 6. embracing variety 
and plurality. 
13 Liebenberg's (op cit 274-275) three dominant themes are: 1. suspicion of meta narratives; 2. 
fictionalization of reality; 3. embracing mass culture. 
14 Feldman's (op cit 162-187) eight themes of po stmodern legal thought are: 1. rejection of 
essentialism and foundationalism; 2. defiance of certainties, inveteracies, edifices and 
boundaries; 3. celebration of paradoxes; 4. decentralization of power; 5. the social construction 
of the subject; 6. self-reflexity; 7. use of irony; 8. political ambivalence. 
15 Such an attempt would, in any event, probably be futile. In 1991 Wicke (cited in Freeman, 
2001: 1254) identified more than 30 varieties ofpostmodernism. That number would have 
increased substantially since. See also Rosenau (I992: 15): 'There are probably as many forms 
of post-modernism as there are post-modernists.' Given this plurality of postmodernisms, it is 
highly unlikely that any single analysis ofpostmodernism could be properly comprehensive. 
question have been chosen, not because they delineate or even approximate the 
structure of postrnodernism, but because they facilitate analytical access to the 
relationship between postmodernism and restorative justice. That is, they offer 
crucial insights into the comprehension of restorative justice as a postmodern 
jurisprudence. 
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The chosen theses were identified by a process of abstraction. As a 
methodological strategy, abstraction necessarily entails a certain simplification, in the 
sense that non-essential matters are sidelined analytically and the focus is upon 
constituent relations. 16 Abstraction is thus a ready target for a charge of omission. 
Such a charge is especially attractive in respect of postmodemism, which has 
acquired a reputation for complexity and contrariness. It may be owned that the 
process of abstraction is a limiting one, which sacrifices at least some of the 
heterogeneity of post modernism. 17 However, such a sacrifice is unavoidable if the 
postmodern impulse of restorative justice is to be laid bare to analysis in historical 
materialist terms. The chosen theses may not capture all the intricacies of 'the 
postmodern condition' as represented and understood by the proponents of 
postmodernism. It is submitted, however, that they do suffice for the task at hand, 
which is to interrogate the relationship between postrnodernism and restorative 
justice. 
16 See Chapter One and Chapter Five above for more detailed consideration of the process of 
abstraction. See also Lash (1990: 3). 
17 Abstraction is a methodologicaJ necessity. In the Marxist canon, it is not a stratagem to render 
the object of analysis an easy theoretical 'mark'. Rather, it is a strategy to facilitate analysis by 
bringing the object into sharp theoreticaJ relief, unencumbered by paitrinesses. 
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It needs to be emphasized also that the discussion below is not an attempt to 
theorize postmodernism in general. 18 There is, in this regard, a crucial difference 
between theorizing postmodernism and theorizing restorative justice as a juridical 
expression of postmodernism. The former would necessitate an account which is 
comprehensive theoretically, regardless of the perspective of the theorist. For the 
latter a narrower focus upon the interrelations between restorative justice and 
postmodernism is sufficient. It bears reiterating that this chapter is concerned with 
the latter. Hence the somewhat circumscribed ambit of the discussion which follows, 
encompassing only those features of postmodemism which contribute to illuminating 
its relation to restorative justice. 
18 The construction of a theory of postmodernism is both beyond the purview of thjs dissertation 
and is not required for the purposes of this chapter. In any event, postmodernism has been 
theorized comprehensively in Marxist terms by analysts who are far more qualified to do so than 
I am. I refer here to the work of such Marxist theorists as Harvey, Jameson, Callinicos and 
Eagleton. Insofar as I engage postmodernism as a general social and cultural form, I do so 
almost entirely on the basis of their insights. As will become apparent later, I consider Harvey's 
to be the most consistent and convincing Marxist theory of postmodernism. 
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6.3 Six Theses on Restorative Justice and Postmodernism 
It is submitted, then, that the following six theses are germane to the 
comprehension of restorative justice as a postmodem critique of the modem 
sensibilities founding the criminal justice system. Each thesis will begin with an 
exposition of the basic postmodem position on the issue in question and then attempt 
to demonstrate that restorative justice shares the essentials of the postmodem 
position. I 9 
6.3.1 Thesis 1: The State 
Postmodemism posits the decline of the nation-state in the face of the 
globalization of capital. The argument is that the postmodem world is a world of 
autonomous subjects, in which there is little room for the strong state of the modem 
era. Edgeworth characterizes the postmodem state as a contracting state. This 
characterization has a dual import. On the one hand, it refers to the retreat of the state 
as a public institution and the diminution of its traditional determining role in 
structuring the lives of its citizens. On the other hand, it signifies the increasing 
19 It is appropriate to note here that postmodemism is discursively hyperbolic. Extravagant 
notions such as hyperreaJity, pastiche, hyperspace and simulacrum are all integral to postmodem 
discourse. And postmodemists present their arguments in similarly exaggerated terms. Thus, 
for example, Best & Kellner (2001: 1-2) describe the postmodem era as one of 'vertiginous 
change', 'surprising novelties', 'turbulent transformations' and the like. See Rosenau (op cit: 5 
& 7), who characterizes the postmodem approach as 'flamboyant' and notes: 'Postmodemists in 
all disciplines reject conventional academic styles of discourse; they prefer audacious and 
provocative forms of delivery, vital and intriguing elements of genre or style and presentation ... 
Such forms of presentation shock, startle and unsettle the complacent social science reader.' It 
is generally not possible to engage postmodemism, in any of its aspects or relations, without 
having recourse to and replicating some of its discursive conventions. If, therefore, parts of the 
presentation below strike the reader as hyperbolic, it is because hyperbole is intrinsic to the 
discourse of postmodemism. 
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privatization of public functions, as the law of contract is more and more relied upon 
in respect of both the provision of (whatever remains of) state services and the 
internal functioning of state departments.2o Essentially, the postmodern state has 
reversed the modern trend to centralization and corporatism. It is a state for which, as 
Edgeworth notes, 'privatization, deregulation and marketization are the preferred 
mechanisms by which governance is secured,.2! 
The welfare state was the pinnacle of the evolution of the modern state. It was 
centralization and regulation epitomized, and, from the postmodern perspective, was 
the left liberal political metanarrative materialized. The postmodern state is defined 
by the neoliberal disavowal of the perceived welfarist errantry of left liberalism. The 
watchwords of neoliberalism are the self-same trilogy identified by Edgeworth as the 
preferred mechanisms ofpostmodern governance.22 In other words, postmodernism 
champions the neoliberal drive towards the attenuation of all the welfare functions of 
the modern state. Postmodernism prefers the invisible hand of the free market to the 
visible hand the centralized state. Ideally, the postmodern state is an absentee state 
or, at least, a minimalist one, divested of many of its traditional functions, which 
become privatized in the hands of capitalist corporations.23 
20 See Edgeworth op cit 53-63. 
21 Ibid 56. 
22 But see MacEwan (1999: 19): 'Markets are always infused with state actions, and the neo-
liberal position is not in reality an advocacy of a weak state; it is an advocacy of a particular 
kind of strong state.' This argument is amplified by MacEwan at 125-139. 
23 Postmodemists tend not to notice that the minimalist state which they extol is often party to the 
commodification of properly public functions, and that such commodification is achieved at the 
cost of increased immiseration of the oppressed and exploited classes. It would appear that for 
them the freedom of the individual which such a state supposedly brings is valuable enough to 
offset the deleterious impact upon the living standards of the masses. Postmodemism is a 
profoundly individualistic worldview. The autonomy of the subject is a centrepiece of the 
postmodem project (in much the same way as it was the centrepiece of the modem project). 
The freedom of the individual which accompanies privatization is crucial. Its impact upon the 
living standards of the masses matters little. 
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The vision of the state held by postmodernism coincides with its rejection of 
the notion of the grand narrative which it considers to be the defining flaw of 
modernism. In this connection, the modem nation-state is perhaps the grandest of all 
narratives. It is a cohesive, centralized and authoritative institution, which is 
uniquely competent to implement and realize its own truth claims. It is omnipotent 
and, for as long as it enjoys a monopoly of force, is impervious to the claims of 
competitors within its national borders. Postmodernism entails the break-up of the 
modem notion of state supremacy. State power becomes fragmented and localized, 
and state authority, like everything else in the postmodern world, becomes negotiable. 
The status of the state, as narrative, is reduced from the grand to the quotidian. In the 
postmodern perspective, most, if not all, traditional state functions can be performed 
as well, if not better, by non-state actors. 
Although it does not admit a postmodern derivation, restorative justice shares 
this vision of a minimalist or absentee state. Indeed, easily the most conspicuous 
property of comprehensive restorative justice is its anti-statism. Its project to replace 
criminal justice with restorative justice is simultaneously a bid to eject the state from 
all matters criminal. In the restorationist quest of a solution to the crime problem, the 
state is considered to be a hindrance which must be removed, lock, stock and barrel. 
Whether they are aware of it or not, or if they are aware, whether they own it or not, 
the proponents of comprehensive restorative justice are, in this regard, all decidedly 
postmodern in their fight for a fully privatized system of criminal justice. The same 
is true, mutatis mutandis, of partial restorative justice. Although its proponents have 
reconciled themselves to the continued supremacy of state criminal justice, they too 
advocate the withdrawal of the state from those areas of the criminal justice system 
into which restorative justice may be admitted. Both versions of restorative justice 
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thus embrace the postmodern argument for a minimalist or absentee state. Both 
believe that non-state actors are capable of solving, in whole or in part, the problem 
of criminality upon which the efforts of state agencies appear hitherto to have made 
little impact. 
The intersection between postmodernism and restorative justice on the question 
of the state is extensive. Essentially, they are at one in their critique of the modem 
state in that both want an end of the state as the decisive authority and the political 
metanarrative. The anti-statism of restorative justice mirrors the postmodem assault 
upon the intrusive character of the modem state. Both the postmodernist and the 
restorationist advocate privatized relations to replace the current state forms. The 
restorationist critique of the state is thus indisputably infused with the ethos of 
postmodernism. 
6.3.2 Thesis 2: History 
Despite a reputation for being ahistorical,24 postmodernists readily trawl the 
past for both inspiration and ammurtition in their battle against the configurations of 
modernism. Historical references bulk large in the postmodern rejection of the 
perceived tyranny of the metanarrative. While such references are most evident in 
postmoderri architecture and art, they form an integral facet of the postmodern project 
in most disciplines?5 Indeed, it has been argued that postmodernism has embraced a 
'return to history' and appreciates the ontological value of historical consciousness?6 
24 See Hutcheon op cit 87. 
25 See Heartney op cit 12 & 20 and Hutcheon ibid 93. 
26 See Hutcheon ibid 91-94. 
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Postmodern historicism is concerned primarily with excavating premodern 
social artefacts and organizational forms which may be enlisted in the battle against 
the supposedly totalizing machinations ofmodernism.27 Postmodernists, following 
Lyotard, generally comprehend the premodern epoch in narrative terms, as opposed to 
the dreaded metanarrative?8 The narrative model of knowledge accepts no fixed 
origin which structures the narrative, and refuses to grant the narrator autonomy from 
the narrative. It is a model which presumes narrator heteronomy and which values 
epistemological contingency.29 
The postmodern commitment to the narrative tradition translates into a 
fascination with tribalism and localism as historical constructs. It is, more or less, 
already a postmodern conventional wisdom to quote the narrative devices of tribal 
societies which survive on the fringes of the contemporary capitalist world in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. These societies are prehistoric in organization and 
technics, and are supposedly free of the metanarratives of the modern epoch.3o This 
is why, for example, arguments for a postmodern re-organization of society invariably 
rely heavily on notions of independent crafts, cottage industries, parochial economies 
27 Of course, the postmodern recourse to premodern principles and concepts is a highly selective 
one. Invariably, the contradictions of the premodern world are avoided. The premodern epoch 
is wide. It spans both prehistoric and historic societies and includes at least two historical 
modes of production, namely, the slave and feudal modes. The cultural and other achievements 
of the ancients were based on slave labour. The attractions oflocalism and community harmony 
omit the feudal structures of exploitation and oppression which dominated the day-to-day 
existences of serfs and peasants. 
28 See Edgeworth op cit 234. 
29 See Davies op cit 68-70. 
30 The postmodern faith in a prehistoric world free of the metanarrative is unsubstantiated. It has 
been established in Chapter Two above that custom was the grand narrative of the prehistoric 
world. The savage horde and the barbarian gens were totalizing institutions to the core. 
Contemporary tribal societies survive not only because they are geographically excluded from 
the reach of the capitalist mode of production but also because they are structured by their own 
metanarratives, arguably even more totalizing than those of modernism. 
and yeoman democracy.3! The idea is to exorcise the demons of modernism and 
rejuvenate the perceived idyll of premodern community.32 
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This premodern historical bias of postmodernism is an inevitability, more or 
less. History offers it only the choice between premodernism and modernism. And 
since postmodernism stands contrary to all that is modern, the choice is an illusory 
one. In other words, the postulates of premodemism are the only viable historical 
alternative to those of modernism. If, therefore, postmodernism seeks to validate 
itself historically, it is entirely logical that it should draw upon premodernism as its 
primary source of such validation. What is more, the premodern epoch has the added 
attraction of being more unequivocally past than the modem era. It is no longer a 
component of living memory and is thereby readily available for a postmodern 
makeover, literally. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two above, restorationists share the postmodern 
predilection for premodern historical justifications. Indeed, restorative justice is 
perhaps more strident in its reliance upon history to advance its cause. 33 The 
opposition between restorative justice and retributive justice has become firmly 
established as a restorationist article of faith. Retribution is portrayed as a modem 
response to crime which has no or little foundation in the history of punishment. 
Restorationists believe that the premodern world was, as regards penal sanctions, a 
31 See Kumar (1995: 48). 
32 For a dissenting view, see Davis (1988b: 83-84): 'At least 100,000 apparel homeworkers toil 
within a few miles' radius of the Bonaventure [the Los Angeles hotel which has become a 
postmodem icon] and child labour is again a shocking problem. This restructuring ofthe 
relations of production and the productive process is, to be sure, thoroughly capitalist, but it 
represents not some higher stage in capitalist production, but a return to a sort of primitive 
accumulation with the valorization of capital occurring, in part, through the production of 
absolute surplus value by means of the super-exploitation of the urban proletariat.' 
33 Certainly, restorative justice does not share the postmodem reputation for being ahistorical. 
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world of restorative justice. Thus, Christie relies heavily upon the justice regime of 
premodern African tribes as the basis for his proprietary theory of restorative justice. 
Similarly, the republicanism espoused by Braithwaite & Petit is rooted historically in 
the premodern Roman notions of libertas, civitas and dominium.34 Other 
restorationists such as Zehr and Consedine concur with the view that the premodern 
era was, more or less, a golden era of restoration in the history of criminal justice. 35 
Restorationists identify retribution with large-scale industrial society. In other 
words, they conceive of it as the penal regime of the modem capitalist world. But 
they are adamant that retributive justice is neither the natural nor the necessary 
response to the problem of criminality. For them, restorative justice is not only the 
aboriginal but also the more natural way of doing justice. It was the justice of 
preindustrial, tribal, small-scale societies, and, as such, was the archetypal premodern 
form of justice. And it was successful in keeping the premodern world free of the 
kind of rampant criminality in which every modem society has been languishing for 
decades. As the paradigmatic modem approach to punishment, retribution has 
allegedly brought about its own demise by its signal failure to make any significant 
impact upon the contemporary crisis of criminality. Hence restorationists argue for 
its replacement by restorative justice which, they contend, has become necessary 
because it alone possesses the radical vision required to resolve the crisis. 
If retribution is the exemplar of the modem way of doing justice, then there can 
be little doubt that restorative justice is the prototypical postmodern approach to 
justice. It defines itself in terms of its opposition to retribution and considers itself to 
34 See Chapter Four above. 
35 See, for example, Zehr (1995: 95-157) and Consedine (1999: 10-11 & 80-96). 
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be imbued with the palliative and regenerative powers of its premodern pedigree. 
From the postmodern perspective, retributive justice is a version of the modern 
metanarrative whereas restorative justice is imbued with the spirit of the premodern 
narrative. And the key to overcoming the tyranny of the former is to revert to the 
freedom of the latter. Restorative justice and postrnodernism are evidently coeval in 
their partiality to the supposed emancipatory promise of the premodern narrative.36 
6.3.3 Thesis 3: Alterity 
Derrida's notion of differance has inspired a postrnodern pre-occupation with 
alterity.37 It is a preoccupation which has resulted in the idea of the Other becoming 
generally acknowledged as one which is 'crucial to any discussion of 
postrnodernism' .38 Such a focus upon alterity is concerned to engage and thereby to 
foreground the traditional outgroups which have been marginalized by the modem 
metanarrative. Women, people of colour, homosexuals, indigenous populations, the 
disabled and the aged - these are the Others, ostracized and silenced by modernism, 
with whom postrnodernism has chosen to identify. A large part of the postrnodern 
36 According to Van Ness & Strong (1997: 76-77), narrative is a 'personalized approach' which 
does 'not attempt to generalize or universalize'. Instead, 'the parties talk to one another; they 
tell their stories. In their narrative they describe what happened to them and how that has 
affected them, and how they see the crime and its consequences'. Narrative has gained a strong 
foothold in restorative justice. Prominent restorationists such as Van Ness & Strong (at 3-4), 
Zehr (ibid 15-18), Consedine (ibid 9-10) and Braithwaite (2003a: 54-55) routinely incorporate 
restorative narratives into their work. In other words, they adopt a typically postmodern 
strategy. This is an area in which restorative justice has adopted not only the techniques of 
postmodernism but also its terminology. 
37 See Appignanesi & Garratt (1995: 80): 'Texts are never simply unitary but include resources 
that run counter to their assertions and/or their authors' intentions. Meaning includes identity 
(what it is) and difference (what it isn't) and is therefore continuously being 'deferred'. Derrida 
invented a word for this process, combining difference and deferral- dijJerance.' See also 
Stacy (2001: 88): 'Through dijJerance, Derrida sets out to explore "otherness", and the ways in 
which texts leave out or suppress alternative significations.' 
38 Heartney op cit 51. 
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project is devoted to embracing all that is different and to championing the claims of 
the outsider. It is about giving a voice to the narrative of every outgroup which 
hitherto has been reduced to 'a sideshow in the grand narrative of world history,39 by 
the domination intrinsic in totalization. The postmodern ideal is a world free of the 
modem bias against the Other, in which there is no longer any ontological difference 
between insider and outsider, and in which otherness has ceased to be a concept of 
marginality. 
The postmodem credo is one of perfect equality, in terms of which every 
perspective is accorded absolute validity. There is no room for either hierarchy or 
domination in the postmodern worldview. If the postmodem ideal comes to pass, we 
shall find ourselves, to mangle Marx once more, in a very Eden of the innate equality 
of narratives. Postmodernism is, in this connection, the self-appointed saviour of the 
Other. Ifpostmodemism is an emancipatory movement, then outsider emancipation 
is at the top of its agenda. There is nothing more quintessentially postmodern than 
the endeavour to find and legitimate the outgroup narrative. Therein, for many 
postmodernists, lies the true meaning of their project.40 
Postmodern jurisprudence is, unsurprisingly, heavily populated by schools of 
outsider jurisprudence. The engagement between postmodernism and the law is 
dominated by the jurisprudence of the traditional outgroups identified above.41 Such 
outsider jurisprudents typically present an alternative truth to that installed as modem 
law. They seek to secure for their constituencies the same substantive legal 
39 Ibid 65. 
40 See Harvey (1989: 47) who refers to the seduction of 'the most liberative and therefore the most 
appealing aspect of postmodern thought - its concern with "otherness'''. 
41 See Feldman op cit 158-9. 
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subjectivity which modernism had reserved for able-bodied white heterosexual 
men.42 The jurisprudence of alterity desires to integrate outgroups into the concept of 
legal subjectivity, and thereby to construct a properly universal and neutral subject. It 
is, ultimately, about validating otherness by subverting the axiom of sameness which 
lies at the heart of the modern legal form. 
Restorative justice may be understood as the outsider jurisprudence of the 
criminal justice system. Like postmodernism in general and postmodern 
jurisprudence in particular, it too is dedicated in a fundamental sense to the cause of 
the Other in the criminal justice system. The traditional outsider of criminal justice 
is, of course, the victim. Victimologists preceded restorationists in their advocacy of 
victims' rights and their overall concern with improving the status of the victim in the 
criminal justice system. Restorationists have, however, taken a far more radical 
approach and installed the victim at the epicentre of the restorative process. The 
victim is no longer someone who must be taken into account by those who manage 
the disposition of criminal conflicts. He is no longer someone to or for whom justice 
must be done. In the restorationist programme, the victim is an agent of justice. He 
is transformed from outsider to insider and becomes an indispensable participant in 
the restorative process. His otherness, originally a source of powerlessness, is 
transfigured into a source of power. He becomes a 'stakeholder'. Restorative justice 
vindicates the narrative of victim in the face of the metanarrative of the criminal 
justice system. 
42 See Davies op cit 70-74. 
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The community is the other Other of the criminal justice system. It may be true 
that courts are usually enjoined to take into account the interests of the community 
when sanctioning a criminal offender. However, the determination of the interests of 
the community is seldom, if ever, made by the community itself.43 The community 
has, in this sense, much the same outsider status as the victim in the criminal justice 
system. Restorative justice aims to do for the community essentially what it hopes to 
do for the victim, that is, to bestow upon it the capacities of an agent of justice. 
The traditional insiders of the criminal justice system are the state, the legal 
professionals and the offender. Restorative justice wants no truck with the first two.44 
Of course, the offender remains crucial. However, he is now, along with the victim 
and the community, a member of a triumvirate of equals, through whom justice must 
be done. Restorative justice, in this regard, is about reconciling a trilogy of 
narratives, none of which is authoritative. It is about finding a restorative sanction in 
the engagement of each agent with the truth-claims ofthe others. And it is about 
ensuring that the traditionally muted are given voice. That is a typically postmodern 
way of doingjustice.45 
43 It may be made by a magistrate or judge, who mayor may not be assisted by lay assessors. Or it 
may be made by a jury. Restorationists do not consider either Jay assessors or jurors to be 
adequately representative of the community. 
44 The ejectment of the state and legal professionals does not amount to the creation of new 
Others. It simply means that they are no longer pertinent to the justice process. Those who 
have no interest in the process are not outsiders in the sense used here. 
45 The postmodem language of alterity has become part and parcel of the advocacy literature of 
restorative justice. Restorationists routinely call for those 'other' voices which have been 
silenced by the criminal justice system to be heard. See, for example, Toews & Zehr op cit 262: 
'Maintaining the crime experience in the hand of experts contributes to othering and the creation 
of social distance between offenders, victims and the rest of society. The public is never 
permitted to encounter offenders and victims as multi-dimensional individuals with personal 
stories and unique experiences. Instead, offenders as well as victims become stereotypes of the 
"other". These others are often associated with ethnic groups and social classes different than 
the majority of society.' 
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6.3.4 Thesis 4: Power 
Foucault's position on power has acquired the exalted status of post modern 
conventional wisdom.46 In accordance with its rejection of the grand narrative, 
postmodernism detaches power from its modern association with the state and the 
repressive and ideological state apparatuses. The state monopoly of power is denied, 
and the locus of power is dispersed throughout the social structure, from the apex of 
political power to the relations between individuals in a myriad of everyday power 
relations.47 In contrast to the centralized notion of power comprehended by 
modernism, postmodernism posits a multiplicity of power relations which penetrates 
into every nook and cranny of our lives. Power, from this perspective, is primarily a 
local phenomenon. It becomes what Foucault refers to as a micro-physics ofpower.48 
Given the perceived decline of the nation-state, it is the power configurations of non-
state relations which matter most in the postmodern worldview. 
The Foucauldian perspective also implies that the postmodem self is, at bottom, 
a power construct. We do not precede the micro-physics of power. Instead, we 
emerge as 'the meeting-point in the flows (or discourses) of power' .49 We are a 
creation of the self-same power which operates upon us everyday in a myriad of 
ways. In postmodern terms, the legal subject is 'intrinsically heteronomous, 
constituted by power' .50 The juridical is, in this regard, the core notion of a paradigm 
in which legal subjectivity is the discursive effect of intersecting power plays. 
46 See Feldman (op cit 169-174) who notes that, in their analysis of power, 'postmodem legal 
scholars follow Foucault'. 
47 See Stacy op cit 69: 'For Foucault, power does not merely emanate clearly from identified 
political and legal domains, but can be found amorphously circulating everywhere in society.' 
48 Foucault (1977: 139). 
49 Kumar op cit 131. 
50 Dews (1987: 161). 
429 
Restorationists do not publicly comprehend restorative justice as a site of power 
relations. To be sure, they are consistent critics of the criminal justice system as a 
matrix of centralized power. And, if they advocate comprehensive restorative justice, 
they also advocate the end of state power in all criminal matters. However, they tend 
to be silent on the question of power within the ambit of the restorative process 
itself.51 Of course, such silence cannot conceal completely the fact that restorative 
justice is as deeply implicated in the connivances of power as the criminal justice 
which it maligns so routinely. 
The restorationist rejection of state-sponsored criminal justice suggests that, as 
a structure-in-power, restorative justice is sensible to the postmodem belief in the 
omnipresence of power in the constitution of social relations. To the extent that 
restorative justice is committed to a decentralized justice system, it is committed also 
to the parcellization of adjudicatory and punitive power. Hence its advocacy of a 
restorative process which presumes a localized disposition regime. Criminal justice 
will no longer be state justice, visited upon offenders from on high. It will be 
neighbourhood justice, structured by the restorative process which embraces both 
victim and offender as empowered agents of justice. Each restorative community will 
become a separate locus of power. There will no longer be a metanarrative of power. 
It will be dispersed into a series of narratives in restorative justice locales. 
Whereas restorative justice comprehends centralized juridical power in 
relentlessly negative terms, its appreciation of the localized variant of such power is 
generally positive. 52 At the parochial level, power is considered to be a productive 
51 This is, of course, to be expected. The connotations of power are predominantly negative, and 
no self-image is eager to admit of such negativities. 
52 See Dews op cit 161-162. 
430 
phenomenon which constitutes the victim and the community (and which 
reconstitutes the offender) as agents of the restorative process. It is an unspoken 
presumption of the restorationist catechism that power relations within the restorative 
process will be fundamentally symmetrical, which will discourage or stymie efforts 
by any party to lord it over any other. The restorative process is supposed to be one 
of equalization, not of domination. 53 It would appear that restorationists need to 
believe that, in their case at least, the fragmentation of power entails a qualitative 
transformation in the composition of power, such that, at the neighbourhood level, it 
becomes an instrument of emancipation.54 At this level, then, power is a progressive 
heteronomy in the constitution of the legal subject. 
6.3.5 Thesis 5: Subjectivity 
Postmodernism comprehends the subject as a composite of a mUltiplicity of 
equal identities. It rejects the notion of the essential subject, rigorously defined and 
exactly delineated, which is at the centre of modernism. For the postmodernist, the 
subject is a social construct. Subjectivity is context bound and historically specific. 
There is no overarching pre-given sUbjectivity which delimits our person. We are 
53 Postmodemists have generally not given attention to the structural factors which militate against 
such equalization. It would appear that their primary goal is to transform the criminal justice 
system from a centralized to a decentralized one. And whereas they have problematized 
criminal justice as state justice, they have, naively, presumed that the restorative process will 
render power relations at the local level unproblematic. 
54 It must be noted here that local power is potentially as dangerous as central power. Local power 
also tends to agglomeration in the same way as does central power. Local power is as 
susceptible ofmetanarrative pretensions as central power. Indeed, many local powers of 
disposition tend to come into existence as a version of central power. If such powers are a 
concession from the state, they are easily comprehended within the grand narrative of state 
power. In other words, there is nothlng inherent in the dispersal of the power of disposition to 
regional or neighbourhood structures to suggest the dissipation of the tyranny of the grand 
narrative. 
created and re-created as subjects within the social context in which we find 
ourselves.55 
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Whereas modern subjectivity is centred, postmodernism proceeds from a 
decentred subjectivity. It is always in formation and is never a nucleus of sovereignty 
for the self. Feldman identifies two implications ofpostmodern subject 
decentredness. Firstly, the subject is not an autonomous site of power which is 
capable of directing the course of social development. 56 Secondly, the subject does 
not possess an immutable centre upon which its elements may be elaborated or from 
which they may be extrapolated.57 Postmodern subjectivity is fragmented to the core, 
so to speak. There is, in other words, no postmodern subject who has not been 
constituted from the asymmetries and incommensurables which make up social 
existence. 58 
Postmodern jurisprudents transpose this idea of the social construction of 
subjectivity to their critique of the legal subject. The modern conception of the legal 
subject is singular and indivisible. Only those characteristics which qualify as 
juridical are factored into the constitution of the legal subject. Any other sources of 
subjectivity are summarily discarded. In other words, the law recognizes only the 
legal subject. In the modern view, all non-legal derivations of legal subjectivity are 
55 See Feldman op cit 174-176, Davies op cit 73-74 and Stacy op cit 11-12. 
56 Feldman ibid 174. 
57 Ibid 175. 
58 See Stacy op cit 12. 
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considered trivial. Postmodern legal analysts are highly critical of this exclusionary 
nature of the modern conception of legal subjectivity. 59 Their major aspiration in this 
regard is to have non-legal subjectivities acknowledged and accepted, alongside legal 
subjectivity, as indispensable to the construction of a truly just dispensation. 
Restorative justice is similarly impatient with the proscriptions and preclusions 
embedded in a strictly legal subjectivity. Indeed, the restorative process cannot 
accommodate the modern conception of the legal SUbject. It is a process which seeks 
to comprehend both victim and offender as more than mere legal subjects, as real 
people who lead complicated and unpredictable lives in diverse and contradictory 
conditions. Criminal justice reduces them to 'mere' legal subjects. Restorative 
justice proposes a subjectivity which extends to all those other aspects of their lives 
which, albeit non-juridical, are pertinent to the construction of a properly restorative 
sanction.6o 
The restorationist rejection of the limitations of legal subjectivity emulates its 
rejection of a state presence in the restorative process. Ultimately, legal SUbjectivity 
is a state-guaranteed status. The absence of the state invariably has a disintegrative 
effect upon legal subjectivity, thereby allowing for the activation of non-legal sources 
of subjectivity in the restorative process. The anti-statism of restorative justice is, in 
59 See Beger (2002: 187-188, original emphasis) who describes the modem conception oflegal 
subjectivity in the following tenns: 'The legal arena carmot operate without the logic of identity, 
yet subjects of the law do not exist prior to their negotiation in the legal processes. The power 
oflaw lies in representing something as real, as the only possible representation of the real. So, 
while subjects in court rooms are real people, they can only ever be represented partially in their 
diversities. The legal subject can only present itself as subject in the discursive logic of the 
juridical. Other possible truths and realities exist, but the reality that can be heard by legal 
interpretation is hegemonic and dominant. Thus, the power of the law is its acclamation of one 
reality as the most true reality, the most important reality.' 
60 Recall Christie's (1977: 9) argument for neighbourhood courts in which are considered 'every 
detail regarding what happened - legally relevant or not'. 
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this connection, crucial to exploding the formal bounds of legal subjectivity. Indeed, 
restorative justice cannot stay within the prescribed parameters of legal subjectivity 
without subverting itself and its goals. The legal subject is germane to criminal 
justice. The restorative process needs to take account of 'the diversity of the human 
condition,61 ifit is to be at all distinguishable from the criminal justice process. And 
the restorative sanction needs to be constructed according to realities which lie 
outside the ambit of legal SUbjectivity if it is not to be just another variant of state 
punishment. Again, restorative justice emerges as a decidedly postmodem way of 
doing justice. 
6.3.6 Thesis 6: Consumerism 
Sardar identifies consumerism as 'the quintessential characteristic of the 
postmodem era' .62 In the same vein, Jameson refers to postmodemism as a 'culture 
of consumption ,63 which reproduces the' logic of consumer capitalism' .64 There can 
be little serious discontent about this characterization. If postmodemity can be 
reduced to any single condition, it has to be the complete triumph of consumerism. 
The postmodem subject is constituted, literally, by his 'consumption of mass-
produced objects and images' .65 And the postmodem world is a hyperreality of 
representations of the universal consumer. It is a world in which: 
'the department store [becomes] the cathedral of post modem desire and 
the act of shopping [becomes] the postmodem version of democratic 
choice' .66 
Postmodem society is, in a word, consumer society writ large. 
61 Stacy op cit 12. 
62 Sardar op cit 59-60. 
63 Jameson (1991: 206). 
64 Jameson (1988: 29). 
65 Heartney op cit 42. 
66 Ibid 47. 
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Consumerism is, of course, more than the drive to accumulate and consume 
mass-produced goods and images. It is also, and crucially, the triumphant 
materialization of commodity fetishism. It is the highwater mark of exchange 
relations in an economy structured by generalized commodity production. The 
relations between postmodem subjects are constituted as relations between 
commodities, the accumulation of which becomes, so to speak, a consuming passion. 
In other words, consumerism entails the fetishization of human relations. 
Postmodem subjectivity is consumerist to the extent that it is a commodified 
subjectivity. 
Consumerism, then, is commodification unbridled. It is a culture which is 
distinguished by the commodification of everything, literally.67 Everything is a 
commodity and the commodity is everything. The commodity is the elemental form 
of capitalist property and all commodity exchange relations are thus fundamentally 
proprietary in nature. In other words, the notion of consumerism is an essentially 
proprietary notion. The postmodem culture of consumption is the spirit of capitalist 
property made tangible, if somewhat rudely and gaudily. If rampant consumerism 
exemplifies postmodemism, then rampant commodification exemplifies 
postmodemity. And if the postmodem subject is first and foremost a consumer, then 
the postmodem consumer is first and foremost a proprietor. 
67 The following statement by Marx (1975: 34) is uncannily prescient of this aspect of 
postmodemism: 'Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as 
inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time 
when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but 
never sold; acquired, but never bought - virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc.-
when everything finally passed into commerce. It is the time of general corruption, of universal 
venality, or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time when every thing, moral or 
physical, having become a marketable value, is brought to the market to be assessed at its truest 
value.' 
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Postmodernism, then, is deeply complicitous in the reproduction of the property 
relations of capitalism. However, and in keeping with its quest of diversity and 
multiplicity, postmodernism is not committed to the conventionally private and 
unencumbered form of capitalist property. The postmodern conception of property is 
an expansive and a flexible one. And while it may accept that bourgeois property is 
primarily private, postmodernism does not accept that it has to be exclusively private. 
Indeed, it urges that the private fundament be augmented by a social or public 
dimension, in terms of which private ownership is charged with collective duties and 
responsibilities. In other words, postmodernism seeks to dethrone the individualist 
and absolutist notion of proprietorship which typifies modernism. Such 
proprietorship is disapproved as totalizing and tyrannical. The regime of private 
bourgeois property must therefore be detotalized, by confronting it with the 
sensibilities of public service and community obligation. The postmodern conception 
is thus one which comprehends a decentred proprietary regime structured by an 
engagement between private rights and public claims.68 
Restorative justice may be considered a version of postmodern consumerism. 
This proposition, especially its conjoining of restorative doctrine with an unsavoury 
culture of consumption, will likely offend the bulk of restorationists. However, it is a 
proposition which is properly defensible. To be sure, restorative justice by no means 
displays or condones the excesses of wanton consumerism. But it is as deeply 
inculpated as such consumerism in the process of accelerated and generalized 
commodification which characterizes the postmodern epoch. In other words, the 
difference between restorative justice and postmodern consumerism is a quantitative 
one, based on the extent to which the one is restrained and the other not. It is 
68 See Feldman op cit 167. 
submitted that they are qualitatively akin in that they both embrace a foundational 
proprietary axiom. Both espouse property as their organizing principle. 
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The proprietary nature of consumerism is obvious and incontrovertible. It has 
been argued in detail in previous chapters, especially Chapter Five, that restorative 
justice is a fundamentally proprietary concept. In this connection it will be recalled 
that Christie, who is the acknowledged doyen of restorative justice theory, expressly 
conceives of crimes as forms of property. In terms of the Christie thesis, every crime 
is the property of the offender and the victim, and every criminal conflict is resolved, 
literally, in consumption by its owners. It will be recalled further that the idea of 
dominion developed by Braithwaite & Pettit may also be comprehended as a form of 
property. For them, too, restorative justice, as a response to the crisis of criminality, 
proceeds from the premise that human relations are proprietary, at base. It is true that 
restorative justice may share none of the extravagances usually associated with 
consumerism.69 But insofar as consumerism recasts human relations in proprietary 
terms, restorative justice is resolutely consumerist. 
The conception of property adhered to by restorative justice cements its affinity 
with postmodemism. It has been shown in Chapter Four above that neither Christie 
nor Braithwaite & Pettit comprehend capitalist property as necessarily private. Their 
theories of restorative justice are constructed around a form of property that is best 
classified as common. This is a form of capitalist property which departs from the 
traditionally private form, in the extent that non-owners enjoy access to it and possess 
69 The extravagances of restorative justice lie elsewhere, in the promises embedded in what Daly 
(2002: 70) refers to as 'the exceptional or "nirvana" story of repair and goodwill'. 
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certain rights in it. For Christie, it is the criminal conflict itself which is common 
property. For Braithwaite & Pettit it is dominion.7o The restorationist position on 
property thus replicates the postmodern position in its willingness to decentre 
bourgeois property and theorize it in terms other than the traditionally private. Both 
positions foreground a form of property which usually exists only in the penumbra of 
the dominant form. And while such an approach may leave the dominant form intact, 
it does undermine the dominance hitherto enjoyed by modem attempts to resolve the 
crisis of criminality.71 
It is submitted that, en bloc, the six theses discussed above support the 
conclusion that restorative justice is the paradigmatic form of postmodern criminal 
justice. The extent to which restorative justice replicates the postulates of 
postmodernism in these six spheres is far-reaching enough to sustain such a 
conclusion. Certainly, from the postmodern perspective, there is nothing 
objectionable about designating restorative justice the exemplar of postmodern 
criminal justice. Thus, for example, Edgeworth identifies the growth of restorative 
justice strategies as a manifestation, in the criminal sphere, of the advance oflegal 
postmodernization.72 He refers to restorative justice as a new paradigm of justice 
which, in true postmodern fashion, advocates both the elimination (or, at least, severe 
reduction) of state involvement in criminal justice, as well as the ample expansion of 
the sources of legal subjectivity to include non-legal considerations.73 All in all, 
postmodernism is not at all reluctant to acknowledge parenthood of restorative 
justice. 
70 It would appear that restorationists have opted for an atypical conception of capitalist property 
because they realize that the crisis of criminality can never be resolved within the parameters of 
a private capitalist proprietary regime. 
71 Indeed, the modem conception must take a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility for 
precipitating the crisis. 
72 See Edgeworth op cit 155. 
73 Ibid 170. 
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It appears, however, that the feeling is not yet mutual. The advocates of 
restorative justice have hitherto not engaged the notion that they have fabricated a 
postmodern phenomenon. Certainly, it is most unlikely that theorists such as Christie 
and Braithwaite & Pettit made any conscious effort to incorporate postmodern 
premises into their work, even less to produce a postmodern theory of restorative 
justice. Indeed, Christie's view of crime as property falls more easily into the ambit 
of Reich's new property ofwelfarist modernism (a fa MacPherson)74 than it does into 
postmodernism. This may well mean that restorative justice does not enjoy an 
impeccably postmodern genealogy. However, it does not diminish the discernibly 
postmodern character of restorative justice. All that it means is that postmodernism 
has pillaged the domain of modernism and arrogated to itself, in whole or in part, the 
expansive concept of property which had emerged in the welfare era. At this 
juncture, postmodernism may not inform the self-image of restorative justice. But 
there exists an undeniable and objective intersection from which it is properly 
reasonable to infer that restorative justice is indeed a species of postmodernism. 
6.4 Critique of Restorative Justice as Postmodern Justice 
It remains to present a critical appreciation of restorative justice as the 
representative postmodern response to the contemporary crisis of criminality. The 
critique which follows will, of course, adhere to the Marxist method which informs 
this dissertation.75 It needs to be noted, however, that it is not intended to be a 
74 Ibid 150. 
75 Postmodemism has a strong anti-Marxist strand, derived from its classification of Marxism as a 
metanarrative. Montag (1988: 96) responds to this charge in the following terms: 'Theory exists 
everywhere in a practical state. Marxism, whatever the conceptualizations it has offered of its 
own practice, has never functioned as a metanarrative. In its practical existence, it speaks of 
nothing other than a struggle for which there is no outside and which is never structured 
according to the order of a logic or a law. Political practice acts within a conjuncture in order to 
act upon it, caught or "entangled" (Lenin) in the very relationship offorces it attempts to 
modify.' 
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Marxist dissection of the six theses explicated above. That would be an exercise in 
theoretical idleness and would shed no analytical light upon either restorative justice 
or postmodemism, let alone upon their interrelation. Instead, the general idea is to 
deploy the resources of historical and dialectical materialism in an effort to illuminate 
the relationship between restorative justice and the postmodem analytic from a 
Marxist perspective. And the specific aim is to show that the designation of 
restorative justice as postmodem does not detract in any way from the applicability of 
Pashukanis's general theory of law to its analysis. 
Rosenau has remarked that 'detached efforts to evaluate post-modem modes of 
thought are quintessentially "no win" ventures' .76 Given the fundamental open-
endedness, indeterminacy and contradictoriness ofpostmodemism,77 its proponents 
will always be able to point to deficiencies in attempts to assess it. The problem is, of 
course, exacerbated in respect of partisan efforts at evaluation, such as that 
undertaken here. Postmodemists and their sympathizers will no doubt decry a 
Marxist assessment as one-sided or incomplete or simplistic. Such a charge is 
inevitable, more or less, since any attempt to 'represent the unrepresentable' is, of 
course, inherently impugnable.78 The 'unrepresentability' of postmodemism thus 
problematizes its critique. Abbinnett has pushed the point to its logical conclusion by 
denying the possibility of making a fair evaluation of post modernism from within the 
parameters of either Marxism or liberal democracy. For him, any valid assessment 
must 'read postmodemist theory in its own terms' .79 That is, the critique of 
postmodemism ought to be made through the lens of postmodemism. 
76 Rosenau (op cit: ix). 
77 See Hutcheon op cit 3 and Rosenau ibid 3. 
78 Rosenau ibid ix. 
79 Abbinnett (2003: 11). 
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Such a position is theoretically untenable, and not only from a Marxist 
perspective. No school of thought can seriously require its critics to adopt its 
perspective as their vehicle of critique. Even those critics who accept the notion of 
postmodernity have no theoretical obligation to accept the tenets ofpostmodernism.80 
The point is that postmodemism cannot expect its opponents to deprive themselves of 
critical resources which lie beyond its theoretical ambit. Postmodernism deploys its 
own theoretical propositions in its assault upon modernism, Marxism and other such 
'metanarratives'. There is no good reason why its critics should not do the same. 
Indeed, there appears to be good reason why they should.81 The postmodern 
dedication to diversity and uniqueness discourages, even repudiates, systematic or 
synthetic critique. Yet, such critique is the only way to make sense of the postmodern 
penchant for idiosyncrasy. What is more, the 'cut-and-paste character of post-
modernism,82 requires that its critique proceed according to the methodological 
precepts ofmodernism.83 The 'unruly child' of modernism needs a modern 
disciplinary yardstick. 
80 See May (1996: 212-213), who points out that both Harvey and Jameson accept the existence of 
postmodernity while rejecting postmodern social theory and maintaining a commitment to 
Marxist social theory. 
81 See Rosenau op cit: 18: 'No effort is made [in this work] to adhere to post-modem guidelines 
for enquiry. On the contrary, it is likely that these will be violated, though not through 
disrespect or malice. Rather, any violation can be construed as an inevitable consequence of 
seeking to cut through the intentional stylistic ambiguity, some would say obscurantism, that 
characterizes post-modem writing and to communicate to an audience broader than the post-
modem community itself.' 
82 Ibid 14. 
83 See Rosenau ibid 19-20: 'But here we really have no other option but to transgress by the very 
act of inquiry. This project necessarily requires a modem emphasis on synthesis and unity, 
rather than the post-modem preference for preserving difference and complexity. If those 
outside its inner circle are to achieve an understanding of post-modernism, then comparisons 
with modem views seem essential; this goal urges us on to generalization and simplification. To 
consider everything a unique occurrence leaves one unable to go beyond description ... Within 
a post-modem world truth is absent, and this renders evaluation and judgment relatively 
meaningless. In the absence of any alternative criteria for evaluation, what option remains 
except to measure post-modernism with a modem gauge ... And is this really so unfair, given 
that many post-modernists do much the same thing when they employ a post-modem perspective 
to judge modem social science?' 
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6.4.1 Marxism and Postmodernism 
The modern criterion of critique which informs this dissertation is Marxism. It 
is appropriate, therefore, to set down a brief statement of the Marxist critique of 
postmodemism in general. 84 This critique is advanced and comprehensive. 
Jameson's categorization of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism 
remains, for the most part, impressively unimpeachable.85 Harvey's analysis of 
postmodernity as an epoch demarcated by a new regime of flexible accumulation 
arising out of the general crisis of overaccumulation besetting capitalism is both 
thorough and entirely convincing.86 Callinicos's spirited argument for a fundamental 
continuity between modernism and postmodernism and his frontal assault upon the 
validity and viability of the postmodem project remain admirably potent and largely 
unscathed.8? Eagleton's subtle analysis of the deeply commodified character of 
postmodernism has stood intact for almost two decades.88 And Sardar's expose of 
postmodernism as a western imperialist 'consumption' of the vitalities and traditions 
of the non-western Other, albeit not classically Marxist, is damning enough to shake 
the faith of all except blind devotees.89 
The general features the Marxist critique of the perceived newness of the 
postmodern epoch in both its structural and superstructural aspects have been 
established. The focus of such a critique has to be less upon what is new about the 
84 Although postmodernism in general is not my focus, such a statement is a desirable 
prolegomenon to my attempt to develop a Marxist critique of restorative justice as postmodem 
justice. 
85 See Jameson (1991: 1-54). 
86 See Harvey op cit 121-197. See also Lash (op cit: 37-38) and Urry (1988: 30-33) who link the 
emergence of a new regime of accumulation to the shift from organized to disorganized 
capitalism. 
87 See Callinicos (1989: 121-171). 
88 See Eagleton (1986: 131-148). 
89 See Sardar op cit 44-84 & 272-291. 
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'new times' than upon its elements of continuity with 'modern times'. This focus is 
not an attempt to avoid grappling with the newness of postmodernism. Rather, it is a 
choice which is intended to throw light upon the political economy of this newness. 
The analysis of postmodernism needs to be anchored in the historical and material 
context of its evolution. In this regard, the paramount feature of postmodernism is 
that it is a capitalist phenomenon. It is the superstructural expression of the 
contemporary conjuncture of capitalism. Thus, whereas the identification and 
demarcation of postmodernism must of necessity proceed from its newness, the 
critique of postmodernism must commence with the capitalist constants which 
underlie its newness. 
Although the Marxist critique of post modernism is by no means unified,9o a 
number of commonalities stand out above any internecine disputes. For the purposes 
of this chapter, those commonalities matter most which have the strongest bearing 
upon the relationship between postmodernism and restorative justice. In this regard, 
there appears to be general agreement within Marxism upon at least the following trio 
of characteristics of postmodernism and postmodernity: 
• Postmodernism is a thoroughly bourgeois phenomenon. It is a superstructural 
expression of the contemporary epoch of capitalism, which is one marked by 
explosive material contradictions. Postmodernism is thus the intellectual product of 
the structural economic crisis which is ravaging the heartland of the capitalist mode 
of production. It is simultaneously the intellectual source of the bourgeois endeavour 
to stay the threat of total collapse.9\ Therefore, and despite its apparently historic 
90 See, for example, the attack upon Jameson (1988) by Davis (op cit) and Montag (op cit) . 
91 Following Harvey (op cit), the crisis is best comprehended as one of overaccumulation, 
requiring a flexible regime of accumulation to counteract the tendency ofthe rate of profit to 
fall. 
newness, there is no reason to analyse postmodernism as anything other than a 
superstructural effectivity of capitalism. 
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• There is no fundamental difference between modernity and postmodernity 
insofar as they are comprehended as eras of the capitalist mode of production. 
Postmodernism may represent an intellectual sea-change from modernism. But 
postmodernity is not as fundamentally different from modernity as to qualify as some 
sort of postcapitalist epoch. Postmodernity is, quite simply, the contemporary 
conjuncture of capitalism. And the essentials of the capitalist constitution remain 
unreconstructed. That is, capitalist social relations of production are still defined by 
the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat; labour-power remains the only true 
source of surplus value; the anarchy which marks all departments of capitalist 
production continues unabated; the bourgeois worldview remains fundamentally 
juridical; and the capitalist property regime continues to be defined in individualist 
terms. This catalogue of constants is by no means complete. But it is comprehensive 
enough to convince that there is no basis upon which to comprehend postmodernity 
as anything other than an epoch - the current one - in the life and death of the 
capitalist mode of production. And while postmodernity is arguably the last epoch of 
the capitalist mode it is by no means the first of a postcapitalist mode. 
• As an economy of generalized commodity production, capitalism has an 
inherent tendency to commodify social relations. The history of the capitalist mode 
of production is, in this connection, the history of the process of commodification. 
Postmodernism has elevated commodification to heights unheard of in the evolution 
of capitalism. 'Postmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodification as a 
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process.'92 And postmodernity is the unmitigated triumph of the commodity. It is the 
stage of capitalism in which 'social reality is pervasively commodified' .93 It is the 
era which is delineated by 'the systematic commodification of everyday life' .94 The 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie materializes as the dictatorship of the commodity. 
6.4.2 Commodification and the Principle of Equivalence 
The last of the trio of items canvassed above, that is, the concept of 
commodification, holds the key to the Marxist interrogation of restorative justice as a 
postmodern justice. The march of the commodity is not merely about the colonial-
type conquest of areas of social existence hitherto unsullied by grubbing 
acquisitiveness. It is also and, arguably, more importantly about equalization. 
Commodification in the postmodern world is, firstly, the assertion of the principle of 
equivalence which governs the market in commodities and, secondly, the extension 
of this principle into areas oflife which traditionally have had no relation to the 
market.95 Essentially, the postmodern acceleration of commodification is an exercise 
in the universalization of the principle of equivalence which defines the capitalist 
92 Jameson op cit x. 
93 Eagleton op cit 133. 
94 Callinicos op cit lSI. 
95 The commodity is at the epicentre of life in the capitalist system. The commodity fonn 
concentrates in itself all the constitutive elements of capitalism as a mode of production. It 
stipulates equivalence as the governing principle of capitalist social relations of production. 
The legal fonn which accompanies the commodity fonn is nothing other than the equality 
postulate given the imprimatur of the capitalist state. The legal subject is the postulate made 
flesh. He exists first and foremost as a commodity owner. And as such, he has no superiors or 
subordinates, only equals. In the epoch of competitive capitalism, it was in the market in 
commodities that the principle of equivalence mattered most. The development of the free 
market depended upon all-round respect for and acquiescence in the principle. The epoch of 
late capitalism has seen the steady extension ofthe principle of equivalence into more and more 
of the non-economic facets of the social relations of production. In other words, there has been 
an increasing intrusion of the spirit of the commodity into more and more areas ofhurnan 
relations. 
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exchange relation. It is the amplification ofthe principle from its origins in 
commodity exchange to the exchanges of everyday life.96 Postmodernity is, in a 
word, the commodification of everything. It is the high-water mark of the 
fetishization of the social relations of production. The absolute dominance of the 
commodity has transformed existence itself into a hyperreality of infinite simulacra.97 
It is tempting to take the accelerated commodification of the postmodern era as 
an index of the vitality of capitalism. That would be a mistake. By the time it 
entered its monopoly stage, capitalism was no longer a developing mode of 
production, and it has been degenerating ever since. Modernism was a response to 
this historic decline of capitalism. Postmodernism, too, is an expression of crisis, not 
of vitality. Thus Davis observes that: 
'the crucial point about contemporary capitalist structures of 
accumulation [is] that they are symptoms of global crisis, not signs of 
the triumph of capitalism's irresistible drive to expand. ,98 
96 See McVeigb (2002: 279): 'Much of the work ofpostmodern theory in United States of 
America has disputed modern jurisprudence in the field of epistemology. It has been concerned 
to work towards ajurisprudence that recognises, and respects, equality in difference.' 
97 This transformation assumed a phantasmagorical aspect in Baudrillard's bizarre pre-war 
pronouncement that the Gulf War would not take place and his even more bizarre post-war 
declaration that the Gulf War had not taken place. See Norris (1992: 15) who avers that 
postmodernism has rendered truth obsolete, 'in so far as we have lost all sense of difference-
the ontological or epistemological difference - between truth and the various true-seeming 
images, analogues and fantasy-substitutes which currently claim the title. So the Gulf War 
figures as one more example in Baudrillard's extensive and varied catalogue ofpostmodern 
"hyperreality". It is a conflict waged - for all that we can know - entirely at this level of 
strategic simulation, a mode of vicarious spectator-involvement that extends all the way from 
fictive war-games to saturation coverage of the "real-world" event, and which thus leaves us 
perfectly incapable of distinguishing the one from the other.' 
98 Davis op cit 83. 
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The postmodern intensification of commodification is part and parcel of the attempt 
to resolve the current capitalist crisis of overaccumulation99 by restructuring the 
regime of accumulation along more flexible lines. loo Flexibility requires a more 
expansive domain of accumulation opportunities. Hence the intrusion of the 
commodity form into areas oflife not traditionally associated with the ethos of the 
market. Accelerated commodification is thus a symptom of weakness, not of 
strength. It is a sign that capitalism can no longer countenance significant spheres of 
social relations outside the market in commodities. The contemporary imperatives of 
its reproduction as a mode of production demand that human existence be 
commodified as far and as fully as possible. Everything must become a potential 
source of capital accumulation. Flexible accumulation means absolute obeisance to 
that basic law of the commodity, the principle of equivalence. 
This is the context in which postmodernism becomes a celebration of equality. 
It is equalization untrammelled. Thus, the fabled postmodern incredulity towards 
metanarratives is really an incredulity towards the inequality inscribed in such 
metanarratives. The premodern narratives towards which postmodernism is 
especially partial are comprehended as perfect equals of one another and are 
understood to display none of the despotic propensities of the metanarrative. There is 
99 See Harvey (op cit 180-181) who defines overaccumulation as 'a condition in which idle capital 
and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no apparent way to bring these idle 
resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks'. He continues: 'A generalized condition 
of overaccumulation would be indicated by idle productive capacity, a glut of commodities and 
an excess of inventories, surplus money capital (perhaps held as hoards), and high 
unemployment. ' 
100 According to Harvey (ibid: 147), flexible accumulation 'is marked by a direct confrontation 
with the rigidities of Ford ism. It rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour 
markets, products and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely 
new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above 
all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational innovation.' 
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no grand narrative; there is only an infinite series of equally valid narratives. In other 
words, the repudiation of the metanarrative is simultaneously an assertion of the 
principle of equivalence. 
Much the same can be said about the process of de-differentiation which Lash 
has identified as a postmodern marker. lol De-differentiation collapses the 
distinctions, erected by modernism, between the spheres of existence. In particular, 
the social is no longer clearly differentiated from the cultural, while the cultural 
assumes the characteristics of the economic. Edgeworth sums up the process 
cogently: 
'There is a fusion of social institutions and elements, previously 
differentiated, into quite novel combinations: institutions formerly 
characterized by ideologies and practices at odds with strictly economic 
criteria, begin to operate in ways analogous to the market. ,102 
Since the market is defined in terms of commodity exchange, the process of de-
differentiation becomes a kind of panegyric to the principle of equivalence. De-
differentiation means, in the end, that there is no sphere of existence which is beyond 
the reach of the commodity and its basic laws. 
Postmodemism's devotion to equality is evidenced also in its approach to 
history. It is an approach which privileges no historical event or epoch over any 
other. The historical record becomes 'an endless reserve of equal events' .103 And 
history ends because every aspect of the past is as important as every other aspect. 
Sardar captures the postmodem historical canon perfectly: 
101 See Lash op cit 11-15. See also Murphy (1991: 124): 'The attitude of enlightenment 
modernism, as opposed to postmodernism, was to say: one sphere, one value. The attitude of 
postmodernism is to say: the different spheres and rival conceptions of justice must be 
accommodated to each other. ' 
102 Edgeworth op cit 53. 
103 Taylor cited in Harvey op cit 85. 
'Postmodernism has a particular take on the end of history: it is truly the 
end of history as we have known it because it envelops all historical 
events in meaninglessness. Significance can only be an act of 
interpretation - postmodernism recognizes only mUltiple competing 
interpretations. How can one subject them all to truth or reality tests? 
The grand school of history sought objective verification, but 
postmodernism suggests a new possibility - that all interpretations are in 
their way cogent and valid. The end of history is not just Fukuyama's 
simplistic, totalitarian terminus, the consummation of modernist 
historical understanding. The postmodern end of history is the 
conversion of all temporal sequence into simultaneity, the coexistence 
of all possibilities as some grand kaleidoscope with no pattern more 
persuasive, dominant or significant than any other.' 104 
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Postmodernism has no use of historical research which is not constrained by the 
equality postulate. And it has no interest in historical investigations which rely upon 
an evolutionary framework. It is prepared to 'make gestures towards historical 
legitimacy by extensive and often eclectic quotation of past styles'. \05 But the lessons 
of history must always be subordinate to the dictates of the principle of equivalence. 
Postmodernism, then, is endowed with an unqualified commitment to equality 
in all things. It is a commitment which is embedded in constitutive notions such as 
polycentrism, multi-perspectivism, antitotalization and the like, which are all versions 
of the hegemonic principle of equivalence. In the postmodern world nothing is 
absolute except absolute relativism. Nothing is certain except that every point of 
view enjoys the same claim to validity as any other point of view. No discursive 
formation is prior to any other and no person is more valuable than any other. The 
104 Sardar op cit 85-86. See also Murphy op cit 118: 'For the postmodemist, history remains, but 
there is no march of reason in history. Measured against the benchmark of the Enlightenment's 
world history, that is, History with a capital H, postmodemism is also posthistory.' Murphy 
goes on to describe the postmodem approach to history as a 'pop historicism' of 'quotations, 
eclecticism and pastiche'. 
105 Harvey op cit 85. 
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postmodem subject is constituted in terms of the principle of equivalence. He lives 
and dies by the law of the commodity. 
Postmodemism's immersion in the culture of commodification has to mean that 
it subscribes to a worldview that is fundamentally juridical. 106 The equality postulate 
which defines the postmodem moment also structures the juridical moment. The 
common factor is the commodity. In the evolution of exchange, to commodify is to 
juridify. This is why, despite its nihilistic excesses and random subversions, 
postmodemism is unequivocally wedded to the bourgeois, that is, the juridical 
worldview. Indeed, it is militant in its purveyance of this patently sectional 
worldview as the generalized worldview of all social classes; and it is radical in its 
advocacy of the principle of equivalence as the determining principle of all human 
interactions. This is why the postmodem era has witnessed the exponential 
intensification of the process of commodification. It is also why the equality 
postulate now reaches into areas which would have been off limits during the modem 
era. 
6.4.3 Pashukanis, Postmodernism and Restorative Justice 
There is no substantive difference between modem and postmodem legal 
subjectivity. Both are structured by the self-same principle of equivalence which is at 
the heart of the commodity economy. Both are brought into existence as a direct 
consequence of the process of commodity exchange. It is correct that postmodemism 
106 See McVeigh op cit 274: 'The account presented here has emphasised that law has changed the 
means and objects of its regulation. Regulation through law no longer proceeds according to a 
principle of limited unity marked by distinctions between public and private spheres, State and 
civil society and so forth. Instead regulation proceeds according to ajuridical saturation of 
social reality.' 
450 
seeks to include non-legal sources in the constitution of the legal subject. But this 
kind of amplification does not entail any diminution in the commodified character of 
the legal subject. It implies no more than that postmodem jurisprudence is prepared 
to consider interpretations of reality which fall without the orthodox limits of the 
legal. Postmodemism is keen to widen the ambit of the juridical. However, there is 
no evidence that it is willing to abandon the juridical as the defining element of legal 
subjectivity. It is one thing to incorporate features of the traditionally non-juridical 
into the composition of the juridical. It is another thing altogether to replace the 
juridical with the non-juridical. The radicality of postmodemism does not 
contemplate the latter. 
Restorative justice is the criminal justice of postmodemity. It is the 
postmodem moment in the evolution of the criminal justice system. Like 
postmodemism, restorative justice is structured by the core juridical principle of 
equivalence. The owner of the criminal conflict which is consumed in the restorative 
process is the Pashukanian analogue of the postmodem consumer. Ifpostmodemism 
demarcates the general configuration of the superstructure of late capitalism, then 
restorative justice is postmodemism expressed in legal superstructural terms. As a 
facet of the legal superstructure, restorative justice is, by definition, more directly 
associated than postmodernism with the legal subjectivity which underpins the 
market in commodities. But postmodemism is as deeply implicated in the exchange 
relation. Indeed, postmodernism is arguably more zealous than restorative justice 
about the principle of equivalence, to the extent that it presses the principle into areas 
and prods it along pathways which are quite foreign to the traditional ambit of legal 
relations. 
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This adventurous streak in postmodernism derives from its involvement in the 
pursuit of a flexible regime of accumulation. It may well be one reason why 
restorationists tend to eschew overt postmodern affiliations. But the objective affinity 
between postmodernism and restorative justice is incontestable. They have the same 
material and historical origins in the long-term decline of the capitalist mode of 
production. And they both take commodification to new heights in their respective 
fields of influence. Postmodernism commodifies everyday life relentlessly. 
Restorative justice commodifies the criminal conflicts which have become a 
relentless fixture of everyday life. Restorative justice is postmodernism writ small. 
The commodity is the primordial expression of bourgeois property. The 
postmodern subject is a man or woman of property whose very existence is a 
materialization of the organizing principle of the commodity economy. The process 
of commodification is thus essentially about the extension of bourgeois property 
relations into new areas of social life. Postmodernism is the medium of 
commodification in contemporary capitalism. It is, in this connection, a profoundly 
proprietary phenomenon. Despite its avowal of a decentred proprietary regime, 107 
postmodernism is complicit in the defence of property as a bourgeois category. 
Whereas postmodernism may wish to infiltrate alterity into the composition of 
bourgeois property, it accords its existence as a category the status of an irrebuttable 
presumption. In other words, it leaves intact the metanarrative of property. The 
postmodern subversion of all things modern stops short of bourgeois property 
relations. The postmodern project to destabilize and decentre the elements of 
modernism has had no significant impact upon the sanctity of property. In the midst 
107 See Thesis 6 above. 
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of the maelstrom of postmodern destabilization, property survives unscathed as the 
most stable of capitalist categories. 108 What is more, it has suffused postmodernism 
with its own ethos. 
It is this proprietary ethos which is at the heart of the relationship between 
postmodemism and restorative justice. Postmodernity constitutes the historical and 
material milieu of restorative justice. It is a milieu which validates the analysis of 
restorative justice based upon Pashukanis's general theory of law, as developed in 
Chapter Five above. In other words, the postmodern character of restorative justice 
does not vitiate the potency of the Pashukanian critique. If anything, the postmodern 
connection confirms the appropriateness of the methodology contained in the general 
theory. For it is the commodified character ofpostmodernism which structures the 
proprietary character of restorative justice. And the postmodern celebration of the 
equality postulate makes patent the correlation between the legal and commodity 
forms which Pashukanis makes the fulcrum of his general theory. 
There is, in other words, nothing in the argument from postmodernism which 
contradicts the Marxist analysis of restorative justice made possible by Pashukanis's 
general theory of law. This is because postmodemism understands the world in 
juridical terms, as does restorative justice. It embraces the principle of equivalence as 
the organizing axis of social relations, as does restorative justice. And it 
comprehends the legal form in relation to the commodity form, as does restorative 
justice. Indeed, the postmodern character of restorative justice does more to 
108 The postmodern project to destabilize modern private property is destined to fail because it 
remains wedded to a property regime which is individualist to the core. In the capitalist world, 
property is special. It is the institution which founds the reproduction of the social relations of 
production. It is the institution which structures the bourgeois worldview. It cannot be 
decentred. It can only be discarded. It cannot be detotalized. It can only be destroyed. 
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legitimate than to undermine the cogency ofPashukanis's general theory. It has been 
shown in the previous chapter that the general theory is the repository of the resources 
required for the Marxist critique of restorative justice. It is submitted here that the 
general theory also contains all the necessary elements of the Marxist analysis of 
postmodem jurisprudence. And if, as has been argued throughout this chapter, 
restorative justice is the criminal justice of the postmodem era, then the Pashukanian 




There is, by all accounts, something near miraculous about the successful 
restorative encounter. Epiphanies are had. Love and compassion abound. Lives are 
touched. And the participants glimpse the possibility of an exalted form of human 
interaction from which the notion of punishment has been expunged. The experience 
is euphoric, even religious. Restorative justice pledges to take us beyond the punitive 
society. In its stead, we are invited to share in the prospect of the good society, 
governed by mutual respect and acceptance of the inalienable value of every human 
being. The Armageddon.;.to-Arcadia claims and promises of restorative justice are 
momentous. And they are utterly seductive. In an epoch defined by a world-wide 
crisis of criminality, restorative justice constitutes an extremely beguiling credo for 
any person seeking a solution to the crisis outside the paradigm of traditional criminal 
justice. It is a credo which is simultaneously impertinently radical and well-nigh 
irresistible. Hence its large and ever-expanding ranks. I 
The sheer audacity of its project demands that restorative justice be the object 
of deliberate critical scrutiny. Despite its many New Age extravagances, restorative 
justice is not a fad. It has established a weighty presence in the criminological world 
and it has done so in a very short time. It needs to be taken seriously, that is, its 
essential arguments and assertions need to be submitted to resolute criticism. This 
dissertation was conceived as a Marxist contribution to restorative justice criticism. 
It was undertaken in an endeavour to engage restorative justice in its constitutional 
fundamentals and to comprehend it as a legal form engendered by the political 
economy of late capitalism. The singular aim was to probe the material anatomy of 
restorative justice from a Marxist perspective. This aim could be accomplished only 
See Acorn (2004: 1-6) for a discussion of the promises and attractions of restorative justice. 
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by a combination of scepticism towards the hyperbolic pretensions of restorative 
justice and a commitment to uncovering the presuppositions which demarcate it as a 
criminological doctrine. In other words, the goal of the dissertation was to deploy the 
Marxist method of analysis to make manifest the 'secret life' of restorative justice, 
which life is for the most part hidden from view by its public physiognomy. 
The systematic pursuit of this goal yielded a number of instructive critical 
insights into the constitution of restorative justice. Firstly, it demonstrated that the 
restorationist assertion of a historical pedigree that goes all the way back to the 
dispute-handling processes of primitive or prehistoric society is not well grounded.2 
Historical materialist analysis showed that the idea of composition, upon which the 
restorationist position turns, is organically linked to the development of the 
commodity economy and hence of class society. This means that the precedents of 
restorative justice are not to be found in the prehistoric societies of the savage and 
barbarian epochs.3 Instead, its origins lie in historical or civilized society in which 
the commodity form is definitive and in which class is determinative. 
Secondly, using the traditional Marxist technique of class analysis, it was 
established that restorative justice is deeply complicit in the reproduction ofthe class 
relations of capitalism. Epistemologically, restorative justice is class-blind: That is, 
it does not comprehend our society as a class society rent by class conflict; it does not 
2 This is recognized even by a proponent such as Daly (2002: 61-64), who classifies this claim as 
one of the myths of restorative justice. 
3 Primitive society was the aboriginal form of human society. It was classless, acephalous, 
lawless and had a natural economy. Class, commodity, law and state made their appearance on 
the historical stage only during the epoch of the break-up of barbarian society and the rise of 
civilization. 
456 
acknowledge the class basis of the crisis of criminality; and it does not admit of a 
class dimension in restorative encounters or conferences.4 Restorative justice 
considers class only insofar as it presumes the naturalness of the class structure of 
capitalist society. This presumption inculpates restorative justice in the perpetuation 
of that structure. A crucial aspect of that which is restored by way of the restorative 
encounter and sanction is the balance of class forces which has been disrupted by the 
crime. Restorative justice is as much about normalizing class relations as it is about 
repairing criminal harm. Objectively, then, the restorationist project features as an 
aspect of the ideological project of the bourgeoisie to secure its class interests as 
general social interests. 
The third proposition emerging from the Marxist critique pertains to the nature 
of restorative justice as legal form. The essential argument here, derived from 
Pashukanis's general theory of law, is that restorative justice is a juridical expression 
of the commodity form. The commodity is the elemental unit of capitalist political 
economy. It is the exemplification of capitalist property. The theory of restorative 
justice is delineated by the proprietary postulate. Behind the talk of compassion, 
forgiveness, love, mercy, healing and the like is secreted the fundamental idea of the 
legal subject as a commodity owner, and of the criminal episode as a form of 
property. Restorative morality, in all its elevated postures, is rooted in the notion of 
property. As a proprietary concept, restorative justice champions the 
commodification of penality. The process of commodification is about subjecting 
new spheres of social existence to the thrall of the law of value, as embodied in the 
principle of equivalence. Pashukanis showed that this principle, which began as the 
defining principle of the commodity form, is entrenched also as the defining principle 
4 References to class and class struggle in the advocacy literature tend to be contingent and 
peripheral. Despite its inescapable facticity in all but prehistoric societies, social class does not 
feature as an element of the core terrain of restorative justice. 
of the legal fonn. Restorative justice, as legal form, pivots on the principle of 
equivalence. The theory of restorative justice commodifies the criminal episode, 
posits victims and offenders as a universe of commodity owners, and intrudes the 
ethos of the commodity into the heart of criminal justice. 
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Marxism thus teaches us that restorative justice is thoroughly suffused with the 
precepts of popular capitalist culture. It reproduces in juridical terms the law of value 
which demarcates the commodity fonn, to reconstruct all of us as perfectly equal and 
propertied individuals. It endows each of us with a proprietary interest, as 
'stakeholders', in the crisis of criminality. Crime is a fonn of capitalist property 
owned in concert by the offender and the victim. The restorative encounter is a 
negotiation between proprietors to resolve the conflict engendered by the crime. And 
the restorative sanction is a contract designed for this purpose. The theory of 
restorative justice thus makes patent the correspondence between the commodity 
fonn and the legal fonn. Both are capitalist fonns. That is, in their mature aspect, 
both are historically specific to the capitalist mode of production. The commodity 
fonn concentrates in itself all the laws of capitalist production and exchange. The 
legal form is the materialization of the commodity fonn. It is the superstructural 
conduit of the process of commodification. And whereas the process of 
commodification is a feature of all eras of capitalism, it has intensified prodigiously 
in the late capitalist era. No contemporary development in legal relations exemplifies 
the 'commodification of everything' more dramatically than restorative justice. This 
'new way of doing justice' is, in fact, an archetypal capitalist way of doing justice, 
entirely circumscribed within the ideological project of the bourgeoisie. 
Fourthly, the Marxist analytic comprehends restorative justice as a product (and 
hence embodiment) of the structural crisis of overaccumulation which characterizes 
contemporary capitalism. More specifically, it is a postmodern expression of that 
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crisis. Postmodernism is the superstructural semblance of the crisis of late 
capitalism. It entails a radical rejection of the modern metanarrative of capitalist 
culture and is the self-proclaimed advocate of narrative, relativism and 
antitotalization. However, despite its radical conceit, postmodernism is completely 
obeisant to the exigencies of the law of value. Indeed, in its quest of a flexible 
regime of accumulation to resolve the crisis of capitalism, postmodernism has 
intensified the process of commodification exponentially in world-historical terms. It 
has carried the flag of capitalist property triumphantly into almost every virgin 
terrain. Today we live in the kingdom of the commodity. Postmodernism has 
catapulted the principle of equivalence to absolute power. It now governs aspects of 
life which were previously considered to be immune to the cupidity of consumerism. 
Postmodernism has rendered the commodity both ubiquitous and omnipotent. If, as 
this dissertation contends, commodification entails juridification, then 
postmodernism adheres to a decidedly juridical view of the world. That is, it 
subscribes to the bourgeois worldview, in which the proprietary postulate is 
sovereign. 
Restorative justice is the postmodern way of doing justice. It is the dictatorship 
of the commodity juridified. The restorationist project is subsumed perfectly within 
the postmodern project. Nothing in the latter detracts from the Marxist critique of the 
former. If anything, the postmodern connection validates this critique, in that it 
unveils the material conditions of the genesis and evolution of restorative justice. 
Postmodernism was spawned by the crisis of overaccumulation of late capitalism, 
restorative justice by the concomitant crisis of criminality. Both are infused with the 
spirit of the commodity. The Marxist analysis of post modernism confirms 
completely the analysis of restorative justice made in terms ofPashukanis's general 
theory of law. 
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Such, then, are the core components of the Marxist critique of restorative 
justice undertaken in this dissertation. This critique has shown that there exists a 
goodly gap between the self-image of restorative justice and its material constitution. 
As with most phenomena, the form assumed by restorative justice conceals its 
content. The Marxist method facilitated the excavation of this content. It made 
available for critical examination the ontological postulates of restorative justice. It 
laid bare the articulation of the restorative justice with the commodity form. And it 
established restorative justice as a postmodern trope of our late capitalist world. All 
in all, the Marxist method has opened a portal to the 'deep structure' of restorative 
justice. 
The critique of restorative justice has necessarily been mostly negative, 
exposing the disjuncture between its form and content, and establishing its 
concordance with the ideological programme of the bourgeoisie. There is, however, 
an important sense in which restorative justice contains a positive prospectus for the 
crisis of criminality and may be viewed as a progressive development, also from the 
Marxist perspective. This aspect is elaborated below. 
The outstanding feature of restorative justice is its campaign to privatize the 
criminal episode. There is no more prominent attribute of the comprehensive version 
of restorative justice with which this dissertation is primarily concerned. And the 
notion of privatized crime is easily the most radical notion to have been formulated 
as a solution to the contemporary crisis of criminality. Criminal justice is state 
justice par excellence. Restorative justice is the parvenu of privatized justice. But 
unlike the campaigns for informal justice which preceded it, restorative justice 
aspires to dismantle state imperium over the criminal justice system and to reinvent it 
as a privatized system which responds to crime according to the wishes of the 
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affected parties. In other words, restorative justice elevates privatized justice to the 
systemic level. This is its hallmark. Other concerns such as the welfare of the 
victim, the reconstruction of the offender and the peace of the community are all 
accessory to the privatization precept. 
The idea of privatization is, of course, emblematic of the accelerated 
commodification of the late capitalist epoch. In this regard, restorative justice is 
entrenched in the designs of the ruling class to secure the reproduction of its mode of 
production. But the proposal to unseat the state as criminal justice potentate is 
impudently subversive of the bourgeois maxim that criminal justice is public justice. 
Besides its impact upon the victim, a crime is also an assault upon the principle of 
equivalence which is the insignia of capitalist relations of production. By his crime, 
the offender declares a refusal to live by the principle. He repudiates it. This is a 
repudiation which goes to the heart of the legal form itself. Capitalism cannot leave 
the defence of the principle of equivalence and hence of the legal form in private 
hands. That is the responsibility of the state. In the final analysis, violence is the 
only guarantor ofthe principle of equivalence. And in capitalist society, the state is 
the only institution which possesses the capacity to compel acquiescence from the 
criminal subversives. Thus, although it may tolerate (or even encourage) privatized 
spheres, capitalism requires its criminal justice to be public in character. 
In this context, the restorationist assault upon the statist character of criminal 
justice is, therefore, a properly radical initiative. It portends a social arrangement 
which is acephalous and hence not governed by the juridical worldview. Such an 
arrangement cannot be constructed within the parameters of the capitalist mode of 
production. In this regard, restorative justice presages a post-capitalist world, that is, 
a world in which the law of value has lost its purchase and from which the notion of 
the juridical has been expunged. 
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Thus, and despite its thorough imbrication in the capitalist order of things, 
restorative justice, objectively albeit unwittingly, does challenge capitalist hegemony 
by its agitation for a privatized criminal justice. Certainly, the anti-statist posture of 
restorative justice puts it on a collision course with the statist imperative of capitalist 
criminal justice. A vision of criminal justice which centres upon the parties directly 
involved in and affected by the criminal episode interacting face-to-face to resolve 
the conflict according to restorative mores is seditious. The restorative belief that 
justice should be based upon right-relation, that is, 'a lived relationship of mutual 
equality and respect',s is militantly different from the conventional postulates of 
criminal justice. The idea that a crime should not attract punishment is undeniably 
subversive of a criminal justice system for which the penal response is an operational 
axiom. Whereas criminal justice posits justice-as-adjudication, restorative justice 
propounds justice-as-repair.6 These designations express cogently the radical 
dichotomy between the two conceptions of justice. They are negations of each other. 
lustice-as-adjudication is paradigmatic for capitalist social relations of production. 
lustice-as-repair can become paradigmatic only in post-capitalist social conditions. 
There is a widespread belief in restorationist circles that the restorative 
encounter can somehow engender human relations which transcend the limitations of 
the legal form. From the Marxist perspective, that is wishful thinking. The success 
of the restorationist project is contingent upon the existence of determinate material 
conditions favourable to its growth. Absent these conditions, failure is more or less 
inevitable. Of course, the restorative encounter may indeed produce in the 
participants a transformative optimism about the future. However, transformative 
optimism is not the same as material transformation. No amount of intellectual or 
5 Acorn op cit 11. 
6 This distinction is taken from Acorn ibid 11 & 158. 
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emotional commitment to justice-as-repair by the parties to the restorative encounter 
can overcome the material barriers to its achievement presented by the social 
relations of production of capitalism. It may be readily owned that, as a 
superstructural effectivity, restorative justice does have an impact upon the material 
circumstances in which it exists. But such impact can never be transformative, in the 
sense that it dismantles the capitalist mode of production. That requires a social 
revolution which would replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Restorative justice is patently not an agent of proletarian revolution. Yet, it 
does possess a revolutionary impulse in that its aspirations adumbrate a social 
organization which is utterly divergent from the alienated structure of late capitalism. 
Justice-as-repair is attainable only in material conditions which humanize social 
relations, that is, conditions in which human relations are unmediated by the law of 
value. The restorationist project must, willy-nilly, encompass the contemplation of a 
society free of commodity fetishism and, hence, of the commodity form itself. And, 
as Pashukanis teaches, a society which abolishes the commodity form has no use of 
the legal form. It is in this connection that restorative justice may be legitimately 
designated revolutionary. 
However, restorationists are undiscerning of the revolutionary dimension of 
their project. They are enthusiastic in their devotion to the ideals of justice-as-repair. 
They are eager to promote the restorative encounter as a site of the construction of 
right-relation. They envisage a new kind of human being, activated by the loftier 
ethical sensibilities. But they appear unable to comprehend the fact that, objectively, 
their project calls into question the very structure of our society. They seek to 
reconstruct human relations according to criteria which are both foreign to capitalist 
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culture and opposed to the bourgeois power matrix. Yet they seem unable to draw 
the logical conclusion that their success has to mean the demise of the capitalist 
system. Restorationists aspire to replace the criminal justice system without 
replacing the capitalist system. They fully expect a historically decrepit mode of 
production to beget a higher form of justice. They forget Marx's admonition that 
justice can never transcend the material conditions of its gestation. And they appear 
unable to perceive that the material constitution of capitalism stands as an 
impermeable barrier to the success of their project. There is here a debilitating 
naivete in restorationist ranks. They cannot or will not see that the attainment of the 
ideals of restorative justice is not possible within the parameters of the capitalist 
mode of production. They cannot or will not understand that their anti-statism can 
prevail only in conditions where the state has been destroyed or is, in the least, 
withering away. 
Restorative justice is thus in the thrall of an impossible contradiction. On the 
one hand, it is a juridical expression of the social relations of production of the late 
capitalist epoch. In other words, it is deeply implicated in the political economy of 
capitalism. Its fundamental proprietary character locates it squarely within the ambit 
of the bourgeois legal form. On the other hand, it proposes to solve the crisis of 
criminality according to a catechism which may be described as post-capitalist. It 
pursues an anti-statist notion of justice-as-repair which is the diametrical opposite of 
the statist idea of justice-as-adjudication. It embraces the principle of equivalence 
which delineates the law of value while simultaneously advocating a way of doing 
justice which is at odds with all that the law of value represents. It is a champion of 
the process of commodification but seeks a justice dispensation which would explode 
the commodity form. It is acquiescent in the material conditions which produce 
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alienated human relations while aspiring to a notion of justice as non-alienated right-
relation. 
There is something extremely attractive about the notion of justice-as-repair. 
Which of us does not desire and would not welcome a way of doing justice which 
resolves the current crisis of criminality by tapping into our capacity for right-
relation? Every human being who is perturbed by the degradation of human relations 
is ineluctably attracted to a doctrine which would elevate these relations above their 
current quagmire of violence and selfishness. Restorative justice is so seductive to so 
many people precisely because its ideals accord with our abiding hope that life could 
and our urgent conviction that it should be better. We need to believe that we have 
not come to the end of history. We need believe that humanity is not trapped in a 
state of terminal barbarism and that we can find the road to a properly civilized 
existence. Restorative justice proclaims itself to be that road, at least insofar as the 
crisis of criminality is concerned. It promises a new world of justice, in which 
equality and mutual respect are the primary standards, and from which the statist 
trope of punishment has been eliminated. There is an almost irresistible allure about 
such promises. The ideal of justice-as-repair is completely captivating. 
This dissertation is an act of resistance against the magniloquence of the 
restorationist project. It has attempted to demonstrate that the promises of restorative 
justice are false for the most part, because they are for the most part unattainable in 
the conditions of late capitalist society. Restorative justice pledges what it cannot 
provide. For, the entire restorationist project turns on the privatization of criminal 
justice. The success of restorative justice as a system of justice is entirely dependent 
upon crime no longer being deemed a public matter administered by the state. In a 
word, restorative justice requires the expulsion of the state from matters criminal. 
I 
I 
But that is a preposterous requirement within the ambit of capitalism. Justice-as-
repair is an ideal which can be implemented only if the ruling class is willing to 
accede to the privatization of criminal justice or if the state is destroyed as an 
institution of class rule. It is not within the capacity of the capitalist class to 
contemplate the destruction of its criminal justice system. The bourgeoisie cannot 
and will not consent to the dethronement of its state as authoritative dispenser of 
criminal justice. Privatization may well be the way of the postmodem capitalist 
world, but it is a way which has had to take a detour around the criminal justice 
system. The statist nature of this system always has been and remains a capitalist 
injunction. Capitalism, in other words, is wedded to justice-as-adjudication. The 
promise of restorative justice can be achieved, therefore, only in an acephalous 
society. Such a society should have to be, at minimum, a post-capitalist society in 
which the state as an instrument of class rule is in decay. 
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In the postmodem world of late capitalism, restorative justice has the enticing 
unreachability of a mirage. Its promise is always in sight but forever unattainable. It 
will take a radical transformation in the material constitution of society to realize the 
restorationist project in its entirety. The restorative revolution to install justice-as-
repair requires a social revolution to demolish justice-as-adjudication. However, 
such a social revolution will also revolutionize restorative justice itself, in the sense 
that it will undergo fundamental re-definition. Currently, restorative justice is a 
proprietary concept, subsumed under the commodity form and enmeshed in the 
ideological project of bourgeois hegemony. It is a legal form embroiled in the 
postmodem iconoclasms of the late capitalist epoch. The social revolution which 
subverts the conunodity form presages the transcendence of the legal form. Thus, the 
social revolution which dismantles capitalism will also necessarily detach restorative 
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justice from its capitalist associations. It will release the revolutionary potential of 
restorative justice and foreground its humanizing mission. It will actualize the 
restorationist ideal of exalting human relations. The salvation ofthe restorationist 
project lies in the social revolution. 
For as long, then, as the social revolution is postponed, restorative justice will 
be burdened by its existential contradiction of being concurrently reactionary and 
revolutionary. For as long as our society is capitalist, restorative justice will have to 
accommodate itself to the requirements of just ice-as-adjudication. For as long as the 
commodity form persists, restorative justice will be its juridical analogue. This 
means that criminal justice as we know it will continue to be paradigmatic, and that 
restorative justice will have to make do with an interstitial existence. It means that 
criminal justice will remain state justice, and that the idea of privatized justice-as-
repair will have to accept a position of subservience to that of public justice-as-
adjudication. Essentially, it means that restorative justice will have to play the 
proverbial second fiddle to criminal justice. 
The potentialities of restorative justice are awesome, but so are the 
impediments to its success. Whatever progress restorative justice may enjoy in our 
society will thus be in its partial aspect.? Criminal justice and restorative justice are 
reconcilable only insofar as the latter acquiesces in the superiority of the former. The 
capitalist system can tolerate and will accommodate restorative justice only in its 
partial version. That is, the restorationist project will have to accept that its 
7 The discussion by Jantzi (2004) of the role of the state in restorative justice is indicative of a 
restorationist acceptance of this proposition. See also Boyes-Watson (2004: 215-216) who, 
while acknowledging 'the fundamental incompatibility between the state system of doing 
justice and the principles of restorative justice', nevertheless submits that 'our greatest hope for 
achieving restorative justice in modern democratic societies lies in growing state involvement 
in restorative justice' . 
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development will occur under the auspices of the criminal justice system and that its 
operations will be subject to the oversight of the capitalist state. Such is the only 
possible existence for restorative justice in the late capitalist world. Certainly, and 
notwithstanding its obeisance to the ethos of bourgeois property, there is no room 
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